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/ Colormap • Page 6328 • {1/76} (1)Wednesday, 25 October 2000 [Open session] [The witness takes the stand] --- Upon commencing at 9.23 a.m. (5) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Good morning, ladies and gentlemen; good morning to the technical booth, the interpreters; good morning, legal assistants and the registrar; good morning to the Office of the Prosecutor, Defence counsel. Good morning, General Krstic. We're going to continue your (10)examination-in-chief. I wish to remind you that you are still testifying under oath, as you well know, and I give the floor now to Mr. Petrusic. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Good morning, Your Honours; good morning, my learned friends from the Prosecution. Mr. President, before we begin, the Defence would like to know (15)whether we are still in private session, because when we stopped, when we adjourned on Friday, we were in private session, and we should like to continue in that mode. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Petrusic. We are in public session. So as we discussed a few days ago, you have the same (20)reasons for requesting private session? MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Yes, Your Honour, precisely. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Petrusic, have you any idea how long you will need to remain in private session?
MR. PETRUSIC:
[Int.] The Defence hopes to complete its
(25)examination by the first break.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] It seems that we are already in
public session. We have completed the examination-in-chief of General
(25)Krstic, and now, perhaps after a short break, we will begin with the
--- Recess taken at 9.58 a.m. (5) --- On resuming at 10.17 a.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] I see Mr. McCloskey on his feet to begin the cross-examination. General Krstic, you will now be answering questions put to you by the Office of the Prosecutor. (10)Mr. McCloskey, you have the floor. Please go ahead. MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President. • CROSS-EXAMINED by Mr. McCloskey: • Q.: General Krstic, good morning. • A.: Good morning. (15) • Q.: I'll be asking you questions perhaps for a few days, so if there's any problems with your leg or any indications you have, please just let the Court know and myself or counsel, and do the best you can to answer the questions as clearly as you can. Thank you. You're a professional officer raised in the former JNA; is that (20)right? • A.: Yes. • Q.: And when the Srebrenica operation first began, you were the Chief of Staff for the Drina Corps; is that right? • A.: Yes, that's right. (25)
• Q.: Do you feel during your time as Chief of Staff for the Drina Corps
• A.: Yes. However, during that time I was absent quite a bit from the corps command, doing my operational duties, and I spoke about that during the examination-in-chief. (5) • Q.: What particular qualities do you possess that make you a good Chief of Staff? • A.: I, during the time that I was performing the duty in the operative body of the Prstina Corps, I arrived at some -- came by some information, that is to say, what the staff of the Corps' duty was together with the (10)Chief of Staff, because I was in the Prstina Corps as well, in the staff of the Corps. So I knew what there was to do. I don't know -- I can't say whether I was a good Chief of Staff and whether I was an effective Chief of Staff in the performance of my duties, the duties that were prescribed to me for my post, but I did try, to the best of my endeavours, (15)to perform my functions conscientiously and with full responsibility, bearing in mind the fact that I had just come to take over the post of Chief of Staff of the Corps with all the absences that took place surrounding the events in Srebrenica and around Srebrenica. • Q.: And you were promoted to Corps Commander, after the fall of (20)Srebrenica, by General Mladic; is that correct? • A.: No. I was appointed Corps Commander by the President of the Republika Srpska, Radovan Karadzic.
• Q.: Is it fair to say that General Mladic would have felt that you did
a good job in Srebrenica, otherwise, he wouldn't have wanted you as the
(25)Corps Commander for the Drina Corps?
• Q.: Were corps commanders generally promoted in the VRS because of (5)their ability to do the job? • A.: To do the job, you would have to go through all the other posts and jobs to arrive at that particular job and at that formation post, and I started out from the commander of a platoon and then went up to corps commander, and along this line, I went through all the jobs and duties and (10)did all my military training, attended all the military schools except the school for national defence. I had not completed that particular one, but I went through all the rest. And that was true for all the other commanders as well, other corps commanders, except for General Zivanovic, who had completed only military academy. (15) • Q.: Now, we've spoken about the documents, some of the rules and regulations of the former JNA, and I want to make reference to what is Exhibit 767. MR. McCLOSKEY: If that could be placed in front of the General. Could you place the English on the ELMO and provide the General with the (20)B/C/S version. • Q.: All right. General, we see before us Exhibit 767, the Rule of the Corps Ground Forces Provisional. You have told Mr. Ruez, and I believe you testified that this was one of the fundamental books used by the VRS as a guideline for corps procedures; is that right? (25)
• A.: Yes, in addition to the other rules and regulations, the Rule of
• Q.: All right. I'd like to direct your attention to what is Chapter III, called Command and Control. It should be on your next page. And provision number 1, the General Provisions, and I'd like to read this (5)out to you and ask you about it. "Command and control are conscious and organised activities of the commander of the corps and the bodies of the command, aimed at engaging and unifying the actions and activities of all units, commands, headquarters and other entities of the All People's Defence and social (10)self-protection in the zone of operation, as well as the equipment used in combat, for the purpose of achieving the set goals in the optimal way. "Command and control are exercised through planning, concerted action, organisation, command and control, preparation and execution of operations and other combat actions; they are based on unified, (15)continuous, secure, flexible, efficient, operative and secret information flows among the commands, units and institutions. "The Commander of the corps commands the forces of the Yugoslav People's Army and the Territorial Defence in his subordination in the zone of operation." (20)Is this principle of command and control fundamental to any effective military operation? • A.: Yes. It is fundamental not only to military operations but also to the work of the commands and staffs in control and command of units, et cetera. (25)
• Q.: And you were well-versed in this principle and experience in
• A.: Yes. This principle exists in the rules and regulations of lower formation units such as the commands of divisions, brigades and further on, up to the rules and regulations for platoons and companies. (5) • Q.: So this principle goes all the way from the top, the Main Staff down to the bottom, to the lowest private? • A.: Yes, precisely so. • Q.: And this is second nature to most experienced military men? • A.: I didn't quite understand your question. What do you mean by (10)"second nature"? • Q.: This is something that's ingrained in most military men, that this is something they all do; they all try to strive for this, working together in a unified, organised way, for a common goal? • A.: Yes. This, first and foremost, refers to commanding officers in (15)command of their units, and not to the ordinary soldiers or privates -- that is something else again -- for the rank and file. • Q.: And as a commander, when you were Commander of the Drina Corps, were you a good commander? • A.: I was the Corps Commander for a very short period of time. I (20)don't wish to give an assessment of myself, my own work. Quite simply, I did not have the time, for the reasons that I spoke of earlier on, to fully express myself in that post. But during the time that I did hold that post, I endeavoured to perform all my duties as prescribed.
• Q.: Part of those duties would be communicating with your subordinate
(25)units, wouldn't it?
• Q.: And knowing the situation in the area of those subordinate units? • A.: Yes, the organs in the corps command and via the commanders of the subordinate unit. (5) • Q.: Now, you testified earlier today that you made no investigation into the crimes that you had learned in August or September of 1995; is that correct? • A.: Yes, that's correct. • Q.: You made a reference that you were not allowed to do so. Do you (10)remember saying that? • A.: I was not allowed to do so, nor -- I was not able to do so, not allowed to, permitted. • Q.: Was it your duty to investigate, under the rules that were present at the time in the VRS and the RS? (15) • A.: Well, you could put it that way. However, I said who was in command of all those activities. It was, first and foremost, his duty. • Q.: You mean General Mladic? • A.: Yes. • Q.: However, you were a general in the VRS at the time of Srebrenica, (20)weren't you? • A.: That's correct.
