PAN DISCUSSION GROUP 

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PAN Discussion Group Wednesday July 25th 2007

Subject: Lula, Chavez and other South American lefties

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Location:  Logan Square -ish  RSVP for details

Time: 7pm to 10pm - ish

Bring drinks and snacks to share 

General:

The articles are the basis for the discussion and reading them helps give us some common ground and focus for the discussion, especially where we would otherwise be ignorant of the issues. The discussions are not intended as debates or arguments, rather they should be a chance to explore ideas and issues in a constructive forum. Feel free to bring along other stuff you've read on this, related subjects or on topics the group might be interested in for future meetings.

GROUND RULES:

* Temper the urge to speak with the discipline to listen and leave space for others

* Balance the desire to teach with a passion to learn

* Hear what is said and listen for what is meant

* Marry your certainties with others' possibilities

* Reserve judgment until you can claim the understanding we seek

  

Any problems let me know...

847-963-1254

tysoe2@yahoo.com

 

The Articles:

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An intro to this eruption of leftiness down South ..

 

http://www.commondreams.org/cgi-bin/print.cgi?file=/headlines06/0320-03.htm

 

Latin American Leftists Redefine Politics by Traci Carl

 

These aren't the hide-in-the-hills leftists of yesteryear, ready to take up arms against the oppressor. A new wave of Latin American leaders — variously labeled leftist, populist, nationalist or socialist — is redefining politics in a region where U.S.-backed, right-wing dictatorships spent decades crushing their mostly leftist opponents and supporting corporate interests amid fears of inroads by the Soviet Union and its Cuban proxy.

That struggle, fought everywhere from the mountains of Guatemala to the streets of Argentina, has given way to a new generation of politicians as the Cold War recedes into history — a more pragmatic left that embraces its own flavor of free-market policies while vowing to champion the poor and forgotten.

The wave has carried leftist leaders to power in South America's largest and richest nations, as well as impoverished Bolivia. And while once-dominant conservatives haven't vanished altogether — right-leaning candidates are popular in Peru and Colombia — the trend is likely to intensify with elections still to come this year in Peru, Colombia, Mexico, Brazil, Nicaragua and Venezuela.

Once-reliable allies can no longer be counted on to support the U.S. in international disputes, and have refused to sign trade deals that preserve subsidies for U.S. industries. Standing up to perceived U.S. bullying is a reliable way to win votes, and the White House has delivered a tailor-made issue by threatening to cut aid to Latin American countries that refuse to make U.S. citizens immune to prosecution in the new International Criminal Court.

The election with the biggest impact on U.S. policy may be in Mexico, where the front-runner, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, could end a 24-year run of conservative leadership that has moved the southern neighbor steadily to the right. Like all Mexican politicians, he has reacted angrily to the U.S. crackdown on illegal immigration.

 

 

 

And while Lopez Obrador has good relations with most of Mexico's business community, he worries some American business interests. A former leader of rowdy labor protests whose left-center party absorbed Mexico's old communists, Lopez Obrador was noted as Mexico City's mayor for handouts to the poor and big-ticket public works projects, an approach to governing that earned him the label many politicians dread: populist.

 

 

 

The term has come to mean short-term pandering to the masses at the expense of the long-term good for all. Similar policies left many Latin American nations deeply in debt and doomed to boom-and-bust economic cycles.

Then there's socialist, a vague term if there ever was one in Latin America, where only Cuban communist Fidel Castro advocates full-on socialist-style public ownership of the means of production. The socialist label is also proudly shared by Chilean free-trader Michelle Bachelet, Venezuelan firebrand Hugo Chavez and Bolivian coca farmer-turned-President Evo Morales.

 

 

 

But under Chavez's brand of "Bolivarian Socialism," the state has tried to maintain a vibrant private sector while claiming an ever-larger role in managing the economy. Morales' "Movement Toward Socialism" party is trying to impose the same changes on Bolivia. And while Peru's outsider presidential candidate Ollanta Humala says he's a "nationalist" not a "socialist," he too would impose greater state control over a free market he considers a "utopia."

Some Latin leftists — like Chavez and Humala, rose through military ranks. Others came up through Marxist-influenced politics of protest. But aside from Castro, all now seem unified in the belief that private business remains essential to economic growth that can in turn ease the region's widespread poverty.

 

 

 

And that has made for some intriguing twists on the old political labels.

Lopez Obrador has maintained such cozy relations with Latin America's richest businessman, Carlos Slim, that the Zapatista rebels attack him for not being leftist enough. Argentina's Nestor Kirchner and Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, a former radical union leader who has embraced conservative economic policies as Brazil's first leftist president, face similar complaints.

 

 

Both Silva and Kirchner orchestrated early payoffs of their nations' International Monetary Fund debts, saving billions in interest and restoring some national pride. And in Chile, the Socialist-led government just won re-election with promises to maintain a fiscal discipline unmatched by the free-spending conservatives in charge in Washington.

 

 

 

While most of these leaders talk about a common Latin American identity — an idea much in evidence when Morales was celebrated at his inauguration as an example for all of Latin America's Indians — they also insist on defending their countries' sovereignty — an attitude increasingly labeled nationalist, particularly when it means standing up to the United States.

 

 

Humala, a retired army lieutenant colonel, labels his outsider campaign a "nationalist project" for Peru, and while he says he wouldn't seize property or limit free speech, he's gained a strong following among voters seeking a tough leader to punish the corrupt and impose order.

 

Leftist, Populist, Socialist, Nationalist — these can be fighting words, especially when the U.S. defense secretary joins in the rhetorical battle.

"We've seen some populist leadership appealing to masses of people, and elections like Evo Morales in Bolivia take place that clearly are worrisome," Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld warned in a recent speech. He also compared the nationalist, socialist Chavez to the original National Socialist, Adolf Hitler.

 

Chavez's quick response: "The imperialist, mass murdering, fascist attitude of the president of the United States doesn't have limits. I think Hitler could be a nursery baby next to George W. Bush."

 

 

 

Imperialist? Fascist? Many Latin Americans attach these terms to the United States, especially after President Bush and Mexican President Vicente Fox were rejected as bullies for pushing a Free Trade Area of the Americas deal that critics said would preserve huge subsidies for U.S. industries.

These acts of nationalist defiance — along with policies to do more for the poor and a general revulsion against of the bloodshed of past decades — have sapped public enthusiasm for the scattered groups of armed leftists that remain in Latin America.

 

 

 

Mexico's Zapatistas have refused to give up their guns and masks, and other small rebel bands sometimes attack Mexican police. Peru's once-feared Maoist Shining Path is down to a few hundred rebels protecting drug traffickers and occasionally killing police in the jungle. And the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia has been reduced, after nearly half a century, to a peasant army of 12,000 with scarce public support. Right-wing assassins decimated its political wing decades ago, and Colombia's peaceful left has weakened under the tenure of right-wing President Alvaro Uribe.

 

 

 

All this goes to show that the old labels are increasingly misleading in Latin America — a point made recently by Carlos Fuentes, a famed Mexican novelist, moderate leftist and frequent critic of U.S. policies. Fuentes wrote that while Lopez Obrador has been unfairly "demonized" as a populist demagogue, Chavez is a "tropical Mussolini" trying to pass himself off as a leftist. His recommendation: Latin leftists should follow the Chilean socialist model, a real genre-bender that mixes free-market economics and fiscal restraint with poverty-reduction programs.

 

In most cases, that's what they're already doing. These new leaders have found electoral success by walking a fine line between fiscally sound policies that please international markets and creating social programs for their long-ignored populations. "I don't see how we can be opposed to that if it helps stabilize democratic systems," said Riordan Roett, director of Western Hemisphere studies at Johns Hopkins University.

 

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How is the US responding to all this?

 

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/06/world/americas/06latin.html?ex=1330837200&en=b6662d3fb27be171&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss

Bush to Set Out Shift in Agenda on Latin Trip By LARRY ROHTER

 

SÃO PAULO, Brazil, March 5 — President Bush arrives here on Thursday with an energy partnership plan to create jobs and decrease poverty and inequality, a marked shift in Washington’s priorities for Latin America aimed at countering the challenge posed by President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela.

 

Since 1990, when Mr. Bush’s father was in the White House, United States policy toward the region has focused on free-trade agreements and related economic measures, with a secondary emphasis on drug interdiction. But the growing leftward and anti-American trend in regional politics, led by Mr. Chávez — who plans a countertour to coincide with Mr. Bush’s trip — has led to a modified agenda and a renewed effort to rebut complaints by Latin Americans that the president has ignored their concerns in favor of the campaign against terrorism.

“When something isn’t working after 15 years, that’s a sign there are insurmountable obstacles and it’s time to change direction,” said Rubens Ricupero, a Brazilian diplomat and former secretary general of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, in an interview here. “This is a very intelligent initiative on the part of the U.S., because there’s no point in tying the whole relationship to something that has only produced frustration and stagnation.”

 

The Bush administration has also signaled a new willingness to consider including workers’ rights guarantees in trade accords. Mr. Bush’s trip will be his longest to the region. But his promises of American support and assistance are likely to fall short of what Mr. Chávez, with his oil wealth, has been delivering recently.

