When one surveys Northeim’s economic, cultural, and governmental structure the impression is that of a balanced, self-contained entity. The one way in which the town was not integrated harmoniously was socially, where there were distinct class divisions in almost every sphere of activity. This disunifying factory grew to be politically important, and under the impact of steadily declining economic conditions, politics became radicalized. In the years after 1930 this flaw split Northeim wide open, led to bloody riots and the deterioration of the democratic mood, and culminated in the Nazi seizure of power. The Nazi answer to the problem of class division was to abolish its expression by force.

In Northeim, as elsewhere in Germany during the first years of the Weimar Republic, there were people who could not accept Germany’s defeat, revolution, and the resultant democracy. Often they opposed modernity altogether: liberalism, cosmopolitan culture, an open society, a competitive industrialized economy, a powerful labor movement. Collectively, such people constituted a radical right wing, but they had no effective organization to express their often inchoate and even contradictory antipathies. Among the many groups was the infant Nazi party, which rapidly grew in southern Germany but hardly at all in the North. (p. 25)

The Gottingen recruits were attracted by to Nazism because of its vague ideology of a new society in which patriotic solidarity would supplant Germany’s rigid class distinctions. (p. 25)

In November 1923, the Nazi party was outlawed all over Germany. The inflation stopped, political stability returned, and the stable period of the Weimar Republic (1924-1929) began. Yet behind the façade of calm prosperity, conditions were developing that would stimulate the regrowth of Nazism in the region. Even before the depression the middle classes, especially small farmers, felt themselves to be in trouble; increased taxes, tight credit, competition from a modernizing economy, and the perception that the government was in the hands of the Left were components of this sentiments. Moreover, the traditional middle class parties were in disarray. (p. 28)

Moreover, the Nazis had used the fallow years to tune up their propaganda machine and redirect it toward the middle classes who were now becoming ripe for a radical mobilization. (p.28) Though there would be a continued attempt to win workers, and though anti-Semitism would not be abandoned, the new emphasis would be on groups that were responding to Nazism and on propaganda themes that produced results. That meant primarily appeals to small businessmen, shop clerks, and the rural population, with a primary content of anti-Marxism plus attacks on the economic policies of the Weimar Republic. …Speeches at meetings continued to serve as the main vehicle of propaganda; getting the speakers before audiences involved methods developed over the whole period since 1925. (p. 29)

“The ranks of the NSDAP were filled with young people. Those serious people who joined did so because they were for social justice, or opposed to unemployment. There was a feeling of restless energy about the Nazis. You constantly saw the swastika painted on the sidewalks or found them littered by pamphlets put out by the Nazis. I was drawn by the feeling of strength about the party, even though there was much in it which was highly questionable.” (p. 32)

“I had left Germany at the height of the power and glory of the Wilhelmine Reich. I came back to find the Fatherland in shambles, under a Socialist republic.” (p. 32)

What were the ideas that drew men to the Nazi movement? First, opposition to the SPDs (Marxist radicals) was of paramount importance in the depression environment. The second idea of Nazism that Northeimers recognized clearly in the early days was its claim to fervent patriotism and avid militarism. (p. 34-35)

“Eleven Years Republic – Eleven Years Mass Misery” – Title of Speech at Nazi Meeting (August 10)

Burghers who watched the unemployed pass through Northeim saw them as more than the symbol of economic catastrophe and potential social degradation. The misery of the jobless evoked suspicion and disgust more often than compassion. (p. 42)

The September election campaign taught Northeim’s Nazis that their best drawing cards were religion and nationalism, preferably combined. (p. 46)

On November 22, the Reichsbanner held a crowded meeting on the subject of Mussolini’s Italy. The speaker compared German democracy with Italian dictatorship, with direct allusions to the Nazi program. (p. 48)

One Socialist Reichstag member once said, “If that bunch every once gets in, democracy will be lost.” (p. 49)

As the depression deepened, the only way that the SPD could undercut the Nazis was not by blind opposition but by an counterprogram sufficiently attractive to awaken in the harts of the bourgeoisie the kinds of hopes that the Nazis were able to arouse. Instead, the Social Democrats concentrated on holding the loyalty of the working class and saw the Nazi threat in terms of armed rebellion. Thus, no matter how hard they tried, Northeim’s Socialist did not provide effective opposition to the Nazis. (p. 55)

One SPD leader, on the dangers of his opposition to Nazism: “I’d rather lose everything than my freedom.” (p. 55)

Speech against “Orthodox Jewish methods of cattle slaughtering.” (p. 57)

