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PAN DISCUSSION GROUP 

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PAN Discussion Group Wednesday October 31st 2007
Subject: Nationalism and Xenophobia
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SINCE ITS HALLOWEEN WE WILL BE WINDING UP EARLIER THAN NORMAL TO GET SOME PARTYING IN. REMEMBER TO BRING EXTRA ALCOHOL AND FOOD TO SHARE - COSTUMES, (NATIONAL?)  OPTIONAL BUT APPRECIATED

Location:
 
Time: 7pm to 10pm - ish

it was a miserable input of article contributions this time. Thanks to those people who did make the effort. We can talk about how this is going to play out in the future.
 
General:
The articles are the basis for the discussion and reading them helps give us some common ground and focus for the discussion, especially where we would otherwise be ignorant of the issues. The discussions are not intended as debates or arguments, rather they should be a chance to explore ideas and issues in a constructive forum. Feel free to bring along other stuff you've read on this, related subjects or on topics the group might be interested in for future meetings.
GROUND RULES:
* Temper the urge to speak with the discipline to listen and leave space for others
* Balance the desire to teach with a passion to learn
* Hear what is said and listen for what is meant
* Marry your certainties with others' possibilities
* Reserve judgment until you can claim the understanding we seek
Any problems let me know...
 

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First a piece on Nation States and why they fail
Robert I. Rotberg  The New Nature of Nation-State Failure
Copyright © 2002 by The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the The Washington Quarterly • 25:3 pp. 85–96.
Robert I. Rotberg is director of the Kennedy School’s Program on Intrastate Conflict and president of the World Peace Foundation. He edited State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror (forthcoming).
Nation-states fail because they can no longer deliver positive political goods to their people. Their governments lose legitimacy and, in the eyes and hearts of a growing plurality of its citizens, the nation-state itself becomes illegitimate. Only a handful of the world’s 191 nation-states can now be categorized as failed, or collapsed, which is the end stage of failure. Several dozen more, however, are weak and serious candidates for failure. Because failed states are hospitable to and harbor nonstate actors—warlords and terrorists—understanding the dynamics of nation-state failure is central to the war against terrorism. Strengthening weak nation-states in the developing world has consequently assumed new urgency.
Defining State Failure
Failed states are tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and bitterly contested by warring factions. In most failed states, government troops battle armed revolts, face civil unrest, differing degrees of communal discontent, and a plethora of dissent directed at the state and at groups within the state.. .absolute intensity of violence does not define a failed state. Rather, it is the enduring character of that violence (as in Angola, Burundi, and Sudan), the direction of such violence against the existing government or regime, and the vigorous character of the political or geographical demands for shared power or autonomy that rationalize or justify that violence that identifies the failed state. Failure for a nation-state looms when violence cascades into all-out internal war, when standards of living massively deteriorate, when the infrastructure of ordinary life decays, and when the greed of rulers overwhelms their responsibilities to better their people and their surroundings. The civil wars that characterize failed states usually stem from or have roots in ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other inter-communal enmity. The fear of “the other” that drives so much ethnic conflict may stimulate and fuel hostilities between ruling entities and subordinate and less-favored groups. Avarice also propels antagonism, especially when discoveries of new, frequently contested sources of resource wealth, such as petroleum deposits or diamond fields, encourage that greed. There is no failed state without disharmonies between communities. Yet, the simple fact that many weak nation-states include haves and have-nots, and that some of the newer states contain a heterogeneous collection of ethnic, religious, and linguistic interests, is more a contributor to than a root cause of nation-state failure. In other words, state failure cannot be ascribed primarily to the inability to build nations from a congeries of ethnic groups. Nor should it be ascribed baldly to the oppression of minorities by a majority, although such brutalities are often a major ingredient of the impulse toward failure. Often, the expression of official power is limited to a capital city and one or more ethnically specific zones. In most cases, driven by ethnic or other inter-communal hostility or by regime insecurity, failed states prey on their own citizens. As in Mobutu Sese Seko’s Zaire or the Taliban’s Afghanistan, ruling cadres increasingly oppress, extort, and harass the majority of their own compatriots while favoring a narrowly based elite. As in Zaire, Angola, Siaka Stevens’s Sierra Leone, or Hassan al-Turabi’s pre-2001 Sudan, patrimonial rule depends on a patronage-based system of extraction from ordinary citizens. The typical weak-state plunges toward failure when this kind of ruler-led oppression provokes a countervailing reaction on the part of resentful groups or newly emerged rebels. Gangs and criminal syndicates assume control. Ordinary police forces become paralyzed. For protection, citizens naturally turn to warlords and other strong figures who express ethnic or clan solidarity, thus projecting strength at a time when all else, including the state itself, is crumbling.
Fewer and Fewer Political Goods
Nation-states exist to deliver political goods—security, education, health services, economic opportunity, environmental surveillance, a legal framework of order and a judicial system to administer it, and fundamental infra-structural requirements such as roads and communications facilities to their citizens...They increasingly forfeit their function as providers of political goods to warlords and other non-state actors...Failed states are unable to provide security—the most central and foremost political good—across the whole of their domains... Because a failing state is unable to establish an atmosphere of security nationwide and is often barely able to assert any kind of state power beyond a capital city, the failure of the state becomes obvious even before rebel groups and other contenders threaten the residents of central cities and overwhelm demoralized government contingents, as in contemporary Liberia and recent Sierra Leone.
Failed states contain weak or flawed institutions—that is, only the executive institution functions. If legislatures exist at all, they are rubber-stamp machines.  The judiciary is derivative of the executive rather than being independent, and citizens know that they cannot rely on the court system for significant redress or remedy, especially against the state. The bureaucracy has long ago lost its sense of professional responsibility and exists solely to carry out the orders of the executive and, in petty ways, to oppress citizens. The military is possibly the only institution with any remaining integrity, but the armed forces of failed states are often highly politicized, without the esprit that they once exhibited.
Deteriorating or destroyed infrastructures typify failed states. As rulers siphon funds from the state, so fewer capital resources are available for road crews, and maintaining road or rail access to distant provinces becomes less and less of a priority. In failed states, the effective educational and health systems have either been privatized or have slowly slumped to increasingly desperate levels of decrepitude. Teachers, physicians, nurses, and orderlies are paid late or not at all, and absenteeism rises. Reports to the relevant ministries go unanswered; and parents, students, and patients—especially rural ones—slowly realize that the state has abandoned them to the forces of nature and to their own devices. Failed states provide unparalleled economic opportunity for a privileged few close to the ruler or the ruling oligarchy. But the privilege of making real money when everything else is deteriorating is confined to clients of the ruling elite or to especially favored external entrepreneurs. Corruption flourishes in failed states, often on an unusually destructive scale. Corrupt ruling elites invest their gains overseas, not at home. A few build numerous palaces or lavish residences with state funds. Military officers always benefit. An indicator, but not a cause, of failure is declining real national and per capita levels of gross domestic product (GDP). High official deficits (Zimbabwe’s reached 30 per- cent of GDP in 2001) support lavish security spending and the siphoning of cash by elites. Inflation usually soars because the ruling elite raids the central bank and prints money. When state failure becomes complete, the local currency falls out of favor, and some or several international currencies take its place. But when unscrupulous rulers and ruling elites have consciously sucked state competencies dry, unforeseen natural disasters or man-made wars can drive ignored populations over the edge of endurance into starvation. Once such populations have lost their subsistence plots or sources of income, they lose their homes, forfeit already weak support networks, and are forced into an endless cycle of migration and displacement. Failed states offer no safety nets, and the homeless and destitute become fodder for anyone who can provide food and a cause.
A nation-state also fails when it loses a basic legitimacy—when its nominal borders become irrelevant and when one or more groups seek autonomous control within one or more parts of the national territory or, sometimes, even across its borders. Once the state’s capacity deteriorates and what little capacity still remains is devoted largely to the fortunes of a few or to a favored ethnicity or community, then there is every reason to expect less and less loyalty to the state on the part of the excluded and the disenfranchised. The state increasingly is perceived as owned by an exclusive class or group, with all others pushed aside. Citizens naturally become more and more conscious of the kinds of sectional or community loyalties that are their main recourse and their only source of security and economic opportunity. They transfer their allegiances to clan and group leaders, some of whom become warlords. These warlords or other local strongmen derive support from external and local supporters. In the wilder, more marginalized corners of failed states, terror can breed along with the prevailing anarchy that emerges from state breakdown and failure.