 

On Monday, in a speech in Washington to the United States Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, Mr. Bush said ties between the United States and Latin America had helped advance peace and prosperity in the Western Hemisphere. But he also appeared to acknowledge the need to reach out more to America’s southern neighbors. “The fact is that tens of millions of our brothers and sisters to the south have seen little improvement in their daily lives,” Mr. Bush said, “and this has led some to question the value of democracy.”

 

Mr. Bush’s first stop will be here in Brazil’s industrial capital. He and the president of Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, are expected to sign a memorandum of understanding for a recently negotiated program that calls for the countries to promote the production and use of ethanol, a renewable fuel that Brazil manufactures from sugar cane. Mr. da Silva, a former labor leader who controls the leftist Workers Party, is also scheduled to visit Mr. Bush at Camp David at the end of the month.But the convergence of strategic interests of the Western Hemisphere’s two most populous countries clearly goes beyond energy. Brazil fancies itself, not Venezuela, as South America’s natural leader. It has also recently shown signs of alarm at Mr. Chávez’s substantial arms purchases and irritation with his involvement in neighboring Bolivia, including providing military assistance and support for the nationalization of Brazilian-held energy assets there. “I don’t think Brazil will accept the idea of being any type of American surrogate in the region, or to moderate or contain Chávez,” said Felipe Lampreia, Brazil’s foreign minister from 1995 to 2001. “But the United States wants to bolster Lula as a counterweight, to show that you can have a leftist government with a strong focus on social issues, income distribution and poverty reduction, without being radical.”

 

Mr. Bush will be sending much the same message at his second stop, Uruguay, which signed a trade and investment framework agreement with the United States in January. There, he and President Tabaré Vázquez, a physician who leads a leftist coalition called the Broad Front, plan to meet at the presidential ranch to commemorate Uruguay’s emergence, with American help, from a fiscal crisis in 2002 and to discuss how to expand commercial ties.Dr. Vázquez’s government includes former Tupamaro guerrillas; the guerrilla group kidnapped and killed an American official in Montevideo in 1970. But Dr. Vázquez, like Mr. da Silva, has migrated toward the center and largely abandoned the kind of fiery rhetoric that is Mr. Chávez’s specialty.“One must be pragmatic,” Dr. Vázquez said in an interview last year. “Uruguayans want jobs that provide dignity, an adequate salary, and security. To have that, you must have economic growth, which is achieved only through production and investment.”

 

Mr. Bush’s itinerary also includes stops in Colombia and Guatemala, two countries where political scandals have recently erupted, weakening the pro-American governments there. He will end his trip next week in Mexico, where the agenda is sure to include immigration, a constant source of tension in relations between the two neighbors.

 

As a candidate in 2000, Mr. Bush vowed that “should I become president, I will look south, not as an afterthought but as a fundamental commitment.” But after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, the United States quickly relegated Latin America to the ancillary role it played during most of the cold war, creating openings that Mr. Chávez, China and even, more recently, Iran have moved to exploit.Now, however, “there is a sense that things are not going well for the U.S. in the region,” said Peter Hakim, president of Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based policy research and advocacy group. “There has probably never been so much anti-Americanism and so little confidence in U.S. leadership since the cold war.” That trend has been aggravated, he said, by the emergence of “such a vehement and reasonably effective adversary” in the form of Mr. Chávez.

An overwhelming majority of government officials and academic analysts in Latin America take it as a given that the United States has been jolted into action by the inroads Mr. Chávez has made. But American officials dispute that notion.

“We are aware of the shortcomings of the Venezuelan government and the kind of unhelpful role it has played in certain countries in the region,” Deputy Secretary of State John D. Negroponte said in a recent interview. “I think the president’s intent is to accent the positive, and talk about the positive, things we want to get done in the relationships with the countries that he is visiting rather than to call undue attention to this issue, which is Venezuela.”

And when asked at a press briefing Monday if Mr. Bush’s trip was “an anti-Chávez tour,” Stephen J. Hadley, the national security adviser, said, “It’s really not.”

 

But Mr. Chávez is acting as if the trip, which he mocks as doomed to failure, is aimed solely at combating his influence, and has responded with a maneuver of his own. While Mr. Bush is in Uruguay on Friday and Saturday, Mr. Chávez plans to be leading anti-Bush demonstrations just across the River Plate in Buenos Aires, Argentina, where he has cultivated an increasingly friendly relationship with that country’s Peronist president, Néstor Kirchner.

There, as elsewhere in the hemisphere, Mr. Chávez has used Venezuela’s oil riches to win friends and influence. He has bought more than $1.5 billion in Argentine bonds, flown poor slum residents to receive medical care abroad and proposed a new regional development bank to make low-interest loans.

In contrast, American assistance for the region has lagged far behind. Mr. Hadley said that the United States has nearly doubled aid to the region since President Bush took office to $1.6 billion annually, although he acknowledged that figure was slated to drop next fiscal year. But recent research by the Washington Office on Latin America, a group that is often critical of American policy in the region, found that the largest portion of money has gone to Colombia for military and counterdrug assistance, that Congress has consistently trimmed aid requests, and that not all funds authorized have been disbursed.

On Monday, Mr. Bush announced several relatively small new initiatives that he would ask Congress to finance. They included $75 million for a new education program promoting study in the United States, $385 million for programs promoting home ownership for low income families, and the development of a health care training facility in Panama to serve all of Central America.

“In the short term, Chávez has more to offer because our aid is peanuts,” said Riordan Roett, director of the Latin American studies program at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington. “We’re talking hundreds of thousands of dollars, and he’s tossing around a billion here and a billion there.”

 

Mr. Bush’s shift away from an almost exclusive focus on free trade, with its calls for austerity and sacrifice in return for access to the American market, also reflects domestic political realities. His trade promotion authority expires in July, and there are doubts about Congress’s willingness to approve free trade agreements that have been signed with Colombia, Peru and Panama.

“It would not be realistic to expect much” from Mr. Bush’s visit, said Mr. Lampreia, the former Brazilian foreign minister. “But there is a fresh look at Latin America, very much derived from the fact Chávez is there, and a new approach that is positive, which is a good thing.”

 

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And another adjustment to policy…

http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-11-09-waiver_x.htm

 

U.S. seeks better ties by aiding militaries

 Barbara Slavin, USA TODAY

 

WASHINGTON — Concern about leftist victories in Latin America has prompted President Bush to quietly grant a waiver that allows the United States to resume training militaries from 11 Latin American and Caribbean countries.The administration hopes the training will forge links with countries in the region and blunt a leftward trend. Daniel Ortega, a nemesis of the United States in the region during the 1980s, was elected president in Nicaragua this week. Bolivians chose another leftist, Evo Morales, last year.

 

ON DEADLINE: Will the move help U.S. influence or cause more trouble?

A military training ban was originally designed to pressure countries into exempting U.S. soldiers from war crimes trials.The 2002 U.S. law bars countries from receiving military aid and training if they refuse to promise immunity from prosecution to U.S. servicemembers who might get hauled before the International Criminal Court. The law allows presidential waivers.

 

The White House lifted the ban on 21 countries, about half in Latin America or the Caribbean, through a presidential memorandum Oct. 2 to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. The training is conducted in the USA. A ban on giving countries weapons remains. Commercial arms sales are not affected, said Jose Ruiz, a U.S. Southern Command spokesman.

 

The training ban had resulted in a loss of U.S. influence in the region. The issue gained urgency after a string of leftist candidates came to power in Latin America. Rice said this year on a trip to the region that the impact of the ban had been "the same as shooting ourselves in the foot."

China stepped into the gap. Ruiz said China "has approached every country in our area of responsibility" and has exchanged senior military officials with Ecuador, Bolivia, Chile and Cuba and provided military aid and training to Jamaica and Venezuela.

 

The ban remains in effect for some countries. Venezuela, whose fiery President Hugo Chávez is a critic of the Bush administration, remains ineligible because it is on a State Department list of countries alleged to have permitted the trafficking of women and children for sexual exploitation and forced labor.

Chávez is up for re-election in December and leads in the polls. Cuba is also off-limits because of a long-standing U.S. embargo against Fidel Castro's regime. Ruiz said efforts are being made to transfer money this year to begin training foreign officers from eligible countries.

 

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http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,,1705685,00.html

 

It’s not all Chavez and Lula, who is this Morales guy? And the coca that used to be in cola

 

He's tackling poverty and corruption, he's the first ever indigenous Bolivian president - and then there's that jumper. No wonder they adore him at home. But elsewhere Evo Morales is not so popular because of his refusal to cut down on the production of coca, the raw material for making cocaine. At the presidential palace in La Paz, Steve Boggan was granted an audience

 

 

Evo Morales is standing before an adoring crowd, a garland of coca leaves draped around his neck, a straw hat layered with more coca shielding him from the searing heat of the Bolivian sun. "The fight for coca symbolises our fight for freedom," he yells. "Coca growers will continue to grow coca. There will never be zero coca."  The crowd of mainly coca growers - or cocaleros - goes wild. There are easily 20,000 people from all over the tropical region of Chapare here to welcome the new president of Bolivia, their favourite son. Only a couple of years ago, their crops - the raw material, of course, in the production of cocaine - were faced with eradication under a zero-tolerance policy intended to mollify the United States.