• Q.: Let's go over some of the duties as they're set forth in some of
the applicable laws. Let's look first at OTP Exhibit 411A. This Exhibit
is from the Official Gazette of the Serbian People in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
(25)dated 13 June 1992, and entitled "Order on the Application of the Rules of
THE INTERPRETER: Could we ask counsel to slow down, please. (10) MR. McCLOSKEY: • Q.: General, you were the Corps Commander. As you know, it is the submission of the Prosecution that you became Corps Commander on 13 July. But be that as it may, even under your theory of becoming Commander on the 20th or 21st of July, you were Commander of the Drina Corps while this law (15)was in place, weren't you? • A.: Mr. Harmon, I do apologise, but I have Exhibit 411B in front of me, and I cannot see your quotation. I cannot see the portion you read out. • Q.: It should have been paragraph 2, under "Order on the Application (20)of Rules of International Law of War." • A.: Article 2: "The customs services perform general affairs in customs duties and other work provided for by this law."
• Q.: It appears you've got the wrong translation, which will happen
from time to time. So I think you're going -- you learned a little
(25)English in your time in the prison?
• Q.: Well, I'll read it one more time and go over slowly. If you could just take my word for it. And if you don't feel comfortable with that, (5)we'll find the document. I think we're getting closer. If you could look to the third page, B/C/S translation. It should be in the upper left-hand corner, paragraph 2. • A.: Yes, that's okay. • Q.: All right. Well, the section I was asking you about is: (10)"It is the duty of the competent superior officer to initiate proceedings for legal sanctions against individuals who violate the Rules of International Law of War." So, was it your duty at the time to initiate legal sanctions for those that were responsible? (15) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. McCloskey, I apologise for interrupting, but perhaps you ought to ask General Krstic if he has read this portion in the B/C/S version, and after having done so, you can go ahead and ask your question. MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President. (20) • Q.: General Krstic, let me know when you've had a chance to read that.
• A.: Yes. Thank you.
I have to say that I have not read this particular Official
Gazette, but it says what it says and was written on the basis of previous
(25)rules and regulation laws and so forth from the former JNA and the SFRY.
• Q.: And did you follow the duty as outlined in this law? • A.: In all cases, up until taking over responsibility from Popovic, I (5)did, but I explained the reasons concerning attempts to undertake something with respect to Lieutenant Colonel Popovic and perhaps some other commanding officers who were together with him from the security services and engaged in all this. • Q.: So you did nothing more than you've already described regarding (10)Colonel Popovic? • A.: I must acknowledge here before you and this Trial Chamber that not in my wildest dreams was I able to undertake any measures. We weren't allowed to talk about anything like that let alone take steps against a commanding officer, regardless of my knowledge that he or somebody else (15)had perhaps committed a war crime. • Q.: So regardless of the law and your duty, you would still not have reported any war crimes? • A.: It was my intention to report war crimes but that was not a possibility. I was not able to do so. (20) • Q.: Why? • A.: First of all, for security reasons, the security and safety of my family. MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President? JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Visnjic. (25)
MR. VISNJIC:
[Int.] I apologise for interrupting
(5) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. McCloskey, have you a response, without saying that we will have to move into private session, but perhaps we could for a brief period of time, but may we have a response, please? MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, I would anticipate us having to go (10)in and out, in and out of private all throughout the cross-examination. I -- this is -- it would be very awkward to try to work the cross-examination around this. Now, if the answer to this -- perhaps I can simplify it. If the answer to this question is he didn't do any reporting because he was afraid for himself and his family, we can just (15)leave it at that and go on to the next subject, but this is very difficult to try to anticipate what is and what is not going to cause us to go into private session. I do not want to bring the General's family in this; however, this question was not meant to bring his family in any sort of detailed way. (20) JUDGE RIAD: You would like to know the dimension of the danger? MR. McCLOSKEY: I really don't need to know too much about it, but if he was afraid for his own safety and the safety of others around him, that would satisfy the Prosecution at this time. I don't think that a lot of details are real important. (25)
JUDGE RODRIGUES: Let me consult my colleagues, please.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] We're going into private session
for two minutes, not more.
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] So we are in public session now. The Chamber has made a ruling last Friday, and that is that in order (5)to ensure fairness of the proceedings, the Prosecutor must be able to use the evidence produced during the hearing, even those that were used in private session for reasons indicated in the ruling of last Friday. Therefore, Mr. McCloskey, you may continue now. MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President. (10) • Q.: General Krstic, is it fair to say that you made no investigation and no report of war crimes because you were afraid for yourself and those around you? • A.: Yes. • Q.: And one of the main reasons you were afraid was that General Ratko (15)Mladic had recently perpetrated the murders of several thousand Bosnian Muslim men and that you were afraid that General Mladic would create the problems for you? • A.: I did not say that General Mladic would provoke problems in my examination-in-chief. I was afraid in the first place for the security of (20)my family and myself and my relatives and the relatives of my wife. I also explained why, because from the moment I asked for a replacement of a certain person, I said that I was constantly followed ever since that moment.
• Q.: General, you have told Mr. Ruez that General Mladic is the one
(25)that murdered thousands of Muslims. Now you've told us that you were
• A.: I said that General Mladic was responsible for the crimes, and I said that during my examination-in-chief. It can be said that I feared (5)him as well as his Security Service. • Q.: It may be a translation problem, but can you answer the question: Did you or did you not fear General Mladic? • A.: Mr. President, I do appeal to you, and I expect my Defence to respond. I would like such questions to be put to me in closed session, (10)please.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] We are still confronted with the
same problem. Mr. Petrusic or Mr. Visnjic, justice must be done in
public. We decided, not yesterday, but on Friday, we ruled on your
request, and the Chamber found that the explanations given could justify,
(15)to a certain extent, that part of the hearing during the
examination-in-chief should be conducted in private session, which was
indeed done, and the reasons are familiar to all of us here in this
courtroom. But we said that the Prosecutor is entitled to do his work,
and therefore, General Krstic, from the moment he agreed to testify, he
(20)did so to tell the truth, the whole truth.
We have always borne in mind security reasons, but we cannot risk
the principle of public hearings. We cannot go into private session,
because, as I have already said at the private session today, the reasons,
or a part of the reasons that justified a private session, had to do with
(25)security, yes, but also other reasons that we gave. And beyond all that,
(5)
MR. PETRUSIC:
[Int.] Mr. President, General Krstic is
referring to the reasons that have been given repeatedly, and with respect
to answers to specific questions by the Prosecution linked to the
responsibility of certain individuals from the army of Republika Srpska.
The Defence continues to maintain that General Krstic is right in
(10)requesting a private session.
The Defence is familiar with the ruling made by this Trial
Chamber. We are also aware of the reasons in favour of a public trial,
also the question of the interview granted, and all the other
considerations that have led the Prosecution to request a public session
(15)for the cross-examination. However, we continue to believe that those
reasons, the reasons which led to a private session during the
examination-in-chief, when it comes to the responsibility of individual
commanders in the Drina Corps and the army of Republika Srpska, and when
it comes to answers to those questions, that they should be given in a
(20)private session. If, however, they have to be made in public, then the
meaning of the previously made ruling is lost, that is, the private
sessions in which part of the examination-in-chief was held.
Without, for a moment, entering into the strategy and method of
questioning by Mr. McCloskey, I think that the Prosecution could make an
(25)effort to group certain questions together so as to be able to put them in
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Thank you, Mr. Petrusic. Mr. McCloskey. (5) MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, I don't think I have anything really new to add to this argument. I think Mr. Harmon began it, and I'm sorry to have stumbled into it again, but we do believe that open session is appropriate, especially for matters that have already been dealt with in open session when the General's tape was played. (10) JUDGE WALD: Mr. McCloskey, recognising, as an experienced trial lawyer, that you may get different nuances in the answers, depending upon whether or not you're in public or private session, I just want to make sure I understand your position. The Prosecution's position is still that it should be entirely public, regardless of whether you might get possibly (15)more information in a private session? I just want to make sure I have your position clear on that.