A collapsed state is an extreme version of a failed state, a total vacuum of authority. Dark energy exists, but the forces of entropy have overwhelmed the radiance that hitherto provided some semblance of order and other vital political goods to the inhabitants embraced by language affinities or borders. When a state such as Somalia collapses (or Lebanon and Afghanistan a decade ago and Sierra Leone in the late 1990s), sub-state actors take over. They control regions and sub-regions, build their own local security apparatuses, sanction markets or other trading arrangements, and even establish an attenuated form of international relations. By definition, they are illegitimate and unrecognized, but some may assume the trappings of a quasi-state, such as Somaliland in northern Somalia. Yet, within the collapsed state prevail disorder, anomic behavior, and the kinds of anarchic mentality and entrepreneurial pursuits—especially gun and drug running—that are compatible with networks of terror.
Contemporary State Failure
This decade’s failed states are Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, the DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan. These seven states exemplify the criteria of state failure. Beyond those states is one collapsed state: Somalia. Each of these countries has typified state failure continuously since at least 1990, if not before. Lebanon was once a failed state. So were Bosnia, Tajikistan, and Nigeria. Many other modern states approach the brink of failure, some much more ominously than others. Others drift disastrously downward from weak to failing to failed.
Of particular interest is why and how states slip from endemic weakness (Haiti) toward failure, or not. The list of weak states is long, but only a few of those weak and badly governed states necessarily edge into failure. Why? Even the categorization of a state as failing— Colombia and Indonesia, among others— need not doom it unquestionably to full failure. Another critical question is, what does it take to drive a failing state into collapse? Why did Somalia not stop at failure rather than collapsing?
Not each of the classical failed and collapsed states fully fills all of the cells on the matrix of failure. To be termed a failure, however, a state certainly needs to demonstrate that it has met most of the explicit criteria. “Failure” is meant to describe a specific set of conditions and to exclude states that only meet a few of the criteria. In other words, how truly minimal are the roads, the schools, the hospitals, and the clinics? How far has GDP fallen and infant mortality risen? How far does the ambit of the central government reach? How little legitimacy remains? Most importantly, because civil conflict is decisive for state failure, can the state still provide security to its citizens and to what extent? Continuously? Only on good days and nights? Has the state lost control of large swaths of territory or only some provinces and regions?
Several test cases are interesting. Sri Lanka has been embroiled in a bitter and destructive civil war for 19 years. The rebel Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a Tamil separatist insurgency, has at times in the last decade controlled as much as 15 percent of Sri Lanka’s total land mass. Additionally, with relative impunity, the LTTE has been able to assassinate prime ministers, bomb presidents, kill off rival Tamils, and last year even wreak destruction at the nation’s civil aviation terminal and main air force base. But, as unable as the Sinhala-dominated governments of Sri Lanka have been to put down the LTTE rebellion, so the nation-state has remained merely weak, never close to failure. For 80 percent of Sri Lankans, the government performs reasonably well. Since the early 1990s, too, Sri Lanka has exhibited robust levels of economic performance. The authority of successive governments, even before the recent ceasefire, extended securely to the Sinhala-speaking 80 percent of the country, and the regime recaptured some of the contested Tamil areas. Before the truce, road maintenance, educational and medical services, and the other necessary political goods continued to be delivered despite the civil war, to some limited degree even into the war-torn parts of the country. For all of these reasons, despite a consuming internal conflict founded on majority-minority discrimination and deprivation and on ethnic and religious differences, Sri Lanka has successfully escaped failure. Indonesia is another example of weakness avoiding failure despite widespread insecurity. As the world’s largest Muslim nation, its far- flung archipelago harbors the separatist wars of Aceh in the west and Papua (Irian Jaya) in the east, plus Muslim-Christian conflict in Ambon and the Mulukus, Muslim-Christian hostility in Sulawesi, and ethnic xenophobic outbursts in West Kalimantan. Given all of these conflictual situations, none of which have become less bitter since the end of Suharto’s dictatorship, suggesting that Indonesia is approaching failure is easy. Yet, as one argument goes, only the insurgents in Aceh and Papua want to secede from the state; and, even in Aceh, official troops have the upper hand. Elsewhere, hostilities are intercommunal and not directed against the government or the state. Unlike the low-level war in Aceh, they do not threaten the integrity and resources of the state. Overall, most of Indonesia is still secure and is “glued” together well by an abiding sense of nationalism. The government still projects power and authority. Despite dangerous economic and other vicissitudes in the post-Suharto era, the state provides most of the other necessary political goods and remains legitimate. Indonesia need not be classified as anything other than a weak state, but the government’s performance and provision of security should be monitored closely.
What about Colombia? An otherwise well-endowed, prosperous, and stable state has the second-highest murder rate per capita in the world, its politicians and businessmen wear flak jackets and travel with armed guards, and three private armies control relatively large chunks of its territory with impunity. The official defense and political establishment has effectively ceded authority in those zones to the insurgencies and to drug traffickers. Again, why should Colombia not be ranked as a failed state? Although it could deteriorate into further failure, at present the Colombian government still performs for the 70 percent of the nation that remains under official authority. It provides political goods, even some improving security, for the large part of the state under official authority. When and if the government of Colombia can reassert itself into the disputed zones and further reduce drug trafficking, the power of the state will grow and a weak, endangered state such as Colombia can move away from possible failure toward the stronger side of the equation. Zimbabwe is an example of a once unquestionably strong African state— indeed, one of the strongest—that has fallen rapidly through weakness to the very edge of failure. All that Zimbabwe lacks in order to join the ranks of failed states is a widespread internal insurgent movement directed at the government, which could still emerge. Meanwhile, per capita GDP has receded by 10 percent annually for two years. During the same period, inflation has galloped from 30 percent to 116 percent. The local currency has fallen against the U.S. dollar from 38:1 to 400:1. Foreign and domestic in- vestment have largely ceased. Health and educational services are almost nonexistent and shrinking further. Road maintenance and telephone service are obviously suffering. Judicial independence survives, but barely, and not in critical political cases. The state has also been preying on its own citizens for at least two years. Corruption is blatant and very much dominated by the avaricious ruling elite. Zimbabwe is an example of a state that, like Sierra Leone and the DRC at earlier moments in history, has been driven into failure by human agency.
Indonesia, Colombia, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe are but four among a large number of nation-states (two dozen by a recent count) that contain serious elements of failure but will probably avoid failure, especially if they receive sufficient outside assistance. They belong to a category of state that is designated weak but that encompasses and spreads into the category of failing—the pre- cursor to true failure. Haiti, Chad, and Kyrgyzstan, from three continents, are representative examples of perpetual weakness. Argentina has recently joined an analogous rank; Russia was once a candidate. Fiji, the Solomon Islands, Tajikistan, Lebanon, Nigeria, Niger, and Burkina Faso remain vulnerable to further deterioration. Even Kenya is a weak state with some potential for definitive failure if ethnic disparities and ambitions provoke civil strife. The list of states in weakness is longer and hardly static. Some of the potentially stronger states move in and out of weakness and nearer or farther from failure. Others are foreordained weak. Particular decisions by ruling groups would be needed to destabilize members of this second group further and drive them into failure.
The Hand of Man
State failure is man-made, not merely accidental nor—fundamentally— caused geographically, environmentally, or externally. Leadership decisions and leadership failures have destroyed states and continue to weaken the fragile polities that operate on the cusp of failure. Mobutu’s kleptocratic rule extracted the marrow of Zaire/DRC and left nothing for his national dependents. Much of the resource wealth of that vast country ended up in Mobutu’s or his cronies’ pockets. During four decades, hardly any money was devoted to uplifting the Congolese people, improving their welfare, building infrastructures, or even providing more than rudimentary security. Likewise, oil-rich Angola continues to fail because of three decades of war, but also because President Eduardo dos Santos and his associates have refused to let the Angolan government deliver more than basic services within the large zone that they control. Stevens (1967–1985) decapitated the Sierra Leonean state in order to strengthen his own power amid growing chaos. Sierra Leone has not yet recovered from Stevens’s depredations. Nor has Liberia been resuscitated in the aftermath of the slashing neglect and unabashed greed of Samuel Doe, Prince Johnson, and Charles Taylor. In Somalia, Mohammed Siad Barre arrogated more and more power and privilege to himself and his clan. The Somali state was gutted, the abilities of the Somali government to provide political goods endlessly compromised, and the descent into failure and then full collapse followed. President Robert Gabriel Mugabe has personally led Zimbabwe from strength to the precipice of failure. His high-handed and seriously corrupt rule bled the resources of the state into his own pocket, squandered foreign exchange, discouraged domestic and international investment, subverted the courts, and this year drove his country to the very brink of starvation. In Sri Lanka, Solomon and Sirimavo Bandaranaike, one after the other, drove the LTTE into reactive combat by abrogating minority rights and vitiating the social contract on which the country called Ceylon had been created. In Afghanistan, Gulbuddin Hakmatyar and Burrhan ul-Din Rabani tried to prevent Afghans other than their fellow Pushtun and Tajik nationals from sharing the perquisites of governance; their narrowly focused, self-enriching decisions enabled the Taliban to triumph and Afghanistan to become a safe harbor for terrorists.
Preventing State Failure