 

But any uncertainty over the future of coca was removed in December with the election of their Evo. This is the man who meets world leaders dressed in jeans and a stripy jumper, the man who has outlawed corruption in a traditionally corrupt society, the president who halved his salary on taking office so he could employ more teachers.

 

Morales has put Bolivia on the map. His inauguration two weeks ago has electrified Latin American politics; he is, after all, the first indigenous Bolivian - an Aymara - to hold the highest office in the land. Morales has promised to channel more of the proceeds of Bolivia's vast oil and gas reserves to his poorest people, the poorest in all South America. And he has already taken significant steps to eradicate discrimination and exploitation.

Foreign diplomats in the capital, La Paz, admit he is that rarest of things - an honest, incorruptible politician with an urgent desire to improve the lot of his people. There is just one fly in the ointment: the coca.

 

We meet the day after his Chapare speech in a first-floor room of the presidential palace in La Paz, 375 miles to the west and almost 12,000ft higher. His appearance is in stark contrast to our surroundings; he in jeans, trainers and T-shirt, the parquet-floored room decorated in velvet drapes, exquisite furniture and oil paintings of Lake Titicaca. I tell him how, in the UK, his election has generated public interest in Bolivian politics for the first time (to say nothing - yet - of astonishment at the appointment of a coca union leader as president) and he wastes no time laying into British imperialism. "Of course it has," he says, his lush fringe almost flopping over deep, dark eyes. "The British have always had this policy of invasion and elimination. Certainly they are going to be fascinated by what is happening here."

 

This would be a good place to explain just what is happening in Bolivia, but a little history and geography first. Bolivia, a landlocked country, is bordered by Brazil in the north and east, Paraguay and Argentina to the south, and Chile and Peru to the west. Two-thirds of its almost nine million inhabitants are indigenous Amerindian Aymara and Quechua, approximately 1% are African descendants of slaves brought over for mining, and the remainder are descendants of European settlers, primarily Spanish. The conquistadores arrived early in the 16th century and extracted metal resources, mostly silver and tin, for all they were worth, ruthlessly exploiting the indigenous population and creating in the minds of most Bolivians a terrible suspicion of foreign exploitation of natural resources. The conquistadores and their mixed descendants, the minority mestizo, had clung to power for 500 years until Morales's victory in December. He was installed as president on January 22.

 

Immediately, there was consternation in the northern hemisphere, especially in Washington. Morales's party, MAS (Movement Towards Socialism), a loose conglomeration of leftist unions and social interest groups, had campaigned on a ticket of decriminalisation of coca cultivation and nationalisation of natural resources. What, outsiders wondered, would this mean for the US's war on drugs? What, too, would it mean for international mining, oil and gas companies that had ploughed billions of dollars into exploration and extraction? British companies alone, such as BP, Shell and British Gas had spent upwards of $800m (£459m) on Bolivian projects in recent years. And the US has been spending an average of $150m a year on coca eradication.

 

Morales said he would be a "nightmare" for the US. He immediately embarked on a tour of world leaders in Europe, China and South America. And during visits to his leftwing political heroes, Cuba's Fidel Castro and Venezuela's Hugo Chavez, he poked fun at George Bush, announcing that he and his friends were the new "Axis of Good". Morales demonstrated immediately that he was his own man, although at least one overt act of individuality - the wearing of that striped jumper at meetings with King Juan Carlos of Spain, President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and President Hu Jintao of China - was an accident. "I was literally walking out of the door to begin the tour when I remembered it was winter in Europe," he grins. "I couldn't find my favourite jumper so I grabbed the one that everyone is now talking about. I had no idea it would cause such a fuss."

 

It is too early to say exactly what Morales and MAS will do. He appointed his cabinet only last week but already alarm bells have begun to ring; the minister responsible for the economy is Carlos Villegas, a leftwing academic from the San Andrés University in La Paz. And the person in charge of fighting narco-trafficking? Felipe Caceres, a coca growers' union leader. Is this, then, the dawn of the world's first narco state? Morales says it is not.

 

Our first interview lasts just 13 minutes; he is arguably the busiest politician in South America at the moment and has a meeting to attend. But two hours later we are back in the presidential palace, he has changed into a pale blue checked shirt and, on a Sunday afternoon, has found time to talk about his roots, his influences and why we should try to be more understanding about his support for coca. "You have to realise that, for us, the coca leaf is not cocaine and as such growing coca is not narco-trafficking," he says. "Neither is chewing coca nor making products from it that are separate from narcotics. The coca leaf has had an important role to play in our culture for thousands of years. It is used in many rituals. If, for example, you want to ask someone to marry you, you carry a coca leaf to them. It plays an important role in many aspects of life."

Unlike other coca-producing countries, such as Colombia, there is here a genuine history and tradition associated with coca use. To the Amerindians, Mama Coca is the daughter of Pachamama, the earth mother. "Before you go to work, especially in agriculture, you will chew some coca leaf," Morales continues. "After lunch, after a nap, you might have some. If you drive long distances for your work, you will chew it to help you stay awake. During the night, you will see police officers on patrol with their cheeks full of coca leaves.

 

"It is used as tea to combat altitude sickness and made into herbal remedies, including cough mixtures, for a variety of ailments. In the past, popes have used it, kings of Spain, Fidel Castro. In your culture, you might have a cocktail or a glass of wine when we would chew some coca. During the republican era, miners used coca to work harder to send more tin to the US. "For us, it is a way of life, but coca is not cocaine. Traditionally, Bolivians have not processed it into the narcotic drug cocaine. We completely oppose that. I am saying no to zero coca, but yes to zero cocaine." Confused? Well, that is because people in the west, or developed northern hemisphere countries, know little or nothing about the Amerindian tradition of coca use. When you arrive in your hotel in La Paz, at an altitude of more than 4,000m, there is an urn of coca tea in the lobby, made from teabags that look exactly like your Darjeeling breakfast brew, to help combat altitude sickness. On a long journey, your driver might offer you a coca pastille. And everywhere, almost everyone chews the leaf. But, as Morales explains, this is not the heavy narcotic substance derived by soaking the leaf in kerosene and processing with sulphuric acid.

 

When you do begin to understand its uses, however, that understanding serves only to raise more questions. Yes, there is habitual "innocent" and traditional use of the leaf here, but there is also production on levels vastly exceeding what is needed for such uses. And this is used to make cocaine. There is legal production in two areas, the Yungas, to the north of La Paz, and the Chapare, to the east. Cocaleros are allowed to farm 12,000 hectares in the Yungas and 3,200 hectares in the Chapare. But, in reality, much, much more is grown.

According to the United Nations Office of Drug Control, around 27,700 hectares was cultivated in 2004. Unofficially, the US estimates that only 5,000 hectares is needed to satisfy the demands of traditional usage. The UN says 36,300 tonnes of coca leaf was produced in 2004 - of which it estimated that 25,000 tonnes was available for cocaine production. It takes between 300 and 500kg of coca leaf to make 1kg of cocaine.

 

Morales flatly refuses to admit it, but without narco-trafficking, large sections of his community would simply starve. Some estimates say that at any given time, one-third of the population relies directly or indirectly on the coca industry. At the Adepcoca market in Villa Fatima, La Paz, the largest coca market in Bolivia, thousands of poor campesinos arrive, 24 hours a day, seven days a week, to weigh and sell their coca. Bent women in traditional Aymara dress, younger cocaleros and their children haul 23-kilo sacks of coca leaves to waiting vans. The buyers are registered and all the coca they buy is supposed to be used for chewing or tea. Coca leaves are everywhere, smelling of day-old cut grass on a summer compost heap. The market is cavernous and the sacks, or taquis, are piled up to five high in room after vast room. It is a remarkable sight. But here, to these people, it is perfectly legal and utterly commonplace. (Perhaps significantly, a long extension to the market is well under construction.) And almost everybody is chewing coca leaves.

 

One of those who has come to sell his coca is Maclobio Ramos, a 42-year-old cocalero from the Yungas region (all the coca here is from that region). He farms three legal catos - 40m x 40m plots - and has brought 20 taquis, for each of which he expects to earn 750 Bolivian dollars ($94). In the Yungas, there are three harvests a year; in tropical Chapare, there are four.

"This means everything to us," says Ramos. "I have two children and, for me, it means we have food, I can pay for my children's education and bring them up properly. If it was left up to the Americans, all the crops would be eradicated and we would starve. We would have no way to make an income." Asked how he would feel if the buyer of his crop channelled it into illegal cocaine production, he replies: "I wouldn't know anything about that."  In the Chapare region, I meet 43-year-old cocalera Efrosina Rodríguez. She, her sister, Margarita, Margarita's husband Gabriel Velasquez, and their three children farm one legal cato. It provides a living well below the the poverty line.