On April 2, Northeim’s branch office of the Commerz und Privatbank closed permanently. A week later occurred the worst calamity to befall the town’s middle class during the depression: the collapse of the Enterprise Bank, a locally financed cooperative bank which was the pride of the lower middle class. Bankruptcy was declared on April 9, 1931, although the liquidation extended into 1933 and caused considerable bitterness. The collapse of the Enterprise Bank was not due to the general economic situation, but was the result of poor management, especially in interest policy. Meetings of the creditors were acrimonious and the matter became a political issue. The Nazis claimed that the bankruptcy was due to the Versailles Treaty and the republican form of government, while the Socialists gleefully pointed out that the board of directors was composed of Nationalists and Nazis, and listed some of the blunders which had caused the bank’s failure. (p. 62)

SPD meeting topic: “Swastika Wonderland, the bloody and shameful regime of Italian Fascism” (p.64)

The American stock market crash led U.S. banks to call in loans they had made to Germany. The credit crisis became acute by mid-1931, and in July the major German banks began to close. In Northeim there was no real run on the banks. Yet the town’s leaders were concerned. Along with economic concern came rising political tension. (p. 64-65)

After the elections on August 9, 1931, not only had all parties succumbed to Nazi leadership; the political process had been further radicalized, and by means of a constitutional provision designed to assure maximum democracy. The violence in Northeim was especially gratifying since it was another step toward bringing the town’s troubled burghers over to Hitler’s side. (p. 68)

In 1931, two SA men crept up to the house of Northeim SPD leader and painted a swastika on his door with the words, “Under this sign you’ll bleed, you red pig.” Northeimers frequently saw slogans painted on walls or telephone poles, “Throw the Jews out!” or “The Jews are our misfortune!” and these too were the casual work of the SA. (p. 78)

By the end of 1932, Northeim’s SA, composed mainly of young farmers’ sons, had developed into a formidable instrument: well trained, equipped, and housed; spirited and under the iron discipline of the Nazi party. The knowledge that people had of the existence of this corps was to be an important factor in the opening months of the Third Reich.

The key to the Nazi system, the base factor in the whole process, was the method of adapting mass meetings, with appropriate speakers to local interests and concerns. (p 82)

“There were two types of Nazis in Northeim,” said a former civil servant, “the decent ones and the gutter type. In the end the gutter won out.” Another ambivalent aspect of Nazism for most Northeimers was the party’s anti-Semitism. Social discrimination against Jews was practically nonexistent in the tow. Jews were integrated along class lines: the two wealthy Jewish families belonged to upper-class circles and clubs, Jews of middling income belonged to middle-class social organizations, and working-class Jews were in the Socialist community. Yet abstract anti-Semitism in the form of jokes or expression of generalized distaste was prevalent. If Nazi anit-Semitism held any appeal for the townspeople, it was in a highly abstract form, as a remote theory disconnected with daily encounters with real Jews in Northeim.
Northeimers were drawn to anti-Semitism because they were drawn to Nazism, not the other way around. Many who voted Nazi simply ignored or rationalized the anti-Semitism of the party, just as they ignored other unpleasant aspects of the Nazi movement. (p 84)

“Nazis mostly did not hate Jews individually, many had Jewish friends, but they were concerned about the Jewish problem: Most Jews, though ready for complete assimilation, willing to be 100% Germans, persisted in being loyal to their Jewish fellows (mostly coming from Poland and Russia), helping them, pushing them on, so that more and more Jews got positions not only in trade, banking, theater, film, the newspapers, etc., whole branches of the economy and key positions being in the hands of Jews, also doctors, lawyers, etc. (The Nazis.) Many people saw the danger of that problem. Nobody knew of any way to deal with it, but they hoped the Nazis would know. If they had guessed how the Nazis did deal with it, not one in a hundred would have joined the party. (p 85)

In the opinion of keen observer, “Most of those who joined the Nazis did so because they wanted a radical answer to the economic problem. Then, too, people wanted a hard, sharp, clear leadership – they were disgusted with the eternal political strife of parliamentary politics.” (p. 86)

Most Northeimers had little idea what the Nazis would really do after they achieved power. Even Jews had no notion that the Nazis really meant what they said. This was not for lack of information. Anyone who went regularly to Nazi meetings, or read the pamphlets, or even the slogans chalked on the walls, should have been able to discern the vulgar and violent aspects of the NSDAP. (p. 86)

The year 1932 was the last year of democracy in Germany. Northeim’s Social Democrats could not know this, but they did have a sense of crisis. An indication of this was the decision, made nationally in response to the Nazi-Nationalist “Harzburg Front,” to amalgamate all anti-Nazi groups into one organization to be named the “Iron Front.” (p. 88)

