The Next Gulf War
Emet R. Anders
24 July 2007

Abstract

There have been three Gulf Wars involving large scale employment of United States military air, land and sea forces. The first occurred 1990 with the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, and the subsequent Allied military response, the second was the U.S. led Allied invasion of Iraq, and the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime, and the third Gulf War is frequently referred to as the Iraq “insurgency" or alternatively described in press accounts as the "Iraq Civil War.” There will be another, a fourth, Gulf War involving large scale deployment and employment of U.S. military forces in what is known as the Southwest Asia Theater of Operations, or SWA. How will the “next” large scale employment of U.S. military power in the Persian Gulf region, or SWA differ compared to the campaigns in 1990-1991 and again in 2003?  What will the next Gulf War be like? Research would indicate the next Gulf War will require the use of overwhelming force,  but also require the planning, logistics, and the intention to sustain that force through long-term, if not permanent, territorial occupation. While the exact timing, shape, and nature of the conflict remains shrouded, the next Gulf War, however, will resemble more a war of “conquest” than a war of “liberation” as has been the case in the past.  

The Next Gulf War

Introduction

    During the last two major military campaigns in which the United States employed large scale air, ground and naval forces in the Middle East—the two occasions being the 2003 Anglo-American invasion of Iraq, and the earlier 1990-1991 relief of Kuwait—the intention was liberation rather than overt territorial conquest. However, it is likely the next international crisis resulting in the U.S. commitment of large scale air, ground and naval forces in the Gulf Region will be different.  In pursuit of vital National Security, or critical national economic interests, circumstances and recent experience may dictate adopting the role and behavior more consistent with that of “Conquerors” than “Liberators” than the United States and the people in the region will like. However, doing so may be the price of success. It is vitally important therefore that the American public and American military be prepared for such an eventuality.

It is important to begin thinking about the "Next Gulf War" now. The planning horizon with respect to satisfying strategic National Security objects in the region would have to extend beyond the 12 to 18 months it is generally anticipated when U.S. air, ground and naval forces will no longer be in Iraq, or at least not in very large numbers.  Although most of the public, political thinking seems focused on how quickly can we get out of Iraq,  there needs to be some thought on what will follow, regardless of how skillfully, or clumsily military forces are withdrawn from Iraq. Care must given to ensure the timely withdrawal of some of the most sophisticated war equipment in the U.S. arsenal like the M1A1/M1A2 Abrams tank, M2A2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle or any heavy artillery, and supporting equipment to make sure none of it could be used against U.S. forces upon an eventual return.  This would require careful, costly, and time consuming retrograde of among other things, tons of U. S. manufactured conventional munitions, bombs, artillery shells, small arms ammunition, fuel, lubricants and food stuffs in quantities more than is required to satisfy the legitimate military defensive needs of a fledgling Iraqi Army (Fireman).

The current U.S. occupation of Iraq will eventually come to an end. Following the ousting of the Soviet military from Afghanistan, Islamists began to envision the establishment of a global Muslim community, the Ummah, stretching from Spain to the Philippines (Sageman, 2004). Their dream is far from diminished in the ensuing years, and if History is any judge; Jihadists may even find enormous encouragement regardless of how and under what circumstances the U.S. makes its departure from Iraq.

Background

Make no mistake, and despite any wishful thinking, there will be another Persian Gulf War within the South West Asia, or “SWA” region. For the purposes of this paper “SWA” is as sub-set of the United States Central Forces Command (CENTCOM) operational Area of Responsibility (AOR) that includes all of the Arabian Peninsula, (Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Yemen and Oman) Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The United States will again be required to deploy large numbers of air, ground and naval forces into the South West Asia Theater of Operations. The employment of these forces in the SWA region, however, will not follow the model of the previous U.S. involvement in Southwest Asia, or the “Gulf” region. In the past Gulf Wars, American forces and their allies embarked on campaigns of liberation: first to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation, and then second to liberate the Iraqi people themselves from the dictatorial rule of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein. Despite the successful “regime change” in Iraq, the Global Salafi Jihad, however, continues only slightly abated. Islamic terrorists continue to have successes such as the Madrid and London bombings, and will make every attempt to take direct control, or control indirectly, what militant Jihadi’s term their "near enemy" the nation states in the Southwest Asia, and affect through continuing acts of terror what they term the "far enemy" in the West, principally the United States of America. What would the U.S. do if Afghanistan was to fall apart and major regions of that country come under the complete control of the Taliban or Al-Qaeda? What are the implications of an Iraq influenced or even dominated by a resurgent Al-Qaeda in terms of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)? What would happen if the U.S. had to "re-invade" Iraq?

The First Persian Gulf War

The first Gulf War was also the first test of security in the “New World Order” following the collapse of the former Soviet Union (Miles, 2006). The invasion of Kuwait by the armies of Saddam Hussein in August of 1990 precipitated the “first” Gulf War involving the large scale U.S. force deployment soldiers, sailors, airmen, the Coast Guard, and U.S. Marines to the region.

This war was a “three phase” conflict that saw the destruction of the Kuwaiti military and occupation of that country by the Iraqi Army. The second phase can be described as the U.S. and United Nations response to the Iraq invasion of Kuwait with the deployment of U.S. ground forces to Saudi Arabia, first with “light” airborne and air assault infantry troops and the gradual build-up and deployment of “heavy” armor and artillery forces of some thirty different nations. During the “build up” phase, an Air Campaign was launched that featured daily air strikes by Coalition Air Forces to include fighter bombers belonging to the Royal Saudi Arabian Air Force that were aimed at “shaping the battlespace” prior to ground campaign (Frostic, 1994). The buildup and air campaign became known as “Desert Shield” and preceded the actual combined air, land, and sea campaign that followed known to History as “Desert Storm.” The extraordinary “100 hours” of the Desert Storm conflict that resulted in the expulsion and all but complete and utter destruction of the Iraq army, including Saddam’s vaunted “Republican Guard” is well documented. Nonetheless, one might argue that the conclusion of the “first” Gulf War only delayed the inevitable, a “second” Gulf War. Among the reasons being, Iraq itself was not permanently occupied, and perhaps more significantly there was no “regime change.” Saddam Hussein remained in power. All of that was to change in the “second” Gulf War.

