B. The site selected for the 819th was Phu Cat Air Base, formerly known as Base X before final site selection was made in March 1966. In the course of site selection surveys Lt Col William Bordner lost his life when, alighting from a reconnaissance helicopter, he stepped upon a booby-trapped phosphorus grenade. Lt Col Bordner's tragic death was the first among Air Force Civil Engineering Officers in Viet Nam.
C. Phu Cat Air Base is located approximately 18 miles northwest of the coastal city of Qui Nhon in Binh Dinh Providence, Republic of Viet Nam. The area now occupied by the base was formerly a Viet Cong Training Center, a not unlikely activity since the town of An Nhon, five miles to the south is the birthplace of the Communist insurgency movement in Southeast Asia. The base lies in a large, fertile, rice-producing valley eight miles southwest of the Phu Cat mountains which, until the fall of 1966, had never been entered by forces loyal to the Central Government. In late April 1966, the 1st Capitol (Tiger) Division, Republic of Korea, moved into the Phu Cat area to secure the proposed base site. On 13 May elements of the RMK-BRJ work force arrived to establish a construction camp and a 3,000-foot temporary dirt airstrip. By 20 August the RMK camp was fully operational.
D. Coincident with the buildup of RMK-BRJ personnel, two contingents, totaling 55 men from the 554th and 555th RED HORSE squadrons, arrived at Phu Cat to start the permanent camp for the 819th. These detachments were joined by the advanced party of the 819th on 6 August and by 1 September had completed 50 - 16 ft x 32 ft living hootches, a mess hall and four concrete pads for industrial shops. All buildings had concrete floors, transite roofs and were fully screened and louvered. As a result of this magnificent effort, which fully
demonstrated the field experience of the 554th and 555th and the training of the 819th, the main body of the 819th which arrived in late August and early September was enabled to bed down immediately and to proceed with the construction of the squadron industrial area.
B. Training was initiated on 1 May 1966 and continued through 1 September when the last increment of the squadron departed for SEA. For the period of training the squadron was assigned to Headquarters Tactical Air Command (TAC). The training was in accordance with the TAC training lan for project RED HORSE dated February 1966 and prepared by the Deputy for Civil Engineering Hq TAC. The overall program was divided into four phases:
(1) PHASE I consisted of orientation on the mission and organization of RED HORSE squadrons; processing and bed down; personnel screening and commander's time.
(2) PHASE II consisted of academic training which was broken into two categories: General Subjects and Special Subjects.
(a) General Subjects covered items relating to the unit mission, mandatory for all squadron personnel. General Subjects included small arms familiarization and qualification, physical conditioning, first aid, field living conditions (including sanitation), tactical training, supply discipline and concept of operations for Civil Engineering squadrons.
(b) Special Subjects were courses required by selected members of the squadron. Special Subjects included:
ARMCO revetment construction, field water purification plant operation, generator operation, explosives and demolitions, well drilling, T-17 membrane,
AM-2 matting, crushing and screening plant operations, aircraft arresting systems, entomology training,
portable airfield lighting, soils, mobility, scuba diving, sawmill operation, and tropical medicines and field dentistry.
(3)PHASE III Unit Operational Readiness Training consisted of classroom lectures conducted by squadron personnel, selected work projects and two training projects assigned by Headquarters TAC. The two training projects were the completion of an assault landing strip with a T-17 membrane surface at Pope AFB, North Carolina, and construction of an
assault landing strip at Pearson Ridge, Louisiana, 80 miles west of England AFB and 35 miles north of Fort Polk.
(4)PHASE IV consisted of commander's time used to prepare the squadron for deployment to the Republic of Viet Nam.