MR. McCLOSKEY: Your Honour, any answer that called for a family
issue or a family member or some highly personal matter, I don't think
Mr. Harmon nor myself would have any objection going into private
(20)session. Now, if I thought we would get more truth in a private session,
that's a very difficult question, because I think there is nothing more
important than getting at the truth here. However, as you know from the
culture of open sessions and Star Chambers, there's a balance here that
has to be weighed.
(25)Now, if I feel that the witness is obviously not going to be
JUDGE WALD: And by your questions.
MR. McCLOSKEY: And I'll definitely have a role in this, yes, Your
Honour. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] We see that it is now the time for the break, and we will indeed have a 15-minute break and resume after that. --- Recess taken at 11.04 a.m. (15) --- On resuming at 11.25 a.m.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] In response to the request of
General Krstic and bearing in mind that the principle of hearings should
be that they should be held in public except in exceptional circumstances,
when there are other interests in question such as the protection of
(20)security to be borne in mind, taking into account also that General Krstic
is now a witness but he's also the accused in this trial, and bearing in
mind that we are truly at the very heart of his defence and that it is
important to learn and know what his defence is, the Chamber would like to
provide the Prosecutor with the following guideline: The Prosecutor, as
(25)we have already said, has the right to conduct his cross-examination, but
MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President. • Q.: General Krstic, is it true that you did not discipline any Drina Corps soldier for Srebrenica crimes while you were the Drina Corps Commander? (20) • A.: Yes, it is. • Q.: And you did not punish any Drina Corps soldier for Srebrenica crimes while you were the Drina Corps Commander. • A.: Except for one individual with whom I spoke, I did not learn of any other individuals who had taken part in all that at the time. (25)
• Q.: Of all the units and officers and soldiers that must have been
• A.: Yes. At that time, only about the individual that you have just referred to. However, during the proceedings I realised that some others (5)also did participate. • Q.: All right. If we could now go to Exhibit 413A. The B/C/S is 413B. General Krstic, if you could -- I believe it's page 11 in the B/C/S version, under paragraph 3, entitled, "Criminal Offences Against Humanity and International Law, Pursuant to Chapter 16 of the Criminal Code." If (10)you could take a minute and read the first four paragraphs of that. And first of all, do you find what I've mentioned? • A.: Yes, under item 3. MR. McCLOSKEY: And this, for the record, is an exhibit titled "Guidelines for Determining Criteria for Criminal Prosecution," from the (15)military prosecutor's office at the Main Staff of the armed forces of the Republika Srpska, dated 6 October 1992. • Q.: Have you had a chance to read some of that, General? • A.: Yes, I have read it.
• Q.: All right. And the part that I want to call your attention to in
(20)particular, to ask you if you disagree with or agree with, would be
paragraph 2, under heading 3, and it says:
"Crimes against humanity and international law can be committed
by individuals acting on their own, but by their nature these criminal
offences are usually committed in an organised fashion in the
(25)implementation of the policy of the ruling circles. Most of these
• A.: This document was issued in October 1992, when I was the Commander of the 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade, and I must admit that at the time I (10)did not have this document. However, nevertheless, a lot of it was taken from the already existing rules and regulations which I was familiar with. This not only could be applied to Srebrenica and the events in and around Srebrenica, but to any other military operation or similar action which is carried out within the framework of combat operations. (15) • Q.: And I would also call your attention to the paragraph -- the fifth paragraph under heading 3. If you could take just a brief look at that. But I just wanted to point out that it says: "In addition to preventing criminal acts which are in violation of the norms of humane conduct and international law, armed forces of the (20)army of Republika Srpska are required to abide by the instruction on the application of the International Laws of War in the armed forces." Now, that instruction is an old JNA instruction that you were probably familiar with; is that right? • A.: Yes. (25)
• Q.: Now, I believe you've stated you didn't discipline or punish or
• A.: Me and my officers, that is the officers that were under my (5)command, including when I was the Brigade Commander or later on when I became the Drina Corps Commander, we fully respected the existing rules and regulations of the former JNA, and those who were in force in the VRS and who had been promulgated on the basis of the previous ones, and also the existing Rules of the International Law of War. (10)However, the fact remains that regardless of the fact that I wasn't the Corps Commander at that time, after I learned about those events, I did not take any measures to investigate them, for the reasons that I have already indicated. • Q.: And you understand that that is not a defence, that that is an (15)absolute duty that you had to investigate and to discipline and to punish? • A.: Yes, that is correct. MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. Now, if we could go Exhibit 412, which is entitled "Regulations on the Application of International Laws of War in the Armed Forces of the SFRY." It should be the very document that was (20)just referred to in Exhibit 413.
• Q.: If I could direct your attention, General, to paragraph 22
entitled "Responsibility for Violations of the Laws of War Committed on
Orders." Could you take a moment to read that.
Now, General Krstic, having read that, it states: "A member of
(25)the armed forces shall be liable to criminal punishment also for
• A.: Everything that has to do with what was committed as a war crime or violation of the existing rules and regulations, the Geneva (10)Conventions, and the International Law of War is punishable. • Q.: My question is: Anyone following General Mladic's orders to murder Srebrenica Muslims would be criminally liable under this law; is that correct? • A.: Yes, that is correct. (15) • Q.: What choice would the superior officers have in the context where General Mladic ordered them to murder thousands of Muslims? What could a General do that received this order? • A.: He should refuse the order. • Q.: How difficult would that be to refuse that order from (20)General Mladic? • A.: The consequences would probably be very severe for the individual who refused to carry out such an order. • Q.: What, practically, could a person do that received such an order from General Mladic? (25)
• A.: I don't quite understand your question. What exactly do you mean
• Q.: What are the options open to a person who receives this order, a military man? • A.: A warning can be given to the officer to the effect that such an (5)execution would constitute a crime, that it would be contrary to the existing rules and regulations, the International Law of War, and Geneva Conventions. • Q.: Let me go on to another subject. In a situation of a corps, the Assistant Commander for Security, who does he report to normally? Who's (10)his boss? • A.: Bearing in mind the organigramme of the organisational structure of the Corps Command, he is subordinate to the Corps Commander. However, the Security Service, generally speaking, has their own rules and regulations whereby its duties and assignments are defined as being (15)carried out by Security Services in secret, I should say, and this type of activity is reported on to the person who issued the order to that effect, that is, to the next echelon within the Security Service of the army. • Q.: If we could go to Exhibit 418A, titled "Rules of Service of the Security Organs in the Armed Forces of the Socialist Federative Republic (20)of Yugoslavia." And if you could -- General, I would ask you to review paragraph 16. It's about five lines. It's under the heading of "Management of Security Organs," Chapter II. Are these the rules of service for security organs that were in place at the time, in July 1995? (25)
• A.: Yes.
(10) • A.: Yes, that is correct. • Q.: And on July 12th he reported to the Commander, General Zivanovic. • A.: Yes, correct. • Q.: And when you took over command of the Drina Corps, he reported to you. (15) • A.: Yes. This other provision in Article 16 of Chapter II is also important. It says that the JNA security organs and organisations for NVO are responsible to the competent Assistant Federal Secretary for National Defence. That is, the Security Service, in general, is responsible to the Assistant Federal Secretary for National Defence. (20) • Q.: For its work, it's responsible largely to the commander, as is stated above. • A.: Yes.
• Q.: Now, you're familiar with the rules associated with using the
armed forces of the MUP in combat that is carried out by the army of the
(25)Republika Srpska, are you not?