 

This is Morales's stronghold, where he rose to prominence as a coca union leader. It is also where, according to La Fuerza Especial de Lucha Contra el Narcotráfico (FELCN), the military force that combats narco-trafficking, 80% of all the maceration pits, in which leaves are soaked and turned into cocaine paste, are found during eradication patrols. Efrosina is carrying a bag that says: "A Drug Free Life." The average cocalero is poor and knows little about cocaine. These are the people whose plight Morales wants us to understand. Efrosina says her land is poor, but even a fertile cato will bring in only $450 every few months. At street prices in the UK, that would be the cost of approximately five grammes of cocaine. The adults are wearing repaired clothes, the children have little in the way of a future outside coca growing.

"I used to farm 12 catos but only one was legal," Efrosina says. "Then, in 2004, the FELCN came and tore up the illegal plots. They asked me which one I wanted to keep and I told them. Then they tore that one up and left me with an infertile cato. "It would help if we could grow more coca legally. We are all opposed to cocaine, but coca could be used in other things - medicine, teas, pomades, creams. Without growing coca, my family would starve."

Evo Morales was born in 1959 in the village of Isallavi in the department of Oruro on the high southern Altiplano east of the Chilean border. He was one of seven children, but four died within a year of birth. "That is normal among the poor," he says. "If you want a family in Bolivia, be prepared to have nine or 10 children so you will have some left."

 

There was no electricity or potable water and, like so many in that region, droughts and economic depression forced Morales's family to move to cities or to the more fertile Chapare region. His father, Dionicio Morales Choque, and mother, Maria Ayma Mamani, both now dead, worked in agriculture.

Morales recalls: "They were illiterate. When I first went to school in the city, the other children would laugh at me and call me ugly because I was Aymara. If I spoke my language, they would laugh and know I was Indian, and at that time I didn't speak Spanish, so to avoid being laughed at, for a long time I didn't speak at all.

 

"There was much discrimination towards the indigenous population. During the time of my grandmother, only 80 or 90 years ago, there were cases of Aymara who learned to read having their eyes taken out. Some who learned to write had their fingers chopped off. When my grandmother and her friends were finally allowed to go to school, they were repeatedly held back and never allowed to graduate."

He points outside the window to the Plaza Pedro D Murillo. "Fifty years ago, I would not have been allowed to walk in that square."

 

Morales's political career began in 1981 when he was appointed secretary of sports in the coca union of San Francisco in Chapare. From there - he had already worked briefly as a llama herder and completed a period of military service - he rose through the union ranks and, in 1992, was elected to the presidency of the six coca union federations of the Chapare.

In 1997, he was voted as a deputy to the Bolivian congress and became a constant thorn in the side of successive governments more prepared to pander to the US than he was. In 2002, he was thrown out of congress amid allegations that he had participated in the murders of three police officers during civil strife over coca production.

 

A popular uprising prevented him from being imprisoned and today the charges are widely considered to have been trumped up with the collusion of the US. "I have been accused of being a narco-trafficker, an assassin, a terrorist and a member of the coca mafia," he says. "The Americans say that I have received money from the Farc [the paramilitaries controlling cocaine production in Colombia], from Cuba and Venezuela. None of this is true. "I have been hated, mistreated, humiliated and thrown into prison three times for trying to defend my people. But now we are in government and I want to bring peace and justice for all. There is no room for revenge. We want to make being Bolivian inclusive for all. There will be no exploitation or discrimination of anyone."

 

In December's election, he replaced the incumbent President Carlos Mesa with 54% of the vote in an eight-horse race. That gives him an unprecedented mandate and a strong hand in renegotiating oil and gas contracts with outside investors. His definition of "nationalisation" is somewhat loose and he promises that foreign companies have nothing to fear - he will, he says, respect property rights. And he will have to cooperate with the huge hydrocarbon companies if Bolivians are to benefit from the extraction of gas reserves worth a potential $250bn.

"We obviously need investment," he says. "We need investment from states and also from private business. But they will be our associates, not our bosses. On other investment, such as tourism, people are welcome to invest in Bolivia in any manner they please. My government will guarantee that all who invest, public or private investors - but preferably public - will receive our full cooperation."

 

Which brings us back, inevitably, to the coca. He won't say whether there will be more or less production under his government, simply that there will be neither unbridled cultivation nor eradication. Figures, he says, will be set by the government in consultation with the unions. "I want to industrialise the production of coca and we will be asking the United Nations to remove coca leaf as a banned substance for export," he says. "That way, we can create markets in legal products such as tea, medicines and herbal treatments. There has even been research in Germany which shows that toothpaste made from coca is good for the teeth. That will then enable us to be tougher on the narco-traffickers. As I said, no to zero coca, yes to zero cocaine."

I leave with the impression that Morales holds deep and honest convictions that will simply not allow millions of poor cocaleros to be hung out to dry by anti-drug policies that would reduce much of his population to utter poverty. He has the potential to be a great president for the poorest nation in South America. Whether he can carry the more extreme elements of his MAS party with him remains to be seen. One thing is certain; he will need time if he is to succeed, and time is not something normally afforded to Bolivian presidents. In the 182 years since it was granted independence from Spain, this chaotic and crippled country has welcomed and waved goodbye to more than 190 failed governments

 

*************************************************************************

Of course some people are not happy with all this….

 

http://www.tfp.org/lulawatch/v2_feb13/1.html

 

 

 

LulaWatch

Focusing on Latin America's new "axis of evil"

Just over one year ago, our first analysis of the administration of newly elected Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva concluded with a cry of alert:

Once in power, the left is showing itself determined to transform Brazil, with its very important geo-strategic position, into an ideological powerbase to oppose American influence and interests, and hopes to rally other hemispheric nations around the South American giant. The political rapprochement with the Cuban regime and President Hugo Chavez is indicative of this design, as is Brazil’s announced nuclear weapons program.

 

Looking at the administration’s first year in power only confirms that assessment. Using words like “pragmatic,” “independent,” “haughty” and “proactive” to describe its diplomacy, the Lula da Silva government has tried in vain to camouflage its leftist ideological orientation. Today observers agree that Brazilian foreign policy under the Workers Party (PT) administration is clearly and boldly out in left field.

 

At the inauguration of Ecuador’s president, Mr. Lula da Silva proclaimed his wish to build a “new South America” and openly stated his desire to lead the whole continent. He also resurrected the “Third World” movement and started to intervene, discreetly but decidedly, in favor of leftist currents on the continent using the pretext of “continental integration.” All of this seeks to bring about an important geo-strategic change in the region to counter the present policies and orientation of the American government.

 

LULA’S PRIORITY: END CUBA’S ISOLATION

Since his inauguration, President Lula da Silva started an open policy of rapprochement with the regimes of Cuba and Venezuela. Due to the symbolic and leading role of the Cuban Revolution in the eyes of certain leftist groups like Brazil’s Workers’ Party, Lula decided to put an end to the international isolation of Fidel Castro’s tyrannical regime and thus help spread Cuban influence around the continent.  For this end, he traveled to Cuba, where he failed to criticize the regime’s human rights violations and refused to meet with opposition leaders. His visit took place shortly after the summary judgment and execution of several Cuban dissidents. Not only did Pres. Lula da Silva and his diplomats never condemn these human rights violations, Brazil’s ambassador to Cuba, a former priest linked to Liberation Theology, even defended Castro’s attitude.

In addition to his political support of the Castro regime, Mr. Lula da Silva signed important trade contracts with Cuba that provide technical and economic help.

 

A “MEDIATOR” FAVORING HUGO CHAVEZ

Acting as a mediator, Lula interfered in Venezuela in a clear bid to support his ideological ally, Hugo Chavez.Several press articles pointed out that the President broke historic diplomatic tradition when he directly interfered in another country’s political affairs and aligned himself with an authoritarian and populist leader. Brazilian political analysts criticized this attitude. Just as he had done in Cuba, Lula refused to hear the opposition in Venezuela despite his supposed “mediating” role.

 

At the time, the press also published complaints by the president of the Organization of American States (OAS), Cesar Gaviria. According to Mr. Gaviria, after his inauguration, Lula strengthened in Hugo Chavez the conviction that he must confront not negotiate with the opposition.

 

While the political situation in Venezuela increasingly deteriorated and the Chavez government took on ever greater dictatorial tones, President Lula da Silva caused great consternation in Mexico’s President Vincente Fox at the recent Special Summit of the Americas in Monterrey when he defended Venezuela’s “exceptional steps to further democracy.”

 

President Lula da Silva plans to intervene again in Venezuela’s political process. Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim announced to the press in Monterrey that Lula will go to Caracas to participate in a summit of developing countries, now called the G15.

 

According to the Folha de S. Paulo, this "appears as a sign, though veiled, of support for Chavez, inasmuch as this group of developing countries is not relevant enough to justify a trip by the president.” Commenting on the statements by the Brazilian foreign minister, the newspaper says: “To Venezuela, the support was clear: ‘We had, have, and will continue to have a solid relationship with Venezuela and the Venezuelan government’" (Clóvis Rossi, “Chavez diz que vence plebiscito,” 1/13/2004).