C. The overall training program was probably too long; however, the general subjects included in PHASE II are considered mandatory for any unit deployment. The construction projects included in PHASE III gave the squadron an insight into field construction techniques. The Peason Ridge project included a mobility exercise of moving equipment from Forbes AFB to Peason Ridge by C-130 aircraft. After 819th insistence that scrapers were required to complete the project, Hq TAC authorized an over-the-road convoy. As insignificant as it may sound, the knowledge gained on
this convoy, 750 miles over road, assisted the squadron especially when once arriving in Viet Nam convoying was the rule between Qui Nhon and Phu Cat. The Peason Ridge project included a field encampment which was excellent training for Viet Nam. At Pope AFB, the T-17 membrane laying was a preview for the squadron's mission at Phu Cat Air Base. The PHASE III training did not provide the entire squadron with the training needed. The 819 CES organized as a medium repair squadron meant that the cantonment unit was larger while the airfield unit was smaller than the 554th, 555th or 820th Squadrons. The training which cantonment personnel obtained was
negligible, that is carpenters, plumbers, masons, etc. It is acknowledged that airfield personnel need training on heavy equipment operation, moving earth and preparing earth pads. The answer to the training would be a longer training period for airfield personnel with a shorter period for cantonment people; or perhaps an initial TDY assignment for airfield personnel to an equipment training center as the Navy has at Port Heuneme. One of the biggest problems was the lack of information on the location of Phu Cat, that is, where the base was and what the squadron's mission would be. Very little advance planning was possible because information was not available. Training could have been directed towards specific problems especially in the engineering areas. Training at Forbes AFB, Kansas, gave the squadron experience in how to operate in a disaster when
in June a destructive tornado hit Topeka and the 819 CES was requested to help clean up the damage.
2. Arrival at Phu Cat-Personnel and construction equipment from the 554th and 555th were transported to Qui Nhon by Navy LSL from Cam Ranh Bay in late July. Joined by the 37th Air Police Squadron, they arrived at Phu Cat AB by armed convoy from Qui Nhon on 1 August 1966. They immediately began construction of the defense perimeter and a field camp. Personnel, cook, mess hall and medic tents were erected. Field showers and latrines were fabricated. A truck-mounted erdilator was set up to supply potable water. Sandbag bunkers were built. A decrepit 100 Kw generator supplied intermittent electrical power. Vehicle maintenance and carpenter-prefab shops were constructed. On 6 August the 819 CES advance party landed at Qui Nhon Army Airfield after a 72-hour flight from Forbes AFB, Kansas, in a slow C-130. The first MOB arrived from Saigon the same morning. The two outfits, escorted by air police, convoyed 18 miles north to Phu Cat AB on the same day. The field camp was complete and construction of the permanent RED HORSE area began the next day.
3. Construction-The construction program consisted of 50 personnel hootches (16 ft x 32 ft, concrete floors, transite roofs, and louvered walls) and a 7,800 sq ft mess hall. An equipment parking lot and a single wall inflatable warehouse were programmed to provide storage for the scheduled arrival of the squadron's equipment and materials by ship the first of September. Utility services and roads were programmed as well as the start of the industrial area construction. The cantonment site was located in a large grove of trees on the slope of a hill; however, initial surveys showed that the construction plans placed over half the hootches in open ground away from the abundant trees. Also the geometric layout planned would necessitate the destruction of many trees. The layout of the hootches and mess hall was modified to take advantage of the trees as well as the natural drainage. Not one tree was destroyed in the construction of the cantonment area.
Local Vietnamese Nationals were hired as carpenters, masons and laborers. Although initially unskilled, they learned their relatively simple tasks quickly and were instrumental in completing the construction program on schedule. The Vietnamese prefabed the hootches, installed louvers and roofing, dug foundations and poured and finished concrete. Because of the limited concrete capability (one unreliable 16 cubic-foot mixer), concrete pouring set the pace of the construction. Although regular working hours were 0630 to 1800, seven days a week, concrete pouring and finishing usually continued until dark. Finishing concrete under floodlights proved unsuccessful. Many crucial jobs, affecting the concrete operation, lasted past midnight, such as building a crude concrete batch plant to use with a borrowed transit mix truck when the 16 cubic-foot mixer broke down for the final time. The breakdown of the advance party by AFSC's was not ideal for the construction job that faced them, especially in the first weeks, primarily carpenter and mason skills were needed. However, AFSC's were forgotten. Electricians set forms and mixed concrete, plumbers drove dump trucks, linemen poured concrete and supervised Vietnamese crews. The construction could not have been completed without this willingness to undertake any task. Many unusual problems confronted the advance party. Heat and dust in August were terrible. However, a thunderstorm in late August (the first rain) collapsed many tents, including the mess tent; supper was served in the rain and mud. The only laundry facilities were the Vietnamese laundries in the village of Phu Cat. The laundry came back smelling worse than before and very little cleaner. The discovery of poisonous snakes was an almost daily occurrence. However, the good chow and showers every night largely made up for the minor discomforts of field living.
4. Conclusion-All the programmed construction was completed as scheduled. The problems caused by lack of materials and equipment were solved by ingenuity and hard work. The preplanning and prepositioning of construction materials at Qui Nhon by 7th Air Force, the assistance of the 554th and 555th and the hiring of Vietnamese Nationals were major factors in the successful
completion of the project.
