by

Iraj Bashiri

Copyright © Iraj Bashiri, 2003

Introduction

By its very nature, conflict consists of two sides that, for one reason or another, do not or cannot agree on certain basic principles. What are these principles? Where do they come from? Why is it that different individuals, communities, or nations choose to adopt, nourish, and promote principles that are not universally popular? The answers to these questions are intriguing in that they are easy enough for a school child to understand, yet complex enough for adults to build colleges and universities around them, and to expound elaborate theories to explain their modes of operation.

Regardless of whether in its simple mode or in its complex form, power--economical, military, psychological, ideological, and political--serves as the core reason for conflict. And the quest for acquisition of more power usually serves as the motive behind almost all conflicts. Power in its abstract form, of course, is innocuous; but not so when it is combined with the forces that shape the economical, military, psychological, and political aspects of societis.

In fact, it is not so much power itself that fascinates and motivates peoples and nations to go to war, but the horizons that acquisition of power opens up for the individual and the nation. In other words, it is the potential benefit from the grain that the capture of the Nile Valley might yield that persuades a commander like Cyrus the Persian to plan an invasion of Egypt. Similarly, it is the cash money that the gold in Lydia would add to the treasury to pay the soldiers to capture the Nile Valley that mobilizes Cyrus to move his provincial army against Media and Lydia. With that kind of provision at his disposal, the conquest of Ethiopia becomes possible. Needless to say, the attraction of Ethiopian ivory for increasing the splendor of the palaces of the king of kings is no less an incentive. After all, subjects have to be fed, paid well, and bedazzled before they can be meaningfully ruled.

This, however, is only one side of the equation. The Medians, the Lydians, the Egyptians, and the Ethiopians are not waiting in line for Cyrus to subjugate them. Naturally, they would defend their cultural values and their wealth against his aggression. The decision of the rulers of these countries to safeguard their heritage makes Cyrus's task difficult. He realizes that for these lands to fall like dominoes before his small army, they must be softened. This is where the levers of power come into play. Seeds of discord must be sown in these regions so that their own tribal, regional, ideological, and political forces can be turned against them. The more smoothly this divide and conquer scheme is implemented, the more easily the military campaign against those communities can proceed successfully.

This paper deals with three basic types of internal shift of power and the conflicts that result from each. The first part of the paper deals with the development of reason-based institutions typical of western democracies. The type of power that emerges from these institutions is secular in nature and controlled; the people elect the leadership that emerges. The shift in power is automatic.

The second part deals with divine-based institutions or autocracies. In these societies, select individuals rule as the deputy of the Almighty. Shift of power, which occurs through communal choice and divine guidance, is enmeshed in a web of beliefs created by the guardians of the faith. The discrepancy among the believers' beliefs vis-a-vis the base determines the likelihood and the intensity of potential conflicts.

The third part deals with institutions that are based on bloodline. Here the charisma of one individual, the founder, grants legitimacy to the rulership of the weakest of his line. Power in these structures is inherently fragmented. Sectarian, ethnic, or regional wars accompany shift of power.

Finally, each system develops a set of internal conflicts, which are inherent to its own mode of operation and a set of external conflicts that are imposed upon it by external exploitative powers. For instance, if the West had not intended to introduce westernization and sovietization into Iran and Afghanistan, respectively, the chances are that would have not been either an Iranian Revolution or an Afghan Civil War.

Genesis of the Reason-Based Systems

The breakup of the Indo-European cultural sphere resulted in the creation of many diverse cultures. These cultures, as remote as they might have been from each other geographically--Ireland to India--continued to share the same language, albeit it had to develop diverse phonological systems. Likewise, these societies shared the same abstract pantheon of gods who contributed to the development of the civilizations of Greece, Persia, and India. Although, outwardly the gods and goddesses in each pantheon appeared to be quite distinct--in the case of India the very number of gods and goddesses was sufficient to draw the line--otherwise they functioned in quite the same way. In each pantheon a chief deity organized the affairs of man through the intermediacy of a number of lower-level deities.

The Greeks became the first to abandon their pantheon for a more reason-based solution to the problems of government. Responding to a need for less divine authority, philosophers like Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle developed institutions that spoke directly to the creation of self-sufficient, citizen-based city-states ruled by trained guardians.

One of the prominent philosophers of his Age, Socrates (c. BC 470-399) drew attention to questions that were at once personal and ethical in import. His unrelenting search for knowledge and justice led him to the creation of the Socratic method of learning that consisted of questions and answers, which delved deeply into both the professional and private lives of individuals, including Socrates himself. Dissatisfied with the oracle at Delphi, which had pronounced him wise, Socrates decided to test his own abilities against those of the rulers, intellectuals, and other respected figures of his community. Surprisingly, he found them all lacking in the values that he considered to be of paramount importance for high administrative officers making life and death decisions for the citizens of the State.

Socrates shared his views on knowledge and virtue with the people of Athens. His frank assertions on the social, economic, and, to a degree, political situation of his time impressed many, especially the youth of Athens. Unfortunately for Socrates, some of his youthful followers took his philosophical assertions literally, led a revolt against the Athenian authorities, and overthrew the democratic institutions of Athens. They plunged the State into chaos. For a decade, a rule of terror prevailed.