 

BRAZIL DEFENDS CASTRO AND CHAVEZ

The American administration has expressed great misgivings about the alliance of Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez which threatens to destabilize Latin America. A case in point is the recent unrest in Bolivia where President Sanchez de Lozada was forced to resign: “The State Department believes the two countries are organizing to ‘share experiences’ and eventually infiltrate people and military personnel in other countries in the region. ... The U.S. also suspects Venezuela and Cuba are supporting FARC terrorist guerrillas in Colombia and financing activities to increase narco-trafficking in the U.S. Roger Noriega, assistant Secretary of State for the Americas, formally accused Fidel of seeking to ‘destabilize democratically elected governments’ in Latin America and said the dictators’ present activities are ‘increasingly more provoking’” (Fernando Canzian, “Fidel e Chavez ameaçam região, dizem EUA,” Folha de S. Paulo, 1/6/2004).

 

Responding to American concerns, the Lula administration’s presidential aide for International Affairs, Marco Aurélio Garcia, rushed to the aid of his ideological allies. He said the Brazilian government does not share the fears of the State Department and criticized members of the American administration: “I think it is very bad for U.S. government officials to make this kind of statement without proof, shortly before a meeting such as the one at Monterrey” (Vladimir Goitia, “Governo rebate crítica americana a Fidel e Chavez,” O Estado de S. Paulo, 1/9/2004).

 

AMBIGUOUS INTERVENTION IN BOLIVIA

The Lula da Silva government’s foreign policy has been characterized by classical double standards. Lula’s ideological and spiritual mentor, Friar Betto, a leader of the so-called Liberation Theology, thus defined this duplicity: “To enemies, denunciation; to friends, reserved criticism” (Folha de S. Paulo, 9/28/2003).

 

In October 2003, street demonstrations and unrest in Bolivia led to the resignation of President Sanchez de Lozada. The chief organizer of this subversive maneuver was Evo Morales, a cocaine growers’ leader who heads the Movement to Socialism (MAS). He also has traveled to Libya and Venezuela to spread his ideas opposing so-called neo-liberalism. Guerrilla movements in Colombia and Peru were also accused of supporting sectors of the Bolivian opposition to setup an extremist, drug-trafficking-cum-unionization regime.

The attitude of the Lula da Silva government in the Bolivian case was substantially different from the one in Venezuela. Pres. Lula da Silva hastened to disavow the entirely peaceful and legal Venezuelan opposition He refused to deal with it on equal footing with the government. In support of his ideological partner, Hugo Chavez, he alleged a need to respect legally established power.

In contrast, Lula did not express any support for the legally established government in Bolivia. He placed the subversive minority on an equal footing with the elected government and called for change. He did intervene when offering to mediate. The aforementioned Marco Aurélio Garcia went to La Paz accompanied by an Argentine envoy, and reported he insisted with Sanchez de Lozada to resign in order to avoid a bloodbath in the country.

The press noted these contrasting attitudes and pointed out that no formation of a “Group of Friends” was contemplated to save Sanchez de Lozada as Lula had done in Venezuela to save Hugo Chavez.

 

Facing a recent U.S. initiative to create a “Group of Support for Democracy in Bolivia,” co-chaired by México, Lula hastened to defend leftist leader Evo Morales. At the Special Extraordinary Summit of the Americas in Monterrey, the Brazilian President had a “tense” meeting with his Mexican colleague, Vicente Fox, where discourage any effort to isolate the cocaine-trafficking leader. Lula added that such an effort could lead to greater internal tension in Bolivia. For an attentive observer, that statement is but a poorly veiled threat of new unrest in Bolivia.

 

OPPOSING COLOMBIA’S FIGHT AGAINST GUERRILLAS AND DRUG-TRAFFICKING

The Lula da Silva administration has also shown, in varying degrees, its willingness to intervene in Colombia.

Through several diplomatic maneuvers, the leftist Brazilian government has tried to force the Colombian government to negotiate with the FARC terrorist group. Such negotiations would be tantamount to reversing Colombia’s current policies on the matter.

 

Itamaraty, the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, offered to “mediate” between the Colombian government and FARC. On several occasions, Brazilian diplomats have offered to hold negotiations in Brazil to solve the “dispute” between FARC and the Colombian government. “Dispute” is how Pres. Lula da Silva labels the terrorist war waged by FARC. Brazilian diplomats also sought U.N. intervention and offered to hold UN-FARC negotiations on Brazilian soil. Pres. Uribe rejected the Brazilian initiatives.

 

In a recent trip to Colombia, Lula explicitly manifested his intention to call on Álvaro Uribe to break away from the United States, since, he claims Colombia derives no benefits from its alliance with America.

In official statements, the aforementioned Marco Aurélio Garcia said that Brazil is opposed to President Uribe’s policy of combating guerrillas and drug-trafficking with American help.

 

Furthermore, the Lula da Silva government refused to heed the request of the Colombian government - reinforced by the American administration - to designate FARC as a terrorist group. As a subterfuge to justify this refusal, Lula said such designation would preclude a future mediation by Brazil. And Marco Aurélio Garcia went even further by saying that Brazil would not make such a designation because FARC could become the government in Colombia.

However, the Brazilian press said the real reason behind the refusal was to allow FARC to continue operating in Brazil. With a terrorist designation, the Brazilian government would be forced to freeze all FARC assets and authorize the capture of all FARC members on Brazilian soil. This refusal represents a dangerous endorsement of terrorist activities.

 

A DIPLOMATIC INCIDENT IN URUGUAY

President Lula da Silva claimed he could not interfere in other countries’ internal affairs when he tried to explain away his failure to condemn human rights violations in Cuba or his refusal to receive Cuban opposition leader. While valid to protect Castro, this “principle” did not apply during his recent visit to Uruguay.

 

At a meeting of Mercosul presidents in Montevideo last December, both Lula and Argentina President Kirchner refused to abide by protocol and personally meet with the hosting Uruguayan president. Nevertheless, they made sure to meet with the leftist presidential candidate, Tabaré Vázquez, less than a year before elections. The two were also present and waved at the crowd at the (leftist-controlled) Montevideo City Hall where they received the keys to the city, an event that turned into a political rally in favor of the leftist presidential candidate.

 

“Both Itamaraty and Palacio San Martín, seat of Argentine diplomacy, house a not-so-discreet rally for the victory of Vazquez in Uruguay’s presidential elections next year,” commented the newspaper O Estado de S. Paulo (Ariel Palacios, “Lula vai a comício uruguaio e irrita Batlle,” 12/19/2003).

Naturally, these attitudes were deemed diplomatically offensive and undue interference in internal affairs. Carlos Ramela, aide to Uruguayan President Jorge Batlle, accused both presidents of acting like agitators or guerrilla sympathizers reminiscent of their past, forgetting they are now heads of state in their respective countries (cf. La Republica (Uruguay) and La Nación (Buenos Aires), 12/19/2003).

 

MERCOSUL AND “CONTINENTAL INTEGRATION”

From the beginning, Lula da Silva and his diplomatic policy defended the need to strengthen Mercosul. However, what “strengthening” really means is a camouflaged transformation of Mercosul into a political bloc. This conception would even have Mercosul shed its geographic-economic character and attract other countries outside its four-member region.

 

Thus, Lula is trying to attract Venezuela to Mercosul. On his part, the Argentine ambassador to Havana said his government wishes Cuba to join as an associate country. “He also said his country wants the creation of a bloc made up by Cuba, Venezuela and Brazil to ‘face up to’ Washington,” according to BBC Brasil.

 

In his very recent speech to the Venezuelan Parliament on the state of the nation, Hugo Chavez’s words were meaningful indeed: “There is a new America present, a new voice,” Reuters quoted him as saying. He also mentioned the existence of an axis “from Caracas to Brasilia, reaching Buenos Aires.” Chavez also greeted Lula and Kirchner as leaders with ideas similar to his own, announced a visit of the two to Venezuela and defended Fidel Castro’s participation in future summits of the Americas.

 

THE BUENOS AIRES CONSENSUS

In the above-mentioned effort to “strengthen” Mercosul, Brazil and Argentina moved much closer together in their foreign policy including their rapprochement with Cuba and condemnation of American military intervention in Iraq.

However, perhaps the most significant development was the recent ground-breaking agreement of mutual cooperation in the United Nations. This year, Brazil replaced Mexico as a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. A diplomat of the Argentine Mission will join the Brazilian delegation to participate in the negotiations of the Council. “The important aspect of this accord is the gesture, which has been determined by a close and profound relationship between the two countries,” said the Argentine ambassador to the U.N., quoted by the EFE news agency.

 

WHAT DOES THIS MEAN?

With a clear intention to counter the United States and “neoliberalism,” Lula da Silva and Néstor Kirchner also signed in Buenos Aires the “Buenos Aires Consensus,” a declaration of principles that sets forth a “progressive agenda.”

Journalist Gilberto Paim of the Jornal do Brasil commented on “Buenos Aires Consensus”: “The expression picked by the two presidents stands out for its anti-Americanism, the word-of-order of Latin American radicals. ... With this move, the two presidents become authors of a new absurdity, as they make common cause with the strident ignorance of orphans of the defunct Soviet Union” (“Antiamericanismo como dogma,” 1/11/2004).