Strengthening weak states against failure is far easier than reviving them after they have definitively failed or collapsed. As the problem of contemporary Afghanistan shows, reconstruction is very long, very expensive, and hardly a smooth process. Creating security and a security force from scratch, amid bitter memories, is the immediate need. Then comes the re-creation of an administrative structure—primarily re-creating a bureaucracy and finding the funds with which to pay the erstwhile bureaucrats and policemen. A judicial method is required, which means the establishment or reestablishment of a legitimate legal code and system; the training of judges, prosecutors, and defenders (as attempted recently in East Timor); and the opening of courtrooms and offices. Restarting the schools, employing teachers, refurbishing and reequipping hospitals, building roads, and even gathering statistics—all of these fundamental chores take time, large sums of money (especially in war-shattered Afghanistan), and meticulous oversight in postconflict nations with overstretched human resources. Elections need not be an early priority, but constitutions must be written eventually and elections held in order to encourage participatory democracy.
Strengthening states prone to failure before they fail is prudent policy and contributes significantly to world order and to minimizing combat, casualties, refugees, and displaced persons. Doing so is far less expensive than reconstructing states after failure. Strengthening weak states also has the potential to eliminate the authority and power vacuums within which terror thrives. From a policy perspective, however, these are obvious nostrums. The mechanisms for amelioration are also more obvious than obscure. In order to encourage responsible leadership and good governance, financial assistance from international lending agencies and bilateral donors must be designed to reinforce positive leadership only. Outside support should be conditional on monetary and fiscal streamlining, renewed attention to good governance, reforms of land tenure systems, and strict adherence to the rule of law. External assistance to create in-country jobs by reducing external tariff barriers (e.g., on textiles) and by supporting vital foreign direct investment is critical. So is support for innovations that can reduce importation and exportation transport expenditures for the weak nations, improve telephone and power systems through privatization, open predominantly closed economies in general, create new incentives for agricultural productivity, and bolster existing security forces through training and equipment. All these ingredients of a successful strengthening process are necessary. The developed world can apply tough love and assist the developing and more vulnerable world to help itself in many more similarly targeted ways. In addition to the significant amounts of cash (grants are preferred over loans) that must be transferred to help the poorer nations help themselves, however, the critical ingredient is sustained interest and sustained assistance over the very long run. Nothing enduring can be accomplished instantaneously. If the world order wants to dry up the reservoirs of terror, as well as do good more broadly, it must commit itself and its powers to a campaign of decades, not months. The refurbishment and revitalization of Afghanistan will take much more than the $4.7 billion pledged and the many years that Secretary of State Colin L. Powell has warned the U.S. people will be necessary to make Afghanistan a self-sufficient state. Strengthening Indonesia, for example, would take a concerted effort for decades. So would strengthening any of the dangerous and needy candidates in Africa or in Central Asia.
Preventing state failure is imperative, difficult, and costly. Yet, doing so is profoundly in the interest not only of the inhabitants of the most deprived and ill-governed states of the world, but also of world peace. Satisfying such lofty goals, however—making the world much safer by strengthening weak states against failure—is dependent on the political will of the wealthy big-power arbiters of world security. Perhaps the newly aroused awareness of the dangers of terror will embolden political will in the United States, Europe, and Japan. Otherwise, the common ingredients of zero-sum leadership; ethnic, linguistic, and religious antagonisms and fears; chauvinistic ambition; economic insufficiency; and inherited fragility will continue to propel nation-states from weakness toward failure. In turn, that failure will be costly in terms of humanitarian relief and postconflict reconstruction. Ethnic cleansing episodes will recur, as will famines, and in the thin and hospitable soils of newly failed and collapsed states, terrorist groups will take root.
 Next why nations are needed ………….
LAW WITHOUT NATIONS? WHY CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT REQUIRES SOVEREIGN STATES, by Jeremy A. RabkinPrinceton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005.  350pp. 
 Reviewed by Paul Carrese, Professor of Political Science and Director, Academy Scholars Program, US Air Force Academy.  Email: paul.carrese [at] usafa.edu.  Views expressed are the author’s alone, and not those of any government agency.
 The complexity of post-Cold War globalized life and the efforts of human rights and global governance advocates together have produced a striking prominence for international law in recent decades.  The victors of the Second World War developed a fragile consensus on the need for some general re-commitment to the law of nations and especially laws of war, albeit not so idealistic a commitment as their Wilsonian predecessors.  These tentative steps set in motion intellectual and political currents about modern international law that now have provoked substantial political controversy – and, with Jeremy Rabkin’s help, some academic controversy.  Rabkin, a professor of political science at Cornell University, has argued in books and articles over the past decade that the new conception of international law as supra-state governance goes too far, obscuring the basic reality that state sovereignty (to include negotiated treaties) is the best foundation for domestic liberty and constitutional government.  His LAW WITHOUT NATIONS emphasizes the political philosophy and jurisprudence he finds at the root of these debates about how to best structure international relations and political economy. 
 Rabkin gave greater weight to the latter in THE CASE FOR SOVEREIGNTY (2004), addressing the trans-Atlantic disagreement about the recent Iraq war and debates about American unilateralism versus European multilateralism or globalism.  These foreign policy and international relations issues occasionally take center stage in this sequel, but here Rabkin mostly examines the jurisprudential and constitutional underpinnings of an American political spirit of independence and exceptionalism – from the ancient Western resistance to empire, to Bodin, to Locke and the Declaration of Independence.  This is a timely and provocative work, not least because Rabkin elaborates the minority view on law and government among American and European academics, especially in law schools and the social sciences.  What predominant school of thought should not appreciate a serious critique or counterargument?  That said, at points he undermines his own status as honest gadfly by falling into the same polemical tone now widespread in American scholarly debates about law, constitutionalism, and judicial power.  Perhaps his defense is that a direct challenge to powerful domestic and international elites – lawyers and judges, as well as advocates for human rights and environmentalism in NGOs, IGOs, and academia – cannot avoid engaging the partisan dimensions to their intellectual projects.
 LAW WITHOUT NATIONS primarily addresses legal theory but traverses a wide territory of other subjects in doing so.  Rabkin recognizes that the salience of his investigations into Bodin or Blackstone rests upon more pressing debates – about the relative status of the United Nations and American power in the post-9/11 world, or the International Criminal Court, or the citation of foreign law in US Supreme Court constitutional interpretations.  Similarly, he must mention debates in international relations theory about realism versus liberal internationalism, or neoconservative arguments for aggressive democratization versus Kantian diplomacy toward a global consensus, or the trope that American unilateralists are from Mars while European multilateralists are from Venus.  The strongest undercurrent here, however, is Rabkin’s earlier work in public law concerning constitutional interpretation and what constitutes judicial activism.  Indeed, the fundamental jurisprudential approach of LAW WITHOUT NATIONS is originalism, and further, the positivism of Hobbes and Locke, for the fundamental principles at stake for Rabkin are constitutional government and the liberty and rights it serves.  He defends Westphalian sovereignty, under which binding international law requires the consent of governmental parties through treaties or unquestioned custom, because this is a prerequisite for constitutional government on the American model.  Against the advocates of Kantianism in international affairs and Progressivism in American constitutional law, Rabkin reaffirms the original conception of the Framers, that the rule of law established and enforced by a capable government, deriving its powers from the consent of the governed, is the best way to protect the rights and security of individuals.  A corollary to this original constitutionalism is a foreign policy of independence in which a sovereign, duly constituted government, dedicated to liberty, carefully undertakes international commitments.
 Would that this book develops a wider readership among the American and international elites in academia, the media, NGOs, and IGOs who comprise “transnational civil society,” for here is a serious statement of all that cosmopolitanism and post-modern humanism must overcome in their quest for a more just global order.  A dose of Rabkin (requiring many a spoonful of sugar) would help sharpen their arguments and tactics, or prod them to moderate their cause to make it more effective.  My own scholarship lies closer to Rabkin’s perspective of originalism, and here one could argue that he only partially presents the Framers’ understanding of the American constitutional commitment to abide by the law of nations and a more principled role in relations among states.  An originalist of an even odder stripe than Rabkin might further note that the most influential sources for this more complex, balanced constitutionalism, Montesquieu and George Washington, receive mention here but not their due place.  Moreover, if Rabkin had incorporated such a dose of originalist, diplomatic sugar from a Frenchman and a general – think of it! – he might have done fuller justice to the most surprising [*184] but still plausible claim of his book: that however imperfect the American constitutional order may be, there is no better record for achieving and spreading, through Westphalian means, the very ends of liberty, equality, and basic security sought by more progressive or post-modern models of law and right.