After democracy was restored, in BC 399, Socrates was tried and condemned to death by drinking hemlock. Among the charges against him were failure to worship the Athenian gods (cf., the Indo-European pantheon discussed earlier) and corrupting the youth of Athens.

Not all of Socrates' students were rebels. Some, like Plato (427-347), became prominent future philosophers. In fact, like Socrates, Plato posed fundamental questions (also in the form of dialogue) regarding knowledge, reality, society, and human nature. Plato was drawn to the circle of Socrates by the same reformist ideas that had led to the demise of Socrates. But he did not allow himself to be discouraged by the fate that befell his teacher. Rather, he set himself the task of compiling Socrates' dialogues and distributing them among the Athenians. More than that, he founded the Academy, a complex of higher education and communal living, for the purpose.

Aristotle (BC 384-322), the last member of the philosophic trio that had set itself the task of introducing faith in reason as the mainstay of social and political enlightenment in the ancient West, joined Plato's Academy when he was about twenty years of age. He remained at the Academy for about twenty years. At the Academy, Aristotle became a favorite student of Plato and remained with his teacher until the time of the latter's death. Thereafter, he taught Alexander the Great for three years, traveled extensively in the Mediterranean region, and founded the Lyceum to which Alexander sent some of the most rare biological specimens he encountered on his long march to India.

Plato's Perfect Republic

The unrelenting efforts of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle are reflected in two masterpieces: Plato's Republic, which describes the training a guardian should undergo, and Aristotle's Politics that recommends of what an ideal state should consist.

In the Republic, as a child, the potential guardian lived with his family until the age of 18. His studies at a private school consisted of reading, writing, learning and reciting epic and dramatic poetry, playing the lyre, and singing lyric poetry. Music that included the arts, letters, culture, and philosophy occupied a major part of the child's time.

After passing a test on the above-mentioned subjects, the potential guardian underwent two years of military training which, among other things, enabled him to manage his own life physically and morally so that he would seldom need to consult either a doctor or a lawyer.

As tests followed rigorous training, the number of potential candidates for guardian was diminished. At the age of twenty, the smaller group underwent higher training. For the next ten years, focus was on mathematics, moral philosophy, and the relations that obtain between abstract concepts and concrete objects. The next five years were spent on dialectics. This entailed learning the ultimate principles of morality, rationalization of the dynamics of the phenomenal world, and application of this knowledge to every-day problems for obtaining the most sound results.

Finally, the last fifteen years of training were spent in public service in subordinate positions, and in gaining practical experience. When the last test was administered at the age of fifty, the candidate had gained the best vision of the Good. For the rest of his life, he would live a Spartan life, study, and serve the Supreme Council. By law, he could not hold private property, form a family, or use his power for self-interest.

This training maximized human abilities. It put the potential creators of the future society through a rigorous test of abilities with the ultimate goal of inculcating the most Good in them. At the start of the project, the first group to fall was the one most attracted to the world of appearances. This was also the group with the lowest form of true cognition. The individuals in this group not only took the visible world and current moral notions at face value but considered them to be the absolute and only reality. In other words, the image they took of the world was intense and all-inclusive.

The second group to fall victim to appearances had a more concrete understanding of the visible world; its abilities, howevr, were stifled by beliefs and by entanglement in moral issues. Their beliefs, rather than based on knowledge of facts, were based on rumor and hearsay.

The group that rose above common belief entered the lower levels of the intelligible world. There, mathematics and moral philosophy were used to lead the applicants to thinking whereby the individual dealt with abstractions representing the dynamics of the visible world. Potential guardians presented postulates, formed hypotheses, and sought definitions for relations that might obtain in the real world and which would impact the world of appearances.

Finally, the individuals who achieved the Good used dialogue as the basis of their abstract deductions. To them the visible world had made its contribution by presenting matter on which to create premises. Their task was to advance the process by moving from form to form until a clear conclusion was reached.

The western mind has continually been preoccupied with classifying individuals, nurturing the intelligent, and moving its agenda forward for the achievement of a unique society. Even centuries after Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, when the West was plunged into its so-called Dark Ages, the relentless search for that unique society did not cease to entertain peoples' minds.

The Humanism Intermezzo

After the adoption of Christianity by Emperor Constantine (AD 313), the Western outlook on life took a definite turn away from the path based on faith in reason. The Crusades (AD 1096-1291) against the Muslim East provide a vivid picture of the absence of the democratic institutions of which Plato had spoken. It was now the authoritarian attitude of the Pope that controlled the multitude and, thereby, power. In fact, the eight crusades led against the Seljuq Turks and, later Saladin, speak to the very ineptitude that Socrates and others had warned against regarding the possibility of mismanagement of the affairs of the state.

But this was not to last long. Humanism as a movement began just about the end of the Crusades in the latter part of the thirteenth century and continued until the 16th century. It was, as would be expected, a major cultural movement against the Catholic church; a movement that not only returned science, philosophy, and the arts to Western institutions but made those institutions to bear their power on education as well as on social and political issues. After that, the Pope was no longer the "shepherd" he had appointed himself to be. Reason and logic gradually replaced the practice of "blind" faith. This iconoclastic process secularized politics and released it from clerical binds. Consequently, government, although feudal and dictatorial, became focused and secular. Furthermore, nationalism replaced the rule of the clergy, and experiment in science formed the basis of Humanism.