When politics becomes a matter of vilification and innuendo, then eventually people feel repugnance for the whole process. It is the beginning of a yearning for a strong man who will rise above petty and partisan groups. The Nazis were to exploit this feeling fully, and though they contributed richly to the rise of partisan acrimony, they were also the first to pronounce “politician” with every possible tone of scorn and sarcasm. (p. 90)

The extensive political activity of the Nationalists was as nothing when compared to the Nazi effort. (p. 95)

When it was decided that a second presidential election would be held on April 10, 1932 (four weeks after the March 13th election), the Nationalists decided to back Hitler, and the other parties became relatively inactive. However, the lack of electioneering did not mean that the mood of violence had subsided. (p. 100)

The Nazis showed no signs of the weariness which might have been expected. They inaugurated their third campaign just four days after the final presidential election with a mass meeting. Much Nazi effort was also devoted to their rural strongholds in Northeim County where, during the Prussian Parliament campaign, they held at least twenty-five meetings. (p 102)

Nazi gains had come at the expense of the small parties of the center and the moderate Right. (p 103)

The DHP and the other splinter parties had paved the way for Hitler by promoting nationalism and anti-Socialism. They served as the repository of potential Nazi backers. The failure of the middle-class parties to withstand the Nazi electoral drive was caused by many factors, primarily the inadequacy of their followers’ commitment to (or understanding of) democracy. The German middle classes hardly wanted a nihilistic dictatorship, but their ideological heritage from the days of Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm II left them ill-prepared to appreciate what Nazism would mean or to develop a viable alternative to it. In the panic atmosphere of the depression they responded to the symbol manipulation that made up Nazi propaganda out of ideological poverty. In this sense the growth of Nazism was as much the product of two generations of the erosion of democratic values as it was of the constellation of circumstances present in the years of Hitler’s drive to power. (p 105-106)

The more Northeimers became concerned about the depression, the more they curtailed their consumption in favor of savings. The depression thus affected their emotion more than their pocketbooks, and if spending in Northeim fell it was not because the middle classes were hurt; it was because they were hoarding their cash. The two groups hurt by the depression were the small artisans connected with construction, and the workers. Despair was bound to register politically, even in the working class with its solid ties to Social Democracy. (p 109)

If the town’s workers were desperate over their economic plight, that was only half the story. The other half was that the Nazis, flushed with their electoral successes in the spring elections and armed with an absolute majority in Northeim, began to apply an inexorable political and economic pressure upon the SPD’s followers which the Socialists were powerless to resist. (p 112)

In the summer of 1932, the SPD-Center government was deposed and an authoritarian commissar replaced it. The Socialists chose to take the matter to court rather than fight. The bastion of German democracy was breeched without a shot being fired in its defense. (p 118)

By the summer of 1932 Adolf Hitler had become Germany’s major media star and a Hitler speech had become something like a combination carnival, rock concert, and major league championship game. It attracted the believers who sought mystical communion, the curious who just came to experience the happening, and the faddists who wanted to share what so many others were doing. Tickets were sold out from the moment the speech was announced; usually they were rationed carefully among local Nazi bigwigs and went for premium prices.
The locale of Hitler’s speeches were not chosen lightly; by 1932 local Nazi officials were always sent, well in advance, a complete set of printed instructions as to how Hitler meetings must be conducted, down to the last detail – including the brand of mineral water Hitler insisted on and other curious requirements. A Hitler speech was also a major financial undertaking and major income-generating event. But the main point was that a Hitler speech gave an enormous boost to the Nazi campaign wherever he appeared. (p 123-124)

Hitler, speaking in the town of Goettingen: “There are moments in the history of nations when a decisive instant comes. The coming vote is not an election but a decision between two worlds – the world of internationalism and that of the true German spirit. One must decide between a Germany riven by classes, parties, religions, and the Germany of one will, one goal. The last thirteen years have brought misery, destruction. No one else could have destroyed the national wealth, created millions of unemployed so well. These thirteen years have led to thirty parties all arrayed against one. All elements have their parties, only the German Volk has none. But the National Socialist German Workers party will never give up the struggle, for only it has the courage and will to act.” (p 124)

All other parties had been reduced to insignificance and hence did not campaign, with the exception of the Nationalists. At one of the Nationalist meetings, the Nationalist speaker said he admired the Nazis for their patriotism but opposed their program, especially its “socialistic” aspects. He also condemned Hitler’s wish to destroy all other parties, for “German culture has grown through diversity.” (p 126)

It was in this atmosphere that Nazi appeals to nationalism and militarism, however crude, could have effect. Socialist charges that the Nazis were militaristic, on the other hand, were valueless, especially when they contained implied threats of violence. Instead of attempting to combat the nationalistic, military-based government of von Papen, the Nazis turned the new emphasis to their advantage. (p 132)

