CHAPTER LXI
ACCOUNTABILITY OF POLICE PERFORMANCE

Our experience in the preceding three decades after independence has shown that a Constitutional system of Government based on democratic principles cannot function without the support of an effective, efficient and accountable administration. Constitutionally, the political executive i.e., the Minister has been made accountable for the performance of the bureaucratic executives under him. We feel that such undiluted ministerial responsibility is not in the interest of either administrative efficiency or the people sought to be served by the administration in the present conditions. Responsibility of the political executive or the Cabinet in the Assembly is too broad to afford relief to the people who have no access to the channels of power. It is, therefore essential that the accountability of the bureaucratic executive at the various levels be defined and a degree of immediate proximity to the people introduced. The concept of anonymity of the bureaucratic executive cannot wish away the necessity for fixing his accountability for the performance of his duties. While the above is true for the entire administrative machinery, it has an extra significance for the police organisation which is entrusted with the task of preservation of the basic order in society which is essential for the stability of a Constitutional Government. Unlike the other executive wings of the Government, the police has maximum visibility. Visibility by itself waters down anonymity. The accountability of the police has to be viewed in this light.
Accountability means answerability for the proper performance of the assigned task. It means more than mere responsibility to discharge the duties involved in a job and includes that the discharge of duties shall be to the satisfaction of the party for whose benefit the duties are being discharged. Therefore, accountability pre-supposes two parties, one under obligation to render account for the proper performance of the task assigned and the other having a right to ask for and receive such an account. While the party who renders account has perforce to be unitary, the party which has the right to ask for and receive the account may be multiple. It may be within the organisation or outside.
It is, therefore, essential that the departmental functionaries should know clearly the source of authority to which they have to account for their performance. A clear understanding of the concept would indicate to them their various roles and functions the level of expectations and the limits and constraints within which they have to function. A similar understanding is essential on the part of the source of authority to which the police is accountable. Lack of understanding by either side will result in misplaced goals and objectives and consequent displacement of accountability.
This leads us naturally to the next issue as to whom the police is accountable. In a democratic society, each department of the Government including the police is ultimately accountable for its performance to the people. However, direct accountability to the people in a society like ours may prove difficult. It has, therefore, been constitutionally laid that the public service is accountable to the elected representatives of the people at the forums of Parliament and State Legislatures through the Minister/ Ministers concerned. We have already stated that in the modern world ministerial responsibility of this kind waters down the administrative efficiency and fails to provide the necessary satisfaction to the people. It has become urgent and essential to devise new mechanisms of accountability to ensure a certain amount of direct responsibility to the people at the various levels of administration.
While the ultimate accountability is to the people, the police have a proximate accountability to the law of the land, which in essence is the expression of its will. As the prime law enforcing agency, the activities of the police not only centre around the enforcement of various laws, but their free functioning is also governed by the processes of laws. The action of the police is, therefore, confined to the laws of the land while enforcing the same. Every stage of their activity is given, governed and judged by provisions of law. In this area of accountability to the law of the land the police activities come under very close scrutiny of the judiciary. In other words, the accountability to the law is ensured by judicial review at several stages.
61.6 Apart from the above two sources of authority to which the police is accountable they have a direct accountability to the organisation. This accountability is ensured under the various regulations and departmental procedures apart from the inspections and periodical review of administration.
61.7 We have spelt out in the preceding paragraphs the three-fold accountability of the police i.e. to the people, to the law and to the organisation. We would emphasise that the concept is in fact inter-related and ultimately points to one and the same principle The laws are the collective will of the people expressed through various legislative bodies and put into a formal shape. The department functionaries are bound to act according to the laws as enacted. Finally, it is the people who have created and authorised the supervisory hierarchy of the department to control and direct the functionaries at police station and other levels so that the latter discharge their statutory duties in accordance with the procedures established by law.