The Liberation of Kuwait

The liberation of Kuwait City is perhaps the clearest example of U.S. intentions to prosecute the first Gulf conflict as a war of “liberation” rather than one of “conquest.” A U.S. Marine reconnaissance team became the first Allied troops to enter Kuwait City proper. According to the official U.S. Department of Defense account:

Twelve Marines from the 2nd Force Reconnaissance Company infiltrated into Kuwait City in the early morning darkness of 27 February, to be greeted by jubilant Kuwaitis and American flags waving from buildings, despite sporadic fire from Iraqi stragglers.

Arab forces had been given the politically sensitive mission of liberating Kuwait City itself. However, the fortunes of war, and caprice of battle combined to bring US Marines to the outskirts of Kuwait City well ahead of their Arab allies. Reinforcing the political imperative that Arab forces liberate the city, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf denied Marine commanders permission to advance farther, and instead urged Joint Forces Group Commander, Lt. Gen. Prince Khalid Bin Sultan al-Saud to redouble his efforts. (Strock, 1992) Coalition forces rolled into the Kuwaiti capitol at noon to officially liberate the city. (Atkinson, 1993; Stewart, 1991).  This is a clear example of the intention to prosecute the war from the perspective of “Liberators” rather than as “Conquerors.”

Once Kuwait was liberated, there was no sense of political urgency to drive on to Baghdad. In fact, it was quite the opposite. The eagerness of the Allies, primarily the United States, to end the fighting, as well as the terms of the ceasefire has drawn serious criticism from a variety of sources including criticism from Prince Khalid himself. Clearly, there was no desire to “conquer” Iraq, and any attempt would have destroyed the “Coalition” that had been so carefully built up to include as many Arab countries as possible. According the then President George H.W. Bush:

As the conflict wound down, we felt a sense of urgency on the part of the coalition Arabs to get it over with and return to normal. This meant quickly withdrawing U.S. forces to an absolute minimum. Earlier there had been some concern in Arab ranks that once they allowed U.S. forces into the Middle East, we would be there to stay (Bush, Scowcroft, 1998).

Clearly, it was never the U.S. intention to stay in Iraq. Americans are uncomfortable with the very idea of establishing a “Pax Americana” in the Middle East, or anywhere else in the World for that matter. In the American mind, “Imperialism” is a fact and flaw in European history and foreign policy and has nothing to do with U.S. goals or objectives. One could go so far as to remind anti-Western, anti-colonial activists that Americans once labored under the yoke of European colonialism as well; fought and won their freedom from Great Britain, one of the mightiest European colonial powers of the time. As far as the general public is concerned, America’s armies are not armies of conquest. They belong to the forces of freedom and liberation. In the public mind, once Kuwait was liberated in 1991, the “first” Gulf War was over.

The Second Persian Gulf War

The armistice that followed the First Gulf War did not settle the matter of containing the threat posed by Saddam Hussein and his regime in Iraq. In the late 1990’s it became the sense of the Congress to overthrow Saddam Hussein and replace his government with a Democracy. The intention was contained in the language of the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, passed by both houses of the Congress and signed into law by President William Jefferson Clinton. The legislation was passed following the aborted 1996 Clinton Administration attempt at “regime change” that resulted in collapse “opposition” forces in Northern Iraq (Weiner). A great deal has been written as to “why” the U.S. invaded Iraq in March of 2003 thereby initiating the “Second” Gulf War. According to the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate Iraq continued its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of United Nations resolutions and restrictions prohibiting development of such weapons, adding:

Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons and missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if unchecked it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade.

Concern over stockpiles of WMD’s, and the future prospect of a nuclear armed Iraq were not the only reasons, and arguably not necessarily the best reasons, for invading Iraq, but taken altogether in the Post-9/11 threat environment, they were enough. Saddam Hussein and his regime was a threat because of who he was, what he had done in the past and what he might do in the future. September 11th had changed the threat calculus and Saddam’s status under the “new” Bush Doctrine.

    The invasion of Iraq was not without its critics when first broached. Among them, Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf, who was concerned that focusing on Iraq, would damage the campaign to restore stability to neighboring Afghanistan (Lafranchi, 2002). Some of the more dire predictions did not come true. Saddam did not use chemical or biological weapons against coalition forces. The battle for Baghdad did not turn out to be a blood-bath of urban fighting. In fact, the heavily armored M1A1/M1A2 Abrams Main Battle Tanks and Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles performed surprisingly well everywhere in Iraq, including in towns and cities. Lastly, despite the fears of some, the overall casualty figures among Coalition forces were exceedingly low.  (Caldwell, 2003) Casualty predictions for an invasion of Iraq varied widely. They ranged from less than a couple hundred to over five thousand. (O’Hanlon, 2002) Regardless of the figure, the unasked question in their numbers was, “What price the liberation of Iraq?” It is a question still being asked.

The Liberation of Baghdad

The liberation of Baghdad was a joyous occasion for the Iraqi people.  Iraqi’s danced in the streets, waved the flag of the pre-1991 Iraq, they tore down posters of Saddam Hussein and posed for the cameras of the print and international electronic news media. The toppling of the giant statue of the dictator was televised around the World. When a U.S. Marine draped the American flag over the toppled statue, the crowd gasped, commanders at the Pentagon watching CNN fidgeted until the flag was taken down. (CNN, 2003) (Taheri, 2003) A conquering American army was not what the “Pentagon Brass” wanted portrayed around the world in the international media. The military objective was “regime change” and not a prostrate, “conquered” Iraq. Time rapidly passes, however, and in the contemporary mind, the “Liberation of Baghdad” is already ancient history. The ongoing insurgency that began insipidly in April of 2003 is now widespread and appears without end.

The Third Persian Gulf War

The insurgency in Iraq is the “third” Gulf War. The sectarian violence that began building in 2005 culminated in the destruction of the Golden Mosque one of the Shiites holiest shrines. There seemed little doubt afterwards that Iraq was facing a serious insurgency. Attempts to create a Western-oriented Democracy failed in parts of Iraq, particularly in the south where a democratically elected local government uses Iraq’s secular constitution to impose Islamist codes, and where Iraqi nationalists, funded by Iran, employ illegal militia groups to enforce their own law (Stewart). This particular model is being repeated in Sunni and Shiite regions alike, and is not what the U.S. or it’s Western partners envisioned for a free, Democratic Iraq. It is however, the reality and as time goes by will play a significant role in precipitating the “next” Gulf war.