At the end of the summer of 1932, despite recent successes, Local Group Northeim was in trouble. Money was still rolling in, but receipts had not risen while expenditures had – in anticipation of ever-increasing revenues. In addition, membership in the Nazi party was actually declining. This may have been because the party had turned “Left,” in an attempt to distance itself from the von Papen government, and thus had alienated some of its middle-class followers. If so, there was a portentous political problem, too. (p 132-133)

Nationally the NSDAP seemed to have passed its zenith by November, 1932. It fell from 230 seats in the Reichstag to 196, while the Communists rose from 89 to 100. Yet the election solved nothing, for the Nazis and Communists still maintained their “negative majority” and authoritarian government continued. (p 136)

The townspeople were convinced of the inevitability of a Nazi victory. It was widely believed that the NSDAP had already compiled lists of how positions of power would be distributed in Northeim. (137)

Contrary to popular opinions about the Socialists, the Communists were considered serious revolutionaries who would fight if the Nazis came to power. This viewpoint was not shared by the authorities in Northeim. (p 138)

Part of the Nazis’ problem was the stalemated national situation. Another part was what Ernst Girmann called “this momentary financial calamity,” though it was actually a region-wide, if not national, crisis. (p 138)

The factors that brought Northeim to the brink of the Third Reich with a three-fifths Nazi majority were not numerous, but they were complexly interrelated. Paramount among them was the depression. Though only the working class suffered physically in the three-year crisis, the town’s middle class was more decisively affected through fears that an ultimate catastrophe would trust upon it the same fate as the “shelterless,” or that social revolution would destroy its status. More important than the actual misery caused by the depression was the constant flow of news items stressing that misery. The depression not only created the climate of fear in which the Nazis throve, it also embittered political processes. Political rivalry in turn prevented the cooperation that was needed to mitigate the effects of the depression.
A further factor which aided the rise of Nazism in Northeim was politicization. The yearnings and needs created by the depression, class antagonisms, and resurgent nationalism all seemed capable of political solution. Constant elections meant constant campaigning and each campaign spurred bitterness and radicalism. Since registration was automatic, only the sick and feeble-minded didn’t vote. The rest were involved in politics, which is to say that political passion pervaded almost all areas of human existence in the town.
Nazi propaganda efforts in Northeim went beyond pure activism. Persistent, imaginative, and driving effort was coupled with a shrewd appreciation of what was specifically suitable for Northeim, and for each element in the town. Aside from general speeches on nationalism, Jews, and “Marxists,” there were meetings devoted to artisans, businessmen, civil servants, pensioners, workmen, and other target groups. Northeim’s local peculiarities were taken into account; there was little real anti-Semitism in the town, hence this was soft-pedaled. But the townspeople were strongly religious and pealed to, the Nazis relied on pageantry, “evenings of entertainment,” film showings, plays, acrobatic acts, lotteries, dances, sport exhibitions, military displays, recitals by children, and other expedients from a seemingly inexhaustible bag of tricks. In short, the NSDAP succeeded in being all things to all men. (p 139-142)

The attributes which made the Nazis respectable were their intense nationalism, their manipulation of religion, and the support given them by the conservatives. (p 140)

The energy and skill of the Nazis comes from their goal to acquire power. This goal was aided by the composition of the Nazi party, which gave them the talent necessary to accomplish their simple goal with less effort then previous parties had to employ. Finally, the mechanism of propaganda and mass mobilization worked out by the Nazi party before 1930 through trial and error was simple, self-correcting, and self-reinforcing. (p 143-144)

The factors conducive to the rise of a radical mass party of the right were thus abundant in Northeim: economic misery which seemed to grow progressively worse, a traditional division along class lines which became exacerbated by political intolerance, intense nationalism and fervid militarism, an ineffectual but belligerent Left, and a splintered, indignant, insecure Right. In addition to its own propaganda the NSDAP contributed one other ingredient to the witches’ cauldron – the breakdown of civil order. The root of the problem was the division of the town into two groups of absolute opponents, each of which meant to destroy the other; the one to institute a dictatorship, the other to save the existing, if battered, democracy. This clash of views led to mutual vilification, first by the parties, then by individuals. Libel suits became commonplace. Taunts and insults by word and deed fostered arrogance. Terrorism, especially in Northeim County, became a standard weapon; knives, blackjacks, even guns became standard equipment. Beyond this there were the persistent rumors, some based on fact, of impending Nazi Putsch. Orderly minded people were sickened by the recurrent fights, but finally became inured to them. Thus the way was paved for the systematic use of violence and terror by the Nazis after Hitler came to power, and for their relatively indifferent acceptance by the people of Northeim. This was to be the prime factor in the Nazi seizure of power. (p 146-147)