• Q.: Are you aware that prior to using the armed forces of the MUP, special police, that there must be an agreement between the Ministry of (5)Interior and the commander of the Main Staff? • A.: I'm sorry. I wouldn't go as far as call it an agreement. There's no agreeing on anything. There is a law of responsibility within the armed forces and there is one such law within the MUP of Republika Srpska. That is the Supreme Command. If it is necessary to engage a (10)certain number of forces, either the forces of the regular police, the civilian police, or special units of the MUP, then the situation is quite clear: A request needs to be submitted to the Minister of Defence. So the Drina Corps Commander, if he needed to engage a number of police forces for any operation or action, then he would have to forward (15)such a request to the Main Staff of Republika Srpska. The request is acted upon, and if there are sufficient grounds to grant the request, then such a request is forwarded to the Minister of the Interior, who is the only organ responsible for engagement and the use of such units belonging to the MUP. (20) • Q.: That appears to be a pretty good synopsis of the law. Do you recall Rick Butler went over the RS law in that area? Do you recall that? • A.: Yes, I do. I listened to Mr. Butler, yes. • Q.: Do you have any disagreement with his view of that law, which you've just talked about, if you recall? (25)
• A.: I couldn't answer that question as to whether I have any
(5) MR. McCLOSKEY: If we could go to Exhibit 420A, which should be, if we've got it correctly, the relevant law. • Q.: General Krstic, if you could take a look at the B/C/S version. It should be called Chapter IV, "The Use of Police Units and Combat Operations," Article 12 through 14. And if you could take a moment to (10)look at that. • A.: You're referring to Article 12, are you? • Q.: 12, 13, 14, please. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. McCloskey, ask the question. Go ahead and ask your question. I see that the General has (15)read through the passage. MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you. I'm sorry, Mr. President. • Q.: And as I look at it, I don't see any talk about an agreement either, so I think you're right. There is no talk about an agreement in this rule, is there? (20) • A.: That's right. • Q.: Practically, does the Ministry of Interior always follow the orders of the Commander-in-Chief if he orders that police units be used or do they end upcoming to an agreement in a practical sense?
• A.: You can see from this that the Supreme Commander is the sole
(25)person who, at the request or at the recommendation of the Ministry of the
• Q.: So in the situation where a corps was planning an operation, and just hypothetically here, we'll get into the details of a particular operation soon, but if just generally a corps was planning an operation (5)and wanted MUP forces -- as I read under Article 14: "Police units assigned to combat operations by an order of the commander-in-chief of the armed forces shall be resubordinated to the commander of the unit in whose zone of responsibility they are performing combat tasks." So if we have a corps that is planning a combat task, those MUP (10)units would be under the command of who, based on this law? • A.: It states clearly here that these units would be commanded by the commander, a member of the MUP whom the Minister or the individual authorised by the Minister, to determine the commander for that unit and to be in command of that unit in the question of resubordination, and this (15)is clearly stated here. That is to say, that during the combat operation, it is resubordinated to the composition to which it is directed on the basis of a request if a request of that kind has been made at all. • Q.: Does the corps commander command those MUP units? Does he have command authority over those MUP units? (20)I would refer you to the first paragraph under Article 14 which says: "The armed forces shall be resubordinated to the commander of the unit in whose zone of responsibility they are performing combat tasks."
• A.: Only on condition that the commander of the corps, the corps
commander, has asked for the involvement of the police in a set -- for a
(25)set operation.
• A.: Yes, but I should like to repeat: Only if the request has been sent to the Main Staff in this case and from the Main Staff this went to (5)the Ministry of the Interior. Only in that case. And if the request was given the go-ahead. • Q.: The second paragraph in Article 14 refers to the command structure of the MUP unit, meaning it retains its basic command structure; is that right? (10) • A.: Yes. • Q.: Is it fair to say that part of the main job of a chief of staff is planning, taking part in planning things? • A.: The chief of staff engages in planning after the corps commander has set out the general guidelines and the decision for performing a (15)combat operation or anything of that kind. So on the basis of that overall guideline, he elaborates the documents necessary and sends them on to the subordinate units. Of course, this goes hand-in-hand with all the other organs in the corps command. I am thinking of the assistance of the corps commander, because I am not authorised to device a plan for the (20)rear, for example, because the corps commander has his assistant for that, for logistics, for example, or for moral and political preparations. There again, he has an assistant for that area or for ensuring security. He has an assistant to deal with that area as well.
• Q.: The definition for chief of staff describes the chief of staff as
(25)the second to the commander, doesn't it?
• Q.: And the chief of staff is the only member of the staff that, in the absence of the commander, can actually provide orders to the subordinates that come within the purview of the commander's original (5)orders; is that right? • A.: Yes. • Q.: And the chief of staff would advise the commander on all issues associated with the command, security, intelligence, logistics, engineering, anything that he had knowledge or experience in. Isn't that (10)part of his job? • A.: I don't think that is part of his job. I don't think so. That is why he has professional assistants for questions of logistics, security, morale, legal matters and so on and so forth. I said that on the basis of the commander's basic idea and decision, the chief of staff, with his (15)staff, elaborates further certain documents along with the full participation of all the other assistants to the commander or organs headed by the assistants to the commander. • Q.: Does the chief of staff advise the commander on operational issues such as -- General, you're looking like you're in pain. I don't want to (20)ask questions if you're -- • A.: Yes. • Q.: Are you ready to ask questions or would you like to take a break? Answer questions. Sorry.
• A.: I would welcome a break, but if you insist, we can continue with
(25)the answers.
--- Luncheon recess taken at 12.12 p.m.
--- On resuming at 1.15 p.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] The hearing is resumed. Mr. McCloskey, your witness. Please continue. (5) MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President. • Q.: General Krstic, the plan to assault the enclave of Srebrenica was entitled "Krivaja 95"; is that correct? • A.: Yes, that's right. • Q.: And that plan was -- let me ask you: What advice did you provide (10)the commander in the development of that plan; the tactics, the forces, the strategy?
• A.: The extent to which the assistance of the commanders, corps
commanders, like myself, depends on the concrete situation. There are two
ways in which decisions of commanders are made, any commanders, not only
(15)corps commanders, decisions that are made in a timely fashion and
speedily. And I said that this was a military operation and that the
decision was taken in haste.
As the Corps Commander from that area was far better acquainted
with the situation than I was myself, the Corps Commander from the very
(20)beginning knew which forces were located in the enclave. He was well
acquainted with the quality of his own forces around the enclave and also
the quality of the forces which he ordered to be separated. I said during
the examination-in-chief that I took very little part in the proposal for
the engagement of forces, and the Corps Commander himself personally was
(25)in charge with the reconnaissance work at the level of the Corps Command.
• Q.: I want to ask you about the planning, but before we get to the planning, I wanted to ask you about what advice, if any, you provided the Corps Commander in the development of the plan: the tactics, the strategy, et cetera. (10) • A.: Mr. McCloskey, I do apologise, but the Corps Commander does not have an advisor; he has assistants. But I can answer that question. Any special advice, I did not give to the Commander. I did not provide any special advice. • Q.: As Chief of Staff, you would have played a role in the development (15)of the plan, the actual writing down of the plan; is that correct? • A.: Yes, quite so, and the basis for the elaboration of the plan is the Commander's decision, and when it comes to information on the forces of the BH army and when we come to the question of the involvement of the Corps troops in that operation. (20) • Q.: So you became very familiar with General Zivanovic's intentions regarding the enclave, and you were able to participate in the planning and writing of the Krivaja 95 document? • A.: I did take part in the elaboration of the documents and plans for the Krivaja 95 operation. (25)
• Q.: Whose responsibility was it to make a final read or review of the
• A.: The elaboration of the plans after the decision had been taken, what refers to the staff of the Corps and under the responsibility of the chief and responsible for logistics, security, and other plans of that (5)sort from the realm, was the responsibility of the assistants to the Commander. • Q.: Did you read Krivaja 95? Did you read over the plan before giving your final draft or the assistants' final draft to the Commander? • A.: The basis for the plan was the decision of the Commander, so there (10)was no need for any special reading, separate reading. Once the decision had been taken by the Commander, certain plans were devised, elaborated, which always have to be elaborated and which emanate from his decision. • Q.: Did you read over Krivaja 95 to make sure that there weren't errors in it, typographical substance, things like that? (15) • A.: I was acquainted with it during the process of decision-making by the Corps Commander, whereas the typewriting and everything, the processing, was done by the heads of the departments and the assistants to the Commander, everybody in his realm of responsibility. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. McCloskey, I must interrupt (20)you at this point. General Krstic, you have already stated that you were the second person in the Corps Command, the number-two man. Do you agree with that? • A.: Yes.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] You said that for logistics,
(25)security, legal assistants, morale, and so on, there were assistants to
• A.: Yes. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] What was the relationship that you had with the Commander's assistants? You were the number-two man. (5)Now, the assistants, were they exclusive to the Commander or did they work together with you as well? • A.: The assistants to the Commander were equal to my own position and standing and were, therefore, responsible to what they were -- for what they were ordered to do by the Commander, concretely linked to a (10)particular operation and that particular operation. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Were you then able, by virtue of the rules and regulations, to use the assistants to the Commander for accomplishing your own tasks? • A.: Well, some special type of assistance with regard to the (15)elaboration of certain plans and documents which come under the competencies of the staff I did not have. They, their own plans, whether they were graphic ones or textual ones, they attached their own -- this to the basic documents which were the documents for the operation as a whole. (20) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] If I understand you correctly, there were several documents. There were several special areas, if I may call them that way. Who gave specific tasks to the assistants to the Commander?