 LAW WITHOUT NATIONS opens by assessing the conflict between Europe and America in recent decades over visions of international affairs and international law, and posing a question to Europeans that hints of Derrida: what’s wrong with difference?  In one sense, Rabkin means only to taunt the post-structuralist school, for his bleak defense of American exceptionalism stems from Huntington’s thesis on a clash of civilizations.  Indeed, Rabkin takes that one step further: recent centuries reveal competing strands of Western civilization, rooted in rival philosophies, and America should recall its pride in splitting from Europe two centuries ago.  This calls to mind Gertrude Himmelfarb’s delineation of distinct ROADS TO MODERNITY (2004) in the British, French, and American Enlightenments, in which she praises America for perfecting British moderation while avoiding the extremism of the French philosophes (or, most of them – Montesquieu excepted).  In Rabkin’s version, one intellectual path has led continental Europeans to seek equality and peace through higher levels of administration and expertise, even to supra-sovereign international structures of bureaucracy and juridical law.  Europeans may charge Americans with imperialism today, but the concept is not American in origin and, long before Voltaire’s advocacy of enlightened despotism, continental thought and practice has been dominated by achieving or fending off utopian visions of empire, right into the twentieth century. Americans, in contrast, place liberty above all and seek this through a sovereign constitution and a complex politics and civil society.  Being more skeptical and traditional in their views of human nature and power, a trait Rabkin traces both to Athens and Jerusalem, Americans adopt separation and balancing of powers in domestic politics and also wariness of international projects for perpetual peace – and thus, a commitment to self-defense.
 Upon this foundation Rabkin argues that Americans should stick with constitutional self-government and resist the charms of global governance under new conceptions of pooled sovereignty, or newly-minted “customs” of international law developed by legal elites outside traditional treaty negotiation and ratification.  In effect this is a defense of separation of powers and a reminder of why America traditionally applied it to both the domestic and international spheres.  The original American aversion to judicial activism – as subverting the consent of the governed and the legitimacy of law –  means that there cannot be a robust international judicial power unless, by traditional treaty processes, the executive and/or legislative powers of sovereign states have made a binding law and empowered courts to adjudicate it.  The core argument of LAW WITHOUT NATIONS explores the foundations of these constitutional [*185] principles in early modern political philosophy – Bodin and Locke – and their influence in turn on the jurisprudence of Blackstone and the Enlightenment theorists of a modern law of nations, especially Grotius and Vattel.  In one sense these analyses might appeal only to political theorists or intellectual historians, but Rabkin regularly notes the connections to the American framers or recent controversies about international law or sovereignty.  These modern social contract theorists view humans as naturally separate and prone to conflict, and therefore develop law and sovereignty to provide for basic security.  Once transmitted to the American framers, their theories inform skepticism about government protecting individual rights if far removed from consent or untethered from positive law: in the original conception, constitutional forms or means are as important as ends.  This, combined with the argument that constitutionalism requires originalism, is Rabkin’s most distinctive contribution.
 The central chapter, on “The Diplomacy of Independence,” sketches an intellectual history of American foreign policy and the law of nations from 1776 to the Cold War, aimed at defending the current Bush Administration policies after the 2001 terrorist attacks.  Rabkin offers a strong case that America’s truest policy, given its constitutional tradition, is neither isolationism nor crusaderism, but the defense of its own liberty.  This is less original but still important, since historians and theorists of American foreign policy and especially of the shifting fortunes of Washington’s “Farewell Address” have addressed many of these points – most recently works by Spalding and Garrity (1996), and Meade (1997).  Rabkin’s particular contribution is that America’s adherence (with some deviations) to a middle ground, avoiding isolation but also adventurism or utopian globalism, follows the logic of its foundations in constitutionalism and sovereignty as indispensable for protecting rights and collective liberty.  However, the brief portrait of Washington’s 1796 address, the first great statement of American foreign policy, over-emphasizes the realist strains in the founder’s advice.  Washington did warn about “permanent” alliances, especially with more powerful states, even as he recognized that our commercial character invariably would draw us into world politics and that temporary alliances would be needed.  Rabkin omits, however, the elements of Washington’s counsel that balance this: that America should “[o]bserve good faith and justice towards all nations” and cultivate “peace and harmony with all,” since “[r]eligion and morality enjoin this conduct.”  The larger moderation of Washington’s statesmanship, and his view of our constitutionalism, dictated that America should engage with the world as “our interest guided by our justice shall counsel” – which gives greater place to interest than neo-Kantians might prefer, but sees a higher standard of justice than realists or strict Westphalians could accept.  Washington called all generations of Americans to “give to mankind the magnanimous and too-novel example of a people always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence.”  Indeed, “every sentiment which ennobles human nature” recommends the American effort to achieve this higher justice, even if [*186] “temporary advantages” might be lost.  One can also note that our judicial tradition which forecloses “advisory opinions” arose because of Washington’s scrupulous care for the law of nations (also a theme in the Address) – for this is why he requested a ruling from Chief Justice Jay and the Supreme Court about our precise obligations under treaties with France and Britain.
 This fuller picture does not contradict Rabkin’s basic argument about constitutionalism and sovereignty, but it does complicate it.  A more moderate position at the founding might indicate more complex policies or at least a more subtle rhetoric today.  Of course, the same challenge arises for today’s advocates of the judicializing of international affairs: how reasonable is it to press ahead with the ambition to legalize and bureaucratize world affairs at the expense of state sovereignty when, as Rabkin shows, this may well involve gambling away a legal capital that has achieved greater liberty and equality for more people than any other jurisprudence or political philosophy?  Some might at least take pause given Rabkin’s argument that there is a tinge of lawlessness inherent in pushing radically new conceptions of international law, and they might gain some understanding of the reaction from sovereign nation states and specifically Anglo-American constitutionalism.
 If Rabkin truly wishes to induce moderation in Kantian advocates of globalism, he might also do more to explain how such a “European” view of supra-national sovereignty penetrated America in the 19th century with Progressivism and such exemplars as Wilson and Dewey, offering the first extensive arguments for perpetual peace and global consciousness.  Why did the detour develop, and how might some be persuaded to turn back?  Similarly, how did an American judiciary and legal community supposedly steeped in Lockean positivism and a narrow view of judicial power develop into a branch that has judicialized our politics and sparked the judicializing of international law and global affairs?  My own axe to grind here is that Montesquieu, that French philosopher mostly forgotten or only ceremonially cited today, plays a crucial role in this story.  He was the single most authoritative source for the Framers in the 1780s and 1790s when developing our constitution, and he is arguably more of an influence upon Blackstone than either Hobbes or Locke.  It is Montesquieu, breaking from his predecessors in liberal philosophy, who elevates the right of nations as one of the basic forms of right or law, along with national law and private law (Montesquieu 1748/1989).  He also establishes that liberal constitutionalism requires an independent judiciary.  Rabkin overlooks this broader dimension to the liberal tradition and its likely effect on the Founders – and, on the subsequent development of progressivism.  Montesquieu is no Kantian, but he also is not a strict social contractarian or atomist.  He and his disciple Blackstone ground the law of nations in natural law and see its fundamental principles as preservation and reciprocity – indeed, the Golden Rule.  Montesquieu’s criticisms of Roman imperialism (he wrote a history [*187] of the fall from republic to empire, which inspired Gibbon) and of Machiavellian conquest clearly fit with Washington’s balancing of interest and justice.  A Montesquieuan like Madison did not need to jump ship to Kantianism for his essay of the early 1790s on universal peace, envisioning an end to wars of conquest.  John Marshall, too, emphasized “the great principles of reason and justice” informing the law of nations in such cases as HOGSHEADS and THE ANTELOPE without remotely supporting Dworkinian theories of Herculean judges who dispense a man-made natural law.  This points to another concern about Rabkin’s portrait of the founding, which downplays traditional natural law as the foundation for individual rights and constitutional government.  He implies that the Roman Catholic tradition, as heir to the Roman empire, is fond of modern schemes of universal rule and that its concept of natural law is putty in the hands of progressives like Dworkin or Human Rights Watch.  Perhaps this is why he never cites Mary Ann Glendon’s work rehabilitating the UN Declaration of Human Rights for concerned traditionalists (Glendon 2001).  Glendon, however, finds no contradiction in her recent criticism of the use of foreign law by the U.S. Supreme Court to overturn statutes on controversial moral issues, as in LAWRENCE and ROPER (Glendon 2005).  All of this suggests that advocates of constitutional sovereignty and traditional jurisprudence may adhere to more complex jurisprudential foundations than Rabkin allows, and, that a case could be made that is more persuasive to those with aspirations to natural and/or international justice.
 To be fair, these kinds of concerns also point to the great service done by LAW WITHOUT NATIONS in provoking a debate about first principles so as to address more effectively several pressing quandaries of law and politics.  I have not even mentioned the three chapters in the second half of the book that specifically examine the model of Eurogovernance, international human rights law, and international trade agreements and the WTO.  Rabkin insists that we need clear thinking about first principles for a world that is startlingly new and dangerous in many ways, but that this in turn will require consideration of traditional principles and established sources.  Those who disagree with his views on sovereignty and international law will at least have a chance to clarify and affirm their own foundations, or anti-foundations, as the case may be.
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
An edited piece on the sociology of xenophobia ..
 