2.Oranization:
a. The squadron was organized in accordance with the Project RED HORSE Commander's guide which was prepared by the Deputy for Civil Engineering, Headquarters Tactical Air Command. This directive organized the squadron in such a manner that all major functions, i.e., Engineering/Operations, Cantonment, Airfield, Logistics, Medical, Administration and the First Sergeant reported directly to the Commander. During the four-month training period prior to deployment to SEA this organizational arrangement appeared to function in a satisfactory manner. The squadron was engaged in a training program, conducted by the Engineering/Operation Section, which involved the scheduling of classes, TDY trips, training exercises, etc. Little conflict between the various sections arose during this period, because the program was straight-forward and little flexibility for varying decisions by the different sections existed. Upon deployment, however, this idyllic state of affairs came to an abrupt halt. Each section began to develop into strong teams by identifying the leaders among the enlisted men and organizing within their framework to take advantage of these more aggressive individuals. Reorganization within the respective sections was also accomplished to take into account the type of construction and work that lay ahead. The final results of this changeover and subsequent reconsolidation was the formation of well knit, highly motivated teams who were proud and jealous of their ability to do an outstanding job. Now the problem - who tells who what to do? This massive juggernaut of men and machines was not ready to set records, but who was to direct it on a daily basis? The Commander had neither the time nor need to become involved in the detailed mechanics of daily operation. In this case the Commander placed the responsibility in the Engineering/Operations Section. This section was held responsible for siting, designing, scheduling, direction and controlling all work performed by the Airfield and Cantonment units. However, the structure of the squadron was never modified. The Airfield and Cantonment chiefs continued to report directly to the Squadron Commander; consequently, the Engineer/Operations Officer, who had the responsibility for assuring that work was accomplished, was forced to control the squadron effort from a staff position. This position of the Operations Officer bordered on being untenable for months. The operating units resented the fact, which was clearly understandable, that they were force to take directions from an office that was not above them in the chain of command. When a problem became an issue it was a toss-up as to who's decision would rule - the Chief of the Operating Unit, or the Chief of the Engineering/Operations Section. An occasional restatement of operating policy by the Commander was necessary to maintain the organizational structure that had been established. Finally, after gradual shifts in position by each in respect to recognizing the fact that there were side benefits to an air of cooperation, an atmosphere of mutual respect began to develop. This spirit of cooperation between the various sections and the desire to do an outstanding job in all aspects of the tremendous undertaking, finally became the prevailing attitude and record amounts of work were then accomplished.
b. The important lesson learned from the trials and tribulations of this formation period was the absolute necessity of having the office responsible for direction squadron efforts in the chain of command and definitely not in a staff position. This requirement was recently recognized by 7th Air Force when it submitted a new standard RED HORSE organization in which the Cantonment and Airfield Units report directly to the Operations Officer.
COMMANDER'S NOTE: The foregoing expresses the opinion of the Operations Officer. As Commander I did not feel that it was necessary to delegate my command responsibilities in that particular area in the belief that a statement of policy by me to the effect that the Engineering Section would direct and control all construction operations was sufficient guidance for all concerned. Such eventually proved to be the case. It has always been my belief that a spirit of mutual understanding, coordination and cooperation will carry any project further than the simple issuance of orders.
3. Climactic conditions at PHU CAT:
a. Phu Cat is located in the eastern coastlands region of Viet Nam, which extends from the demilitarized zone to Nha Trang and averages between 25 to 40 miles in width. The mountains of the interior highlands extend to the coast in several places, but primarily the area is a scene of intensive cultivation. Phu Cat itself lies in a fertile valley encircled by mountains from southeast to the northwest and from north to east. The monsoon season for this area begins in late September or early October and lasts until January with the rain blowing consistently from the north. During this period in 1966-67, 89.48 inches of rain fell on the air base; however, from January 1967 to August 1967, insignificant amounts of rain were experienced. By late May the streams on the base had dried up completely and the local water table had dropped to the level that previously active aquifers stopped flowing. By mid-June, the once soggy, bottomless rice paddies had dried to the point that vehicular traffic could be supported with absolutely no difficulty. Without question, the construction period for this area of Viet Nam, from a climatic standpoint, is from February to mid-September.
b. Hot weather was not considered a factor to contend with in this area. Normal nine-hour work days were observed during the very hottest periods. Even the installation of a 206,800 square yard AM-2 aircraft apron was accomplished during the hot season with no heat exhaustion problems. The consequence of extended periods of hot dry weather is the creation of clouds of blowing dust in the areas of construction and other locations where the vegetation had been removed.
c. Weather is definitely a factor that must be considered for this section of Viet Nam. While it is true that some construction is possible during the four-month monsoon, only the remaining eight months of the year should be considered as acceptable for heavy construction.