 

INTERVENTION IN CANCUN AND OPPOSITION TO THE FTAA

Some ”pragmatic” politicians and diplomats - including some American conservatives - say there is a difference between the ideological orientation of Pres. Lula da Silva and his team and the rather conservative trade policies they pursue. However, Itamaraty diplomats appear willing to apply their ideological ideas to trade relations. Indeed, Pres. Lula da Silva is rehashing the third-world rhetoric of confrontation between rich and poor countries preaching a kind of planetary “class struggle.”

 

At the World Trade Organization (WTO) meeting in Cancun, Brazil politicized its leadership of a group of countries in the trade negotiations (the so-called G20) and brought negotiations to a complete fiasco. On the occasion, Lula proclaimed: “We left Cancun victorious.”

 

In an article in the Financial Times, American trade secretary Robert Zoellick denounced the political confrontation led by Brazil, which emphasized North-South division and made any trade agreement impossible.

Brazilian diplomacy also targeted the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), an important set of negotiations for South America. Brazil presides over these negotiations together with the U.S. While never formally declaring its opposition to the FTAA and thus jeopardizing its international support, the Lula da Silva government has slyly maneuvered over some months to create the diplomatic conditions to empty the negotiations of content and thus make the signing of the treaty unviable. Even diplomats agreed that the strategy conceived and carried out by Brazil’s Foreign Relations Ministry blocked the negotiations.

 

As shown in a previous LulaWatch dealing with this topic, this diplomatic action was due to the Brazilian government’s leftist ideological orientation which sees the FTAA as a U.S-led process of “annexation” of South America and “neoliberal” domination, a process to be frustrated at any cost.

 

This ideological opposition to trade relations has become so patent that the Brazilian press reported: “The George Bush administration identifies Brazilian foreign minister Celso Luís Nunes Amorim as the ‘ideological’ enemy of the FTAA, as Folha has heard from an important U.S. official who prefers not to be named. ... The Bush administration saw the creation of the G-20 as an ideological operation to relaunch the North-South conflict, a milestone of the Cold War” (Clóvis Rossi, “Amorim é alvo ‘ideológico’ do governo Bush,” Folha de S. Paulo, 11/19/2003).

 

THE LEFT GAINS STRENGTH AT ITAMARATY

Another sign of the leftist orientation of Brazilian foreign policy under Lula da Silva is the appointment of Brazil’s new ambassador to Washington, Roberto Baden. His appointment reinforces the influence of Celso Amorim in the Brazil’s important embassies abroad. An intimate friend of the Brazilian foreign minister, Baden shares Amorim’s foreign policy orientation, strategies in FTAA negotiations, and the inclusion of Brazil in the international scene as an “independent” power.

 

Like Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, Ambassador to the U.N. Ronald Seidenberg, and the ambassador to London, José Mauricio Butane, Roberto Baden is part of the group of “barbudinhos” [little bearded ones], as they were called by former U.S. ambassador to Brazil, Anthony Motley.

When examined by the Brazilian Senate’s Foreign Affairs and National Defense Commission, Roberto Baden declared that Brazil must be cautious in its relationships with the United States. He was peremptory: “The asymmetry is so great that a strategic partnership is neither possible nor desirable, since it could degenerate into an undesirable relationship of subordination and passivity” (“Futuro embaixador em Washington não quer `subordinação´ aos EUA,” Folha de S. Paulo, 12/10/12/2003).

 

About the influence of the “little bearded ones” in current Brazilian foreign policy, the weekly Veja magazine commented: “The group defines itself as a defender of IFP - an independent foreign policy. Independent, of course, from the United States even if, in the meantime, they make rapturous statements about dictators like Qadaffi and the Syrian Bashar Assad. ...”

 

“When they were cutting the deck NOT CLEAR WHAT THIS MEANS. in foreign policy during the military period, this group tried to bring Brazil closer to Africa and the bloc of ‘non-aligned’ countries - nations which were quite aligned with condemning the United States and turning a blind eye to the shenanigans of the now extinct Soviet Union.” Commenting on the substantial changes in the world over the last three decades, the report concludes: “Everything has changed, but Brazilin foreign policy continues to reflect the past. Lula went to Cuba, Africa, and now left on an excursion through the paradise of Arab dictatorships” (“A turnê de Lula pelas ditaduras,” Eurípedes Alcântara, 12/17/2003).

 

TIES WITH THE DEMOCRATS

The Brazilian press reported with great fanfare on the statements of Democratic hopeful Howard Dean praising Pres. Lula da Silva.

Dean called for a “special relationship” with Latin America and specifically mentioned President Lula da Silva. Dean said “the U.S. has been inimical” with Lula whereas “we should work with him.”According to Reuters, the aforementioned Marco Aurélio Garcia commented: “This ... shows that Brazil has become an issue in the American election campaign, and that is an important datum.”

The statements by Howard Dean are certainly the result of conversations between PT members together with Lula government members, particularly Marco Aurélio Garcia, and American Democrats which was clearly seen during the recent meetings of the Socialist International.

 

LULA’S LEADERSHIP AND GEO-STRATEGIC CHANGE

A recent article in the newspaper Le Monde Diplomatique, emphasizes Brazil’s new leadership role. This newspaper serves as a spokesman for the antiglobalist left and principal mentor of the World Social Forums. The article analyzed the profound changes in Latin America and especially the anti-American opposition of the group of countries led by Brazil.

 

The article chronicles the revolt in Bolivia and above all the relationship between the cocaine-trafficking leader Evo Morales with his Movement to Socialism (MAS) and leftist leaders such as Fidel Castro, Hugo Chavez, Lula and Nestor Kirchner. Brazil’s important role in hindering trade accords at the WTO and above all the FTAA was also mentioned:

 

“Brazil has definitively imposed its position and raised itself as a continental counterweight to the United States. Lula, the great winner at this juncture, supported from different angles and in varying degrees by other key countries in the region such as Venezuela and Argentina, thus appears as the center of a de facto coalition which, if it defines its profile and consolidates its perspectives, will have redesigned the continent’s political map, effecting a drastic change in the balance of forces to the detriment of the giant to the North” (“América Latina esboça sua proposta,” December 2003).

 

For his part, Evo Morales, in a speech in Castro’s presence in Havana, stated: “I believe that with the creation of people’s power and the conquest of Latin American unity, we have the necessary clarity to defeat imperialism and will soon celebrate the transformation of Latin America into a new Vietnam for the United States” (Anthony Boadle, “Líder cocaleiro boliviano convoca AL a se tornar ‘Vietnã’ para EUA,” Folha Online, 11/1/2003).

In a recent interview with the leading Argentine newspaper La Nación, Morales again brought up the idea of a Latin American unity that creates a “new Vietnam” for the USA. When asked who should lead such a bloc, he answered: “In many cases, it should be led by social movements, and in others by heads of state. In Latin America they are led by Chavez, Lula and Cuba” (Laura Capriata, “Evo Morales: ‘Seremos otro Vietnam,’” 1/11/2004).

 

These final considerations lead to yet another important aspect of the politico-diplomatic orientation of the Lula da Silva government: its strange opposition (in tune with the world left) to the war on terrorism and even its rapprochement and collaboration with dictatorial and terrorist states.

 

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The future…?

 

http://www.latrasol.com/analysis/?p=132

 

Chávez, Lula, and the Expectations Revolution in Latin America: Which Model Will Survive?”

 

Introduction

Private industry planning and government’s actionable intelligence assessments are effective when they include analysis of current events and predictive views of events or trends. This is why I believe it is important to analyze the complementarity and differences between Chávez’s and Lula’s policies to predict which political model will be more beneficial to Latin America’s long run; and which model is likely to survive after Chávez and Lula are gone from power.

Venezuela and Brazil will remain the two leading economies in Latin America as long as energy, its sources, ownership, distribution, commercialization, and prices, remain a force in the world economy. Venezuela is Latin America’s largest oil producer and exporter and has the largest natural gas reserves in the Western Hemisphere. Brazil is the world’s leader in sugar-ethanol and has the most advanced technology and know-how in biofuels.

 

Latin America’s Expectations Revolution (The Pink Revolution)

The Pink Revolution is the name the media gives to the transformational political, economic, and social-restructuring model that emerged in Latin America with the election of Hugo Chávez to Venezuela’s presidency in 1998.

For a majority of Venezuelans and many Latin Americans, the Chávez model of the Expectations Revolution means two different things, depending on one’s economic position, since economic status leads to political affiliation in the region. If one belongs to the about 80% of the poor or to the descending middle class, the Pink Revolution is the just desserts the elites finally got at the hands of a leader, Chávez, unafraid of the US, and committed to the poor’s equitable participation in their countries’ riches. If one belongs to the traditional elites and the Washington Consensus beneficiaries, all allies of the US, the Pink Revolution is a Fidel-Castro like takeover of Latin America by an authoritarian, boisterous military/politician, made lucky by oil money.