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF XENOPHOBIA AND OTHER-ISMS
Tom R. Burns,1 Masoud Kamali,2 and Jens Rydgren3
This paper has been prepared for the EU Workshop on _Racism and
 Xenophobia: Key Issues,Mechanisms, and Policy Opportunities,_ April 5-6, Brussels. This is a very preliminary work.
 
 
 
Introduction
European societies have exhibited high levels of xenophobia and racism
 in attitude surveys, a desire tolimit immigration and acceptance of
 refugees, and a readiness to exclude foreigners from certain social areas and arenas (Hargreaves & Leaman 1995; Solomos & Wrench 1993;
 Eurobarometer surveys forEUMC). Furthermore, there is a persistent threat that racist socio-political movements will arise and establish themselves, introducing a  _racist agenda,_ pressuring established parties to shift their position, and blocking or reversing institutional re-alignment in favor of pluralism, equality, and
justice. It is paradoxical that established elites within Europe stand
 for increased pluralism and opposition to xenophobia and racism, but
 that they have been largely unable to prevent or limit socio- political movements articulating ethno-nationalism (implying an ardent
 xenophobia), and authoritarian views on socio-cultural matters (e.g. law-and-order).  Nor have they been able to overcome much of the institutional inertia and resistance in  order to effectively address the problems of widespread  institutionalized discrimination.
      These notes identify in Section I normal group and community
 processes that lie at the root of xenophobia and racism, and related forms  of negative response to diverse
 _others_ _ _otherisms_ is the term we  have coined. Our main point is that problems of xenophobia and otherism,  including racism, are particular radical expressions or forms processes taking place in all social groups and communities, but, of course,  taking different forms and having different consequences. By  undesrstanding these basic processes, we can better analyze and most effectively address problems of racism and xenophobia.This view differs, of course,  from those that see xenophobia as largely pathological, as something purely irrational and exceptional The notes go on to examine two major forms of xenophobia and otherism in contemporary societies:  on the one hand, taken-for-granted and institutionalized forms (
 
I. GENERAL THEORY:
 BASIC GROUP AND COMMUNITY PROCESSES5
  1. Paradigms, Classification Schemes, and Strategies in Dealing with
 Problematic
 
Other.
All human groups conceptualize and grapple with problems, some of which
 are flet to be very serious problems defined as _dangers_ and
 _threats._ These are collectively conceptualized and organized in category  systems. Some of these dangers have to do with internal _deviants._ Others  are connected with outside agents who are economic, military,  political, or other _competitors_ _ possibly _enemies_. In some cases, the  latter are linked to internal groups, who may be defined as potentially  disloyal, and possibly _traitors._ This is illustrated in the case of  conceivably aggressive neighboring countries or regions with ties to  internal minorities of the same ethnicity, religion or political ideology.                                                         
 
Obviously, for such purposes the group or community must be able to
 distinguish itself in its right and proper states or conditions from its  environment. This entails then the
 construction and articulation of a  collective identity _ which can be distinguished not only from an
 environment but from deviant or divergence forms of its own structure and  processes that are considered improper or  failings, even threats to the  integrity, status, or survival of the group. _Dangers_ may be attributed  not only to human social agents but to natural conditions, or  supernatural beings.The dangers arising from natural causes
differ from those embodied or generated by willful human agents. Social
 agents, whether internal deviants or external powers, may be seen as
 possessing certain values and loyalties, and an identity, different
  from those of the community in question. Thus, a collectively_s self  is  differentiated from that of another (or that of a class of agents).
 
