The following notes explain the operation of the Nanson-Baldwin system, as adapted by the Morac-Songhrati-Meads Electoral Commission (MSMEC).

The Nanson-Baldwin system allows voting for fewer candidates than the number of vacancies to be filled, but minimises the effect of "plumping" by providing for the candidates not voted for to share equally the value of the preferences not cast by the voter. Filling in the voting paper can be a complicated or simple matter, as each elector determines.

The system provides as far as practicable for -

a. candidates to be elected on their personal merits;
b. a successful candidate to have gained a preponderance of the weight of preferences of the electorate;
c. an elector to vote for any number of candidates, irrespective of the number of vacancies; and
d. an elector to be able to do any one or more of the following:
i. to express a positive preference between one of the candidates or more, or between all of the candidates;
ii. to express an equal preference between any two or more of the candidates within an overall order of preference; or
iii.to express no order of preference in relation to two or more of the candidates.

Briefly the system is as follows:

A ballot paper has a total "points value" of
N(N - 1)
   2
where N is the number of candidates.

The number of vacancies to be filled is irrelevant; this will be shown later in this section. As an example of the operation of the formula, if there are eight candidates, the "points value" of the ballot paper is 28; and if no two candidates are grouped together as having the same merit, the points would be distributed as follows:

	VOTER'S INDICATION ON BALLOT PAPER	DISTRIBUTION OF POINTS
First Preference	1	7
Second Preference	2	6
Third Preference	3	5
Fourth Preference	4	4
Fifth Preference	5	3
Sixth Preference	6	2
Seventh Preference	7	1
Last Preference	8	0

An elector may vote for one, some or all of the candidates; and may indicate a straight out order of preference, or bracket two or more candidates together as being of equal preference. A vote cannot be made totally invalid by the elector placing all the candidates of equal preference, although it may thereby be rendered valueless.

A vote is counted by relating the preference accorded to each candidate to the preference accorded to each other candidate.

If in the example given above, two candidates are bracketed as of equal first preference, each will receive;
7 + 6 = 6.5 points
   2

if four are bracketed as equal first preference, each will get;
7 + 6 + 5 + 4 = 5.5 points
     4

Lower preferences receive the relevant points after the higher preference points have been allotted, e.g. if after three equal first preferences three candidates are bracketed together as equal second preference, they will each (in the example given above) receive
4 + 3 + 2 = 3 points
   3

Where no preference is stated for some candidates, all such candidates are treated as being of equal preference in distributing the points remaining after the points have been allotted to the candidates for whom preferences have been expressed.

Places are filled one by one. The candidate with the highest total number of points shall be elected. If two or more candidates tie for top place, and there are at least the same number of vacancies then both or all shall be elected. If the number so tying exceed the number of vacancies the result shall be determined by lot.

When one or more candidates has been elected and there remains a further vacancy to be filled, all reference to the successful candidate or candidates is notionally removed so that the preferences accorded to the successful candidate are not passed on. The points value and the points for each of the candidates remaining in the ballot are recalculated in accordance with the formula.

Counting the votes under the Nanson-Baldwin system is time-consuming if done clerically; but it can be done relatively quickly by computer. A computer programme for the purpose has been written and tested.