Some critics place the blame the insurgency on United States government and its military, while others point to both the military and the Iraqis themselves (Hashim, 2004). The criticism of the U.S. military is that it has not adapted quickly enough to the requirements of counterinsurgency warfare, a criticism Nagl disputes (Nagl, 2007). And as far as the Iraqis are concerned Nagl quotes Hashim as saying, ". . . the various Iraqi interests seem incapable of resolving, or unable to resolve their differences or even reduce their maximalist demands vis-a-vis one another for the sake of the greater good. The only reason that they have not fallen upon each other in an orgy of violence is the presence of the Coalition" (as cited in Nagl, 2007, p.2). The problem Nagl suggests may be with the Iraqi’s themselves, many of whom see their sectarian and tribal relationships in totally zero-sum terms (Dodge). This does not bode well for prospects of an evolving “power-sharing” rule in the Democratic mold in Iraq of any kind following a withdrawal of U.S. forces. The Iraqi insurgency, the third Gulf War, promises to be long and bloody regardless of whether, when, or how U.S. forces depart the scene. The insurgency in Iraq is beginning to look more and more like a “fever” that must run its course. Unfortunately it is a fever that may end up killing the patient.

The Next Persian Gulf War

The Strategic Imperative

Current U.S. policy in countering terrorist activities was established in June 1995 by Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD 39), U. S. Policy on Counterterrorism, subsequently reinforced by PDD 63, Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas (GAO-04-501T) (Brake).  Both the Executive and Legislative branches of the Federal government have taken significant steps to change, shape and improve domestic security following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States.  The White House first published the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism in 2001, outlining the goals and the methodology for defeating terrorists, terrorist organizations, their supporters and diminishing the conditions that terrorist exploit in recruiting new terrorists. (United States, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism) The “National Strategy” is updated and amended every year to meet the changing circumstances of countering the global terrorism threat.

International terrorism remains a serious threat despite the progress made in identifying and neutralizing individual terrorists, terrorist cells, and terrorist organizations. According to the Homeland Security Advisory Council in its 2007 Report on the Future of Terrorism, the most serious threat to the American homeland comes from the Jihadist/Salafy movement:

The members of this movement seek to overturn regimes considered to be apostate; to re-establish the Caliphate; and to impose an extremist, militant interpretation of Islam. Some have cast the struggle within the Muslim world over interpretation of the Qur’an as a battle for the “soul of Islam” (Homeland Security Advisory Council, 2007, p. 3-4).

This revivalist movement will continue to spread regardless of when, and/or how U.S. forces disengage on the battlefields of Iraq. The most seriously, worrisome threat is a terrorist with an atomic device. Research to date indicates it is indeed plausible that a well organized terrorist group, with adequate funding, perhaps from a “rogue” or hostile nation-state could build and deliver a “crude” nuclear device or a so-called “dirty” bomb and detonate such a weapon within a major city somewhere in the United States (Medalia, 2004). Al-Qaeda has made clear it wants a nuclear weapon. According to research, Osama Bin Laden stated as early as 1999, possession of a nuclear weapon was a “religious duty” (Bunn, Weir, 2006). The U.S. government has been engaged in preventing such an eventuality ever since; not only pursuing the terrorists groups like Al-Qaeda wherever they might hide, but also working towards effective global nuclear security standards (Bunn, 2003). The “third” Gulf War, even if successfully concluded in better terms than are currently likely, will not spell the end of instability, strife and turmoil in Southwest Asia. What happens to Iraq is important, even key. However, the “next” Gulf War will come about because of issues that go “beyond” Iraq.

Strategic Response

How would the U.S. respond to the detonation of a nuclear device, or a radiological device on American soil? This is not a strictly hypothetical question. According to the press, Al-Qaeda has openly threatened Britain and other countries in the West, with the same prospect of attacks “on par or greater than Hiroshima and Nagasaki” (Gadher, 2007). The threat is not something to be ignored; nor is it. In fact, the threat of atomic attack, a nuclear detonation or radiological attack is taken very seriously at the highest levels of the U.S. government. “Noble Resolve” is a U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) program aimed at enhancing homeland defense and “improving military support to civil authorities in advance of and following natural and man-made disasters” (USJFCOM Public Affairs, 2007). Among the “man-made disasters” considered is the prospect of the detonation of a so-called "loose nuke," a ten kiloton nuclear weapon, or perhaps one smaller (Hoffpauir). The threat itself is not new. Even before President George W. Bush took office, the Hart-Rudman Commission warned America’s biggest security challenge in the near future would be from terrorist attack on U.S. cities where thousands would die (Fallows, 2005). Jenkins argues the U.S. must re-focus on destruction of the jihadist enterprise and says so in his 2006 book, Unconquerable Nation. He also points to what Iraq has become and what the war in Iraq symbolizes by visiting a quote from British Prime Minister Tony Blair:

If we can defeat the jihadists in Iraq, we will have dealt them a serious blow. And if instead, the United States is forced to withdraw in failure as Iraq spirals into sectarian chaos, the jihadists will have again proved their ability to defeat a superpower, while Americans descend into partisan finger-pointing. (Jenkins, 2006)

The “forced” withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq will be seen as not only a sign of weakness, but a clear victory by those who have made opposing the Allied occupation of Muslim lands a central component in the jihadist struggle against the West. A collapse of civil authority following a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq will only encourage and invigorate the rise of Radical Islamism throughout the Persian Gulf region and the rest of the Middle East, and make more difficult the successful prosecution of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) as Jenkins and other observers have suggested (Pipes, 2006) (Krauthammer, 2007). Most experts on the subject see some sort of continued U.S. troop presence in Iraq, or somewhere in the immediate region of Southwest Asia, in the foreseeable future, and despite the political clamor to “bring the boys home.”

Disengagement

The objective of creating a Western-style Democracy in Iraq that will be an example to people of the Middle East is a lofty objective. However, it may be a goal very much out of reach, if indeed it ever was within reach, as some critics claim. Leaving behind a government in Iraq that will not immediately collapse in the aftermath of the departure of U.S. forces is perhaps the best possible outcome under the current set of circumstances within the strife torn country. According to Terrill and Crane, achieving even that much will not be easy, “Balancing the goals of supporting stable Iraqi self-government and leaving Iraq in a timely manner has emerged as a central challenge of U.S. regional policy” (2006).