_Other_ may be distinguished on any of a number of dimensions: in terms
 of skin color or other biological characteristics, their institutions
 (economic, political, family), cultural patterns (norms, values,
 rituals), their territory or the place they live, their orientations to one_s  collective _self_, the history of one collective _self_ compared to the _other._ This model  points up the great variety of elements that can be built on to define  the _other._ It also points to the great variety of dangerous or  threatening factors that give meaning to the definition of the _other__  including those that are figments of an extraordinary imagination facilitated through the creative use of  language. But all _threats_ or _dangers_ are conceptualized as  differentiated from the group or community, its _core,_ even if in some cases  dangers are embodied in persons or subgroups of the community (contaminated or subverted agents). In sum, a community or group distinguishes then between itself  as a system and its _environment._ In interacting with internal and/or  external agents which are judged or perceived as different, possibly  dangerous or threatening, the community or group asserts, possibly  re-constructs, its identity by differentiating itself
 from _other._
 
What we are proposing then is the following: 
(1)In general, groups or communities operate with shared models or
 paradigms6 relating to their collective self and to their environment. A  social order is distinguished from its environment and, in particular,  from any factors which are believed to undermine or destroy the order.  The collective paradigms identify problems, dangers or threats, which  must be taken into account if a community is to to function effectively or  to survive as a community or group.7
 
(2)Groups and communities make distinctions, operating with
 institutionalized category systems
 that distinguish _inside_ from _outside._ With  respect to both the _inside_ and _the outside,_ they identify and  distinguish types of problems, threats, and dangers. These include  potentially problematic agents, in some cases defined or perceived as _enemies_  or _potential enemies._ Thus, values are associated with many category  or distinction systems, which give rise to a hierarchy: good/bad,  pleasant or gainful versus harmful or painful.
 
(3) Among the internal threats to a group are loss of respect and/or
 loyalty to institutions, refusal of some or many group members to uphold  the symbols, rules, and boundaries that are essential to maintaining  social
 order, integration, and solidarity in the community. Also  important are major tensions and conflicts between key individuals or sub-groups in a  community or group. 
 
External agents may be threatening or dangerous in a number of ways.
 They may be competitors for the same scarce resources or social space. They may  have a dislike or hate for one_s  grounded in transcendental truth and  morality, that come from _outside_or from groups. Or, they may be  considered a potential threat simply because they are _different_ on one or  more dimensions and rapidly growing in numbers, although there is no  immediate or clear and present danger. They may be considered
 threatening or  dangeroous because they are impure and polluting in a certain sense.  As suggested earlier, danger may be real or imaginary. It is important  to note, however, that belief in such a danger may become  self-fulfilling Acting on such beliefs elicits response from the _other_ defined as dangerous or threatening. They may behave in ways  which validate the belief  hence, the model of self-fulfilling prophesy  is an appropriate one to analyze and understand the vulnerability of  human communities to self-perpetrated problems, dangers, and conflicts.
 
(4) Moreover, the groups and communities have or develop strategies to
 deal with categories of entities
 seen as problematic, possibly
 threatening or dangerous. They must be dealt with, controlled, avoided,  possibly even destroyed (provided one has, or believes oneself to have the  power to do so). A community deals with problematic _other(s)_through  systematic discrimination, marginalization, and exclusion of individuals and subgroups that differ from community  ideals or are perceived as a threat or dangerous. They may be excluded from  access to resources or to power by barring them; by dividing and ruling  them or, in other ways, preventing them from forming strong  communities; by carrying out group cleansing; by terrorizing them; by ultimately  extermination either through mass murder or allowing them to
 die.
 
(5) Discourses and rituals9 directed at the _other_ serve to displace
 (or minimize) internal tensions and conflicts toward an object
 considered a threat or dangerous to the community.10 The community gains in  cohesion and power, its capacity to mobilize and to deal with _danger._ As  discussed later in the dynamics of the politics of xenophobia, political entrepreneurs and  organizations may try to frame a situation or create or define a situation  as one of clear and present danger from other(s), as a means to gain  support, to mobilize and integrate a group or community. The group is  _pulled together_ around a common problem, threat, or danger. In this 
 sense, the mobilization and integration and support of the authority of
 the group (or an aspiring authority) may become ends. The means entail
 the attribution of danger to another group or community. This is a common  strategty used by political elites as much as another elite strategy, that  of _divide and rule_. They both work  under a wide range of conditions.
 
 
In sum, the above suggests that that there is a potentially unlimited
 number of possible dangers and threats. There may be diverse agents who  are perceived or defined as _causes_ or _sources_ of threat or danger.  Each may relate to or arise in connection with a particular crisis,
 a  growing sense of uncertainty and anxiety. Communities have institutionalized strategies to deal with  problematic, threatening or dangerous groups. This is grounded in  group processes _ which may perceive or identify threats from inside and  well as outside the group. Thus, there is not one xenophobia or  ethnicism, or racism, but many. This is the basis for our coining the term  _otherisms._
 
There is a certain logic to _otherism_ in defining problems facing the
 community as associated with or caused by _other._11 It facilitates the  community_s development of  a common orientation and values. 
                                                          
The group is integrated in the face of a _danger._ Under these
conditions, deviance from group normsand values, erosion of community
authority, internal conflicts and aggression are controlled or reduced. The destructive potentials are displaced from within the social order toward an  object, which may be aggressed, even destroyed, at the same time, strengthening solidarity  and unit of the group. In general, otherisms are a basis for defining 
 clear and present danger or threat, which may be accepted by some or  many, and which may operate in an immediate way to increase solidarity and  integration. Indeed, groups and communities may be held together  largely by perception or fear  of threat from the _other_ Conceptions  of the _enemy_ -- real or potential _ are the basis upon which mobilizing agents can construct consensus converting fear of  terror into solidarity, confidence in the group, a strong identity. The  boundary is between _our goodness_ and  _their evil._ Indeed, some groups  have their identity closely connected with conflict with another group.  _We exist as long as long as there is someone who represents what we  are not.  Social identity (and definition of the other) are thus  constructed through actions, particularly symbolic actions, and rituals that  define and reinforce the contrasting difference to others considered  _evil_ or _monstrous._
 
A clear and present _enemy_ or other immediate threat provides a value
 ordering. That is, in a certain sense, this logic involves a
 redefinition or reframing of dangers. An external problem or threat is defined as  more serious than internal ones. Value hierarchies are thus
 re-ordered. People downplay or _bracket_ certain problems, tensions or conflicts  in order to deal with the _major_ problem or
 threat.
 
2. Institutionalized and Emergent Otherism
A major distinction in our theoretical framework is that between
 institutionalized otherism and emergent otherism where the later is
 constucted and institutionalized as part of a _political_ process. That is, the  distinction between known and institutionalized conceptions of  problems, particularly _dangersous ones_ and vague, undefined experiences of threat or danger,  which become the point of departure for social construction and  institutionalization of otherism.
 
Institutionalized Otherism
A community may have established patterns of thinking and
 response,
 institutionalized strategies, for dealing with others considered
 problematic or dangerous. That is, the community makes use of shared category  systems and organizational arrangements that systematically identify and respond to internal or external agents that are defined as problematic or dangerous. Some  real or anticipated _problems_ are attributed to categories of others,  for example, in Europe, _Jew,_ _Muslim,_ _gypsy,_ _foreigner,_ or  _immigrant,_ believed to have problematic and even highly negative, in some cases dangerous, characteristics.
 