Accountability to the people
61.8 As stated earlier, at present the concept of total anonymity of the bureaucratic executive and undiluted ministerial responsibility to the people has resulted in distortions affecting police efficiency and citizen-satisfaction. Unfortunately, therefore, the concept of ministerial responsibility has given the wrong impression to the political executive that they are authorised to guide and intervene in all functions of the police in all areas regardless of such guidance or intervention being in accordance with or in contravention of the law of the land. We have brought into clear focus in our earlier reports the harm this has done to the people. We wish to emphasise that it is ultimately the people whose agents the police functionaries are and to whom they are ultimately accountable. Realisation of this concept in our opinion, is of vital importance. We however, find that the process of the police accountability to the people has suffered considerable distortion in the recent past. Various pressure and elite groups have come to develop in society having infinite expectations from all Government departments including the police and seeking favours to the exclusion of legality and fair play. These are members of State and Central Legislatures, the local bodies, important functionaries of political parties, particularly the ruling ones, representatives of the local, yellow press, other important persons of the locality and Government servants holding important positions, who have tended to divert the police accountability from the people to themselves. Police functionaries, therefore, also have tended to shift their priorities on to these pressure groups. This has had obvious effect on the attitude of the common people themselves, who feel that the public services including the police service are meant only to serve the elitist groups and in case they wish to avail of any public service, they have to purchase it through illegal gratification or secure it through exercise of pressures from power-wielding sections of the society.
61 9 Another distortion noticed by us is preferential attention of the police to the urban areas at the cost of the rural areas. Since the urban population is more vocal and more demanding, the public services have tended to neglect the rural population. We understand, in several States, departmental instructions provide compulsory stay of district level officers in the rural areas for at least 90 days every year. We notice that these instructions are seldom complied with. Police functionaries of and above the level of Dy. Supdt. of Police/SDPO, therefore, do not come into contact with the rural population as frequently as they should. The rural areas are neglected except for completing the rituals of supervision and inspection. Therefore, the police officials appear to be out of touch with the problems and difficulties facing the vast majority of the people, residing in the villages. In this context, we would strongly recommend strict compliance of the existing instructions and would emphasise that officers of the level of SDPO and SP must reside in the rural areas for at least 90 days in a year Such stays would help them to come in close contact with the common people, know their problems in full and seek their cooperation in various police activities. It will also provide opportunity to police officers to meet representative sections of society and discuss various problems facing the people at large.
61.10 The assessment of the police performance has two facets — the-first facet consists of the examination of records during inspections, which constitutes the visible part of accountability as prescribed. More important is the invisible part which can be gathered only by interaction with the people by the inspecting officers. This interaction will enable them to assess the actual qualitative performance of policing, its impact in that area on citizens and the feeling of security. It is, therefore, essential that officers should not make such inspections a routine drill but introduce such fraternisation as is deemed fit so that the interaction with the public will enable them to elicit the maximum possible information about the views of the people in regard to the functioning of the officials in the area.
61.11 At present the Annual Administration Reports of the State Police are compiled on the basis of statistics and information collected from the various levels in the organisation. This report attempts to present a picture of the standard of policing within the State during a specific period, usually a calendar year, but generally it bases its conclusions on the basis of the statistics, emanating from the police stations. The report is submitted to the State Government who review it and along with its conclusions present it to the Assembly for discussion. In actual practice, in most States there is a considerable time lag between the date of submission of the report before the Houses and the period to which it relates.
61.12 We have recommended in our Second Report that the evaluation of performance of the State Police would be one of the tasks assigned to the State Security Commission The aforesaid Annual Administration Report of the State Police will naturally be an important document to aid the State Security Commission in the evaluation of the performance of State Police. But we feel that this document is not enough for an objective assessment. It is based on the statistics, which, as we have more than once observed in our previous reports, are unreliable on account of the fact that there is considerable burking of crime. Further, the Annual Administration Reports generally project only a quantitative assessment. It is not possible to have an accurate idea of the qualitative satisfaction of people from such reports. We, therefore, recommend that the State Security Commission be also provided an independent Cell to evaluate 'police performance, both in quantitative and qualitative terms. This Cell should not be a part of the police and may include experts from other disciplines according to requirements. In addition to the two reports mentioned above, the State Security Commission would also be receiving an assessment report, though not so detailed regarding the state of policing from the Central Police Committee recommended by us in our Seventh Report. In our view, these three reports, each emanating from different channels, should provide a reliable base to enable the State Security Commission to assess the police performance objectively and with an amount of certainty, enough to inspire public satisfaction. The State Security Commission will thus be adequately equipped to prepare its own assessment of the performance of the State police, to be placed before the State Legislature.