On January 31, 1933, “the news burst over the town that Adolf Hitler had been appointed chancellor or Germany. To all Northeimers it was clear that the pointless wanderings of national politics were over and that at last something was happening.” (p 152)

“Others in the SPD knew the game was up, too. They pinned their hopes on the German Army. If the Army gave the word, they would fight; if not, Germany would go Nazi without organized armed resistance by the Reichsbanner or other worker organizations. The membership of the Reichsbanner was still willing to fight, but it was clear to them that unless the word was given soon they would be picked off individually by the Nazis.” (p 155)

“The instruments of repression were also increased. The Nazis not only controlled the police – now they were the police. At the same time that force was being applied to silence the SPD, the Nazis undertook to spread slander about them.” (p 157-158)

“The task of women would be to buy only German goods when shopping and to instill “religion, morality, discipline, and love of Fatherland” in the children.” (p 159)

“The Nazis knew that their goal was not to win elections but rather to secure enough popular support to work their will without serious public outcry.” They tried to increase public support through force and propaganda. (p 160-161)

Ernst Girmann: “A week ago, a new Germanic spirit swept through Germany, that of National Socialism, for National Socialism and Germany are now coterminous. “ What was needed now was to cleanse Northeim from Marxist corruption. (p 164)

“The first task fo Northeim’s Nazis after the local elections were over was to convert the town’s mechanisms of power from democratic, pluralistic ones into instruments of dictatorship. This involved a purge – of the City Council, of the administrative officials, and of the rank and file city workers. The precondition was absolute control over the Council.” (p 170)

"With virtual control over the administration of Northeim and Northeim County, the Nazis undertook the first most obvious task: cleansing the city and county offices of actual or potential opponents. The Nazis considered the "general cleaning action" one of their foremost accomplishments. The basis for the purge was Hitler's "Decree for the Reconstruction of the Professional Civil Service," promulgated under powers given the government by the Enabling Act, on April 7, 1933." (p 176-177)

"The Nazis were bankrupt people prior to 1933. Afterwards they all got jobs. The party in 1933 was full of the poor, the thieves, the morally and financially bankrupt." (p 177)

"Not only had the Nazis gained absolute control of Northeim's Council, Senate, and Executive, they had also conducted a thorough purge of the city's administration. All actual or potential dissidents from Nazi goals and methods were eliminated or under control." (p 181)

"The initial investment of terror would multiply itself through rumor and social reinforcement until oposition would be looked upon as wholly futile. Part of the Nazi's justification for their harsh measures had already been developed - the suggestion that the Communists and Socialists planned to overthrow the state by force." (p 184)

"Witht the propaganda justification for police action firmly established, the Nazis in Northeim made use of the familiar tactics of repression and terrorism. The homes of potential or actual opponents were repeatedly ransacked and verious people were arrected. This was done under the public eye, to increase its deterrent effect." (p 186)

"Even to express oneself against the new system was to invite persecution. The general feeling was that the Gestapo was everywhere. At least five people were identified as being "Gestapo agents," though in point of fact there was probably one one for the whole town, Hermann Denzler, and that was considerably later." However, "individual members of the party and SA took it upon themselves to spy on potential opponents; others implied that they were doing so, for their own self-aggrandisment. ...Given the atmosphere of terror, even people who were friends felt that they must betray each other inorder to survive." (p 189)

"What happened to those who had sworn resistance? What happened to the Reichsbanner, which had repeatedly asserted in the years before Hitler came to power, that when the expected Nazi coup came they would be able to defend the Republic? In Northeim, at least, the Republic was destroyed without a single blow struck in its defense. The Reichsbanner, with all tis plans for instant mobilization, had its members struck down one by one, its leaders imprisoned, beaten, hounded from their jobs and thei homes without any resistance from the organization as a whole." (p 191)

"This situation, where even heroism was denied the mend of the Democratic Left, came about in no small measure because of the failure of the OScial Democrats to understand the nature of Nazism. Just as their basic premise in the years before Hitler came to power was the erroneous assumption that the Nazis were essentially Putsch-ists who could not possibly attract a mass following, so their basic premise after Hitler came to power was the equally erroneous assumption that his would be a government similar to the others of the Weimar period." (p 192)

A "pattern emerges of how the Northeim Nazis dealt with avowed opponents to the regime. They were, first of all, economically hurt, as far as this was possible. Most SPD members who could be forced out of their jobs were subsequently given the choice of no work at all or work in the stone quarry. The latter was work designed to break their spirits. In addition they were hounded by the police with arrests, questionings, and repeated house searches. Behind this lay the constant threat of the concentration camp, the very factor of uncertainty adding terror." (p 199)

