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The Validity and Accuracy of Cognition of the Two Truths

Berlin, Germany, February 22, 2002

1. GELUG-PRASANGIKA EXPLANATION

Cognition of an Object
All Tibetan traditions accept that in cognizing an item (dngos-po), mental activity (sems, mind) simultaneously gives rise to (shar-ba, produces) a cognitive object (yul) and cognitively engages (‘jug-pa) with it.

For example, in cognizing an orange, mental activity simultaneously produces the sight of an orange and sees it. What we actually cognize is a visual image of an orange – a sight (gzugs); although in order not to contradict convention (tha-snyad), we would need to assert that we also see the orange. Cognition of an orange, however, does not create the orange.

Producing a cognitive object and cognitively engaging with it are two aspects of the same mental activity, two ways of describing the same phenomenon. It is not that production of a sight comes first and then, a moment later, the seeing of it occurs.

[For a more detailed discussion, click here for Objects of Cognition.]

The Two Truths
According to the Gelug explanation of the Prasangika-Madhyamaka view, the two truths (bden-pa gnyis) refer to two true aspects of any phenomenon.

Correspondingly, mental activity (mind) has two aspects, each of which is valid for cognizing only one truth about a phenomenon. They are the aspects:

Sautrantika Forerunner
The Prasangika-Madhyamaka distinction of individual aspects of mental activity valid for cognizing each of the two truths parallels the earlier Sautrantika presentation.

The Mahayana traditions – Chittamatra and Madhyamaka – present the two truths as two aspects of any phenomenon. The Hinayana schools – Vaibhashika, Sautrantika, and Theravada – present them as two different classes of phenomena.

[For a discussion of The Terms Hinayana and Mahayana, click here.]
According to Sautrantika, the two true phenomena are:

[For a detailed discussion of The Two Truths in Sautrantika and Vaibhashika, click here.]

[For a detailed discussion of Concomitant and Nonconcomitant Affecting Variables, click here.]

Since Sautrantika asserts that objective entities exist unimputedly, whereas metaphysical ones exist merely imputedly, the two true phenomena are knowable in valid bare cognition (mngon-sum tshad-ma) by two different aspects of the cognition:

For a valid cognition to give rise to a cognitive appearance of a metaphysical entity, it needs to be conceptual, as in the case of valid inferential cognition (rjes-dpag tshad-ma). Thus, the two true phenomena are directly apprehensible by distinct valid ways of knowing:

[For a more detailed discussion, click here for Relationships with Objects.]

Aspects of Superficial Truth
Within superficial truths, as defined by Gelug-Prasangika, there are two aspects of the appearance of something:

Consider the case of a visual object.

(2) How something appears to exist may be either as something truly existent (bden-par grub-pa) or as something absolutely devoid of being truly existent. The two alternatives constitute a dichotomy (dngos-‘gal), with no third alternative (phung gsum-pa) possible.

For an item to be truly existent means for it to have a truly existent conventional identity (tha-snyad-du yod-pa’i bdag) as “this” or “that.” A truly existent conventional identity is one established by the power of an objective defining characteristic (rang-mtshan) findable inherently on the side of an item. Such an objective defining characteristic would allow for an accurate mental labeling (yang-dag-par ming ‘dogs-pa) of the item as “this” or “that,” because it would be what makes the basis having it (mtshan-gzhi) a proper basis for labeling (gdags-gzhi) “this” or “that.”

Although mental activity can give rise to an appearance of a mode of existence that resembles true existence, actual true existence cannot appear because there is no such thing. The item’s absolute absence (med-dgag) of true existence is its voidness (stong-pa-nyid, emptiness).

For something to be absolutely devoid of being truly existent means for it to have a non-truly existent conventional identity as “this” or “that.” A non-truly existent conventional identity is one established by the power of mental labeling alone, and not in conjunction with the power of an objective defining characteristic findable inherently on the side of an item.

Impure and Pure Superficial Truths
Corresponding to the above distinction concerning the mode of existence of something, there are impure (ma-dag-pa) and pure (dag-pa) superficial truths about it.