Thomas More's Utopia

Sir Thomas More (AD 1477-1535) is closely related to reforms of the type discussed above, although some would like to credit him with being an early advocate of the communist movement. A humanist, a statesman and a saint, More picks up Plato's Republic in AD 1516. While indicting the economic and social conditions of his own time, he creates a quasi-communistic Utopia in which individuals enjoy equity in education, clothing, housing, and food as well as share philosophical ideas, religious preferences, and government.

More's crescent-shaped island in the "New World" is defended by a single fort. It has 54 equidistant cities and a poor climate. Its capital, Amaurot, is located in the center of the island. A council, consisting of 162 representatives (three from each city), sees to the smooth administration of the affairs of the state. Primarily farmers, the Utopians work diligently in their allotted collective farms, produce a surplus even though the land and climate are not favorable to farming, and share their surplus with their neighbors.

Located on the sides of rivers, Utopian cities are surrounded by walls. Within the cities, however, there is no consideration of privacy. Utopian citizens keep well-attended gardens, cover their windows with glass or oiled linen and use wells for drinking water.

Utopian officials must be educated. 200 city representatives, themselves chosen by the city's 30 households or 6,000 population, choose a Prince of the City from among four candidates. The office of the Prince of the City is for life.

Legal matters are resolved through discussions at various levels. All decisions are made only after three different debates have taken place in the Senate. Issues submitted cannot be discussed on the day they are submitted. No discussion of Senate affairs must occur outside the Senate on the pain of death.

The Utopians are utilitarian. As farmers, their school subjects are centered on theoretical and practical aspects of farming. Major trades such as masonry, metalwork, and carpentry are taught primarily to meet community needs rather than for satisfying the greed of feudal lords.

Utopia's dress code is simple. Everyone is in uniform and, indeed, wears the same uniform for seven years. Sex and marital status of individuals are apparent from the clothes they wear. Everyone is provided with a cloak to cover his ordinary clothes when presenting themselves.

Bodily work is the order of the day. Altogether 500 able-bodied scholars, voted in by the priests, are exempt from bodily work. The Prince of the City, ambassadors, priests, the chief administrator, administrators, and assistant administrators, too, are exempt from bodily work. Priests not chosen through the process of secret voting, landlords, beggars, and lawyers have no place in More's Utopia.

Although regimented, the Utopians' work schedule has a rhythm of its own dictated by common sense. Six hours of work is divided equally into half by two hours of rest in the afternoon. Supper takes one hour (at 8:00), followed by an hour of gardening. The bulk of the individual's time goes to sleep (8 hours) and study, and to engagement in intellectual activity and attending or giving public lectures (6 hours).

Utopian adults are tied neither to the land nor to family. Surplus adults--households cannot have more than 16 adults--are shipped to cities with an adult deficit or to one of the colonies. They may return only when the number of adults in their particular community has declined.

Traveling to and from Utopia requires a permit from the Prince of the City who also assigns carts and drivers for the trip. Loiterers and those traveling without a permit are arrested and fined. Repeat offenders are made slaves.

Enslavement is a sort of catchall punishment. The undesirables of society, i.e., first-time adulterers, prisoners of war, Utopians who had committed heinous crimes and foreigners who had accepted slavery for pay, are kept constantly at work. Their captivity and labor allow the proper Utopian to study languages, music, dialectics, mathematics, geometry, astronomy, ethics, law, and medicine or, simply, to contemplate nature.

Humanism's Twins: Liberalism and Socialism

In the centuries that followed More's Utopia, liberalism emerged among the wealthy city dwellers and intellectuals of Europe; it peaked in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The political equality as well as the political, economic, and religious freedoms that liberalism bestowed on the individual allowed him more social mobility. But more than that, it opened up positions that so far had been occupied by the nobility and their sycophants.

In the main, liberalism is promoted by capitalism, which expands the domains of liberalism through imperialism. In democracies, all citizens are equal under the law, enjoy political, religious, and social freedom, and have an independent judiciary. Parties can be formed freely and a constitution, based on human rights, is enforced. Freedom of conscience and institution of secular laws are also among the achievements of liberal societies.

Achievement of the "golden age" of liberalism remains in the realm of theory, even though some Western countries claim to have approached, if not actually achieved it. Conflicts in democracies arise from competition for power as ethnic, racial, and economic levers are used by pressure groups to further their agendas. At times this kind of discrimination, for lack of a better word, heightens disunity in these societies to the point that the formation of a genuine, merit-based society of the type envisaged by Plato and More becomes a task.

Socialism emerged among the poor European city dwellers and peasants who sought sustenance rather than liberation. Socialist leaders advocated that power must be wrested from the kings, princes, feudal lords, and the rich and be instituted in an equitable system under the proletariat. The proletariat then would dismantle the bourgeoisie, take over its assets, and centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the state.

Like capitalism, this system too is yet to attain its "golden age." Expropriation of property, inequitable taxation, abolition of rights of inheritance and out and out confiscation of property did not sit well with the rich. Nor did centralization of labor, credit, and transportation in the hands of the State. Besides, what would people gain? In compensation, the system promised education for all, equal ability to work in industrial armies, and service in unique agricultural and industrial complexes. What it did not promise was freedom of choice and access to natural and human resources. It prevented the individual from pursuing his own destiny to wherever it might take him or her.