Major combat operations in Iraq concluded in May of 2003 with the collapse of the Iraqi Army and dispersal of Saddam Hussein’s vaunted “Republican Guards.” What followed were a wide range of post-conflict activities that include everything from providing security to humanitarian reconstruction. During this period, U.S. forces switched from primarily combat operations to security and so-called “peacekeeping” operations. Nonetheless, and despite the best intentions, and earnest efforts, there are limitations of what international intervention and humanitarian assistance can accomplish in Iraq (Hanks, 2006). One can argue that establishing the “rule of law” in a country racked by sectarian violence is a worthy goal in its own right, and ought to be a major objective of any attempt at international intervention, and humanitarian assistance, whether in Iraq, Sudan, or anywhere else in the Middle East, or in Africa. However, secular rule might not be the wish or the desire of the native population, thereby raising serious doubts about chances of success in countering the current insurgency, and subsequently dooming the creation of a Democratic state where “the legitimacy of the government derives from the consent of the governed, and where the rights of individuals and minorities are not only respected, but protected” (Daly, 2005). The sheer brutality, the beheadings, mutilations, and mass murders accompanying the insurgency, rival anything in Western experience including the “Reign of Terror” that followed the French Revolution that gave “terrorism” its name.

Departure

Disengagement and withdrawal of some significant number of U.S. military forces from Iraq seems inevitable. Timetables for their withdrawal, establishment of phase lines, setting of departure schedules may vary, but they can not be avoided indefinitely, if for no other reason, the forces in-country will need to re-arm, re-fit and re-organize outside the area of operations before re-deploying to accomplish future objectives in the region, or elsewhere around the globe. Clearly, the U.S. can not afford to stay in Iraq forever, nor would the American public tolerate such a prospect. In fact, with the costs rising above the billion dollars a month mark and casualties continuing to climb, one could argue, the U.S. can not afford to stay in Iraq for very much longer at all (Wolk, 2006). Some critics praise the effort to bring the insurgency under control but fear it will be a case of “too little, too late,” and will ultimately fail. (Sewell, 2007) The loudest and harshest critics of the U.S. occupation of Iraq insist the U.S. has already stayed in Iraq too long and should get out now.

Should the U.S. depart before Iraq is stable, sustainable, and secure, the resulting chaos would have a significantly negative impact on not just Iraq, but also upon all of Southwest Asia. Among the most knowledgeable observers is former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft who worries:

Iran, heady with the withdrawal of its principal adversary, would expand its influence through Hezbollah and Hamas more deeply into Syria, Lebanon, the Palestinian territories and Jordan. Our Arab friends would rightly feel we had abandoned them to face alone a radicalism that has been greatly inflamed by American actions in the region and which could pose a serious threat to their own governments (Scowcroft, 2007).

Whether the United States, and other nations that have chosen to fight Global Terrorism, can make a dent in the growing radicalization of the Muslim population Worldwide remains a subject of much debate. The minimal end-state for withdrawal would appear to be a viable, if not entirely stable and secure government in Iraq, where “Civil War” is less, rather than more likely to occur once U.S. forces retire. The objective of creating a government that is “friendly” to the West, in the way Jordan, or Saudi Arabia is “friendly” to the West, ought to be achievable, but is not altogether necessary. Regardless, the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq could combine with other local political and economic factors to precipitate the need for a re-deployment of military forces to Iraq, or elsewhere in the Southwest Asia region. It is almost certain that once the majority of U.S. forces depart Iraq, the impact on the region will be immediate, and possibly negative (Riminton, 2007). Ironically, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region, in any significant way, rather than “staying the course,” may become a contributing factor in precipitating the “next” Gulf war (Fahil, 2007). Regardless of whether the U. S. chooses to stay and fight, or when and/or how the U.S. decides leave Iraq, the withdrawal will go a long way in determining Iraq’s future.

Three Futures

Critics of the U.S. war on terrorism claim there is a fundamental misunderstanding of Islamist groups such as Al-Qaeda.  One could argue, as former CIA Counterterrorism chief, Michael Scheuer does in his analysis, “Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terrorism,” that American foreign policy, rather than our values is “why they hate us” (2004). The problem is the argument may encapsulate the “stated” reason of “why they hate us,” but the real phenomenon at work in the Middle East is the bid for “power” by those who wield the rhetoric of Jihad, as they would a sword, and do so for their own narrow individual interests (Baldrate, 2005). If the U.S. would change it’s foreign policy, for example, by abandoning, or even moderating its support for the nation of Israel; perhaps modify its relationships with other countries in the Middle East such as Saudi Arabia that are seen by Islamists as repressive, then America would in fact be carrying out Osama Bin Laden’s foreign policy, rather than our own, which would only enhance “his” reputation, and status in the region, and concentrate enormous power into his hands, and his hands alone.

Deciding when to withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq, without undermining the existing government is an enormous challenge. According to Terrill and Crane:

An important ideological goal that the United States has set for Iraq involves creating the conditions that allow democracy or at least power-sharing with minority rights among key communities to flourish—if that is possible. The further advancement of democracy in Iraq will be a complex process that may or may not be aided by the continuing presence of U.S. and other foreign troops in that country beyond the point at which an Iraqi government can survive on its own. (2006)

If there is any consensus with respect to a U.S. troop pull-out, it would seem to be that leaving Iraq too soon or worse yet, leaving long after there is any real need to be there, will largely determine what happens next in the region, and will most likely determine the nature and the shape of the “next” Gulf War.

The best possible “future” would be the smooth transition to a Western-oriented, democratically elected government with respect and protections for minorities, and an end to sectarian violence. A free market economy, establishment of equal-rights for women, and religious tolerance for all faiths, and sects would work toward an Iraq that would be the envy of the region and a shining example to the rest of the World. Iraq would therefore become a strategic partner with the United States as Schwartz and Michaels suggest:

The first potential end state would be a strategic partnership between the Iraqi government and the United States. This would likely entail the ratification of a security treaty that would give formal status to a large-scale permanent U.S. military presence in Iraq. This end state would be based on the realistic need for an alliance devoted to jointly fighting terrorism and promoting common regional objectives. This would loosely resemble the type of relationship the United States had with Japan and West Germany during the Cold War. (2005)

This would undoubtedly be the “best” possible outcome for the U.S. intervention in Iraq. The United States would have a strong partner in the volatile area of the World to help combat terrorism at its core, while at the same time become a powerful example and hope for change throughout Southwest Asia, and the rest of the Middle East. Unfortunately, circumstances may not conspire to produce the best possible “end-state” in Iraq.