Deepest Truth
The deepest truth about an item is its actual mode of existence, which is its voidness – the absolute absence of its having a truly existent conventional identity as “this” or “that.”

An item’s absolute absence of a truly existent conventional identity does not mean that it has no conventional identity at all. Items have non-truly existent conventional identities as “this” or “that.” Otherwise, the absurd conclusion would follow that everything is the same item and you are me.

Simultaneous Cognition of the Two Truths
Cognition of two aspects of something by two appropriate aspects of mental activity can occur simultaneously. We can see the sight of an orange with visual consciousness and, at the same time, smell its fragrance with olfactory consciousness. We cannot see and smell the visual and olfactory cognitive objects, however, with just visual consciousness.

Similarly, we can cognize the superficial and deepest truths about something simultaneously, but only by the appropriate aspects of mental activity valid for cognizing each. Thus, mental activity valid for cognizing superficial truths about an item – what it appears to be and how it appears to exist – is not valid for cognizing its deepest truth – how it actually exists, and vice versa.

This statement is true whether the mental activity is cognition of impure or pure superficial truths and, within the latter category, whether the mental activity is conceptual or nonconceptual.

Conceptual and Nonconceptual Cognition
Conceptual cognition of something is through the medium of either an idea (snang-ba) of the item or some other cognitive token representing the item. It occurs only with mental cognition.

Nonconceptual cognition is bare cognition, without such a medium. It may be either sensory or mental. Sensory cognition is exclusively nonconceptual.

Conceptual cognition and both sensory and mental nonconceptual cognition of an item give rise to and cognize only impure appearances of it. Both may be equally valid for cognizing impure superficial truths.

The sight and the smell of an orange are not mutually exclusive phenomena (‘gal-ba) and thus one moment of mental activity can cognize both simultaneously. The presence and absolute absence of true existence, however, are mutually exclusive. One moment of mental activity cannot cognize both at the same time. Therefore, because the impure appearance of an item is with an appearance of seemingly true existence, such an appearance occludes (khegs) or blocks simultaneous cognition of its deepest truth, its absolute absence of true existence. In other words, cognition of impure superficial truths and of deepest truths cannot occur simultaneously.

Clear-light mental activity (‘od-gsal), a topic discussed exclusively in anuttarayoga tantra, is the subtlest level of mental activity. Clear-light cognition of something gives rise to and cognizes only a pure appearance of it. It is the only level of mental activity that can do so.

Because the pure appearance of an item is with an absolute absence of true existence, such an appearance can be cognized simultaneously with its deepest truth. Thus, clear-light cognition and only clear-light cognition is valid for cognizing the superficial and deepest truths about something simultaneously. In other words, cognition of deepest truths can occur simultaneously only with cognition of pure superficial truths.

[For a more advanced discussion, click here for The Union of Method and Wisdom in Sutra and Tantra, Gelug Sutra.]

Accurate and Distorted Cognition of Superficial Truths
Mental activity cognizing impure superficial truths may be accurate (yang-dag-pa) or distorted (log-pa) regarding each of the two aspects of the appearance of something – what it appears to be and how it appears to exist. Mental activity cognizing pure superficial truths may only be accurate.

(1) If our mental activity cognizes an item as having the conventional identity of being a white rectangular piece of paper, it is accurate, so long as convention and other valid cognitions of superficial truth do not contradict any of these aspects. This is the case whether the cognition is of the impure or pure appearance of the item. In both cases, it is a valid cognition of the superficial truth of the appearance of something as conventionally “this” or “that.”

If mental activity cognizing superficial truths cognitively takes (‘dzin-pa) the white as pink, because of looking at the item through tinted sunglasses, it is distorted regarding this aspect of what the item appears to be. The cognition is contradicted by a valid cognition of superficial truth made after removing the sunglasses. Because the cognition of white as pink is fallacious (bslu-ba), it is a nonvalid cognition of a superficial truth A valid cognition of something must be nonfallacious (mi-bslu-ba).