Comparatively viewed, in the democratic system the individuals, through competition--fair or otherwise--control and promote each other's growth. In other words, democracy cherishes and offers freedom unquestioningly. Race, ethnicity, ideology, and economy are used as means for directing power. Conversely, in the socialist system, the State strives doggedly to curtail individual freedoms and access to power. Rather, power is mysteriously directed upwards to benefit a few pseudo-guardians.

In sum, through an invisible process of sifting and classification, Western societies train the individual from childhood to be aware of his place in society, to recognize and defend his rights, and to strive for leadership. Individuals also learn to recognize their limits within the law and obey the law. As a result, conflict over leadership is relatively non-existent. The resolution of the presidential race between George Bush and Al Gore is a case in point.

At the end of this section, it should be added that both liberalism and socialism are highly goal oriented. Their goal is material in nature and, although in conflict with each other with regard to methodology, ithe achievement of the goal remain paramount in their minds. The westernization of Iran and the sovietization of Afghanistan provide exemplary test cases for the determination of the United States and the Soviet Union in reaching their economical and ideological goals, before they themselves clashed.

Roots of Iranian Theocracy

As mentioned, through their Indo-European connection, the Greeks and the Iranians shared the concept of the pantheon of gods, a mechanism through which, they thought, the affairs of the world were administered. But, while after centuries of debate, the Greeks replaced the rule of the gods with the rule of man, the Persians transformed their pantheon into a monolithic superforce capable of organizing their affairs in this world and in the hereafter. This superforce, through the investiture of the divine right (cf., farr), empowers select individuals, or their deputies, to enforce his laws.

The process, of course, was not simple. In order to attend to all aspects of peoples' lives, the deity assumed a dual role. In the first role, he took absolute charge of major phenomenal forces like earthquakes, the wind, and rain. These he eventually relegated to lower-level deities to attend to. For the second role, he undertook the administration of the concrete needs of society such as justice, security, shelter, and sustenance. These he assigned to his deputy on earth. The first system, within which the deity controls the supernatural forces, is celestial in nature. The second system is terrestrial.

The celestial system allays the fears arising from earthquakes, floods, and other such phenomena over which man has no control. The Amesha Spentas, divine embodiments of the uncontrollable forces, controlled earthquakes, droughts, and other such calamities. The afflicted individual asked his own Farahvashi (or soul) to contact the appropriate Yazata who, through an appropriate Spenta, persuaded the deity to avert the calamity.

The terrestrial system, responsible for the provision of security, justice, shelter and sustenance, required the constant involvement of human agents on the earth plane. For this, the deity appointed a human being, but not just any human being. At the beginning, an extraordinary man called Gayomarta was assigned the task. He was invested with the farr and was introduced as the deputy of the deity on earth. During cosmic times, he functioned both as the first man and the first king.

When mythology replaced cosmology and affairs on the earth plane became more involved, mythical kings foresaw the future and made life and death decisions for entire populations. To prevent ordinary people from a claim to rulership, the concept of the farr was concretized. The ruler had to visibly show that the deity was supportive of his rule. At about the same time, a belief system was also developed that made it incumbent upon every Iranian to avenge any infringement on the legitimate rights of the ruling house. It was also understood that when faced with incredible odds, the right to kingship had to be defended at all costs.

The first legendary king of Iran to have to deal with a more complex world than that of his predecessors was King Faridun. While still ruling, he divided his kingdom among his three sons so that Iraj, the youngest, received Iran and the farr. His other sons, Tur and Salm, questioned the legitimacy of Iraj and murdered him. Their action brought the belief in vengeance into play. The descendants of Iraj rose in vengeance against Tur and Salm and destroyed them.

The situation was not as easy for Prince Siyavosh who had to choose between sacrificing himself for the achievement of a united Iran and Turan and kowtowing to the whims of his supporter, Afrasiyab. The Prince chose the former route and, when faced with the superior numbers of Afrasiyab, folded his arms and allowed himself to be killed. His death, interpreted as a sacrifice for the cause, created a flare up in the wars between Turan and Iran, a flare up that, under his son, Kaykhusrau, led to the unification of the two realms.

When mythical times gave way to the historical era in Iran, the faith in divine right did not change. Darius the Great, whose access to the farr was questionable, proved to his subjects that he enjoyed the protection of Ahura Mazda. He fought nineteen battles during the same year and subjugated nine kings, a feat that he claimed he could not have accomplished without divine intervention. Resistance against the rulership of a meritorious commander such as Darius emphasized the Iranians' devotion to the principle of the divine right of kings.

The farr became a stumbling block in the way of the Greeks who, after Alexander's death, had to regulate the affairs of the Iranian lands. Since Seleucid emperors did not enjoy the loyalty of the people, an essential factor in creating a harmonious society of the type advocated by Plato, they were greatly handicapped. The reason for this lack of cooperation on the part of the conquered people was obvious. The territories and the loyalty of their peoples belonged to Ahura Mazda; they could not be ruled properly by individuals who were not Iranian and whom Ahura Mazda did not support.

To bypass this handicap, and introduce Roman law into these territories, the Romans went so far as to introduce the concept of the god-king. None of their inventions, however, produced the type of legitimacy with which their Iranian subjects were familiar. After a hundred years, their rule collapsed and power returned to the Iranian rulers.