61.13 The preparation of the final report, to be put up before the Legislature by the State Security Commission itself will lend the report greater acceptability. The Commission will consist of not merely the Home Minister but Members of known integrity and impartiality drawn from various cross-sections of society who would have no temptation not to call a spade a spade. At the same time, the system suggested by us will bring to the notice of the Home Minister a more reliable and more detailed picture of the State policing and will thus enable him to take the necessary corrective steps thereby helping him to discharge his responsibilities as a Home Minister in a much better manner.
61.14 We would have liked the accountability of the police to the people to be made more direct and visible by vesting the power in the people to ensure accountability directly to the people themselves. But in a representative democracy like ours we are aware that ensuring such a direct accountability, though desirable, is beset with various difficulties. We are, however, convinced that it is not impossible to introduce a near direct accountability of the police to the people whom they serve. This does exist in a way even today. The Superintendent of Police of a district and the Range DIG get regular feed-back from the people and the press. This enables them to assess the performance of the officers at the Station House and other operational levels.
61.15 What we desire is to create the awareness of direct accountability to the people at the various levels in the police hierarchy. In other words, this awareness of accountability to people should not only permeate the system but the officers individually as well as in groups should be sensitized to the idea of the importance of accountability to the people. We have stressed this aspect in our Chapter on 'Training of Police Personnel' also.
61.16 Inspections are instrumentalities in introduction of direct accountability to people Officers, therefore, have to take inspections seriously and make them more meaningful by conscious and constant interaction with the people. They should not hesitate to meet the people and the press, nay, they should seek out people during their inspections to get the necessary feed-back to assess the functioning of operational level policing. This should be both at the district and at the Station House level. During the inspections the Inspecting officers should call meetings of the cross-sections of the people and discuss their problems with them. At the district level they should hold meetings not only with the cross-sections of the people but with the representatives of the people at the Municipal, Zila Parishad levels and with the MLAs and MPS of the constituency.
61.17 During inspections the inspecting officers should devote special care to scrutinise and review the overall pattern of complaints that are received. If a complaint of a particular kind is repeated or frequent complaints are noticed from a particular area the Inspecting Officer should investigate into the causes. Selective inspection should be carried out so that the complaints as well as the reasons therefor could be ascertained in detail.
61.18 We would like to lay emphasis on the point that officers at the level of Superintendent of Police and above should be required to watch the reputation of Station House Officers. Responsibility in this regard must be squarely fixed on them and any failure on their part in this regard should be viewed seriously. However, there may be circumstances where the supervisory ranks may either fail to assess the reputation of the SHO or fail to take appropriate action even after a case of bad reputation has come to their notice. In such circumstances, the people have a right to petition to the State Security Commission. In such cases the State Security Commission should cause appropriate enquiries to be made to gauge the reputation of the SHO concerned and take such action thereafter as may be required.
61.19 We have in our earlier Chapters expressed the hope that the future police station will not merely be a point of crime control and prevention but will develop into a service centre. At present, people hesitate to go near police stations but with the introduction of training we have recommended for the police personnel, and the quality of recruitment we have envisaged and the constant sensitising of the police personnel to the problems of the people by the superior officers, it should be possible to convert the police stations into 'service centres' for people with problems.
61.20 When the Range DIG or the Supdt. of Police of the district feels that a particular station house or operational level policing is not giving the necessary satisfaction to the people, he should go into the causes in depth and try to remove the same. If the attitude of a particular Station House Officer or his methods of functioning are not in the interests of the people of the locality, the higher officers should not hesitate to shift the officer from that particular area and to take such corrective or disciplinary action against him to mend his attitude and behaviour.

