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| Looking
on the Bright Side |
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| Fear
has long paralyzed Western policy toward the Middle East. And what has
come of this? Repression, radical Islam and terror |
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Yesterday,
a discussion on the meaning of love turned—as did every discussion at
Davos this year—to one subject, America and Iraq. Most European and
Middle Eastern participants at the conference think a war with Iraq
would be a disaster. You’ve heard the case. The war could go badly.
Saddam could set fire to his oilfields, sending oil prices soaring. War
could provoke a major terrorist attack, by Saddam or others. Muslim
sentiment around the world could get inflamed. If Iraq implodes, the
region could get destabilized. |
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THESE ARE ALL LEGITIMATE concerns. The risks are real. But so are
the potential benefits. Consider for a moment the possible results of a
successful war in Iraq:
A major producer of weapons of mass destruction would be eliminated.
Since there are very few states that have set out to make chemical,
biological and nuclear weapons, taking one off the list is a big step
toward safety. Other would-be weapons producers will likely think twice
before going down a similar path.
The Iraqi people would gain liberty. No matter what comes after Saddam,
it will be better than his totalitarian regime. For the majority of
Iraqis—who are Kurds, Shiites and Turkmens—as well as for most
Sunnis, it will be the end of a nightmare of repression.
The Iraqi people would get on the road to economic well being. The
current policy of containment has the awful side- effect of starving
millions of Iraqis. The United Nations tried to design its sanctions to
prevent this, but thanks to Saddam’s subterfuge, the oil-for-food
program has become the oil-for-palaces program. With the end of the
regime will come the end of sanctions. It would also end a military
machine that has swallowed most of Iraq’s money.
Political and economic reform
would quicken around the Arab world. Just as Japan’s economic success
after World War II became a powerful model that other countries in East
Asia emulated, even moderate success in Iraq could embolden reformers in
the region.
The cause of radical, violent anti-Westernism—the one ideological
trait that is shared by both Saddam and the Islamic
fundamentalists—would be dealt a severe blow. Osama bin Laden once
said that when people see a weak horse and a strong horse, they
naturally want to side with the strong horse. No one will want to side
with a dead horse.
The oil cartel would break down. An Iraq that is market-friendly and
needs to pump out oil to meet its reconstruction costs may not join
OPEC. Or it may refuse to keep to OPEC’s quotas. Either way, it would
mean the end of the oil cartel since three of the world’s largest
oil-producing states—Russia and Norway being the others—would not
engage in price fixing.
If oil prices stay low, over time the pressures for reform could build
even more. The regimes of the Middle East—most of which are
nondemocratic and nonperforming—will find it increasingly difficult to
stay in power if they don’t open up. In short, if oil goes to $10 a
barrel, the Saudi monarchy goes to Majorca.
As regimes in the Middle East begin performing better and allow their
people greater freedoms, people will give voice to their frustrations
and ambitions through regular economic and political means—not
radicalism and terror. This is not as farfetched as it might sound.
Radical communism—which seemed a potent threat in the late 1940s and
1950s in Europe and East Asia—lost its appeal as those countries
achieved stability, political freedom and economic vitality. |
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Not all of this will
happen. In fact, most of it will probably not happen. But not all of the
bad things people predict will likely happen, either. And even if a few
of the forces described above are unleashed, they will have lasting
positive effects on the region and the whole Muslim world.
Of course, not everyone would
be helped by a successful war. The ruling elites in the Middle
East—particularly those that remain stubbornly set in their old
ways—will be challenged, threatened and eventually overturned. For
these potentates and their courtiers it would mean the end of one of the
richest gravy trains in history. That is why they will fight change as
fiercely as they can. But for the people of the Middle East, after the
shock of the war fades, it could mean a chance to break out of the
terrible stagnancy in which they now sit.
There are always risks
involved when things change. But for the past 40 years the fear of these
risks has paralyzed Western policy toward the Middle East. And what has
come of this caution? Repression, radical Islam and terror. I’ll take
my chances with change.
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