The Parthians and the Sassanians launched major retrieval programs and recaptured the spirit of the farr inculcated by the ancients in what had come to be known as the Ahuric Order. This was a hierarchy that began with Ahura Mazda, supported by his six Amesha Spentas who, in turn, were supported by countless Yazatas. A number of specific Spenta-Yazata group interactions in relation to the soul or the Farahvashi of the faithful administered the affairs of the world.

After the Arab invasion of the Iranian lands, the Islamic kings of Iran made a point of not repeating the mistake of the Romans. As a result, government of the Iranian lands was handled somewhat differently than government in other parts of the Islamic Empire. In fact, certain germane changes were introduced to accommodate ancient principles and beliefs. These changes were both defensive and protective in nature. They were not set up to negate the prevalent Islamic concepts but to harmonize them with the system with which the Islamized population was familiar. As a result, a considerable body of ancient Iranian political and religious thought remained and was blended into the very fabric of Islam in Iran. Paramount in this regard is the concept of the legitimacy of the sultan and the recognition of the divine source of his authority.

In general, the Iranians had little difficulty in accepting Allah as the source of authority in place of Ahura Mazda. But, they could not do without access to the source of knowledge and guidance of Allah as well as with the hierarchy that connected them with that source. After all, their salvation in the hereafter depended on safeguarding that connection. That is perhaps why, in time, a pseudo-pantheon developed. A pantheon that consists of at least three levels. Allah, Muhammad, Ali, Fatimah, Hassan, and Hussein or the Sacred Five (panj tani al-i aba) at one level; Muhammad, Fatimah, Ali and his eleven descendants or imams or the Immaculate Fourteen (chahardah ma'sum) at a lower level; and the Forty Guardian Spirits (chehel tanan) at still a lower level.

This is not the place, of course, to detail the correlation that exists between Iran's ancient religion and its present-day Shi'ite faith. That discussion belongs to a separate forum. What is of importance is the political ramifications of the survival of such pre-Islamic structures as the principle of divine right and the belief in vengeance and sacrifice. The martyrdom of Imam Hussein, which ignited the Shi'ites' claim to legitimacy, works on the same principle as the martyrdom of the legendary Prince Siyavosh whose sacrifice led to the unification of Iran and Turan under Kaykhusrau.

The contemporary rulers of Iran can identify themselves either with a national Iranian heritage or with an Islamic one. The Shah of Iran considered himself to be a successor to the throne of Darius the Great and Ardashir, kings whose rule was sanctioned by Iran's pre-Islamic deity. Present-day rulers consider themselves deputies of the 12^th imam of the Shi'ites. Allah blesses their rule through the intervention of the imams and the Prophet.

Internal conflict arises when these forces jockey for position. When outsiders, along with their own ideological, economical, and cultural mptives, enter the scene, the picture becomes even more complex. To illustrate this point, a brief foray into the history of the westernization of Iran is in order.

Before the arrival of Western companies and the onset of modernization and westernization, Iranian affairs were quite simple. They dealt with internal security, defense against possible external encroachment on regions such as Khurasan and Khuzistan, and prevention of enslavement of Iranians, women in particular, by Turkmen marauders.

The West--Britain until 1953 and the United States after 1945--in order to create a consumer market in Iran, introduced a program of modernization buttressed with a program of westernization. The former was the lure for the sale of the latter. Neither concept sat well with the traditional Iranian society, most definitely with the clergy. Nevertheless, modernization divided Iran between the advocates of westernization and the supporters of safeguarding Iran's Islamic traditions. A mere glance at Persian literature of the time is sufficient to fathom the depth of this division.

The levers that were manipulated by the West in Iran were varied. Politically, the monarch was held hostage to the whims of the oil cartels, construction companies, and weapons production factories. He was placed on a modernization program that he could not stop. Ideologically, the traditional and religious classes were persuaded to pressure the monarch so that he would need to become more closely allied with the West and, consequently, sign larger contracts. Economically, Iran was persuaded to satisfy its agricultural needs by purchasing from the outside so that it could use its labor force for urban development. Iranian institutions for education and health as well as Iranian industry from the fisheries to carpet production were revamped to accept foreign experts and foreign parts respectively.

The longer the program of westernization proceeded in Iran, the deeper the source of hatred for the Shah and the foreign intruders became. Eventually, in the 1960's, a program was established in Iran to study and, eventually, evaluate the plans of the Shah and their benefits for the Shah's foreign supporters. Iran, the study found, was being gradually but relentlessly robbed of its identity. That could not happen. Iranians had stemmed the tide of Hellenization, Arabization, and Turkification in the past. They rose once again and stemmed the tide of westernization.

Their approach to the problem, however, was dictated by the system with which they were most familiar, i.e., divine right of kings. They could not, as hard as they tried, distance themselves from the monarchy. The best they could do was to abolish the monarchy in favor of a "monarchical republic," the first of its kind in the world.

Today Iran is the only republic with a president who can be dismissed by a Supreme Leader. The Supreme Leader enjoys the belief of the population in his ability to keep Iran on the correct, divine path. The President enjoys the support of the segment of the population that believes he can administer the secular affairs of the country with dexterity.