Accountability to Law
61.21 The principal criminal laws in the country are the Indian Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code. There are also some special/local laws making certain acts penal offences. The Police Act which is one of the special laws spells out powers functions and duties of the police.
61.22 The Police Organisation is subject to the superintendence of the State Government We have analysed the nature of this superintendence in our Second Report in paragraphs 15.36 to 15.42. We have explicitly mentioned therein that "the investigative tasks of the police are beyond any kind of intervention by the executive or non-executive." Therefore, so far as the police-activities pertaining to investigation of offences are concerned, they have professional independence whereby they are to be entirely governed by the provisions of law. No authority except the supervisory ranks of the police themselves are authorised to issue an executive order to the police official to investigate or not to investigate a criminal offence, arrest or not to arrest an alleged offender or decide a case under investigation in a particular way. Any executive instructions issued in this regard would be contrary to the law. With regard to preventive tasks and service oriented functions, we have said that "in the performance of preventive tasks and service-oriented functions, police should be subject to overall guidance from the Government which should lay down broad policies for adoption in different situations from time to time. There should, however, be no instructions in regard to actual operations in the field. The discretion of the police officer to deal with the situation within the four corners of the overall guidance and broad policies should be unfettered."
61.23 The police accountability, therefore, is to the law as established by the people in all areas of law enforcement. In the area of investigation they are exclusively governed by the laws, both substantive and procedural. They are not subject to the directions of any authority not recognised by the law. In other areas of law enforcement, the police accountability continues to be to the law as enacted. In the latter areas, however their functions are subject to such broad policies as may be laid-down under the law by the recognised authorities. Even here the broad policies can be laid-down only under the law and not beyond or against it.
61.24 Although the laws are ultimately the wishes of the people themselves, neither the people nor the elected representatives have any authority to intervene or interfere in the activities of the police in the discharge of the duties under the laws once enacted though the people through elected representatives may amend the law if they deem so necessary.
61 25 The above-mentioned factors are essential for ensuring police accountability to law ; but we observe that there has been a continuous erosion by undue interference in the exercise of the discretionary authority and statutory duties of the police. Extraneous interference is damaging the police accountability to law. In this context Professor David H. Bayley expressing his views on the subject has observed :—
"In India today a dual system of criminal justice has grown up — the one of law the other of politics. With respect atleast to the police, decisions made by the police officials about the application of law are frequently subject to partisan review or direction by elected representatives. This autonomy of police officials in specific and routine applications of law has been severely curtailed. This is not only true of law and order situations. People accused of crimes have grown into the habit of appealing to political figures for remission from the sanctions of law. Police Officers throughout India have grown accustomed to calculating the likely political effect of any enforcement action they contemplate. Fearing for their careers and especially their postings, they have become anxious and cynical. But everywhere officers expect to be held personally accountable by politicians even more than by superior officers for enforcement actions taken in the course of duty."
He has further observed —
"Altogether, then, the rule of law in modern India, the frame upon which justice hangs, has been undermined by the rule of politics. Supervision, in the name of democracy has eroded the foundations upon which impartiality depends in a criminal justice system."
The findings of Prof. Bayley support our own observations of the situation in the country.
61.26 While police functionaries have been accorded wide powers under the law, many of them affecting the freedom and liberty of an individual, provision has also been made for strict scrutiny by the courts over the manner in which the police exercises these powers. Almost all preventive and investigative activities of the police are Subject to scrutiny by law and adverse observations by courts on police conduct call for a mandatory enquiry attended with follow-up action. At the same time any member of public who feels that the police in a particular situation has acted contrary to the law, can move the courts for redress. In order to secure fuller accountability of the police to the laws, we have already recommended in our First Report, mandatory judicial inquiry into certain categories of police "misbehaviour" through a District Inquiry Authority. We have in the same report also recommended creation of a Complaint Cell under the District Superintendent of Police and Special Cells under the Range Deputy Inspector General of Police an Inspector General of Police to handle complaints against the police personnel.