"Poverty, terror, bureaucratic chicanery, social isolation - a potent formula. Perhaps one shoudl add what might have been the most significant factor of all: the sense of futility. What ws the Northeimer Social Democrat to do? Rebel? Even if one had weapons, whom was one to shoot? Policemen? Every Nazi (including those you went to grade school with)? And when? Which one of the various small acts exactly tipped the scale toward a dictatorship? And who was to rebel with you, since the factor of distrust entered in? And what the? Was Northeim to declare itself an independent entity in Germany? Perhaps one shoudl attemtp first to prepare the population through effective propaganda. But Northeim voted for the NSDAP with a 63-percent majority, and if the SPD could not sell democracy when it had the advantages of free speech, its own press, and a party machine, what could it do with none of these?" (p 200)

Hermann Denzler speaking to the Hitler Youth at a May Day celebration: "But besides letting your courage be strngthened by his examples, let the name Schlageter cause you to increase your hatred against Versailles and against the French who merdered him because - despite the persecution and danger - he dedicated himself to his Fatherland. (Turning then to the boys and girls.) Be you his avengers! Be you the German YOuth that knows how to hate foreigners! Your way leads you daily by this stone; clench your fists and think: 'Never forget, revenge is mine!'" (p 212)

"Thus in the first six months of the Nazi regime, Northeim was subjected to a veritable barrage of propaganda. While the NSDAP took the lead, all the various nationalistic and militaristic elements in the town were brought into play to support and generalize the Nazi appeal. In addition to the mass-participation events in Northeim, there was the steady stream of national news stories, radio speeches, and propaganda in magazines and books. The total effect was to create the spirit of a revolution and to justify the kidns of steps the Nazis took to insure themselves in control over the people." (p 216)

"Northeim's Jews were simply excluded fromt he community at large. At the same time the Nazis undertook their most Herculean task: the atomization of the community at large. Though the methods differed, the result was the same, and by the summer of 1933 individual Northeimers were as cut off from effective intercourse with one another as the Jews had been from the rest of the townspeople. The total reorganization of society was the most important result of the Nazi revolution. Eventually nor independent social groups were to exist. Wherever two or three were gathered, the Fuehrer would also be present. Ultimately all society, in terms of formal human relationships, would cease to exist, or rather would exist in a new framework whereby each individual related not to his fellow men but only to the state and to the Nazi leader who became the personal embodiment of the state. The usefulness of a general shakeup of social organization for dictatorial control can be well imagined. In the first place it would mean that people could be more easily observed, since all clubs would be Nazi controlled. Secondly, with onld social ties broken down there would be less opportunity for the spreading of discontent. Thirdly, by given a Nazi cast to all organizations, the members would become involved in the general Nazi system. ...An attempt was made to amalgamate all clubs that had the same function but were formed along class lines, since the new criteria were to be German citizenship and good Nazism, not the old traditions or class distinctions. There was a consistent attemtp to subordinate and join together all communal endeavors that had roughly the same goals or subject interests. This Nazi insistence on politicalizing all organizations poisoned the hitherto liverly clubs." (p 221-222)

"If an organization was ordered by the NSDAP to dissoble its present executive committee and elect a new one with a Nazi majority, the assumption was the this would be necessary to comply with the law." (p 223)

"In contrast to the thoroughness and ruthlessness with which the Nazis dealt with the town's economic organizations, they were very cautious about the numerous patriotic societies. Theyc reated only one new organization, a National Socialist Wor Victims' Association (NSKOV). There were enough Nazis in the other groups to dominate them already, and resumably the NSDAP did not want to stir up needless trouble. Propaganda seemed sufficient for control. In time the slower but equally effective social atrophy resulting from fear and distrust woudl destroy the patriotic societies as independent entities." (p 227)

"Nazi efforts at social hegemony did not stop with the customary associations: economic, patriotic, speical interest. The NSDAP also desired a dominant voice in religious and purely cultural matters. Nazi interests in religion predated the Third Reich. During the years before Hitler came to power one of the strongest appeals the Nazis had made in the town was through the Lutheran church, and their favorite speakers were Lutheran ministers. For its part, the NSDAP promoted religion as an aspect of the struggle against the "religionless November-state" (i.e., the Weimar Republic). The men who backed the German Christian Movement were apparently sincere in their belief that it would aid Protestantism. In later years when the NSDAP became seriously antireligious, the same men were in the forefront of the struggle agaisnt Nazism and formed a courageous resistance. But by their blindness in the early months of the Third Reich they gave an enormous boost to Nazism. (p 229-230)

"The town's public library was also "coordinated." By mid-May over five hundred books were burned (1/4 of the total number). This "un-German, foreign-to-the-Volk, and worthless literary trash" was replaced by a select list of books, beginning with Mein Kampf. (p 231)