• A.: Concrete tasks with respect to the elaboration of all the plans
(25)necessary ordered by the Commander were issued by the Commander himself,
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] I have one more question. What was your type of involvement in the Krivaja 95 operation? (5) • A.: I was engaged, like all the other assistants, in the process of decision-making by the Corps Commander and the elaboration of plans which the headquarters and my subordinate organs were to elaborate. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] You told us that the first step was the decision of the Commander, whereby he decided that an operation (10)would be launched. What was your type of participation in that initial stage, that is, to make a decision to launch an operation? • A.: My participation in the process of decision-making boiled down to the fact that I took part in the assessment of the overall situation, an appraisal of the overall situation, whether with respect to the BH army or (15)the possibility of setting aside a portion of the forces for realizing the Commander's decision to commit the forces. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] So we can say that the Corps Commander was in charge of making an assessment of the situation before he was able to make a decision. Is that what you're telling us? (20) • A.: Every commander does that. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] So you discussed it. You evaluated the situation together with the Commander, General Zivanovic. • A.: Yes, an evaluation of the situation, on the basis of which the Commander made his decision. (25)
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Very well then. Thank you.
MR. McCLOSKEY: • Q.: During the planning phase for Krivaja 95, what did you believe your actual role in the operation was going to be when it began? What (5)kind of a leadership role, if any, were you expected to play in that operation? • A.: I said during the examination-in-chief that after the Commander made his decision, that we started reconnaissance at the level of the Corps Command and control and monitoring of the preparation of the units (10)and to commit forces to the operation. I was included in that process. • Q.: As I understand -- • A.: And -- • Q.: Excuse me, General. My question was: During the planning stage, what job, if any, did you anticipate that you would have in carrying out (15)this job? Would you stay back at Vlasenica taking care of staff duties while General Zivanovic was at the forward command post leading the troops? Was it the other way around? Was it some kind of combination? Or was it never discussed until the last minute?
• A.: I expected that the Corps Commander, that is to say,
(20)General Zivanovic, from the forward -- would be commanding the units
involved in the operation from the forward command post and that I would
stay at the command post in order to see to the work of the rest of the
staff that was left in the Corps and in the other areas of responsibility
of the Corps. However, General Zivanovic decided, on the basis of the
(25)overall situation that I described earlier on, that he would stay at the
(5) • Q.: Well, before we get to the implementation of his decision, that would have -- I want to ask you -- so with that kind of role that you would be playing at the forward command post, it was very important for you to become familiar with all aspects of Krivaja 95, is that correct, the plan? (10) • A.: Yes, that is correct. • Q.: Did you actually write up any of the sections in Krivaja 95, the plan? • A.: The writing itself was the responsibility of the Chief of the Operations Section of the Corps. He was responsible for the part which (15)involved the staff of the Corps. • Q.: And who was that? • A.: Colonel Obrad Vicic. • Q.: And did Colonel Vicic consult with you regarding that plan during the time that he was developing it and writing it? (20)
• A.: Colonel Vicic participated in the decision-making process,
together with the Commander, and he was in charge of writing down
everything that the Commander was saying, according to the rules. And at
the end, he wrote the part of the decision which refers to the Staff of
the Command, whereas other organs of the Corps Command made their
(25)contribution to the order.
• A.: Well, all Colonel Vicic had to do was to process, technically (5)speaking, those parts of the plan. The Commander was very clear when he exposed to us his general concept and the decision in general terms. • Q.: I'm sorry to have to ask you this one more time, but did Colonel Vicic consult with you regarding the details of the plan that he was drawing up, to get your help and your knowledge and your experience as the (10)Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps at the time, the second man in charge? • A.: Well, according to the rules, he was supposed to. However, in view of the specific and the concrete situation, he didn't have the need to consult with me. All he had to do was to write it down and to process the document in technical terms. (15) • Q.: So you're saying he did not consult with you in any way in the development of this plan? • A.: There was no need to consult with me. If there had been any need to do so, he would have consulted with me. He would have had to do that. • Q.: What role, if any, did you play in the writing and the developing (20)and the creating of Krivaja 95? • A.: I have already indicated that I was not involved in the writing of any of the documents. My role was to see that the documents are prepared on the basis of the Commander's decision, in a timely fashion and with adequate quality. So that was my role. (25)
• Q.: So did you read the finished version of the plan?
JUDGE RIAD: Just a second. I'm just confused. You said that Vicic, Colonel Vicic, did not need to consult you. Then you just say here that you were supposed -- I'll just read for you: "My role was to see (5)that the documents are prepared on the basis of the Commander's decision." Now then, you had control; you had authority for control. He had to take your opinion. So was it possible for him to do it without your knowledge, without coming to you at all? • A.: Yes, I understand what you mean, Your Honour. I said that Colonel (10)Vicic was an experienced commander, and as regards specific explanations for the development of the plan after the decision of the Commander had been reached, they were not necessary. I was instructed by the Corps Commander to be deployed at the forward command post, and of course I had to read his order once again and have a look at the other documents as (15)well. JUDGE RIAD: So could he render the order without passing by you, without submitting it to you to make sure, as you said, that it was in line with the whole policy? • A.: I'm sorry, Your Honour. Could you please repeat your question? (20) JUDGE RIAD: My question: You said that it had to come to you to make sure that it is in line with the orders of the Command. And he did not come to you; is that what I can gather? Vicic did it without coming to you?
• A.: No. That particular document did reach me, the decision of the
(25)Commander and all of the plans pursuant to it, after which the Commander
JUDGE RIAD: You had to okay [Realtime transcript read in error "obey"] it, as they say? • A.: Yes. (5) JUDGE WALD: I'd like to ask one question. General, when this order, when Krivaja 95, the document and the attachments of all the assistants came to you, before being submitted to the Commander, did you make any changes? Did you suggest, make any changes in it, or did it just pass through you to the Commander, as written by Colonel Vicic and others? (10) • A.: I see what you mean. There was no need to make any changes, because the documents were well prepared, of good quality, and they were submitted to the Commander for his signature. JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me. I want to correct the transcript. I asked General Krstic: You had to okay it, you had to approve it. But (15)it's written here, "You had to obey it." So I just -- my question was: You had to okay it, you had to approve it? And you answered, "yes." Thank you. MR. McCLOSKEY: • Q.: You had to obey this plan also, I take it. (20) • A.: Yes. • Q.: So the various parts of this plan Krivaja 95, which, just to clarify the record, is Exhibit 428, those -- the parts that make up the whole plan are very important to that plan and the successful carrying out of the plan, are they not? (25)
• A.: Yes.