4. Use of Vietnamese labor:
a. A major contributing factor in the progress of work at Phu Cat was the use of
Vietnamese laborers. Vietnamese were hired from the time of the squadron's arrival in August 1966 with increasing numbers brought on board as the construction pace accelerated.
b. It was immediately recognized that despite the fact they came from a rural peasant area, they could produce good work with the inherent skills possessed but would work only at their own speed - slow. They could not and would not be pressured to accelerate their work pace not matter what the inducement. Best results were always obtained when airmen actually worked side by side with the Vietnamese rather than occupying solely the position of supervisor.
c. The trials and tribulations of lack of verbal communication were overcome by the use of interpreters and lavish use of sign language. Airmen versed in the art of charades did well in leading the Vietnamese, and those who worked continually with them did begin to pick up the language - some even became quite fluent. It was also found best to keep crews intact with the same leader for better understanding on the part of all.
d. Labor relations did at times become quite strained through minor grievances and misunderstandings, but were generally resolved by wholesale firings when necessary. Gradually the philosophy of no work, no pay became accepted as a matter of principle. On one occasion a work team in the Cantonment Section actually staged a sit-down strike. Here the backbone of the strike was quickly broken by firing the lot. A policy of firmness coupled with fairness was followed at all times.
e. Gradually the poor workers, usually the extremely lazy and those with a record of excessive absenteeism, were weeded out and the good workers rewarded by promotions with increased pay.
f. Early in the game it became quite apparent that an NCO had to be in general charge of the hiring, firing and overall administration of the workers. Fortunately the right man was found, one who took an interest and pride in his work despite the tedious headaches of misunderstanding and resulting grievances. In addition to processing their personnel records, he also handled payrolls and supervised the daily in and out processing through the entry gate. Each worker was searched coming and going to prevent the bringing in of explosive devices and petty thievery. The latter being a matter of instant dismissal.
g. An interesting sidelight on American-Vietnamese relations was the rapport generated in most sections. At Christmas 1966 a number of sections had parties for their workers as gestures of appreciation, these were quite spontaneous on the part to the airmen. It was quite amusing to see a
Vietnamese get "drunk" on carbonated soft drinks, an effect never before thought possible. It is believed that the effervescence went to heads, thus making them lightheaded.
h. Initially the 819th was authorized a strength of 764 workers; however, this was subsequently reduced to 514 with the maximum of 511 ever on board. The strength while steadily increasing as the workload picked up was subject to wild fluctuations due to dismissals and those who simply failed to show up. Local Viet Cong press-gang draft activities as well as those of the Central Government also took their toll of the labor force. All of these events contributed to a constant hiring action. Despite this seemingly wholesale turnover, a surprising number have been loyal steady workers and have remained with the 819th for one year. The constant effort has been weeding out process so that in time the squadron as well as the base would benefit from having on board a reliable work force rather than a simple mass of bodies. To a large extent we were successful.
i. On the whole, the average Vietnamese worker is a happy individual despite the conditions under which he lives. He responds to kindness and does develop a loyalty of sorts to the airman for whom he works. He also has a certain respect for the "America" way of doing things although they might be puzzling at the time. While the vast bulk of them were hired as simple laborers it was soon apparent that some had advanced skills. In this way we screened out electricians, vehicle mechanics, welders and sheet metal mechanics along with a vastly greater number of carpenters and masons. The latter two being their best crafts.
j. Although something over 800 workers passed through our labor ranks in the course of the year, there were no instances of subversive effort discerned on their part. The concrete crew did, however, manage to mix one batch of concrete with a 60 mm mortar found tumbling around inside the mixer. It was rationalized that this probably came through in the sand and was not introduced by the workers. The Americans on the crew were properly shocked at the sight of the round coming out of the mixer while the Vietnamese thought it was quite hilarious.
k. In summation the presence of local nationals in our work force proved to be a vital asset. Without exaggeration approximately 30% of the total RED HORSE construction at Phu Cat can be attributed to their efforts.