"Thus by the summer of 1933, the Nazis had either broken up, altered, fused, or brought under control most of the clubs and societies of Northeim. The complex and diversified social organization of the town had been almost completely uprooted. In most cases the Nazis tried to fill the vacuum, but often people simply stopped coming together. Either there was no more club, or the attractiveness of the club had been destroyed by Gleichschaltung, or people no longer had the leisure or the desire to continuewith their club. What social life there was continued in the most basic groupings: the Stammtisch, the beer-and-cards eventings, or small social gatherings in homes. Even these were threatened as people began to distrust one another. What was the value of getting together with others to talk if you had to be careful about what you said? THus to a great extent the individual was atomized. By the process of Gleichschaltung individuals had a choice: solitude or mass relationship via some Nazi organization. None of the Nazi measures in the first six months of the Third Reich had a greater ultimate effect than Gleichschaltung. By it the externals of the rigid class structure were destroyed, and Northeimers were molded into the kind of unorganized mass that dictators like so well. (p 232)

Note: Chapter 15 - The Positive Aspect

"In short, there are two sides to every question. After all, in six short months the town had been unified, the economic problems were being dealt with, and nothing was more convincing than the shining faces of the Stormtroopers outlined by all the torches and silhouetted against the flags. The Nazi party was providing decisive leadership and was monolithic, dedicated, selfless, and purposeful. In reality, however, Northeim's Nazi Group was rotten and festering within. The first and, during the initial period, the only reisistance to the NSDAP came from within the ranks of the Nazis themselves. The leaders of the revolt were opposed to teh violence, corruption, and dictatorial methods which they naively believed to be contrary to the true principles of National Socialism." (p 244)

"In October 1933 Hitler withdrew the German Reich from the League of Nations." He held an election to prove to the world that Germans truly supported him. (p 251)

"The significance of the election did not lie in the results but in the methods and techniques used. The campaign and the balloting showed that the dictitorial state was fully organized. For almost two weeks before election day practically all Northeim was forced to be involved in a ritual devoid of inner content. The function of the election was not to determine or register the will of the citizens of Northeim. It was to impress upon Northeimers the omnipotence and determination of the NSDAP." (p 254)

"Henceforth the operation of terror was undertaken by simple injuctions or by subtler and more effective means of social reinforcement. There were injuctions to establish oneself as a good citizen by attending meetings, contributing to charity drives, and tracing "Aryan" ancestry." (p 256)

"The NSDAP was not only interested in removing opposition. It was also concerned that education be enlisted as a positive support for the new regime. Converting the schools into ideologiacl bastions of the new state was a process begun almost immediately. New textbooks were brought in in 1933. The existing school libraries were stripped of "degenerate" literature and stocked with books glorifying nationalism and militarism. Teachers were given lectures laying down the general lines under which history and other sensitive subjects were to be taught. New courses were introduced in "Racial Theory" and Teutonic prehistory. In addition to the new subjects and teh new approach to old subjects, the schools were required to emphasize sport and physical education, expecially shooting and "defense sport." (p 258)

"While the increases in crime were large, the numbers were still small. One can hardly speak of a crime wave in Northeim inr esponse to the establishment of the dictatorship. Girmann was undoubtedly puzzled by the numerous cases of embezzlement involving members of the Nazi party, who then had to be expelled. The evidence of both corruption and lack of commitment is not conclusive but it suggests that the Nazis were beginning to discover the consequences of creating a lawless regime and of forcing people to live a life of compelled insincerity. The context in Northeim in the years after 1933 was one characterized by the general breakdown of trust and by the destruction or perversion of hitherto unifying social organizations. The response of the individual was generally withdrawal, sometimes aggression. Both were useful to the dictatorship: withdrawal removed threats to the new system; aggression could be channeled against internal or external enemies of the regime. But the type of inner unity that the NSDAP had promised did not appear. Instead of creating the ideal Volk-community the Third Reich launched an era of deceit, distrust, and progressive spiritual decadence. (p 264)

"The real usefulness to the Nazis of the "coordinated" economic associations was that they could provide lever to pry the economy of NOrtheim out of the depression. How the NSDAP proposed to do this became apparent by the fall of 1933. During the summer the town had been temporarily stripped of unemployed through a variety of public works projects. However, the Nazis recognized that consumers needed to purchase and employers needed to hire in order to get the unemployed back into the regular economy. Thus the economic problem was viewed as one to be solved by organization and propaganda, fields in which the NSDAP felt it excelled." (p 268)