Both characterizations are faulty. There cannot be a Pink Revolution in Latin America because there is no monolithic Latin America where the political system of one country and its policies can be easily replicated in all.

There is, however, a Latin American Expectations Revolution. The expectations of, and demands for, change from groups that had none before other than the continuation of a life of misery, government neglect, social exclusion, and hard toil.

 

Therefore, what we have in each country, including Chile, is a revolution of people’s expectations of:

* What their government is elected to do

* What countries should get from the exploitation of their natural wealth and resources by foreign direct investors

* How the return on these resources should be distributed and to whom

* How society should be organized to satisfy communal needs and to be competitive in a global economy

 

All these play out differently in each country, despite similarities among them and close friendships and compatibilities among their heads of state.

That Chávez tries to intervene in the domestic life of several countries in Latin America cannot be denied. He is vocal about it. However, Chávez talks but not every government listens or does what he wants. In fact, some countries openly defied Chávez: Perú, Costa Rica, and Mexico elected presidents who rebuked Chávez publicly. Others distance themselves from Chávez’s utterances against the US, but not from his money, as in Uruguay. Colombia’s Alvaro Uribe and Chávez stand at opposite sides of the political and economic spectrum. Yet Uribe refuses to be the hand that helps the US contain Chávez, and Chávez is unable to mobilize Colombians against Uribe.

 

If we look closely, other so-called Pink presidents — Néstor Kirchner in Argentina, Tabaré Vásquez in Uruguay, Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, and Evo Morales in Bolivia — do not blindly follow Chávez. In fact, even Chávez’s closest political allies, Kirchner and Morales, do not go in lockstep with Chávez. Morales was committed to nationalization of oil and gas long before Chávez entered Latin America’s political scene. Morales, despite his entanglements with foreign oil companies, is more willing than Chávez to negotiate with them, somehow. Kirchner is effective in balancing his support of Chávez with the reasonable relations Argentina has with the US.

To Chávez the Pink Revolution does not exist. He created and maintains the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela, exporting it to whichever country is willing to accept, not so much his populist ideology, but his financial support. The Bolivarian Revolution, also known as Socialism for the Twenty-First Century, blends Chávez-style socialism, military involvement in private industry and government, social participation through consejos comunales, international expansion through misiones (social work delegations to foreign countries), and socialist populism.

 

The Expectations Revolution gained momentum with the election of the former labor organizer Luis Inácio Lula de Silva (Lula) as president of Brazil in 2002. But Lula’s revolution is not in the Chávez model. Lula uses a less encompassing approach to alleviate poverty through the highly successful Bolsa Familia program, leaving private industry and the political system alone. Since 2004 Bolsa Familia rescued 11.5 million Brazilians from absolute poverty. Bolsa Escola, now part of Bolsa Familia, was extended to 14- to 17-year olds to ensure they continue their education.

 

Lula did not dissolve Congress, as Chávez did, nor did he reform the constitution to ensure his will prevails as Chávez did. Chávez has complete sway over Venezuela’s National Assembly. Lula struggles with a disparate, multiparty Congress, which often makes governing difficult. Lula’s Brazil never adopted even an approximation of the Bolivarian Revolution. He does agree with Chávez that energy and financial integration can be beneficial for Latin America, if properly implemented within a democratic framework. One reason is that Lula’s political training as a labor organizer made him an accomplished negotiator. A military man, albeit of lower rank, Cháves is used to giving orders. Also Lula does not have the oil money Chávez has to finance a revolution or throw money lavishly around. Nor is Brazil a one-commodity country, as Venezuela is.

Two Different Expectations Revolution Models: Chávez and Lula

Lula and Chávez represent two complimentary, and yet opposite, sides of the Expectations Revolution. Both have compatible views on the central problems Latin America must solve:

* Hunger

* Hopelessness

* Lack of broad access to high-quality education and in-country employment opportunities

* Profound cleavages in income distribution

* Social exclusion or displacement

* Government neglect of the majority

 

The crucial difference between them lies in how each attempts to resolve these issues and the policies they enact and implement. As we will see, Lula’s model has the highest probability of surviving in the long run. Chávez’s does not.

Here is why. While Chávez is the more written about, I believe Lula’s conciliatory, negotiating, adapting, and quieter revolution, if his government can be called that, will have far more lasting effect on Latin America’s political future than Chávez’s. Despite Chávez’s lavish financial assistance and close, noisy relationships with like-minded presidents in Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, his bombastic, authoritarian, and confrontational Bolivarian Revolution model has inherent weaknesses. They are likely to cause the Revolution’s demise, or render it ineffectual even for his strongest supporters: Venezuela’s poor and the disenfranchised everywhere else.

Chávez’s revolutionary model rests on the high price of oil, his ability to capitalize on the obsolescence of Venezuela’s two traditional political parties, a disorganized, unfocussed opposition, and 225 million Latin Americans who live on under US$2/day. However, despite his political savvy, Chávez would not be Chávez save for oil at an average price of US$50.00-65.00/b. When Chávez assumed power in 1999, oil was at US$10/b. This made it very difficult for Chávez to keep his campaign promises and lift Venezuela’s poor from one of the country’s worse economic recessions.

 

Despite loud claims to the contrary, there seems to be little doubt the Bush Administration was at least supportive of the coup d’etat that briefly removed Chávez from power in 2001. Less talked about is that Chávez was in serious trouble with his followers when the coup took place. It was Chávez’s luck that world oil prices began to rise as he regained power days after the failed coup. The last eight years show that Chávez’s power runs in tandem with oil prices.

Lula, by contrast, overcame Brazil’s worse public corruption scandal and lackluster economic performance to be reelected to a second, consecutive term in 2006. Lula’s conciliatory and outward-focused political style combined with overwhelming support from Brazil’s beneficiaries of his Bolsa Familia program and other poor to take him to victory.

 

A significant focus of Chávez is to eradicate US influence in Latin America through populist policies, his model of social economics, and his version of democratic participation through a centralized government and communal activities. Chávez’s social economics calls for active participation of the government in the economy, nationalization of natural resources and other critical sectors, and control of Central Bank activities.

Opposite to Chávez, Lula’s strength lies in his profound understanding of the internal diversity of Brazil, be it economic, political, social, or cultural. Lula has left private industry alone under a model of economic orthodoxy to which his government adheres without deviation. With the exception of Petrobras, the state-owned oil company that operates like a private company, the exploitation of Brazil’s natural resources and industry is in private hands. Several Brazilian families control large sectors of the economy and are respected global players in their respective industries. Rather than attacking the US, Lula’s government has worked with it, often behind closed doors, to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes, such as the ethanol agreement just signed with President Bush. While Chávez blasts globalization as a scourge on Latin America and the poor, Lula and the Bush Administration work to revive the Doha Round of Trade talks that might open agriculture, services, and the financial sectors in the developing world.

 

Although Lula opposes several of the US initiatives in the world and at the Word Trade Organization, he has done so in cooperation with other countries. Brazil’s participation in the derailment of the WTO negotiations in Seattle and in Genoa (Italy) was the result of Lula’s concern for the terms the less-favored countries of Africa and Latin America would receive in exchange for opening their economies to exports from the developed countries. Lula supported the trade agendas of China, India, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa, among others, but did not intervene in their internal affairs.

 

While Chávez’s primary focus is on Latin America energy and financial integration through the Energy Ring and Banco del Sur, Lula’s foreign policy has been to integrate Brazil in the global economy and in Latin America. Not before Lula was Brazil integrated with Latin America and the world as it now is. Although Brazil’s export sector grew under President Fernando Enrique Cardoso, Lula’s predecessor, it is Lula who moved Brazil internationally like never before. While intervening at others’ requests to help resolve intraregional issues, such as the frequent spats between Colombia and Venezuela, Lula’s Brazil remains a hands-off actor in the region’s internal politics, much to the chagrin of the US who would like to see Brazil muzzle Chávez.

 

Venezuela and Brazil have diversified their markets away from the US. Brazil did so more successfully because its industrial base is larger and more diversified than Venezuela’s. Oil accounts for over 60% of Venezuela’s exports and over 40% of its GDP. To Chávez’s chagrin, oil makes the US Venezuela’s largest trade partner. Chávez needs the over US$30bn/year it receives from oil exports to the US. Venezuela’s heavy crude has for now limited leeway as to where it can be refined outside the Gulf region of the US. It will be years before Venezuela can refine as much oil in China and India as it does in the US. Neither China nor India has sufficient heavy crude refining capacity to compensate for Venezuela’s exodus from the US, were Chávez to fulfill his threat to divert shipments from the US to other markets.

 

Chávez and Lula are both committed to alleviate poverty and elevate their countries’ competitiveness through advanced education and technology innovations. For this both need foreign direct investment (FDI).

Foreign capital is welcome and protected in Brazil, despite the country’s notorious lack of protection for intellectual property rights. Foreign direct investment is under attack from Chávez. Granted, Chávez has paid market value for nationalized properties, such as the takeover of AES’s and Verizon’s assets in Venezuela. But the oil companies whose investment in the Orinoco Basin Chávez nationalized in March 2007 may not fare as well. It remains to be seen how Chávez treats Brazil’s Petrobras’ investments in the Orinoco. They have been untouched so far.