Authority in Iran's theocratic system hinges on two things: community belief in the legitimacy of the ruler and the ruler's ability to identify with the peoples' aspirations and respond accordingly to their needs. The Shah, even though he believed he had the Iranians in the palm of his hand, failed on both of those accounts. As a result, people's trust in him diminished. Khomeini, on the other hand, capitalized on both of those accounts and won the hearts and minds of his generation; they raised him to the unprecedented level of an imam.

Historically, this was a foreseeable situation. In its defense against Western encroachment on its resources, Safavid Iran sought distance from Britain. Early Qajars, too, followed the same trend. Later Qajar shahs who could not resist the lure of the money that flowed into their treasuries from the sale of Iranian assets, including oil, opened the way to modernization. The Pahlavis intensified the trend by implementing two extensive modernization programs of reform in the 1930's and the 1960's. Before long, when the Iranians found themselves where their Safavid predecessors had found themselves in the 16^th century, they reacted accordingly.

In sum, although the modernization of Iran and the westernization that accompanied it entered Iran quite harmlessly on the surface, dislodging them required the mobilization of a nation and the force of a revolution. As a result, the very fabric of the nation was tested. If Iran had lacked national unity, it would have fallen victim to the same type of regional and ethnic forces that tore Afghanistan apart only a decade after the Iranian Revolution.

As can be seen, the process of sifting that is the hallmark of the western system does not exist here. Instead, the individual awaits the will of the deity on the one hand and the dictates of the deity's deputy on earth on the other hand. He is led to accept his lot without question. Rather than defending his own right to a good life, as was the case with the reason-based system, he defends the right of humanity, an incredible task. Lack of access to proper education, disillusionment and grief breed discontent. The discontent then is promoted and channeled in one of three ways: against internal opposition (national or Islamic as the case might be), against the foreign aggressor, or against the internal opposition and the foreign aggressor combined. The 1979 Iranian Revolution chose this third route to conflict and with it swept both the Shah and his American supporters off the political map.

Systems Based on Bloodline

The third type of rule that has attracted attention over the centuries and has shown great leadership potential and capability at times, is government by the chief of nomadic tribes. Originally warriors of the steppe, the nomads live isolated lives, taking care of their herds, families, clans, and lineage with little interference from the outside. At the same time, however, they have the potential of becoming united; in that case, they are likely to conquer settled regions, depose well-established rulers, and promote ruthless bureaucrats and functionaries to carry out their behest.

The majority of the tribes in the East are regional; they are small in size, organized around a ruling family, and tend not to interfere with the affairs of the state. The Bakhtiari tribe of Iran is one such example. The remnant of a major confederation of Lur mountain peoples, present-day Bakhtiaris are small nomadic groups with two camps, one on each side of the Zard Kuh in the Zagros range in southwestern Iran.

Rather than hegemony over ancient Iranian lands, although in recent years there have been attempts at controlling the government, the main goal of their chiefs is to supply their fellow tribesmen with food and their flocks with sufficient fodder. To satisfy these needs, they cross the icy and turbulent waters of the Bazuft and Karun Rivers and climb the treacherous snow-clad peaks of Zard Kuh. For five winter months each year the tribe lives on the lush plain of Khuzistan on the western slope then, for the other five, on the lush plains of Bakhtiari on the eastern slopes near the city of Isfahan. The other two months are spent on the epical migrations themselves.

A simple, utilitarian people, the Bakhtiaris live in portable, austere black tents barely capable of providing shelter against harsh winds. Their homemade clothes are distinctive, but offer little protection against the type of harsh climate they face. The leader's family lives among the people and helps them take their flock over rivers and mountain peaks to better pastures. A major task for the men is to safeguard the herd, the base of the Bakhtiari economy.

There is little exploitation of the people in a Bakhtiari camp as there is relatively little to exploit. Rather than by greed, therefore, the Khan's efforts to save his tribesmen and their flock are motivated by personal satisfaction. Shift of rulership is through consensus.

As a rule, the Bakhtiaris avoid things that demand construction, be it a house, a barn, or a simple tripod. Everything they use is makeshift. Even the poles that hold up their tents are dried branches yanked off trees. They have been crossing the Bazuft and Karun Rivers at the same fords for centuries. Each time, they lose a considerable number of people and animals. Yet they refuse to facilitate the crossing by building bridges.

Bakhtiari children do not get a formal education. While they learn the Luri and Persian languages from their parents and the basics of Islam (Shi'ite) from the more learned men of the tribe, their future is tied to the ebbs and tides of the daily needs of their people. They are destined to follow the grass from one side of the Zard Kuh to the other.

A similar pattern existed in the lives of the Kyrgyz of the Little Pamir when they carried on their nomadic lifestyle in the Wakhan Corridor of northeastern Afghanistan. Unlike the Bakhtiari tribes, however, the Wakhan Kyrgyz had participated in the creation of an Anti-Soviet, Pan-Turkist Turkistan. Pressured by the Soviets to settle, and fearing liquidation, they had fled to the Wakhan Corridor. (See below for more explanation.)

Russians and Soviets in Central Asia

When the Russians came to power in Central Asia in the late 1800's, they relied heavily on the northern Turks for both educating the populace in Russian ways and for stemming the tide of rebellion among the Iranian, Tajik, and Afghan Muslims in the south. As a result Turks, still primarily nomadic, found themselves at the center of a newly-found power, a power that was nourished by Russian support and refurbished annually by the arrival of Pan-Turkist and Pan-Islamist volunteers from other Turkish domains.