The less than optimal future, from the perspective of U.S. foreign policy objectives are concerned, is an Iraq comprised of a loosely joined confederation of regional entities, still racked by sectarian violence, and external interference from neighboring states like Iran and Syria. The strength of the central government in Baghdad would wax and wane as the Iraqi people themselves struggle with the complexities of forming a viable secular government, as individual personalities, political and religious groups, all battle for personal and collective power. Schawartz and Michaels describe this “second” possible end-state as very much resembling the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan at the end of 2005 (2005). While hardly the best outcome, such a post-conflict end-state following, or just prior to a U. S. withdrawal from Iraq would not be the worst-case, nor would it be the least likely.

The situation in Iraq could go rapidly from bad to worse, hopefully after the U.S. withdrawal. Again, unfortunately, that may, or may not be the case. According to former CIA Director George Tenet, the Agency produced a paper in 2002 titled “The Perfect Storm: Planning for Negative Consequences of Invading Iraq.” Tenet says the summary included a number of “worst-case” scenarios, among them being the following:

•    Anarchy and the territorial breakup of Iraq;

•    Regime-threatening instability in key Arab states;

•    A surge of global terrorism against U.S. interest fueled by deepening Islamic antipathy toward the United States;

•    Major oil supply disruptions and severe strains in the Atlantic alliance (Tenet, 2007).

The “territorial breakup” of Iraq before U.S. troops disengage would be the very worst, “worst-case” scenario. American forces in Iraq are already in insufficient numbers to “pacify” the country as almost every expert on the subject now admits. With Syria, Iran and foreign fighters pressing in from all sides, and the prospect of little, if no help from neighboring countries, Turkey to the North, and the Gulf States to the South, “saving” Iraq could begin to look like not only a “Bridge Too Far,” but loom as a trap. Tactical withdrawal under fire is one of the most difficult of military maneuvers. It becomes exponentially more difficult on the operation level of combat. Circumstances in a crumbling Iraq could require U.S. troops in the North to conduct a “fighting withdrawal” southward, through Baghdad, through Basra to the Persian coast before finding a “friendly” port in Kuwait. Even if in-Theater logistics would permit a withdrawal with all heavy equipment, artillery, armor, and all troops, and even if conducted with the utmost success, sacrifice and bravery, such a withdrawal, under the glare of a hostile, if not mocking, international press would be seen as a total victory for the Jihadists; total defeat for the West in general, and absolute defeat and total humiliation of the United States of American in particular.

The “territorial breakup” of Iraq after most of the U.S. troops have withdrawn from Iraq would not be the very “worst-case” scenario, but might produce an equally undesirable outcome. Happening soon after U.S. withdrawal, and before rearming, refitting, and re-enforcement of American Army, Marine Corps and Air Force units is completed, such a debacle would pose serious challenge to any forces ordered to “re-invade” Iraq, or tasked to prevent the total disintegration of Iraq into Civil War. Should the crisis arise after a change of Administration in the United States, the prospects for a swift response is even a less likely possibility. New Administrations, with new personnel and personalities operating, some of them for the first time, at the highest levels of government, are often slow to respond to crisis, particularly if it is one perceived to be not of their own making. The abortive “Bay of Pigs” operation, a holdover from the Eisenhower Administration, at the start of the new Administration of President John F. Kennedy is of particular historical relevance (Wicker, 1965). The temptation, also, to do something, anything, perhaps to retaliate in some way, might become the most attractive choice of decision makers in a “new” government, if not among the military. The most pressing and troubling questions would be then, “How do we retaliate, and with what?”

Iran apparently believes the U.S. not only would not use military force against Tehran to prevent further efforts to develop a nuclear weapon, but could not do so even if Washington wanted to do so (Xuequan, 2007) (Krane, 2007). Considering the seriousness with which the U.S. has approached the issue of a nuclear armed Iran, and the continued interference from Tehran in Iraq’s internal affairs, figure prominently in the prospect of U.S. retaliation as a result.

Iraq or Iran?

Despite calls for an immediate pull-back of U.S. troops in Iraq, or a withdrawal from Iraq entirely, it seems likely there will be some Allied troop presence in the country to some degree, for some unspecified time to come. Pentagon critics claim the Department of Defense is planning to secure over 100 “permanent” bases in Iraq regardless of the politics of the day. What the critics fail to understand is that “permanent” describes the sturdiness of the structures and facilities and have nothing to do with whether they will be “permanent” with respect to manning. Besides, should the U.S. withdraw a bulk of military forces currently in Iraq, they will very likely have to return, perhaps sooner rather than later. According to retired Marine General Anthony Zinni, Iraq is not Vietnam nor is it Somalia, “It is not one of those places we can walk away from. If we just pull out we will find ourselves back in in short order" (Gordon, 2006). Considering the concern voiced prior to the 2003 Iraq war and the criticisms that followed the insurgency, it seems likely the number of “Boots on the Ground” will far exceed the numbers currently deployed or deployed in Iraq at anytime during the previous Gulf Wars.

Lind, and other strategic thinkers, claim the distinction between war and peace with respect to “Fourth Generation Warfare” is blurred; the distinction between “civilian” and “military” even more so. While not willing to define “terrorism” as belonging to the “Fourth Generation Warfare” model, Lind suggests there are similarities (Lind, et al, 1989). That said, the next Gulf War will be waged in the crease between “Third” and “Fourth” Generation Warfare. Commanders will have to face the challenge of target selection ranging, as Lind suggests, from political and cultural, to military targets. The “re-conquest” of Iraq, for example, would require the same kinds of air, land and sea forces that successfully invaded the country in 2003. The difference would be in the numbers, and an emphasis on post-conflict activity. The often quoted 200,000 figure attributed to former Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki is a good starting figure (Hanson, 2005). Pacifying a troubled Iraq, or at least a second attempt at doing so, may require far greater U.S. troop involvement than ever in Iraq, according to some press accounts as many as 500,000 as well as an increased commitment from other departments and agencies of the U.S. government (Yingling, 2007). The re-conquest of Iraq would also require allies. The question then becomes, “Who can we count on to help?”