• A.: Yes. • Q.: This is a very, very serious document this plan? • A.: Yes. (5) • Q.: Let's go through some of the exhibits that talk about your role in the planning to get your opinion on them. MR. McCLOSKEY: The first exhibit, which I don't believe we need to show the General, unless he would like to see it, is Exhibit 499, and that is the article that Mr. Petrovic wrote that sort of went hand-in-hand (10)with his video. • Q.: In that article, he describes you as a brilliant strategist that was involved in the planning of this operation. If you want to look at the paragraph, I believe it's 6; 6 or 7. What I was referring to is the line that says: "It took only five days for the Serbs to complete the (15)takeover of the enclave. The world is still amazed by Serbian efficiency and ability when it comes to surprise attacks. NATO always underestimates them and then regrets it. The surprise this time was named Major General Krstic, Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps, commanded by General Zivanovic. A month and a half ago, Krstic was promoted to the (20)rank of Major-General and is reputed to be a brilliant strategist in military circles." Do you know where or how it was that -- the idea that you were a brilliant strategist in military circles or is that just journalists talking? (25)
• A.: I don't think I should comment on this article at all. It is just
• Q.: All right. • A.: After all ... • Q.: If we could, let's go to Exhibit 112/1, which is a Fibus report. (5) • A.: This is all in English. • Q.: There is a very brief section which I'll read for your comment. MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. Usher, apparently we do have a B/C/S version. • Q.: The source is -- it's dated July 20, 1995, from Belgrade Crna, and the paragraph that I'm looking at is the third in the English version, and (10)it says: "Karadzic is reported to have appointed Main Staff General Radislav Krstic, former Chief of Staff, new Commander of the Drina Corps." Then in quotes it says: "Krstic and General Zivanovic were the chief architects of Serb victories in Srebrenica and Zepa." Now, the term "architect" implies that you took some part in the (15)design of the plan of this operation. Is that true or not true? Did you -- were you an architect of the plan Krivaja 95? • A.: No. I would never use the words such as "architects" or "plan." All we had was the Commander's decision, which was the source of all other subsequent plans. (20)President Karadzic probably wanted to minimise the role of General Mladic by saying this, for the reasons that I indicated during my examination-in-chief.
JUDGE WALD: I had one question there, General. You testified a
few minutes ago that you did play a role before the Commander decided to
(25)launch the operation by sharing with him your appraisal of the situation,
• A.: Yes. You're quite correct, Your Honour. The main objective was (10)to separate the two enclaves. JUDGE WALD: And that was something you discussed before the General made his decision about the operation. • A.: In the course of the decision-making process, the assessment of the forces of the BH army and the Drina Corps forces that were to be (15)committed for that operation, which can be clearly seen from the order of the Corps Commander. JUDGE WALD: Thank you. MR. McCLOSKEY: • Q.: Now, General, I want to show you a video. It's Exhibit 99. I'm (20)informed that the booth has it. It should be a brief clip of President Karadzic, the transcript of which is Exhibit 430A in English, 430B in B/C/S. MR. McCLOSKEY: If the General could get 430B before we play the video so he can see the transcript. (25)
• Q.: I believe it's something you spoke briefly about in direct
MR. McCLOSKEY: If we could play the video.
MR. McCLOSKEY: We don't want to see Colonel Karremans at this
(5)point. No Colonel Karremans. That's not the right video. We wanted 99. MR. McCLOSKEY: • Q.: Now, we just saw your President tell Serb TV that you had planned this operation. You have told the Court that you were involved in (10)assessments made during the planning stage. So again, were you involved in the planning of the operation, as noted by your President at the time? • A.: I believe that I have already said that I did participate in the assessment of the situation and, finally, in the elaboration of all the operative plans. As regards this interview and the position of President (15)Karadzic, I do not wish to comment on this interview. He had no basis for this type of allegation. And as regards what I said previously, this has to do with the relationship between himself and General Mladic. A President of the Republic cannot approve my plans. There are certain rules in the army. The corps commander forwards the plan, the decision, (20)to the commander of the Main Staff, and he is the one who issues the approval, and later on the process takes its due course.
• Q.: The President would have to approve the change of plans to
actually make the assault on Srebrenica, wouldn't he, since the initial
plan didn't involve taking the town of Srebrenica? Maybe that's what he's
(25)talking about.
MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. If we could go to the plan now, (5)Exhibit 428A in the English and B in the B/C/S. • Q.: And General, I would like to address your attention to paragraph 2, which should be on the second page of the B/C/S version, the third page of the English. Now, this paragraph makes reference to operations directives number 7 and 7/1. Were these the basis by which the order was (10)drawn up? • A.: No. The directives number 7 and 7/1 were the formal basis for the elaboration of the plan. During my examination-in-chief I said that the operation was contrived after all those events, especially after the event on the 26th of June, when the Main Staff was attacked in the area of the (15)village of Rjecice, after which the Corps Commander was called by the Commander of the Main Staff for the purpose of elaborating the plans for the operation. • Q.: I understand that was the tactical situation on the ground, but as you stated yourself, operations directives 7 and 7/1 were the formal basis (20)for this plan; is that correct? • A.: Yes. • Q.: So you naturally had made yourself familiar with these directives, 7 from President Karadzic and 7/1 from General Mladic?
• A.: At the time, they were elaborated and sent to the subordinate
(25)commands of the Corps, I was still undergoing treatment, medical
• Q.: Okay. Now, I will read this opening paragraph -- or paragraph 2, (5)excuse me, slowly, and ask you questions about it. As we've stated, "The Command of the Drina Corps, pursuant to operations directive number 7 and 7/1 of the GS VRS, and on the basis of the situation in the Corps area of responsibility ..." I take it this is the tactical situation you alluded to briefly. (10) • A.: Yes. • Q.: "... has the task of carrying out offensive activities with free forces deep in the Drina Corps zone, as soon as possible, in order to split apart the enclaves of Zepa and Srebrenica, and to reduce them to their urban areas." (15)So that appears to be a two-part objective: one, split apart the enclaves of Zepa and Srebrenica; and two, reduce them to their urban areas. Is that correct? • A.: Well, Srebrenica -- that is, the protected area of Srebrenica -- was mostly urban area, in particular its eastern and (20)northern sides. With the implementation of the decision of the Corps Commander as regards the separation of Zepa and Srebrenica enclaves and taking up the lines that had been designated as objectives, so Srebrenica would have been reduced to its urban areas also from the eastern and southern sides. (25)
• Q.: "Urban areas," in the common definition, means the city area: the
• A.: Yes, and suburbs as well. • Q.: Now, perhaps it's a difference in language, but "urban areas" (5)means the city; "suburbs" means suburbs. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. McCloskey, you can ask General Krstic what he means when he says "urban areas" exactly, and he will provide an answer to that question. MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President. (10) • Q.: Do you include suburbs in your definition of urban areas? • A.: Yes. • Q.: Now, the enclave of Srebrenica is made up of hundreds of villages, isn't it? • A.: I don't know how many villages there are, but quite a few that (15)were part of the enclave. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. McCloskey, sorry to interrupt you, but I think that this would be a convenient time for our break, so we will have a 15-minute break at this point. --- Recess taken at 2.03 p.m. (20) --- On resuming at 2.20 p.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Having fulfilled our city habits for a break, we can continue, Mr. McCloskey. MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
• Q.: General Krstic, could you step briefly to the map which is Exhibit
(25)485, that large map in front of you, and I believe there was a big pen
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Petrusic, you have an objection to make? (10) MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Yes, Mr. President. The Defence considers that possibly the answer to this question can be given, that is to say, indicated on the map on Exhibit number 2, where the places are quoted and the areas shown. They are far clearer on that map, on that exhibit, than they are on this map that my learned colleague is talking (15)about, Mr. McCloskey. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Petrusic. In any case, we can try. If General Krstic tells us that it is easier for him to respond by using the Exhibit number 2, then we can perhaps replace it, take off this particular exhibit and allow General Krstic to use the other (20)exhibit. So Mr. McCloskey knows this. He knows about the exhibit. Thank you for your suggestion, but let us try. MR. McCLOSKEY: • Q.: They're both good maps. We could do both, but, General, do you have any problems marking 385 [sic] the big NATO-based map? (25)
• A.: At all events, the other map would be better, I think. On this
(5) • Q.: There may be miscommunication. I'm not asking you to make actual references to the trig points and the various objectives on the map. That's not what I'm asking. I'm just merely asking for the urban area of the Srebrenica enclave, and if that could be done on either map, I don't really care. (10)I think I misspoke. The big map in front of us is 458, not 385. But I'm not asking for a military analysis of the objectives and all that. That's not what I'm asking. Now, if there is no such thing as the urban area or if there's something that can't be explained here, please tell me, General, but -- and either map is fine. (15) • A.: The line where the forces of the Drina Corps were to have reached, that is to say, the orders of the Corps Commander, on this map would be the following -- I haven't got the names of the places indicated here though, but I will show you. I think that Banja Guber is somewhere around here. Zivkovo Brdo lies somewhere in this region. Then we have (20)Alibegovac and Kak.