61.27 On occasions, however, it is seen that false and frivolous complaints are made against police officers before criminal courts, to embarrass and demoralise them so that they desist from taking stern action against an offending party. Sometimes such complaints are got filed through third parties by influential persons who have a grouse against the police but do not themselves want to come out in the open. They only make funds available and exercise their influence to create and produce evidence. Law takes notice of such vexatious prosecutions and has provided protection to police officers, as also to other Government servants, for acts done or purported to be done in the discharge of their official duties.
61.28 Section 132 of Cr.P.C. 1973 gives protection to members of the armed forces of the Union, executive magistrates and police officers against prosecution for acts done under section 129, section 130 and section 131 Cr.P.C. which relate to dispersal of unlawful assembly by use of force etc. According to sub-section 1 of section 132, no prosecution can be launched against a police official except with the sanction of the State (Government. Section 132(2) provides that police officials acting under good faith in connection with dispersal of unlawful assembly would be deemed to have thereby committed no offence.

61.29 Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. provides protection to judges, magistrates and all public servants not removable from their office except by or with the sanction of the Government. Thus no court is authorised to take cognizance of an offence against a public servant, if the alleged offending act has been committed while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of duties, except with the previous sanction of the State Government. Sub-section 3 of section 197 empowers the State Government to make any class or category of members of the force charged with the maintenance of order immune from prosecution except with the previous sanction of the State Government.
61 30 The difference between the provisions of the above two sections are firstly that while section 132 Cr.P.C. gives protection to police officers of all ranks, section 197 Cr.P.C. generally covers only the officers who are not removable from their office save by or with the sanction of the appropriate Government. Secondly, section 132 Cr.P.C covers only acts purported to be done under section 129, 130 and 131 Cr.P.C. while the other section provides for omnibus protection for all acts done or purported to be done in the discharge of official duty.
61.31 The above provisions in actual practice seem to have made neither the public nor the police officer happy. The public feel that the restriction placed by the law are dilatory and undue. Obtaining permission for prosecution from the competent authority takes considerable time and the consequent delay provides an opportunity to the accused police officer to suborn witnesses and even pressurise the complainant. The common man feels that he should have an unfettered right to seek redress for an injustice done to him by a public servant, from a court of law. The police officers, on the other hand, feel that the law as it has been interpreted and applied hardly provides them any protection worth the name. The police officers, whom we met, repeatedly drew our attention to many occasions when they got no legal protection, even though the acts in question were done in the discharge of their duties.
We have given anxious consideration to the two opposite views stated above While we feel that on the one hand the police officers are exposed to frivolous prosecutions and there is need for help from the Government so that they do not feel helpless or abandoned, we also at the same time see merit in the plea that the public should be free to seek the verdict of a court of law if he has a grievance against a Government servant.
Section 197 Cr.P.C. suo moto makes a distinction between officers not removable save by or with the sanction of the appropriate Government an other ranks of police officers. Though in some States (like Delhi) the protection has been extended to other ranks charged with the maintenance of public order under the provisions of sub-section (3) of this section, we see no justification for making a distinction between the various ranks of police officers and would like the recommendations which we will be making in this chapter later on to be made applicable to all ranks equally.
Police has vast powers which may affect even the liberty of an individual. Stigma attaches to any person, action against whom is taken by the police. Similar powers are not enjoyed by officers of other departments and hence we feel that the police should also have a greater measure of accountability. The public complainant should, in our opinion, be free to press his complaint against a police officer for a judicial pronouncement without there being a need to obtain permission from any body. At the same time we feel the necessity for certain measures for the protection of police officers against vexatious and frivolous prosecutions. While we advocate that the public complainant should have the liberty to go ahead with his case in a court of law, we would recommend that the police officer should be defended at the cost of the Govt. According to the existing rules and instructions in some States the permission of the Government has to be obtained for such a defence. We do not consider this to be necessary. We feel that officers of and above the rank of Superintendent of Police should be empowered to order defence of their subordinates. The Government orders should be necessary only in cases when a complaint is filed against an officer of the rank of Inspector General of Police or Director General of Police and also in case the complaint against the police officer is of rape or murder. Such defence at Government cost should extend upto the appellate stage. We have examined the propriety of the suggestion that in case the officer is convicted by a court of law, the expenses incurred by the Government in such cases should be recovered from him. In the case of conviction of a Government servant he will automatically be subjected to some other departmental penalty which may extend up to his dismissal. We think that such a departmental penalty should be enough and the recovery of expenses would not be necessary.