When the Soviets took over from the Russians, the situation did not change. The Turks continued to exert influence in the region. By now, however, they were a more closely-knit group and showed more readiness to accept Soviet rule than the Tajiks, Afghans or Iranians. Within a few years, Soviet education and Soviet funds enabled the Turks of Central Asia to nearly rival the nascent Soviet State itself for hegemony in the region. In other words, Turkistan in the mid-1920's had the potential of reversing the Soviet takeover of Central Asia.

Lenin, an astute politician, recognized the danger. He realized as early as 1922 that he would have to break up the unity of the Turks and employ Turkish initiatives in more constructive ways for the benefit of the Nation at large. For instruction, he took a long look at the history of the Mongols. He carefully studied the very history that Russian chroniclers had painstakingly left out of their accounts. The three centuries of the Tartar yoke from the rise of Chingiz Khan to the fall of Mamai had a great deal to offer Lenin on the subject of tribal solidaritybut, more importantly, on how that solidarity could be undermined.

Merging of Tribal Identities

There have been, and there might be in the future, tribes that allow assimilation, i.e., tribes that accept to either become incorporated into a larger tribe or allow smaller tribes to become integral parts of them. An outstanding example of this kind of merger is the coalition of tribes that gave rise to the establishment of the Mongol hordes that swept through Asia and devastated a good portion of Eastern Europe.

At the end of the 12th century, a number of distinct tribes occupied the areas surrounding Lake Baikal in the confines of Asia. The Mongol tribe, occupying the northeast side of the lake, shared the Onon River with the Merkids, the Neimans, the Tatars, and the Kereyids. The western region, all the way to the land of the Kyrgyz, was occupied by the Oriat tribe while the southeast, all the way to the Wall of China was taken by the Oniggud. Inter-tribal marriages, commerce, and struggles over grazing land were common, but there existed no ambition on the part of individual tribes to take on a power such as China. They preferred fighting among themselves, or reducing weaker tribes to submission.

A young man called Temuchin changed the status quo. Born in the Burkhan Kaldun highlands around AD 1160 and brought up under strict Mongol rule, he envisioned the possibility of uniting the disparate tribes around the Baikal. By combining their energies and by bringing it to bear on the civilizations of Asia and Europe, Temuchin thought, he could become a mighty ruler. And, as is known, his vision became a reality. 1n 1206, he was accorded the title of Chingiz Khan and, tribe after tribe, hearing his call, joined his banner and pledged to defend his cause.

The newly acquired Mongol tribal strength was first tested in the south, against the Kin dynasty of China. The Wall of China was breached in 1209 and Beijing was overrun by 1217. These were very encouraging results for young Temuchin. Devastated, China pledged to not only pay tribute to the Khan but to send troops to his aid whenever such deployment was requested. Chingiz Khan then directed his devastating army to his west against the land of the Khwarazmshah.

There, too, victory was imminent. In 1219, four devastating armies were deployed from the shore of the Irtysh. They were commanded by Chingiz Khan himself, his sons, and two of his "dogs," Subadai Bahadur and Jebe Nuyan. The attacks were directed at Utrar, Jand, Bukhara, and Khujand. Helpless, those cities fell as the Khwarazmshah had assembled his total force at Urgench. Left on their own, other major Central Asian cities like Nishapur, Herat, Balkh, and Bamian also fell.

By the time of Chingiz Khan's death in Mongolia--he returned home and lived in the heartland for two years before he died in 1227--the entire land mass east of the Caspian Sea had been incorporated into the empire of the Khan, an empire that he bequeathed to his three sons, Chaqatai, Ogodai, and Tuli. The apanage of Jochi, his eldest son who had died recently, was given to Chingiz's grandson, Batu, the future Batu Khan.

Chingiz Khan's approach to rulership was different from that of the khans of the Bakhtiaris in that he sought to subsume under his own the identities of all the tribes that shared the land with him. With this in mind, he systematically divested the Naiman, Kereyid, Merkid, and Oriat chiefs of their individual identities. He also took away the identities of the chiefs' subjects. All of them then were reintroduced to the world with a new, indelible identity, Mongol.

The reidentification process was systematic. The individual joined the army as a member of an arvan (group of 10), a Juz (group of 100), a quran (group of 1000), or a Tuman (group of 10,000). In all these cases, he would find himself in an orda, which could contain anywhere between 30,000 and 50,000 members. Although only a few in each group were actually of genuine Mongol extraction, they all worked under the rule, or Yasaq, of Chingiz Khan, a Mongol.

Neither did the process stop there. Each commander had to introduce his sons and relatives to Mongol service under a special pattern. The sons of the leaders were to bring a younger brother and a set number of their men to serve the Khan. All recruits were provided with horses from the Great Khan's stable

The Mongol army was a monolith at the apex of which stood the Great Khan. His word was law and his power was paramount, No chief, commander, or administrator dared approach him, let alone rebel against his might. His army did not recognize defeat.