• Q.: What about Gradac? Actually, General, maybe I can save us some
time. I don't want, at this point, to get into the various objectives
that you're talking about. I just wanted you to show us where you believe
the urban areas are, the urban area of Srebrenica. The order says,
(25)"Reduce them to their urban areas." "Reducing the size of the enclave to
(5) • A.: In respect to what the Commander ordered, that is to say, the line we were to reach, you can see clearly that all the other villages in the protected zone were not urban areas. The urban area of Srebrenica, it is difficult for me to define, but I think that what the suburbs are -- that the suburbs belong to the urban area, the outskirts. Here we have the (10)village of Bojna, somewhere in this part. Then we have Bajramovici, Pusulici. All that are the outskirts. Then we have Potocari. That too, Potocari too, because they are linked up with the main road and it's all inhabited area. From Srebrenica to Potocari, that makes up a whole. It doesn't go up to Potocari alone, but goes up to the Zuti Most area, the (15)Yellow Bridge area, which is where the checkpoint was while the forces of the Dutch Battalion were present in the area.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Mr. McCloskey, the General has
already said that it would be easier for him to answer your question with
the other exhibit.
(20)So, Mr. Usher, perhaps we should remove this map and let the
General respond in the way that is best suited for him.
General, the idea of this question was that there was a zone that
was to be protected, the protected area of Srebrenica, and there was a
military objective of the operation which was to reduce those areas to
(25)their urban boundaries. Mr. McCloskey wants to know what is, in your
MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President. • Q.: General, if you could put -- just draw the boundaries of the urban areas as -- that you feel are the urban areas as defined in this order; just the boundaries, if you could. Take some time to study it, but ... (10)
• A.: I do apologise, and I have to repeat what I've already said.
First, the objective of this operation was not the civilian population but
the forces of the 28th Division. The Corps Commander ordered the line,
the demarcation line of Srebrenica and Zepa, and which line the forces
were to reach, attain.
(15)And it is correct to say that in his order, the line Banja Guber,
Zivko Brdo, Alibegovac, and the Kak feature, that was it. And from his
decision, we can see that if we were to take up positions along this line,
that all the rest does not belong to the urban area of Srebrenica, neither
was it our intention to attack further on towards Srebrenica.
(20)I do not know the mayor of Srebrenica, when it comes to the status
of the town, what the urban area actually implies and what is defined as
the urban area, but I can say that everything within this, east of
Srebrenica position to the demarcation line, that all that was the urban
area, towards Bratunac, the Zuti Most, from Srebrenica, and Potocari.
(25)That is an urban area and it is all linked up. It is one entity. And
• Q.: Can you do a boundary of the urban area for Srebrenica, just with -- and if you don't feel like you can, that's fine; we'll go on to (5)the next question. • A.: Well, all I can do is to draw in what I have indicated, to draw it in. • Q.: Please. • A.: Very well. (10) • Q.: And if you could just mark your initials on that so we can identify it for the record, on the red line you've drawn. Okay. Thank you, General. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. McCloskey, I'm sorry to interrupt you. (15)General Krstic, if we look at the line that you have just drawn, I should like to know if that line involved certain modifications in the boundaries of the Srebrenica protected area. • A.: No. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] So this means that for the (20)purposes of the Krivaja 95 operation, one of the objectives was to reduce this area to its urban boundaries but not to modify the lines, to change the lines that you have indicated.
• A.: The objective of the operation of Krivaja 95 was not at all to
advance towards this line or circle that I have drawn in here and
(25)indicated. The objective was the line that was quoted in the order.
(5) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Thank you. Sorry, Mr. McCloskey. You may -- I'm sorry. Madam Judge Wald. JUDGE WALD: Sorry, Mr. McCloskey. General, did the lines that you indicated on the map there, are they different from the lines that had been defined a couple of years (10)earlier by the UN when it declared Srebrenica a protected enclave? In short, let me put it another way: Were there DutchBat patrols, DutchBat OPs or posts outside of the line that you drew there? • A.: Madam Judge, these are not the lines of the protected area. Let me repeat once again: It was not our objective to advance towards the (15)line that I have indicated here. JUDGE WALD: I understand, General. I just wanted to know -- I just wanted to clarify the relationship between the line that you drew and what had been included in the UN protected enclave. I understand that was not your objective, and you've answered my question. Thank you. (20) MR. McCLOSKEY:
• Q.: General, there is on that same page, there is an area entitled
"Objective." It says: "By a surprise attack, to separate and reduce in
size the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves." I think we've talked about that a
bit, but I want to ask you about this next part: "To improve the tactical
(25)position of the forces in the depth of the area and to create conditions
• A.: It means -- that is to say, it's another time. It implied another time. If the forces of the 28th Division were to continue to do what they had been doing throughout the time since the beginning of the operation, then perhaps a new operation and the planning of a new operation would be (10)undertaken. So within this operation, that was not at all our objective. • Q.: What were the conditions that were supposed to be created that would -- that could lead in the future to the elimination of the enclaves? It says "create conditions," and that's the present. What does that create -- what conditions are to be created by this order? (15) • A.: By advancing to the line referred to in the order by the corps commander -- and that is the line Banja Guber, Zivko Brdo, Alibegovac, Kak -- no conditions had been created for the elimination of the enclaves, first of all, because it was a protected zone, a protected area, and because there was the civilian population there. And it was not at all (20)our intention to continue the attack towards Srebrenica, and I have already spoken about that at length in the examination-in-chief. And I should like to repeat: To create conditions, that refers to some other time. Only if the forces of the 28th Division continue doing what they had been doing up until then. (25)
• Q.: General, it is the submission of the Prosecution that the term
(5) • A.: The order by the Commander of the Drina Corps -- this is not seen at all from the order of the Drina Corps Commander when he said advance to such-and-such a line and create conditions for the elimination of the enclaves. Let me repeat, that is some other time, a later point in time, only if there was repeated occurrence of what had happened in the (10)operations of the 28th Division. The Drina Corps had no other plans, nor did it elaborate any document whatsoever for it to be able to realise the operation, that is to say, to eliminate the enclave. All that existed were several documents of which we have the order by the Commander for the separation of the Zepa and Srebrenica enclave. (15)Then there was a reconnaissance plan, communications plan, and the plan for quartermaster affairs. And had the objective been the elimination of the enclaves, then the Commander of the Drina Corps would have had to have undertaken the elaboration of all other documents and plans focusing on logistics, focusing on quartermaster issues for the population, a plan for (20)cooperation with the civilian structures, a plan for cooperation with UNPROFOR and all the other documents that this would require. And the Drina Corps Command did not have that. It did not devise plans of this kind, neither did it consider that for the implementation of this order by the Drina Corps plans of that kind were at all necessary. (25)
MR. McCLOSKEY: If we could go to Exhibit 425A briefly, the Main
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. McCloskey, before we start analysing this particular exhibit, I have to interrupt you once again, and I'm sorry for that. (5)General Krstic, the term -- the words "to reduce to urban areas," even if your definition which would include suburbs, in view those words, I should like to know what were the consequences as regards the modification of the boundaries of the protected zone, one thing. And second, what were the consequences as regards the status of the (10)observation posts and checkpoints which were manned at the time by the members of the Dutch Battalion? • A.: I apologise. I did not quite catch your first question, Your Honour. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] I'm referring to the objective (15)of the Krivaja 95 operation. One objective was to reduce the areas, the zones, to their urban areas. Do you agree with that? • A.: I do. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Now, what I should like to know is the following: What were the consequences of that for the boundaries (20)of the protected area? So that is one question. And my second question was: What were the consequences for the observation posts that were manned by members of the Dutch Battalion at the time?