We have considered another suggestion which was made to us, namely, making it obligatory for the public complainant to deposit a certain amount of money along with his complaint in the court of law which amount should be subject to forfeiture in the event of the complaint being found false. We think that such a provision will prevent the weaker sections of the society from going to courts for the redressal of their grievances. As an alternative, we feel that in case the court comes to a finding that the complaint is unfounded, it should by law be empowered to take the explanation of the complainant and if it finds the explanation unsatisfactory, it should have power to inflict suitable punishment on the complainant. The Law Reforms Commission appointed by the Australian Government in its Report on 'Complaints against police' has recommended that "where the complaint filed against a police officer concerning action taken by him is false or misleading in a material particular, it should be treated as an offence punishable with fine upto Rs.500 or/and imprisonment upto six months". We are in general agreement with this approach and would suggest the introduction of a suitable legal provision in this regard. We would also add that it might be impressed upon courts by the High Courts concerned that such complaint cases against police officers should be disposed of on a priority basis. Delay not only causes frustration to the complainant but also brings the police force as such into disrepute. Further, we would suggest that the High Courts might draw the attention of the lower courts to the provisions of section 202 Cr.P.C. and advise them generally to ask for a report from the District Superintendent of Police on the complaints filed before them. It should be the responsibility of the District Superintendent of Police to either make an inquiry himself or have it made by a sufficiently senior officer and submit a factual report to the court before the court decides to proceed further with the case. Objectivity of such a report must be ensured at all costs and there should be no attempt to white-wash or cover up the lapses. A fair and impartial report will enhance the confidence that the court may repose in police.

61.36 We would like to add a word of caution in this regard. Sometimes the main purpose of filing a complaint in a court of law is to secure the transfer of the officer concerned and once the transfer has been ordered, the complainant loses interest in the case. We feel that on mere filing of a complaint transfers should not be made unless there is a prima facie case and justification for the same.

Organisational accountability 
61.37 In the system of accountability internal to the organisation also we have noticed equally serious drawbacks which have led to distortions and which would require suitable corrective measures. In a hierarchical system like the police, accountability is determined at various levels with reference to the next higher level. For instance, the SHO is accountable for his individual performance as well as collective performance of the Police Station to the Superintendent of Police. So far as the performance appraisal of individual functionaries are concerned, we have dealt with that in a separate Chapter in our Seventh Report. In this Chapter we are confining ourselves to evaluation of collective performance. This is because in our opinion individual performance appraisal requires a more detailed and exclusive discussion and the evaluation of group performance may be more appropriately dealt with in the context of police-accountability. Evaluation of group performance is conducted by various levels of supervisory police officers by the exercise of periodic inspections. For instance the District Superintendent of Police inspects police-stations under his charge periodically. Similar inspections are carried out in respect of the District Police by the D.I.G. and the Chief of the State Police. We note that the yard-sticks adopted for evaluation of group-performance are generally similar in most States with regard to the major areas of police activities. For instance the most commonly used parameter relates to assessment of police efficiency by comparison of crime-statistics of the period under review with those of the previous years. If the number of offences registered during the period under review is more than those in the preceding years, a facile conclusion is drawn that the police of the area has failed to control crime. Firstly, statistics of reported cases of crime do not reflect the true position regarding police efficiency, as the police by themselves do not exercise control over all crimogenic factors. Secondly, adoption of this parameter leads to large-scale non-registration of offences at the police station level. Since free-registration of all cases reported at Police Station would mean swelling of crime figures, under-registration at the Police Station level has become a prevailing practice. We would like to add even at the risk of repetition, that supression of crime-statistics is not a malady afflicting the Police Station level only ; it has taken into its sweep the supervisory authorities at all levels also. Since the crime situation is discussed every year on the floor of the State Legislatures primarily on the basis of crime statistics, State Governments in the majority of the cases are also interested in presenting a rosy picture of crime incidence Therefore, the State Governments and the senior police-officers frequently connive at under-reporting of cases. 