When Chingiz Khan divided his kingdom, he also divided the solidarity that had become its hallmark. In 1237, a Mongol horde captured Bulgar on the Volga and destroyed its fur trade. Then, following the fleeing Bulgars, Batu Khan (r. 1240-1255), the future ruler of the Golden Horde, captured Riyazan, Moscovy, and Vladimir-Suzdalia. From there, he invaded Kiev (main Russian stronghold and seat of Christianity) and destroyed its might. By 1242, Batu Khan, had added a considerable amount of land and prestige to the already impressive legacy of Chingiz Khan. This included the Qipchaq Plain, Moscovy and related principalities, all the way to Budapest in present-day Hungary.

The rule of the Mongols in Russia remained solid as long as they stayed faithful to the Yasaq of Chingiz Khan and the Mandate of Heaven. But change was inevitable, given the rise of Muslim power in Anatolia and Iran on the one hand and of Christianity under Moscovy in the west. Khan Uzbek (1313-1341) became the first to gravitate towards Islam and, consequently, the first to undermine the unity of the Golden Horde. Under him the New Serai became the center of Islamic learning; the threat of Russification of the Mongols was averted.

The Russians, on the other hand, continued their relentless effort to overthrow the Mongol yoke by creating ethnic and religious strife among tribal constituents. In time, tribal chiefs, whose ancestors had allowed their identities to be subsumed under Chingiz Khan, asserted themselves, formed the Khanates of Kazan, Astarakhan, and Crimea, and put an end to Mongol hegemony. Between 1552 and 1783, the growing Russian Empire annexed the khanates.

Reviewing such accounts, Lenin realized correctly that the chiefs themselves could, under proper circumstances, undermine the unity that had gave them such might. Bloodline, after all, is a property of the tribe not of the confederation. He thus formed a commission to study the tribes of Central Asia and to establish as many republics as would populate the majority of certain ethnic groups. Divided along ethnic lines, Lenin was certain, the Turks would no longer pose a threat for the nascent Soviet Nation. Additionally, competition as well as squabbles among the chiefs of the new "republics" would keep them from giving United Turkistan a second thought.

In the same way that Iran served the West as its showcase of modernization and westernization in the Middle East, Afghanistan was used by the Soviet Union to showcase its advanced programs of sovietization in Southwest Asia. Amity between Kabul and Moscow was sealed in a friendship treaty in 1921. In the 1950's Afghanistan became the first non-Communist nation to receive aid from the Soviet Union. Two years later, the Soviets started to broadcast into Afghanistan in the Pushtu language. During Zahir Shah's reign, the Soviets built countless factories, tunnels, roads, canals, gas pipelines, and airports in Afghanistan. They upgraded the infrastructure of Kabul, Herat, and other major cities and trained large groups of Afghan youth that would, at the appropriate time, take the reigns of power in the country.

Predictably, the Soviets, too, faced in Afghanistan the same problem that the West faced in Iran. Reactionary clergy would not allow reforms that concerned the education and unveiling of women, distribution of property, prevention of polygamy, and of child marriages. In the 1970's, the Soviets pressed the issue by changing the government and by applying pressure on the clergy. The Afghans' response emerged in the form of the anti-Soviet Mujahiddin supported by the West, primarily the United States. It also resulted in a senseless Soviet-Afghan war that lasted almost a decade and cost a million lives.

The Soviets in Afghanistan were in the business of nation building, A trend that the West continues to pursue because it is a model that it recognizes to be the best. Nations, however, by nature, require the unflinching loyalty of all constituents. Afghans, on the other hand, identify themselves as Herati, Qunduzi, Ghilzai or Durrani. The first two are individuals who are loyal to the warlords of Herat and Qunduz, respectively. The latter two are members of two Pushtun tribes. Neither would call himself a Pushtun. Additionally, none of the four would identify himself as an Afghan per se.

In bloodline systems, the individual is tied to the land, to a guerrilla army, and to the whims of a tribal khan. He receives little or no education, does not understand his rights, and lives and dies with little knowledge of the world around him. Neither does the tribe that he lives in and serves document its glories or its ignominy. The Central Asian scene after the fall of the Soviet Union presented a most telling example of tribes emerging from the darkness. In 1992, the Kazakhs could not provide any documentation regarding their long and glorious past; nothing, that is, other than what was recalled by their contemporary akins, batyrs, bais, and biis.

Conclusion

Present-day conflicts result from either the incongruity that exists within governing systems themselves or from one system imposing its will on the other. The complexity of the conflicts depends on the sophistication of the systems in conflict. The impact of the imposition of westernization on Iran and of sovietization on Afghanistan were briefly reviewed.

Of the systems discussed, western democracies are less prone to internal conflicts. They use education as a means to reach the roots of conflicts and eradicate them. The United States' efforts since the 1960's in eradicating problems arising from race and sex can serve as examples.

Autocratic or faith-based systems are most prone to internal conflict. This conflict can be acerbated by manipulation from the outside. When that happens, the country is drawn into interstate conflicts such as the Iran-Iraq War. Hinging on faith, i.e., community interpretations of divine will, the system is driven by emotion more than by logic. In addition to education, a requirement for the reason-based systems as well, this system needs a benevolent dictator to keep its people out of harm's way. Iran presents a good case history for this.

The ideal mode of operation for bloodline-based systems is government through consensus under the auspices of a respected warlord or chieftain. Imposition of western-style nationalism on regionally and ethnically diverse peoples is a contradiction in terms. The situation in present-day Afghanistan illustrates this point.

Selected Bibliography