(2) Mental activity cognizing impure superficial truths regarding the appearance of how something exists may also be accurate or distorted. If our mental activity cognizes an item’s impure appearance of seemingly true existence as an appearance of seemingly true existence, it is accurate with respect to the manner of existence that appears to it. It is still a valid cognition of an impure superficial truth.

If it cognizes the item’s impure appearance of seemingly true existence as a pure appearance of non-true existence, it is distorted in this regard. It is a nonvalid cognition of an impure superficial truth. Such nonvalid cognition occurs, for example, as a consequence of taking a Svatantrika-Madhyamaka understanding of voidness as the deepest understanding of voidness and therefore nullifying an underpervasively identified object to be nullified (dgag-bya ngos-‘dzin khyab-chung-ba dgag-pa).

Thus, accurate valid cognitions of the impure and pure appearances of something are the same with respect to the conventional identity of the item as “this” or “that.” They are equally valid and accurate regarding what the item appears to be. They differ only with respect to how the item appears to exist with its conventional identity as “this” or “that.”

Deceptive Cognition of Superficial Truths
Conceptual cognition of impure superficial truths, whether accurate or distorted, is deceptive cognition (‘khrul-shes). This is because it cognitively takes a phenomenon’s mode of existence that it makes appear (snang-tshul) – namely, an appearance of its seemingly true existence – to be the phenomenon’s actual mode of existence (yod-tshul). In other words, in taking its appearing object (snang-yul) to be identical with its implied object (zhen-yul), it manifestly grasps for true existence (bden-‘dzin).

[For a discussion of appearing and implied objects, click here for Objects of Cognition.]

Sensory and mental nonconceptual cognition also give rise to impure superficial truths – appearances of true existence (bden-snang). However, they do not have manifest grasping for true existence. Thus, they are not deceptive cognitions from the point of view of mistaking the appearing mode of existence to be the actual mode of existence.

2. NON-GELUG MADHAYMAKA EXPLANATION

Two Phases of Cognition of Superficial Truths
According to the non-Gelug explanations, an item appears as “this” or “that” – for instance, as a white rectangular piece of paper – only to conceptual cognition of it. To sensory nonconceptual cognition, the item appears merely as a white rectangle, not as a “this” or a “that.”

In other words, when cognizing the superficial truths of this item, we see it as a white rectangle and conceptualize it as a white rectangular piece of paper. Each of the two phases of cognition of superficial truth may be accurate or distorted.

Gelug asserts that the item appears as a white rectangle and as a white rectangular piece of paper both to conceptual and nonconceptual cognition of it.

Contrast between Non-Gelug and Gelug Regarding Grasping for True Existence
Non-Gelug agrees with Gelug that manifest grasping for true existence accompanies only conceptual cognition, and is not manifest during nonconceptual cognition. Therefore, a cognition cannot produce an appearance of something as “this” or “that” without also grasping for its true existence as “this” or “that.” When something appears in nonconceptual cognition as merely a shape and color, however, there is neither an appearance of seemingly true existence nor a grasping for true existence.

Gelug agrees that an appearance of seemingly true existence is as a seemingly truly existent “this” or “that.” However, Gelug does not allow for the appearance of a shape and color to cognitively arise without the two also appearing to be a seemingly truly existent shape and color. The appearance of a white rectangle, even in sensory nonconceptual cognition of one, is still the appearance of a “this.” Here, the “this” is a “white rectangle.”

In short, for non-Gelug,

For Gelug,

[For a more advanced discussion of Types of Appearances According to Non-Gelug, click here.]

Contrast between Non-Gelug and Gelug Regarding the Accuracy of Cognition of Superficial Truths
Because of the above distinction that non-Gelug draws between conceptual and nonconceptual cognition, accurate conceptual and accurate nonconceptual cognition of the superficial truth of what something is differ in their conclusions. What is accurate for valid conceptual cognition of superficial truth – for example, that something appears as a white rectangular piece of paper – is inaccurate for valid nonconceptual cognition of superficial truth. This is because, in this example, valid nonconceptual cognition of superficial truth cognizes only that the item appears as a white rectangle.