61 38 Another commonly used parameter is the so-called 'preventive measures' taken by the police during the period of review. Incidence of reported offences under Local and Special Laws is generally considered to be an index of the extent to which 'preventive measures' were taken by the police. The higher the number of reported cases under Local/Special Acts (e.g. Police Act, Arms Act, Excise Act, Gambling Act, Supression of Immoral Traffic Act etc.), the more creditable it is considered to be for the police. The logic behind this practice appears to be that the acts punishable under Local and Special Laws are the breeding-grounds for more serious offences and the arrest and prosecution of offenders at this stage acts as a deterrent against major offences. The obvious flaw in this assumption cannot escape notice. But more than that, adoption of this determinant of evaluating police performance leads to large-scale and unwarranted arrests, and initiation by police of false cases against innocent persons.
Another yard-stick adopted in some States pertains to police-encounters with the gangs of dacoits and robbers. Total number of encounters during the period of review total number of criminals apprehended and killed in police-encounters, fire-arms etc recovered from the outlaws are the parameters by which the police efficiency is assessed This yardstick also often leads to police staging fake encounters and at times killing of criminals after they are caught by the police. Fire-arms are often planted in the hands of dacoits and to acquire them, unscrupulous police officials connive at the illicit manufacture of such fire-arms.
The above are the most frequently used yardsticks on which the police efficiency is assessed. A few other yardsticks common to all States are —
(i) Recovery of stolen property during the period of review, as compared to previous years;
(ii) Successes in investigation of offences determined by the percentage of chargesheeted cases to those registered by the Police during the period of review;
(iii) Successes in criminal cases in the courts of law determined by percentage of cases successfully convicted to those decided, etc.
In adopting these determinants, a lack of correlation between the determining factors and yardsticks which are supposed to measure police efficiency is apparent. But more than that, these parameters encourage the police to adopt questionable means of recording and controlling crime and even resorting to illegal acts. One modern yardstick adopted in some big cities is the 'response-time' which is the time-lag between the receipt of a call by the police and the arrival of the police at the place of the caller But we note that the average response-time of the police-car in big cities does not provide a realistic picture, as the police records appear to be manipulated frequently to show a quicker response-time.
Due to a faulty system of monitoring police performance at various levels, we have come across a number of odd situations. For instance, in one major State the sense of security in the community has been lacking during the last decade or so, but crime statistics create an impression that it is a very peaceful area. In another major State there is a similar situation, but the crime figures of today in that State are much below those recorded 10 years back. In this State several thousands of dacoits have been shot dead during the police encounters during last 5-6 years, but the dacoity menace remains unchecked.
Great harm has been caused to the image of the police department due to laying down of faulty determinants for evaluating police performance, which has led to a misplaced sense of accountability and questionable methods of crime control adopted by police. In our opinion, the parameters of performance evaluation act as reference points for determining police-performance which ultimately help delienate the coordinates of police accountability. Therefore, we have addressed ourselves to the possible yardsticks which may be the desirable indicators of police performance. While determining these yardsticks we have two considerations in our view :—
(a) that these should help the authorities to have an objective evaluation of police performance ;
(b) these yardsticks should not encourage the police to resort to extra-legal methods.

We recommend the following determinants to be adopted by the State Police organisations :—
(1) Prevention of Crime :
(i) Sense of security prevailing in the community.
(ii) People's willing cooperation and participation secured by the Police in preventing crime.
(2) Investigation of Crime :
(i) Correct registration of crime (ii) Prompt visit to the scene of occurrence (iii) Speedy investigation (iv) Honesty and impartiality in investigation.
(3) Law and Order:
(i) Extent to which law and order is maintained, taking into account the forces which promote lawlessness.
(ii) The manner in which law and order is maintained. Two factors have to be judged — (a) People's cooperation, (b) Use of force.