The _other_ may be seen an economic or political competitor. This may
 be connected to feelingsof threat, resentment, or
 both. They are
 perceived as a threat if they are believed to be taking or   gaining from the  first group. Or they may have already succeeded, and resentment is felt  with  respect to their achievements and gains. Internal groups in a  community may be a threat in that they deviate from established community   norms and laws. In some societies, as in Northern Europe  (Netherlands, Scandinavia) deviation   from the laws is judged by most as highly  problematic and condemnable. _Immigrants should    adapt their culture to the laws_ ( XXX in Northern Europe as opposed  to YYY in Southern Europe). In Southern Europe, for instance ItalySpain, Portugal, and Greece), violation of the law is less of a problem.  More problematic is the preception of particular forms of criminality  which are a threat to physical security (e.g. crimes of violence). In  yet other countries immigrants or minorities are seen as a threat to  national loyalties and identity; they are polluting in relation to national  ideals. Authorities and people in the community may want to  distinguish
 between right and proper immigrants and irregular or _chaotic   immigrants, but institutions fail to do so affectively. This serves to generalize the _otherness._ For instance,  police and administration are incapable of distinguishing and dealing with illegitimateimmigrants as opposed to regular or legitimate immigrants. The former may be associated with crime or activities that violate community sensibilities. The risks is, under conditions of inability to discriminate, that _all_ immigrants become defined and perceived as potential violators or pollutants.
 
In general, _negative otherness_ _ the basis for one or another form of
 _otherism_ -- especially in combination with large numbers threatens
 loss of control and disturbance of  normal and normative
 patterns.
 Social life becomes uncertain and unpredictable. Some groups of _others_ may be seen as polluting, contaminating. _Other_ may be attributed the cause of criminality and other kinds of insecurity, e.g. they are violent. Or, _they steal, fight, sell drugs and rape women._ Or, they are seen as an economic threat or violator of established economic markets and patterns of distribution. They quickly and effectively accumulate substantial wealth, causing resentment and envy (Chinese in SE Asia, Indians in Uganda, Cubans in Florida, Jews in many parts of the world). They may be seen as a political threat or potential disturber of the political system (Poles and other East Europeans in the context of EU enlargement). They may be defined or perceived as abusers of the generosity of welfare states, a violation which translates
 into higher taxes, less resources for us, that is, _those of us belonging to the right and proper _ethno-nationality._ In general, any number of problems, dangers, or threats may be attributed to immigrants or foreigners.
 
The institutionalized categorization and organization _ to respond to
 and deal with problematic other(s) -- provide a basis for systematic
 forms of discrimination, marginalization and exclusion of persons and
 groups that differ from community ideals, or are perceived as a threat or dangerous, as indicated earlier.  Not all arrangements that discriminate and exclude may have been designed for this particular purpose. They may be unintended, the result of pursuing other goals _ but which nevertheless result in tragic outcome(s) for the
 _other(s)_.
 
Emergent Otherism
A modern, dynamic society generates and distributes stress and
 uncertainty as well as concrete gains and losses. For many, there may be a sense of uncertainty and threat that is yet to be identified or
 comprehended in the context of systemic transformations. This may arise because of  changing ways of work, consumption, politics, or of general life  patterns. At some level, there is an anxiety and fear. This occurs  especially in times of rapid change where everyday conditions are experienced as  increasingly uncertain, strange or alien. The transformation of modern  societies has differential impact on different groups. Stress and uncertainty as well as
 burdens and gains are  distributed unequally. As a result, some experience more discontent, resentment, frustration and anger than others. This sets the stage for   entrepreneurial actors and groups to initiate movements against one or more  _other(s)._ This becomes an important source of _otherisms_ in modern societies. 
 
In the system theoretical perspective outlined here, all groups and
 communities operate with a general open template entailing the general
 concept of potential hazards and dangers. This template can be activated  in times of crisis or unexplainable anomalies or new, not-yet-identified  or specified dangers.
In other words, community members are predisposed to a
 greater or
 lesser extent to the potentiality of new threats and dangers. In a certain  sense, they are thus prepared  for procsses of defining or constructing  dangers. And dangers may be imagined and constructed _ with little or  no evidence. A newly defined danger fits the template of potential  threats, threats operating in a yet-to be  identified or known way. The  logic need not be the logic of science or causality, but a logic of  guilt  by _association_ or other forms of everyday reasoning.
 
Given conditions where some or many in the community or group
 experience disorder, discontent – a sense of
 growing _chaos_ and increasing  risks -- democratic societies offer opportunities for agents to associate  and to define problem(s), including dangers, and to suggest solutions,  that is to propose a new paradigm _ or activate and adapt a _retired_  paradigm -- defining source(s) of disorder, faillures, and  discontent,  and measures that may be taken. Contemporary society with its perpetual  (and restless) dynamic, transforms people_s conditions providing a rich  soil for the emergence of uncertainty and stress, discontent, resentment and sense of distributive injustice.  These experiences and feelings may be tapped, mobilized by movements and collective agents which define the new problem(s) and their causes and ways to solve them.
 The template of potential danger(s) is activated and given content: who or what is the cause or source of the problems and threats? Why and  how does it happen? How is it to be dealt with? Of course, these explanations and appeals must be articulated in appropriate discourses in time
 and place.They must also connect with some elements of common
 experience in order to be plausible and compelling. Most contemporary forms of, for instance, racism and xenophobia are no longer formulated in Europe in terms of race biological discourses of the inter-war years.
 
Creative imagination may fill in the template of potential dangers and
 risks. The opportunities for variety and even _collective madness_ are
 particularly advantageous in a
 highly complex, non- transparent world.
 That is, it is difficult to understand, to know, what and who is
 dangerous and why. Certain failures _ for example in connection with an economic crisis, epidemic, natural catastrophe, the  failure of agriculture _ must be attributed to _causes_ or _violators._ For instance, some agent or agents have violated key rules, broken the harmony. The _cause_ or _violator_ must be identified and dealt
with.
 
In the context of democratic societies, a mobilization around even
 extreme ideas _ possibly dismissed by established political elites and
 experts _ nevertheless provides a certain legitimacy to be heard, to
 participate in framing issues and problems, and suggesting
 solutions. It is in this context that paradigms of _inner_ and/or _outer_ threatening agents or enemies may be  articulated. Dangers and risks are defined, as are their causes. And strategies  to deal with them are implied or also articulated. The Nazi movement attributed, to a greater or lesser extent, many of Germany_s problems to the Jews. They were defined as internal traitors.
 
Institutional failures may be blamed on _other,_ internal or external
 to the community. This is a magical solution in situations where the
 group, or its leadership, cannot deal with serious economic
 malfrunctioning, health care failures, growing numbers of immigrants, uncertainties about welfare, etc.The community_s security, welfare, and in some cases its very existence, may
 appear  threatened.People may no longer feel as confident in the community, or as obligated to respect its rules of authority and solidarity. Members will recognize less and less _others_ in the group as trustworthy members. There is a sense of potential disintegration. One attractive strategy, as  suggested above, is for political and institutional elites to displace the blame from established institutions and themselves to _the other(s)_.13
 Typically, such labelling can be carried out because the level of
 concern with the _others_ is low and their marginality or weakness
 precludes a credible or effective response. The immediate consequences are much  greater if the critiques and attacks were directed to powerful core groups or
 elites.
 