• A.: With respect to your first question, Your Honour, vital changes
with respect to the boundaries of the protected area did not exist nor
(25)would the realisation of this decision by the Commander lead to any
MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you. • Q.: Now, I just want to briefly -- (5) THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President. • Q.: I just want to briefly go to the directive 7, and if I could direct your attention to the paragraph entitled the "Drina Corps." JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. McCloskey, could you please (10)tell us once again the number of the exhibit? MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes. It's Exhibit 425A, and the B/C/S version, it should be shortly after "Unit Assignments" at paragraph 5, and then it gives Corps and you'll see the Drina Corps mentioned there. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Thank you. (15) MR. McCLOSKEY: • Q.: Now, if you would take a moment to read the first paragraph, which is the paragraph that I'm most concerned about. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Once again, Mr. McCloskey, I have to interrupt you. Could you please be more specific in terms of (20)references so that the usher can give us the relevant text and the relevant paragraph on the ELMO.
MR. McCLOSKEY: I'm sorry, Mr. President. It's page 10 in the
English. And the B/C/S, I believe the General has found it based on my
explanation. I'm sorry, I forgot about the English. It's at the bottom
(25)of the page under "Drina Corps." There we go. Thank you.
• A.: That refers to the Drina Corps. • Q.: Yes. Just that first paragraph of the "Drina Corps" in the (5)directive. Now, you stated earlier that you did have a chance to review this document, Exhibit 425, and the military document associated it, which was directive 7/1. What I'd like to ask you about is the middle part of it, where it says: "... while in the direction of the Srebrenica and Zepa (10)enclaves, complete physical separation of Srebrenica from Zepa should be carried out as soon as possible, preventing even communication between individuals in the two enclaves." Now, that sounds like the first objective in Krivaja 95, the separation of the two enclaves. Is that correct? (15) • A.: Yes, that is correct. • Q.: Okay. Now, the next part of the directive reads, and I quote: "By planned and well-thought-out combat operations create an unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa." (20)Was this last part that I just read incorporated into the Krivaja 95 plan? • A.: No. This was by no means included in the plan. We never took this into account. We never had any thoughts to this effect.
• Q.: The outcome of the overall operation ended in the elimination of
(25)the Srebrenica enclave, didn't it?
• Q.: Now, let me ask you about -- if thousands of people from the Srebrenica enclave crowded into the city areas of Srebrenica, what kind of conditions would that create for those people? • A.: After the decision of the Drina Corps Commander for active (10)operation, active combat activity, with the purpose of separating Zepa and Srebrenica, was carried out, nothing in particular would have changed in the life of the citizens of Srebrenica. We didn't target the civilian population of Srebrenica at all. At that time, the objective wasn't even the 28th Division. The main objective at the time was to prevent their (15)communication and their infiltrations into the no man's land between Srebrenica and Zepa. • Q.: Could all the inhabitants of the Srebrenica enclave fit into the city area of Srebrenica and live in any kind of a decent way?
• A.: Let me just answer to the question relating to the line that was
(20)taken up by the Drina Corps forces. Again, I have to say that nothing
would have changed. The line that I have drawn on the map is -- well, I'm
not going to call it an arbitrary line, but it may fall within the
boundaries of the urban area. I hope I did answer your question. The
objective of the Drina Corps forces was not to penetrate the area within
(25)this circle, according to the decision -- to the order of the Corps
(5) • Q.: Could thousands of people live in the Srebrenica urban areas? • A.: As regards the line that I have drawn on the map, of course they couldn't. However, this line here has nothing to do with what I have previously spoken about, that is, the line that was supposed to be taken up by the Drina Corps forces, which, according to some, were actually the (10)boundaries of some urban area. Because from the east and partly from the north, that is, the area between Srebrenica and onwards, that was already the urban area from the moment Srebrenica was declared a safe area. • Q.: I'm going to direct your attention now to page 14 in the English. It should be paragraph 6, called "Support for Combat Operations" in the (15)B/C/S, the fourth paragraph down, beginning "The relevant state." Paragraph 6 in the B/C/S, General. You should be able to follow them by paragraphs. It's entitled "Support for Combat Operations" in the B/C/S. • A.: You said page 14? • Q.: No, I'm sorry. That's the English. You have to go by the (20)paragraph for the B/C/S. So if you could just try to find paragraph -- what is marked as heading or paragraph 6, "Support for Combat Operation." It looks like page 10 in your copy, General. • A.: Yes.
• Q.: And if you could review paragraph 4, starting with "The relevant
(25)state and military organs," and if you could just read that to yourself
• A.: Yes. • Q.: So under the heading "Support for Combat Operations" and then the subheading "Moral and Psychological Support," this paragraph says: (5)"The relevant state and military organs responsible for work with UNPROFOR and humanitarian organisations shall, through the planned and unobtrusively restrictive issuing of permits, reduce and limit the logistics support of UNPROFOR to the enclaves and the supply of material resources to the Muslim population, making them dependent on our goodwill (10)while at the same time avoiding condemnation by the International Community and international public opinion." The effect of this order would be reducing the amount of food that goes to the civilian population; is that correct? • A.: I think that the best would be for me not to comment on this at (15)all. One can clearly see that this is not a military document, properly speaking, but a political document which had nothing to do with the Drina Corps Command. • Q.: Who enforced whether convoys got into the Srebrenica enclave or not? (20)
• A.: Well, it is difficult for me to say who did that, whether to allow
them in or not. The MUP forces were also there in the area, and the
checkpoints at the border of the enclave were manned by the members of the
army. So whether a convoy would be allowed in or not, I didn't have any
responsibility for that. I couldn't issue any decisions to that effect.
(25)I don't know about General Zivanovic. All I know is that could
• Q.: Is the Drina Corps responsible for carrying out the orders of the Supreme Command as it comes down to you through the Main Staff? (10) • A.: Yes, the Drina Corps had to carry out the orders. But specifically speaking, when it comes to this particular paragraph, I don't know. It's very difficult to comment on this. Only the liaison officer of the Main Staff was able, on the basis of their decisions, to allow or deny entry. (15) MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, I note we've just gone by 3.00 p.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. McCloskey. We have worked five minutes more, at least. We have a lot of work to do, but I think that we have to wind up for the day -- we have a number of other obligations, the Chamber -- and we will be here again at 20 minutes past (20)9.00 to continue with the cross-examination. I'll see you tomorrow. --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.05 p.m., to be reconvened on Thursday, the 26th day of October, 2000, at 9.20 a.m. |