(4) Traffic Management: 
(i) Smooth flow of traffic in urban areas and control of fatal and serious accidents by prosecution of persistent offenders.
(5) Service :
(i) General spirit of service, especially to weaker sections, physically handicapped, women and children.
(ii) Quality of service rendered in a distress situation like cyclone-havoc flood-damage, famine etc.
(iii) Specific instances of service-oriented functions performed by the Police which drew special appreciation and gratitude from the public.
(6) Reputation of integrity and courtesy :
(i) General reputation.
(ii) Police collusion with criminals organising illicit distillation, gambling economic crimes, prostitution etc.

(iii) Reputation for courteous behaviour (iv) Prompt and satisfactory enquiry into complaints against policemen.
However, the problem likely to be faced in this connection by the police authorities will be fixation of specific determinants to evaluate the performance of the police relevant to each of the above-mentioned heads. These determinants would have to be evolved in due course after some experimentation and experience.
61.43 With regard to the departmental accountability, we would like to lay down as a guiding principle that a functionary in the department at a particular level should be held accountable only with respect to functions and duties assigned to him ; conversely the accountability should not extend to duties over which he has no direct control. Such duties and functions are assigned to police-officers at various level from time to time by virtue of various laws and departmental rules. Great damage has been done, in our view, by not taking note of this important principle, and holding functionaries at each level (e.g. SP. DIG and IG) responsible for everything happening throughout his jurisdiction. To elaborate our point, the IG is responsible for generally maintaining law and order throughout the State, generally maintaining integrity and morale of the force, personnel management including training of personnel etc. But he cannot be held responsible for each isolated incident in a particular district unless it is proved that the particular incident occurred because of some acts of omission or commission on the part of the Chief of Police, or such incidents have been widespread and the latter has failed to react adequately. In a similar manner, it would be wrong to hold the SP or the SHO accountable for each isolated incident in their respective jurisdictions.
61.44 Finally, with regard to the departmental accountability we strongly disapprove of the practice of fixing unreasonable or impossible targets which cannot be achieved except through irregular or illegal means. Examples of these are the categories of orders to 'reduce' crime within a fortnight, or clear the area of outlaws, particularly dacoits and robbers, within a short time or to create a sense of security in the community within a similar period or to work out a sensational offence within an unreasonably short time. More often than not, these are the very orders which induce policemen at the Police Station level to resort to such unlawful means as indiscriminate arrests, adoption of third-degree methods, staging fake encounters etc. Often targets of the kind indicated above are promised by the Government in the State Assembly after a hue and cry has been raised regarding law and order/crime situation in a particular area or in the State. Such instructions filter down to the Police Stations through the various levels of police hierarchy. In our opinion such instructions and directions which are instrumental in creating a distorted sense of accountability among the police functionaries should be controlled effectively and avoided.
61.45 The necessity for accountability of the police organisation is not far to seek. As mentioned earlier, it is too much to expect the political executive alone to account for the acts of the Government departments under their control and the individuals in those departments. The very remoteness of the political executive from the grass-root functioning of the Governmental agencies makes it imperative that the accountability has not only to be defined but prescribed precisely for various levels of the Government organisation. Again the concept of ministerial responsibility to the people through the Parliament and Assemblies presupposes anonymity of the Governmental agencies. In progressive democracies, the concept of anonymity has given way to direct accountability of the various constituents of the Government to the people.
61.46 We want to emphasise that accountability can be ensured only by active supervision. Accountability also depends upon the awareness of the people of their rights and their willingness to exercise the same in a responsible manner by activating the mechanisms worked out by us. At the same time that awareness should also include clear understanding of the limitations and constraints within which the police has to function. Police on their part should also clearly understand that the ultimate accountability is to the people and to the people alone. Their accountability to law and to their organisation are only complementary to the ultimate objective of accountability to the people. If the people are not prepared to assert their rights through the various agencies prescribed by us apart from the Courts, if the State Security Commissions are not established, if the media remains biased and not constructive and inspections continue to be a farce, nothing much can be expected from the mechanism of accountability.