In the following sections, two of the major bases of xenophobia and
 otherism in contemporary society are examined further and elaborated. 
 Institutionalized otherism. Here what is of interest are established,
 relatively well-defined forms of institutional discrimination,
 xenophobia, and otherism inherent in arrangements of particular key
 institutions, markets, bureaucracies, and democratic associations which deal with groups or classes of persons defined as problematic, threatening, or
 dangerous; (2) New problems (or old problems experienced in new ways), uncertainty, stress, discontent, and resentment in connection with modern societal developments sets the stage for defining particular others as the source or cause of the problems and specifying actions to be taken, or solutions._ This is often accomplished through  democratic processes (see later). Templates for danger are activated and filled in with one or another form of _otherism._This is the dynamic and sustained source of _otherisms_ in modern societies.
An excerpt on historical US xenophobia ………..
The Truth about Immigrants: Xenophobia existed in early America by Brian Frazelle
Recently, one of my friends was at a family reunion. When she told her family what I was doing this year--volunteering at a house of hospitality for Latin American immigrants--one of her aunts expressed disapproval because "illegal immigrants take jobs away from tax-paying Americans." This is not an uncommon sentiment. Immigration from Mexico and Central America, documented and undocumented, is flourishing and many people in the United States want to stem the tide. But during this process the history of immigration in the U.S. is often forgotten, while the global forces that work to send contemporary immigrants here remain largely unnoticed.
There is always a touch of irony when a citizen of the United States complains about immigration. Except for those of pure Native American origin, every one of us is of immigrant descent. Native Americans inhabited the continent for over 12,000 years before the arrival of Europeans. The United States gained its territory largely through the dishonest and violent removal of the indigenous population. Yet somehow we maintain the idea that this land is ours alone and that it is not only harmful but immoral for other people to enter it.
Picture this: a state within the U.S. has been receiving a large number of immigrants from a foreign country. The immigrant population becomes so great that the public school system institutes bilingual education in many areas. Over time, abetted by political events, this practice becomes controversial and a public backlash forms against bilingual education and the immigrants themselves. One disgruntled state legislator declares, "If these people are Americans, let them speak our language." Does this story describe California or Texas in the 1990s? No, it describes Nebraska in the early part of this century. The immigrants in question are German immigrants (Daniels, Roger. Coming to America: A History of Immigration and Ethnicity in American Life. New York: Harper Collins, 1990. ps.159-60). The history of the United States is a story of successive waves of immigration, each wave arriving from a different area on the globe. With each new influx of immigrants, the older population has balked, claiming that the new arrivals would cause harm to the nation. Chances are, what is said today about Hispanic immigrants was once said about your own ancestors.
The first major immigration boom in U.S. history began in the 1840s. Before that period, about 60,000 immigrants came to America each year. This number tripled in the 1840s, and quadrupled in the 1850s. More important than the sheer numbers, however, was the change in ethnic composition. Previously, the vast majority of immigrants hailed from England. But during these two decades, over one-and-a-half million Irish came and almost as many Germans (A. Thomas Bailey,. The American Pageant: A History of the Republic. 3rd ed. Boston: D.C. Heath & Co., 1966. p324). The reaction of the "natives" to these newcomers shows that American attitudes towards immigrants have changed very little.
The Irish had been coming to America for years, but in the 1840's the potato famine crushed their homeland. During that decade, a fourth of the population died of disease and hunger, and many fled to the U.S. (Bailey 325). Here, they lived at the bottom of the social scale, working as menial laborers and domestic servants, and living in squalid conditions. The native population looked down on them, considering them less clean and hygienic (Daniels 131). Furthermore, the Irish, like today's Hispanics, were accused of stealing American jobs. This fear and resentment led to the famous sign often posted in store windows: "No Irish need apply." The sign was so common that it was frequently abbreviated simply to "NINA" (Bailey 325).
At the same time, Germans were pouring into the U.S., fleeing political instability at home. While most Irish stayed in east coast cities, the Germans were more likely to move to the mid-west. They were slightly better off than the Irish, but suffered discrimination nonetheless, as the Nebraska anecdote illustrates. Hostility towards the Germans had been around since they began to immigrate en masse in the eighteenth century. Benjamin Franklin, in his 1751 pamphlet Observations Concerning the Increase of Mankind, wrote
"Why should the Palatine Boors [Germans] be suffered to swarm into our Settlements, and by herding together establish their Language and Manners to the Exclusion of ours? Why should Pennsylvania, founded by the English, become a Colony of Aliens, who will shortly be so numerous as to Germanize us instead of our Anglifying them, and will never adopt our Languages or Customs, any more than they can acquire our Complexion." (Daniels 109-10)
From our vantage point, it is comical to hear someone claim that those of German descent will never integrate themselves into the U.S.
The arrival of the Irish and Germans in the U.S. prompted the formation of many anti-immigrant institutions. In 1849 the Order of the Star-Spangled Banner was formed; its goals included rigid immigration restrictions and the deportation of "paupers" (Bailey 328). This animosity towards immigrants often exploded into violence. Irish and Germans were reviled for their Roman Catholicism, and in 1834 a Catholic convent near Boston was burned by a mob, followed by subsequent attacks on Catholic schools and churches. In 1844, a several-day riot in Philadelphia left thirteen citizens dead and fifty wounded. Violence against Catholics on the East coast was so common that insurance companies practically refused to insure them (Daniels 267). It is difficult for us to imagine such malice being directed towards Irish or German people.
Over time, of course, the Irish and Germans did assimilate. By the time the next big wave of immigration occurred, they were considered the old guard as opposed to the newcomers. This wave began at the turn of the century, as hordes of new immigrants arrived from Europe. By 1920, one-third of the population was either an immigrant or the child of an immigrant (Daniels 274). Again, the changing ethnic composition was critical: throughout the nineteenth century, immigrants had come mostly from Northern and Western Europe. But in the beginning of the twentieth century, the newcomers were from Southern and Eastern Europe. They included Italians, Poles, East European Jews, Hungarians, Albanians, Romanians, Russians, and Lithuanians, among others. Between 1880 and 1920, 4.1 million Italians alone came to the U.S. (Daniels 188). Like nearly all immigrants, from the earlier Irish to the later Hispanics, Italians joined the poorest class, working at manual labor for low wages and living in crowded urban apartments. "As early as the 1890s commentators were noting that the Irish no longer built the railroads and paved the streets; Italians did" (Daniels 195).
These new arrivals from Italy and other Eastern European nations frightened the native population, as the Irish and Germans had before. In large part, the fear was based on the belief that the newcomers were racially inferior. People believed that differences, including great disparities in quality, existed. The pamphlet by Benjamin Franklin quoted earlier continues: "The number of purely white People in the World is proportionally very small . . . in Europe, the Spaniards, Italians, French, Russians and Swedes, are generally of what we call a swarthy Complexion; as are Germans also, the Saxons only accepted, who with the English, make the principal Body of White People on the Face of the Earth" (Daniels 110).
By the early twentieth century, these prejudices had developed into widespread and sophisticated theories about ethnic disparities. The Immigration Restriction League, formed in the late 19th century by Harvard graduates, proclaimed the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon, or Aryan race. One founder, Prescott F. Hall, asked rhetorically if the U.S. was "to be peopled by British, German and Scandinavian stock, historically free, energetic, progressive, or by Slav, Latin and Asiatic [meaning Jewish] races, historically down-trodden, atavistic and stagnant" (Daniels 276). While researching for this article in the local university library, I came upon a history of American immigration published in 1926. In it, the author wonders "whether or not the American environment will transform the Italian, Slav, and Jew as it has transformed the Irishman . . ." Lurking behind much contemporary resistance to immigrants from Mexico and Central America is an underlying if unacknowledged prejudice against their race.
These twentieth-century anti-immigration movements were eventually successful. In 1921, the government passed the Emergency Quota Act. It decreed that each year, the U.S. would accept a number of immigrants from any country equal to 3% of the number who were living in the U.S. in 1910. This law was quickly amended with the Immigration Quota Act of 1924, which allowed a number equal to 2% of those living here in 1890 (a time when few Southern and Eastern Europeans had arrived). Following this law, Great Britain could send 65,721 immigrants a year, while Italy could send 5,802 (Bailey 780). The nation succeeded in warding off the "undesirable" new European immigrants.
The Latin American immigration of the past few decades is merely the latest example in this cycle. It cannot be understood except in the context of America's history of immigration.
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An article on ‘hate in the home of the hated’ ….
Hatred by Hated People: Xenophobia in Israel
 http://nssc.haifa.ac.il/files/Hatred.pdf1
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That’s all folks!
Colin

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