 

The confiscation of foreign assets affects Venezuela’s industry adversely. Unless potential foreign investors learned from Mexico’s Carlos Slim to have a “nationalization escape clause” in their investment contracts, it would be difficult to invest in capital intensive industries, such as oil, mining, and agribusiness. Investors shun environments where they cannot depend on how the government will treat FDI in the future; few can predict what Chávez will do tomorrow. While Chávez sees nationalization as strengthening the country, it is acting against PdVSA’s interests. PdVSA needs investments in infrastructure and technology and is having a hard time bringing it in from where it is most advanced and readily available: the US and the EU.

Meanwhile, Brazil is attracting investment in critical sectors from major investors in the US, the EU, China, and India. Unlike Venezuela, which relies on oil, Brazil is highly diversified. It achieved self-sufficiency in oil in 2006. Petrobras has the world’s most advanced technology for deep-water oil exploration. Brazil leads the world in sugar-ethanol technology and use, and its agribusiness is a power in world agriculture. It has the world’s largest miner and exporter of iron ore (Companhia Vale do Rio Doce, VALE). Embraer (Empresa Brasileira de Aeronáutica) manufactures the most dependable, low-altitude surveillance plane, the Tucano, and is a major exporter of regional jets. Brazil is the world’s largest exporter of orange juice concentrate, chicken, and beef, the second largest exporter of soy, and the second largest producer of cellulose.

 

While Venezuela’s FDI decreased from US$14bn in 2005 to US$3bn in 2006, Brazil expects to increase its share of FDI by about 79% to 2015, particularly in biofuels and sugar ethanol. Biofuels will cause Brazil’s already formidable agriculture sector to balloon. Soy plantations are being turned over to sugar-ethanol. Brazil is one of the world’s largest producers of bagasse, the expected magic bullet of alternative fuels. Contrary to what many believe, the Brazilian Amazonia is not being cleared for sugar cultivation; sugar cane demands a totally different climate. The Amazonia will continue to be cleared, legally or illegally, to expand cattle grazing, mining, and quite possibly, cellulose from felled trees.

 

Brazil’s government makes limited overseas investments, although BNDES (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Económico e Social) is the world’s second largest development bank, after the World Bank. BNDES finances government projects abroad and funds PPP (Public-Private Partnerships) inside Brazil.

In contrast Chávez’s foreign investments are lavish. Chávez has US$18bn cash in Fonden, the government’s development fund financed by transfers from PdVSA. Chávez can use Fonden as he pleases. Venezuela’s oil exports rose by 21% in 2006, which earned PdVSA US$55bn, and gave the government reserves of over US$34bn. This is almost equal to the US$30bn Venezuela receives from supplying 12-14% of US oil imports. Through changes in the organization of the Central Bank, Chávez can easily access these funds and allocate them as he wishes.

As of 2006, Chávez lent US$2.5bn to Argentina; US$500m to Ecuador; and US$1.5bn to Bolivia. PdVSA is financing a refinery in Paraguay. Argentina and Venezuela plan to float together $1.5bn in Bonos del Sur in April 2007; they placed US$1bn in November 2006. Chávez has sold oil below market value and in barter to Cuba for an estimated US$1bn, which Cuba does not have to repay in cash. Through PdVSA-owned PetroCaribe it sells subsidized gasoline to Nicaragua and some Caribbean countries. Through PdVSA’s wholly-owned subsidiary CITGO, Chávez sells cheap gas, gasoline, and diesel fuel to New York’s Bronx, Boston, and to London’s public transport company.

 

In March 2007, Chávez and Argentina’s Kirchner signed 17 cooperation agreements in addition to the formal incorporation of Banco del Sur. Shareholders of Banco del Sur are: Venezuela, Argentina, Paraguay, Ecuador and Nicaragua. Given the economic disparities among them, Venezuela and Argentina, and possibly Brazil, are the critical funders. Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Ecuador are likely to be the Banco’s major recipients; neither country is in a position to help finance the others. Banco del Sur has an initial capital of US$7bn, which dwarfs the two other leading regional financial institutions: the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the Corporacion Andina de Fomento (CAF). Although the IDB has total resources of over US$100bn, it has paid-in capital of US$4bn; CAF has US$3.7bn, plus a US$1bn from Brazil, its newest shareholder, and US$600m from Argentina. A key factor in Banco del Sur is that so far Chávez will be its major decisionmaker, followed by Kirchner. After all, the financing of the bank will come from their combined reserves, until Brazil joins, which remains to be seen. This means there will be no conditionalities, the approval process will be swift, probably with little verification of the borrower’s ability to pay back, and limited scrutiny as to the long-term viability and usefulness of the investment. Therefore, Banco del Sur will be a regional institution that can fund projects as big and ill-conceived as the Gran Gasoducto del Sur, planned to unite Venezuela with Argentina by a pipeline that will span South America at an estimated initial cost of US$20bn. The first phase will run from Venezuela to Brazil.

 

Banco del Sur looms big in Chávez’s political tool bag. The CAF’s nimblessness and low-low cost loans may not be sufficient to counter the influence of Banco del Sur. It will also be a challenge to the IDB, used as it is to provide macroeconomic guidance along with loans. Latin America’s current account surpluses and diversification of exports to China, India, and the EU mean the region is less dependent on US-multilateral financial organizations such as CAF and the IDB. In recent years, countries, beginning with Argentina and Brazil, rushed to pay off the IMF, making it almost irrelevant to the region.

 

Which Model Will Survive?

Barring any drastic changes in the world economy, all indicators point to long-lasting effects for Lula’s model, while there are good reasons to question to survivability of Chávez’s.

 

Venezuela’s Enabling Law of 2007 is likely to result in Chávez’s being named president for life in the near future. However, for-life does not mean eternity, particularly if Chávez’s policies keep Venezuela a one-commodity country and if the exodus of educated Venezuelan professionals continues.

Venezuelans are restive by nature. Their independence-seeking alma llanera prevails in the end. While many in Venezuela are better off today than the were before Chávez, luxury consumption by the new rich is raising inflation, which decreases the purchasing power of everybody. Price controls on basic goods lead to daily food shortages for all. Higher taxes on gasoline may yet trigger broad discontent, although the brunt of this tax will fall on the drivers of luxury SUVs. And if the opposition, without intervention by the US, finds a compromise candidate who can unite most Venezuelans behind him or her, Chávez’s revolution may have a rough ride ahead. The ride will get rougher if the US intervenes covertly, but this approach is likely to have deleterious, unintended consequences for the US in the region. Many Latin Americans dislike and disapprove of Chávez, and want him gone. But this does not mean they support his removal by the US.

 

Chávez’s revolution hinges on a fungible commodity currently at prices that fluctuate between US$50.00-65.00/b, depending on what happens in the Middle East. But, should prices fall below a certain point, Chávez’s base will collapse. So far no one has come up with this threshold price. If Chávez falls and a new Venezuelan government calls the loans and debts Chávez has amassed, Cuba, Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Nicaragua will face unstable economic conditions that will affect Latin America. Political chaos will be prevalent in Venezuela as conflicting expectations clash. But Venezuela will not go back 40 years to the predominance of the Democratic Action (DA) and the Christian Democratic Party (COPEI). They collapsed under their national mismanagement, corruption, and willful ignorance of societal needs, creating the political opportunity into which Chávez walked.

 

While Chávez has imposed populism in Venezuela, Lula has deftly kept Brazil allied with Venezuela and the US and free from Chávez-like populist forays. Lula’s populism in the form of education and social advance for the poor is either accepted or tolerated by Brazil’s industrial leadership. It cannot be denied that Brazil suffers from profound economic inequalities. However, the size of the country, the quintessential Brazilian quality of “dar um jeito,” the influence of its industrial class, and the fluidity of its political system combine to help it stave off the anachronistic populism of Getulio Vargas, were it to be revived, or of Chávez.

 

The boisterous, multiparty government of Brazil has a built-in fluidity that enables compromise and leaves ample room for maneuver by congressional delegations and the president. Contrast this with Chávez’s idea of a sole United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) in full control of PdVSA and all government institutions, including the National Assembly, and dedicated to support only Chávez.

 

The political fluidity of Brazil will enable Lula to use the coming four years to accomplish what Brazil needs to increase growth:

* Approval of the General Law of Medium and Micro Enterprises. They represent about 90% of economic activity. About 500,000 new companies form every year only to disappear in two years under the burden of bureaucratic red tape, high taxes, and high interest rates. Many are financed with credit card debt at usurious interest rates

* The introduction of PPPs in energy and sanitation to attract foreign direct investment

* Continued export expansion and technology transfer agreements

* Continued inflation control and lower effective interest rates

All the above are an anathema to Chávez. Therefore, Venezuela will not follow Brazil’s model.

Despite its oil riches of today, Venezuela will lag behind Brazil in general industrial development and diversification, taking Chávez’s revolutionary model down, and confining it to the history books as an example of what not to do to run a country and create sustainable development in the Twenty-First Century.

That’s all folks!

Colin