Therefore, conceptual cognition of superficial truth may be accurate within its own sphere, but is inaccurate when compared to nonconceptual cognition. This is the case in terms of both

In Gelug, on the other hand, conceptual and nonconceptual cognition of superficial truth can have the same accuracy regarding the appearance of what something is and the appearance of how something exists.

Consequently, non-Gelug stresses reliance on nonconceptual cognition more strongly than does Gelug. Nevertheless, both Gelug and non-Gelug agree that conceptual cognition is more deceptive than nonconceptual cognition is, because only conceptual cognition is affected by manifest grasping for true existence.

Denumerable and Nondenumerable Deepest Truths
The non-Gelug Madhyamaka traditions assert two levels of deepest truth about something. Gelug-Prasangika does not accept this division.

[For further detail about Affirmations, Nullifications, and Denumerable and Nondenumerable Truths, click here.]

[For further detail about self and other-voidness, click here for The Theory of Tantra: Why Tantra Is More Efficient than Sutra, Non-Gelug Variations Concerning General Tantra.]

Valid Cognition of Denumerable and Nondenumerable Deepest Truth
Denumerable deepest truth is validly known only by valid conceptual cognition of deepest truth. Valid nonconceptual cognition of voidness is cognition of only nondenumerable voidness.

Nondenumerable deepest truth is validly known only by valid nonconceptual cognition of deepest truth. Valid sensory and mental nonconceptual cognitions are cognitions of only superficial truths. They cannot cognize denumerable deepest truths. Only yogic and clear-light nonconceptual cognition can cognize nondenumerable deepest truths.

Thus, conceptual and nonconceptual valid cognition of deepest truth cognize different objects. This non-Gelug assertion contrasts sharply with the Gelug position. According to Gelug, conceptual and nonconceptual valid cognition of deepest truth cognize the same object – the absolute absence of true existence.

The Deceptiveness of Cognition of Denumerable Deepest Truths and of Superficial Truths
Valid cognition of the denumerable deepest truth about something cognizes only its absolute absence of true existence. It may be accurate regarding the absolute absence it cognizes, but is deceptive because an absolute absence does not exist on its own, as this cognition of it makes it appear to do. An absolute absence of true existence cannot exist on its own, separately from the basis for its nullification (‘gog-gzhi) – the item that is absolutely devoid of existing in that way.

Valid cognition of denumerable deepest truth is also deceptive from another point of view. It is necessarily a conceptual cognition and, although it does not produce an appearance of seemingly true existence, it produces an appearance of an absolute absence of true existence. In effect, it produces an appearance of the conceptual category “not-true existence.” Moreover, although this valid conceptual cognition lacks grasping for true existence, it has grasping for not-true existence.

Valid cognition of a superficial truth about something is also always deceptive because it cognizes only a superficial appearance of something and makes that appearance seem to exist on its own, separately from its actual mode of existence. This is the case both for

Thus, according to the non-Gelug definitions, valid cognition of the superficial truth of something is always deceptive. Whether conceptual or nonconceptual, whether accurate or distorted, it is always the cognition of the impure appearance of something.

[For a more advanced discussion of Divisions, Causes, and Elimination of Unpurified Appearance-Making According to Non-Gelug, click here.]

The Nondeceptiveness of Cognition of Nondenumerable Deepest Truth
Valid cognition of the nondenumerable deepest truth about something simultaneously cognizes the deepest level of how it actually exists and of how it actually appears. Ultimately, how something exists and how it appears are both beyond words and concepts. Such an appearance is a pure appearance. Gelug does not accept pure appearances defined in this manner because, according to its theories, no third alternative exists besides an item’s appearing seemingly truly existent or non-truly existent.

Thus, for non-Gelug, valid cognition of the ultimate appearance of something is by a valid cognition of a deepest truth. It is not valid cognition of a superficial truth. Superficial truth is exclusively impure. The cognition of pure appearances occurs exclusively with valid cognition of nondenumerable deepest truth.

Contrast between Non-Gelug and Gelug Concerning the Two Truths
For non-Gelug,

For Gelug,

© 2002 by Alexander Berzin. All rights reserved.