THE CHICKAMAUGA CAMPAIGN
Battle of
Chickamauga
Date: September 19-20, 1863
Location: Georgia
Confederate Commander: Braxton
Bragg
Union Commander:
William Rosecrans
Confederate Forces
Engaged: 66,326
Union Forces Engaged:
58,222
Winner:
Confederacy
Casualties:
34,624 (16,170 Union and 18,454
Confederate)
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(1817-1876) |
Battle of Chickamauga
September 19-20, 1863
Rosecrans' successful Tullahoma Campaign turned Bragg out of his
positions in Tenn. North of Chattanooga and opened the way for the capture of
that vital communications hub. The town was too well fortified to be taken by
frontal assault, so Rosecrans planned another strategic envelopment. He decided
to operate west of the town, rather than to the east, so as to make the best use
of the rail lines to Stevenson for supplying his forces. Bragg expected his
opponent to shift his line of operations to the other side of Chattanooga, where
he would be in a better position to secure the assistance of Burnside's forces
in east Tenn.
The Confederate authorities considered another offensive
into Tenn., but decided they lacked the means. They then ordered a
reorganization of Bragg's forces in order to assure the defense of Chattanooga.
Buckner was put under Bragg's command, and Longstreet was ordered from the Army
of Northern Va. with the divisions of McLaws and Hood to reinforce Bragg.
After much unsuccessful urging, the authorities in Washington on 5
Aug. Sent Rosecrans and Burnside orders to advance and gain possession of the
upper Tennessee Valley. On 15 Aug. Rosecrans issued orders for an advance to the
Tennessee River, and Burnside ordered an advance on Knoxville and Kingston.
Rosecrans' forces reached their initial objectives 21 Aug. And spent the rest of
the month preparing to cross.
Bragg began concentrating his forces
around Chattanooga when he learned from Wheeler's cavalry that the Federals were
starting to cross the river. About 1 Sept. He was reinforced by two divisions
from the Army of the Miss. (Breckinridge and W.H.T. Walker). Wheeler and Forrest
remained in command of the cavalry carps. On the morning of the 18th
three brigades of Longstreet's corps arrived, under Hood's command. Longstreet
himself arrived the next night with two more brigades. The six brigade of the
eastern troops and E.P. Alexander's artillery did not arrive in time for the
battle.
Rosecrans crossed the river without opposition, completing
the operation 4 Sept. Assuming from incorrect reports that Bragg was evacuating
Chattanooga, Rosecrans advanced through the mountainous terrain on a 40-mile
front to cut off Bragg's retreat. By 6 Sept. His three corps were in the valley
of Lookout Creek, with the most advanced division in Steven's Gap. Burnside
occupied Knoxville and Kingston this same day. It was also on 6 Sept. That Bragg
decided to abandon Chattanooga, concentrate at LaFayette, and defeat the
Federals as they emerged from the mountain passes. Hill moved the night of the
7th to LaFayette; Polk started the next morning for Lee and Gordon's
Mill; Walker joined Hill near LaFayette; and Buckner took up a position
generally between the two wings.
There followed a complex sequence of
maneuvers in which the failures of Bragg's subordinates deprived the
Confederates of their opportunity for defeating isolated Federal units in
detail. The first failure was on the 10th when faulty coordination
between the divisions of Hindman (Polk) and Cleburne (Hill) enabled Negley's
isolated division at Dug Gap to be reinforced before the Confederates could
attack it. Rosecrans now believed the entire enemy army was around LaFayette and
started concentrating his own forces. Crittenden, who had taken Chattanooga and
then moved to Ringgold, started westward on 12 Sept. To Lee and Gordon's Mill.
Walker was ordered from LaFayette to reinforce Polk and to attack Crittenden.
The forces of both commanders now began to shift north. Rosecrans order McCook
to withdraw from Alpine and move west of Lookout Mountain to join Thomas at
Steven's Gap. Both commanders shifted troops as bits of enemy information
were reported. Bragg, having missed repeated opportunities for destroying
isolated Federal forces, now was content to await his reinforcements from Miss.
And Va.
Bragg ordered a dawn attack for 18 Sept. Against Crittenden's
corps on the Federal north flank. This well-conceived plan was frustrated by
Federal mounted brigades. Bushrod Johnson's division finally succeeded in
forcing a crossing against Minty's cavalry at Reed's Bridge late in the
afternoon. Wilder's cavalry inflicted heavy losses on Liddell's division
(Walker's corps), succeeding finally in dismantling Alexander's bridge and
forcing the Confederates to cross at Lambert's Ford. Polk was to attack
Crittenden frontally at Lee and Gordon's Mill after the enveloping force of
Forrest, Buckner, W.H.T. Walker, and Bushrod Johnson crossed the creek; the
failure of the envelopment meant that Polk could not attack. As a result,
Crittenden's corps was not engaged at all during the day.