A War Against Iran

The 1990-1991 Gulf War saw the formation of an unprecedented coalition of Arab and Non-Arab military forces united in the aim of ejecting the Iraqi invaders from Kuwait and restoring what had been the “status quo” in the region. A similar coalition failed to coalesce in support of the “second” Gulf War. However, circumstances may combine to produce a local political environment in the region that may see an opportunity to reconstitute the previous coalition. Predominately Sunni Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan are already concerned over the prospects of a Shiite revival in the region lead by Iran and supported by Syria. A nuclear armed Iran scares not only the West but Tehran’s immediate neighbors as well (Beehner, 2006). According to the Christian Science Monitor, the insurgency in Iraq has only strengthened Iran’s hand at the expense, and to the detriment of Tehran’s Sunni neighbors:

The disorder in Iraq has strengthened the hand of Iran, an influential player in the maelstrom of Iraqi Shiite politics. And the ability of Iran to project itself into the Arab world through Shiite allies, with Moqtada al-Sadr in Iraq and Hizbullah in Lebanon, is a source of deep unease among Sunnis in the region. Strengthening ties between Iran and Syria with Hizbullah and Iraqi and Palestinian groups has further aggravated Sunnis over the emergence of a "Shiite crescent" stretching from Iran through Iraq, Syria, and into Lebanon (Blandon, 2006).

Saudi Arabia is particularly concerned about the prospect of an in-balance of power once the U.S. leaves. Such an in-balance would leave Iran in a dominate position throughout the region, and in light of the Sunni/Shiite sectarian divide threaten the internal security of the Kingdom itself (Gause, 2007). Not everyone agrees that establishment of a “Shiite Crescent” from Baghdad to Damascus seriously threatens the “status quo” in the region. It can be argued that Tehran can still be influenced, perhaps even contained, by diplomacy alone, and that culture has its limits (Shaffer, 2007). The latter may in fact be true, to a greater or lesser degree. The perception to the contrary, however, may be closer to the reality.

A war against Iran may not be initiated by the United States. A number of scenarios cast Israel in the primary role. Some analysts believe Israel is even more threatened by the prospect of Tehran developing a nuclear weapon than the U.S. or any one else in the region. According to some press accounts, Israel is prepared to repeat its 1981 raid on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear facility and with the U.S. ‘bogged-down” in Iraq, Tel Aviv would not have to worry about interference from Washington (Salhani, 2004). Nonetheless, according to press reports, the U.S. has already picked out targets for attack in Iran and may not wait for Israel to act (Chossudovsky, 2007). A failure of diplomacy to stop Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon may very well precipitate a U.S. attack. Attacking Iran will not be without difficulty. Hundreds of targets would have to be hit to be effective, and there would also be a risk of retaliation by Iran. Iranian President Ahmadinejad openly boasts of ties to Hezbollah terrorists who are said to be already inside the United States and who are ready to launch widespread terrorist attacks. A nuclear armed Iran would be in no one’s best interest, even for Iranians. Should the only answer become what Louis Rene Beres calls an act of “anticipatory self-defense” the “next” Gulf War may be against Iran (2007).

Conclusion

How and when the next “Gulf War” breaks out is too difficult to forecast. Whether the next “Gulf War” will be a re-conquest of Iraq, or a “new” war against Iran, is yet to be determined. The threads of potential conflict are many, and even sometimes contradictory. How prepared the U.S. military, and the American population is for the next war in Southwest Asia, however, will go a long way in determining the shape, timing and outcome of any such war.

Iran will be a significant factor, depending on how long Tehran is willing to see an unstable Iraq as an advantage and a possible route to regional dominance, if not outright hegemony.  Syria can not be ignored. It is surprising that the ruling Alawite clan in Damascus has so far succeeded in siding with the Shias in the region despite the overwhelming Sunni Majority in Syria and in the Syrian Army. The reasons are complex and many. President Hafez Al-Assad, in 1975, convinced a Lebanese cleric to declare the Alawites to be Shiite Muslims despite the fact most Arabs consider the Alawi heretics (Fitchett, 2000). Furthermore, President Bashar Assad, as head of the Alawite clan, has demonstrated by his decisions during the “third” Gulf War that he will do whatever he must to hold tight his grip on power in Syria; against any prospect of a Sunni uprising within the country. Consequently, he and the others in the ruling Alawite clan see their individual and collective fates tied closely to Shiite ascendancy in the region (Eschel, 2007). Hence, there is now firmly established what Yaakov Amidror calls a “Hizballah-Syria-Iran Tri-angle” that is not only Anti-Israel, but Anti-Western, and with the recent occupation of Iraq, overwhelmingly Anti-American. The crucible of the “next” Gulf War may very well lie within the Hizballah-Syria-Iran Triangle, with Iraq at its base.

Continued instability in Iraq, following a U.S. departure, could very well escalate into all out civil war. Whether the international community, in the form of the United Nations, or some regional entity like the Arab League, would be willing to step in to stop the violence, and ethnic cleansing that would likely occur on an unprecedented scale in Iraq in the aftermath of disengagement, remains very much in question. The United States will undoubtedly feel the pressure to act decisively, and depending very much on the politics of the day may do so.

Whether by retaliation, re-enforcement, or “re-invasion,” the escalatory nature of re-engagement is obvious. The U.S. public might be willing to commit, or re-commit the military to a mission to stop the bloodshed in a disintegrating Iraq, if they can be convinced that doing so is vitally in the National Security interest of the United States. The public will demand, however, that the mistakes of the “last” Gulf War are not repeated. The “next” Gulf War will require the use of more “military force” than was employed in all the previous Gulf Wars. Based on past experience, the “next” Gulf War will require more U.S. troops to both “seize” and “pacify” to prevent a “re-insurgency” and outright anarchy in Iraq. The result will be a war that will far more resemble a war of “conquest,” than a war of “liberation” as has been the history of U.S. wars in the Gulf until now.

References

Amidror, Yaakov (2007, March 11). The Hizballah-Syria-Iran triangle. Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 1, Retrieved May 19, 2007, from http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2007/issue1/jv11no1a1.html.

Atkinson, Rick (1993). Crusade: The untold story of the Persian Gulf War. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Books.

Baldrate, Brian C. (February, 2005). Imperial hubris: Why the west is losing the war on terror: A book review. Army Lawyer, Retrieved May 6, 2007, from http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m6052/is_2005_Feb/ai_n13629120

Beehner, Lionel (2006, April 20). Arab views of a nuclear Iran. Council on Foreign Relations: Backgrounder, Retrieved May 19, 2007, from http://www.cfr.org/publication/10491/

Beres, Louis Rene (2007, May 8). The case for strikes against Iran. Christian Science Monitor, Retrieved May 20, 2007, from http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0508/p09s01-coop.htm

Bunn, Matthew (2003, January 29). Global nuclear security standards. Retrieved April 27, 2007, from Securing Warheads and Materials Web site: http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/securing/standards.asp

Bunn, Matthew, & Weir, Anthony (2006). Securing the bomb 2006. Nuclear Threat Initiative, Retrieved April 27, 2007, from http://www.nti.org/e_research/stb06webfull.pdf.