"Since the depression was ended in NOrtheim by means of works projects and a construction boom, what was the role of all the propaganda, the discussions, the "Battle of Work"? Though its dirct economic contribution was minimal, its psychological contribution was crucial. It convinced the townspeople that the depression was over, and it convined them that they had been the ones to end it, under Nazi leadership. The Nazis pushed two concepts. The first was that everyone should help; the second was that contributions were not charity but rather a rightful obligation to fellow Germans." (p 273-274)

"on the one hand, Nazism had apparently ended the depression, initiated an economic revival, beautified the town, provided vigorous and efficient leadership, and increased Northeim's economic assets. On the other hand, it had vatiated and regimented social life, introduced a system of terror and authoritarianism, attacked the churhces, forced Northeimers to participate in a constant round of dulling and ritualistic propaganda events, and tied the fortunes of the town to the personal whims and dubious personality of Ernst Girmann." (p 277)

"At the end of 1935, Protestants were secretly circulating anti-Nazi writings; the Catholic Curch was systematically and ceaselessly trying to make its followers anti-Nazi. The lower classes were ripe for recruitment by the workers' underground. Ex-Social Democrats were handing together and mutually reinforcing their opposition to the regime. People were still shopping in Jewish stores. Former conservatives were disgusted with the party and were seeking contacts with Army officers. Parents were turning against the Hitler Youth. And the old Nazis felt that they had been bypassed while the new members incessantly complained that there was too much being demanded of them. However, by 1935, no matter what Northeimers felt about the Nazis, there was little that they could do about it." (p 279)

"Long before Ernst Girmann discovered how difficult it was for one Local Group Leader to keep control over so many people, the Nazi party had developed a system to divide the taks. Every Local Group was broken up into "cells," each of which was to contain several "blocks"; each block was to supervise a few dozen households. By being in close and constant contact with such a limited number of people, the Nazi Block Warden was supposed to bear the prime responsibility for representing their needs to the party as well as conveying the party's commands to them. However, the goals of the Block Warden were limited, the results easily measured by standard bookkeeping practices, and the duties were tiresome. At least once a week the Block Warden had to visit every one of his forty-four households to collect contributions, or otherwise pester the people. Yet it is precisely these "Political Evaluations of Individual Persons" produced by Northeim's Block Wardens in the years after 1935 that demonstrate most dramatically how far the Nazi party had retreated from its millenialist asperations. (p 287-288)

"By the time Hitler determined to murder all the Jews in his power, as his "Final Solution," almost all of Northeim's Jews had left the town for a bigger city and supposed anonymity, or had gone to another country for safety. Northeimers did not harass theri Jewish neighbors, but they also did their best not to "know" what their government was doing to the Jews. By then, apathy and psychological denial had become a way of life." (p 290-291)

"As for the reasons behind the particular experience in Northeim, the most important factor in the victory of Nazism was the active division of the town along class lines." (p 296)

"What was needed in Northeim to stop the Nazis was a political coalition of decent people, regardless of party, to recognize that - whatever it promised - Nazism was an indecent thing. That such a coalition never developed was the main reason the Nazis got into power. But it was the middle class that gave them their chance." (p 297)

"The main effect of the depression was to radicalize the town. In the face of the mounting economic crisis, Northiemers were willing to tolerate approaches that would have left them indignant or indifferent under other circumstances. Tus the disgusting and debilitating party acrimony and violence mushroomed in the years before the dictatorship. The extent of the violence in Norhtiem was an expression of the radical situation, but it also added to it by making violence normal and acceptable. Along with the growing nationalism and increasing impatience over the depression, violence and political tension were significant factors in preparing the town for Nazi takeover. (p 298)

"The single biggest factor in this process was the destruction of formal society in Northeim. What social cohesion there was in the town existed in the club life, and this was destroyed in the early months of Nazi rule. With their social organizations gone and with terror a reality, Northeimers were largely isolated from one another. This was true of the middle class but even more true of the workers, since by the destruction of the SPD and the unions the whole complex of social ties created by this super-club was effaced. By reducing the people of Northeim to unconnected social atoms, the Nazis could move the resulting mass in whatever direction they wished. The process was probably easier in Northeim than in most other places, since the town contained so many government employees. By virtue of their dependence on the government the civil servants were in an exposed position and had no choice but to work with they Nazis. Especially Northeim's teachers found themselves drawn into support of the NSDAP almost immediately. As other Northeimers flocked to the Nazi bandwagon in the spring of 1933, and as terror and distrust became apparent, tehre was practically no possibility of resistance to Hitler." (p 298-299)

"The Nazi leaders were forced to settle for external compliance rather than internalized commitment on the part of the townspeople." (p 301)

"There was no real comprehension of what the town would experience if Hitler came to power, no real understanding of what Nazism was." (p 302)

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