The First Day (19 Sept. '63)
During the night preceding the battle both sides were shifting troops.
"Neither army knew the exact position of the other....It is probable that
division commanders on either side hardly knew where their own commands were, in
the thick woods., let alone the other troops of their own arm, or the troops of
the hostile army. The lines were at this time about six miles long."
On the morning of the 19th Thomas ordered Brannan's
division, then posted on the road two miles north of the Lee and Gordon's Mill,
to reconnoiter toward Chickamauga Creek. Brannan encountered and drove back
Forrest's dismounted cavalry, which called on the nearest Confederate infantry
for help. This brought on an all-day battle. Every division of the XIV, XX, and
XXI Corps was committed. Of the Confederate forces, only the divisions of
Breckinridge and Hindman, on the south flank, were not engaged. Neither side
gained any decided advantage.
The Second Day (20 Sept.
'63)
Battle
Map
During the night the two opposing forces further rearranged their
dispositions in the difficult terrain. Rosecrans prepared defensive positions,
and Bragg planned an attack. Longstreet had arrived during the night; he was
given command of the left wing of Bragg's army, and Polk was given command of
the other.
Bragg's units were to attack successively from north to
south. Breckinridge attacked on the north at 9 o'clock Sunday morning. Thomas,
commanding the Federal left wing, called for Negley's division, which was
supposed to be in reserve. Due to an error, however, Negley was in the line.
Wood, whose division was in reserve where Negley's was supposed to be, moved up
to relieve Negley, while the latter sent one brigade and then another to
reinforce Thomas. For two hours the Federal left successfully held off heavy
attacks.
Rosecrans' misunderstanding as to the true location of his
units then led to a fatal error. He was trying to strengthen the defenses on his
right while Thomas held the other flank. Thinking that Wood was on Reynolds'
(right) flank, he ordered Wood "to close up and support Reynolds." Actually,
Brannan was on Wood's left, and following his instructions, Wood pulled out of
the line, passed behind Brannan, and fell in on Reynolds' flank. The divisions
of Sheridan and J.C. Davis were closing to fill this gap at abut 11:30 when
Longstreet attacked. By a strange coincidence, Longstreet hit the precise point
left open by the Federal error. Sheridan's and Davis' divisions were shattered
by superior force, and the Federal right was driven back on its left flank.
Rosecrans, McCook, and Crittenden, unable to rally the troops around
them, fled to Chattanooga, thinking the entire army was being destroyed. Thomas
remained on the field, turning Wood and Brannan to block Longstreet on the
south. Bragg had failed to provide for a general, and so was unable to exploit
Longstreet's success. Three brigades of Granger's Reserve Corps ("Army of the
Kentucky") were near McAffee's Church with orders to remain there and protect
the flank. In a splendid example of battlefield initiative Granger violated his
orders and "at the moment of greatest need reported to Gen. Thomas with two
brigades" (Whittaker and Mitchell from Steedman's division). Van Horne says "the
opportune aid o these two brigades saved the army from defeat and rout" (Van
Horne, I, 353). Thomas held the field until dark and then, on orders from
Rosecrans, withdrew to Rossville Gap. Rosecrans withdrew his army into
the defenses of Chattanooga. Bragg followed, occupied Missionary Ridge and laid
siege to the town.
Epilogue
Although Bragg had won a decided tactical victory, his piecemeal method of attack and lack of a general reserve deprived him of the success that an outstanding general might have achieved under the circumstances--particularly the rare bit of luck occasioned by Longstreet's attack finding a gap. Failure to pursue the shattered Federals deprived Bragg of the fruits of his victory. The work of Thomas--the "Rock of Chickamauga"--the steadfastness of the troops on his wing, and the troops on his wing, and initiative of Granger, all helped make this a Pyretic victory for the South.
An evaluation of the statistics shows that the Union had 19.6 percent killed and wounded and Confederates 25.9 percent. Using Livermore's "hit by 1,000" system of comparing the combat effectiveness, Rosecrans' troops killed or wounded 292 Confederates for every 1,000 Federal soldiers engaged; Bragg's forces, on the other hand, killed or wounded only 172 Federals for every 1,000 of their own troops engaged. The battle, fought in a densely wooded area which permitted little or no tactical control of units, was one of the bloodiest of the war.
Chickamauga was a maker and breaker of reputations. Thomas's performance elevated him to top command, and Granger was also marked for higher responsibility. Rosecrans, Alexander McCook, Crittenden, and Negley were relieved: the last three were charged with misconduct but acquitted. The fractious Bragg, whose personality defect were large responsible for the poor cooperation of his subordinates, relieved Polk, D.H. Hill, and Hindman for unsatisfactory performance during the campaign.
Source: "The Civil War Dictionary," by Mark M. Boatner III