Bush, George H. W., & Scowcroft, Brent (March 2, 1998). Why We Didn't Remove Saddam. Time, Retrieved May 6, 2007, from http://www.millat.com/ghalibcom/events/iraq98/why_we_didnt_remove_saddam_.htm.

Caldwell, Allison (2003, February 10). Debate rages over possible Iraq war casualties. PM, Retrieved May 19, 2007, from http://www.abc.net.au/pm/stories/s780810.htm

CNN (2003, April 9). Saddam statue toppled in central Baghdad. Retrieved May 19, 2007, from War in Iraq Web site: http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/04/09/sprj.irq.statue/

Chaddock, Gail Russell (2002, September 23). A Bush vision of Pax Americana. Christian Science Monitor, Retrieved May 9, 2007, from http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0923/p01s03-uspo.html

Chalabi, Ahmad (2004, December 22). The future Iraq deserves. Wall Street Journal, p. Vol. 244 Issue 122, pA1.

Chossudovsky, Michel (2007, February 27). "Theater Iran Near Term" (TIRANNT). Global Research, Retrieved May 20, 2007, from http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=CHO20070221&articleId=4888

Daly, Lieutenant Colonel Terence J. (2006). Counterinsurgency warfare: Theory and practice, David Galula, reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Terence J. Daly, U.S. Army Reserve, Retired. Military Review, Retrieved May 11, 2007, from http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cchrp/Sewall%20-%20military%20review%2010_2006.pdf

De Young, Karen (2006, September 24). Spy agencies say Iraq war hurting U.S. terror fight. Washington Post Online, Retrieved April, 28 2007, from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/23/AR2006092301130.html

Dodge, Toby (2007). The causes of U.S. failure in Iraq. Survival, Retrieved 28 July 2007, from http://www.cfr.org/content/meetings/Iraq-Impact/49-1_06_Dodge.pdf

Dombey, Norman (2007, January 25). Iran and the bomb. London Review of Books, Retrieved May 20, 2007, from http://www.lrb.co.uk/v29/n02/print/domb01_.html

Eschel, David (2007). Assad's Alawites: Iran's missing link to Shiite Crescent? Defense Update, Retrieved May 20, 2007, from http://www.defense-update.com/newscast/1206/analysis/analysis-251206.htm

Executive Order 12333. Full Document, Retrieved April 24, 2007, from http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/execorder12333.html

Executive Order 12333. Prohibitions, Retrieved April 24, 2007, from http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/execorder12333.html#2.11

Fahil, Mohammed (2007, May 10). A Baghdad plea: U.S. should stay and fight. New York Daily News, Retrieved May 24, 2007, from http://www.nydailynews.com/opinions/2007/05/10/2007-05-10_a_baghdad_plea_us_should_stay_and_fight.html

Fallows, James (2005). Success without victory. The Atlantic Online, Retrieved April 24, 2007, from http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200501/fallows

Fireman, Ken (2007, July 27). Bombs, heat, Vietnam lessons may prolong Iraq exit. Bloomberg.com:Worldwide. Retrieved July 28, 2007 from http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aNvEVbPPFwns&refer=home

Fitchett, Joseph (2000, June 13). Assad's Alawite roots complicate power shift. International Herald Tribune, Retrieved May 19. 2007, from http://www.iht.com/articles/2000/06/13/A6_9.php

Frostic, Fred (1994), Air campaign against the Iraqi army in the Kuwait Theater of Operations. RAND. Retrieved May 24, 2007, from http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2006/MR357.pdf

Gadher, Dipesh (2007, April 22). Al-Qaeda ‘planning big British attack’. Times Online, Retrieved April 24, 2007, from http://www.timesonline.co.uk/top/news/uk/article1687360.ece

Galula, David (1963). Pacification in Algeria: 1956-1958. RAND, Retrieved May 12, 2007, from http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG478-1.pdf

Ganor, Boaz (2005). The counter-terrorism puzzle. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers

Gordon, Michael R. (2006, December 6). Early critic of Iraq war has a new message for Bush. The New York Times, Retrieved May 19, 2007, from http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/12/04/news/zinni.php

Gause, III, Gregory F. (2007, March). Saudi Arabia: Iraq, Iran, the Regional Power Balance, and the Sectarian Question. Strategic Insights, Volume VI, Issue 2, Retrieved May 20, 2007, from http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Mar/gauseMar07.asp

Hanks, Robert (2006, June 23). Rory Stewart: Days of hope and hubris. The Independent, Retrieved May 11, 2007, from http://enjoyment.independent.co.uk/books/features/article1094898.ece

Hanson, Douglas (2005, October 21). The troop strength question. American Thinker, Retrieved May 19, 2007, from http://www.americanthinker.com/2005/10/the_troop_strength_question.html

Hashim, Ahmed S. (2004). Iraq's Chaos: Why the insurgency won't go away. Boston Review: A Political and Literary Forum, Retrieved May 19, 2007, from http://bostonreview.net/BR29.5/hashim.html

Hashim, Ahmed S. (2007, March 28). Police and militants gun down Sunnis in revenge attacks. Retrieved May 19, 2007, from PBS Online NewsHour Web site: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/jan-june07/carnage_03-28.html

Hoffpauir, Chris (2007, March 30). USJFCOM gears up for Noble Resolve. News from USJFCOM, Retrieved April 24, 2007, from http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2007/pa033007.html

Homeland Security Advisory Council (2007).  Report of the future of terrorism task force, January 2007. Retrieved May 6, 2007, from http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac-future-terrorism-010107.pdf

Jenkins, Brian Michael (2006). Unconquerable nation. Retrieved April 24, 2007, from Rand Corporation Web site: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG454.pdf

Kessler, Ronald (2007, March 8). War college professors warn against Iraq pullout. NewsMax, Retrieved April, 30 2007, from http://newsmax.com/archives/articles/2007/3/7/160137.shtml

Krane, Jim (2007, May 14). Iranian leader threatens retaliation. Associated Press, Retrieved May 19, 2007, from http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070514/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iran_us

Krauthammer, Charles (2007, March 30). The 'Good War' and the 'Right War'. Real Clear Politics, Retrieved April 24, 2007, from http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/03/afghanistan_is_not_an_argument.html

LaFranchi, Howard (2002, September 10). Pakistan's leader cites risk on Iraq. Christian Science Monitor, Retrieved May 9, 2007, from http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0910/p01s02-wosc.html

Lind, William S., Nightengale (USA), Keith, Colonel, Schmitt (USMC), John F., Captain, Sutton (USA), Joseph W., Colonel, & Wilson (USMCR), Gary I. Lieutenant Colonel (1989). The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation. Marine Corps Gazette, Retrieved May 20, 2007, from http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/4th_gen_war_gazette.htm

Medalia, Jonathan (2004, September 24). Nuclear terrorism: A brief review of threats and responses. Retrieved April 27, 2007, from Federation of American Scientists Web site: http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32595.pdf

Miles, Donna (2006, February 22). 15 Years after desert storm, U.S. commitment to region continues. Retrieved April 28, 2007, from American Forces Press Service Web site: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=14792

Nagl, John S, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army; Commander, 1st Battalion, 34th Armor (2007, April). A portrait of the insurgent as a nationalist. H-Net: Humanities and Social Sciences Online, Retrieved May 19, 2007, from http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.cgi?path=113311179427701

National Intelligence Estimate: Iraq's continuing programs for weapons of mass destruction. Retrieved April 28, 2007, from Federation of American Scientists Web site: http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/iraq-wmd-nie.pdf

O'Hanlon, Michael (2002, September 8). Counting Casualties: How many people would die in an Iraqi War? Slate, Retrieved May 19, 2007, from http://www.brook.edu/views/op-ed/ohanlon/20020925.htm

Pipes, Daniel (2006, November 15). Paul Goodman, MP, analyses radical Islam. Retrieved April 24, 2007, from Daniel Pipes Weblog Web site: http://www.danielpipes.org/blog/708

Riminton, Hugh (2007, May 3). No safe way for U.S. to leave Iraq, experts warn. CNN, Retrieved May 20, 2007, from http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/05/02/iraq.scenarios/index.html

Salhani, Claude (2004, September 13). Four day war: The Iran/Israel conflagration, a history. The American Conservative, Retrieved May 20, 2007, from http://www.amconmag.com/2004_09_13/article.html

Sageman, Marc (2004) Understanding terrorist networks. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

Scheuer, Michael F. (2004). Imperial hubris: Why the West is losing the war on terrorism. Potomac Books. Potomac, Maryland.

Scowcroft, Brent (2007, January 4). Getting the Middle East back on our side. Washington Post, Retrieved May 6, 2007, from http://www.scowcroft.com/html/gettingthemiddleeast.html

Sewell, Sarah (2007, February 25). Petreaus in the field: He Wrote the Book. Can he follow it? Washington Post, Retrieved May 11, 2007, from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/23/AR2007022301741.html

Sewell, Sarah (2006). Modernizing U.S. Counterinsurgency Practice: Rethinking Risk and Developing a National Strategy. Military Review, Retrieved May 11, 2007, from http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cchrp/Sewall%20-%20military%20review%2010_2006.pdf

Shadid, Anthony, & Wright, Robin (2005). Inner Circle in Syria Holds Power, and Perhaps Peril. Washington Post Foreign Service, Retrieved May 19, 2007, from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/27/AR2005102702342_pf.html

Shaffer, Brenda (2007, April 25). 'Shiite Crescent' might not be what it seems. Baltimore Times, Retrieved May 19, 2007, from http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bal-op.shiites25apr25,0,4808576.story?coll=bal-oped-headlines

Shaw, Alan (2001, October 2001). Protecting the United States. Retrieved April 27, 2007, from Public STINET Web site: http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA457801&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

Stewart, Brian (1991, February 27). The liberation of Kuwait. Retrieved May 1, 2007, from 1991 Gulf War: CBC Archives Web site: http://archives.cbc.ca/IDC-1-71-593-3126/conflict_war/gulf_war/clip13

Stewart, Rory (2005). Losing the South. Prospect Magazine, Retrieved May 11, 2007, from http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article_details.php?id=7111

Strock, LTC Charles A (1992, November 6). The Gulf war: The politics of coalition warfare. Retrieved May 1, 2007, from National Defense University Archives Web site: http://www.ndu.edu/library/n3/93-E-020.pdf

Schwartz, Lowell H., & Michaels, Jeff (2005). Exiting Iraq. RAND News & Events, Retrieved May 12, 2007, from http://www.rand.org/commentary/082905UPI.html.

Taheri, Amir (2003, April 9). Freedom & Dignity: Iraqis get a taste. Retrieved May 19, 2007, from NRO Review Online Web site: http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-taheri040903.asp

Tenet, George (2007). At the center of the storm: My years at the CIA. Harper Collins Publishers, New York, NY.

Terrill, W. Andrew, & Crane, Conrad C. (2005). Precedents, variables and options in planning a U.S. military disengagement strategy from Iraq. Strategic Studies Institute Publications, Retrieved April 30, 2007, from http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB627.pdf.

Telvick, Marlena (2005, January, 25). Al Qaeda today: The new face of global Jihad. Frontline, Retrieved April 19, 2007, from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/front/etc/today.html

U.S. Central Command (2007, January). CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). Retrieved May 24, from http://www.centcom.mil/sites/uscentcom2/Misc/centcom_aor.aspx

U.S. Department of Defense, Final Report to Congress, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, April 1992, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office

USJFCOM Public Affairs, (2007). Noble resolve. Retrieved April 24, 2007, from About USJFCOM Web site: http://www.jfcom.mil/about/facts_prt/Noble%20Resolve.pdf

Weiner, Tim (1996, September 7). Iraqi offensive into Kurdish Zone disrupts U.S. plot to oust Hussein. New York Times, p. A1, A4.

Wicker, Tom (1965, July 23). Washington: The Bay of Pigs and Vietnam. New York Times, p. A28.

Wolk, Martin (2006, March 17). Cost of Iraq war could surpass $1 trillion. MSNBC, Retrieved May 24, 2007, from http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11880954/

Xuequan, Mu (2007, April 15). Ahmadinejad: Iran's nuclear activities "legal and peaceful". China View, Retrieved May 19, 2007, from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-05/16/content_6105036.htm

Yehiav, Ayellet 2007, March 11. The Anti-Iranian front: Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, Vol 11, No. 1, Retrieved May 19, 2007, from http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2007/issue1/jv11no1a2.html

Yingling, Paul, Lieutenant Colonel (2007, May 11). A failure in generalship. Armed Forces Journal, Retrieved May 20, 2007, from http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/05/2683230

© Copyright, E. R. Anders
22 July 2007 , All Rights Reserved