H I S T O R Y
BEFORE WWII	DURING WWII	1944 BILL ILES	1944 CURTIS PARTCH	1947 ED SPILMAN	1950 - 1951 GENE WOOLIEVER	1951 - 1969	1970 - 1989	1990 - 1994	HISTORY COMES ALIVE

World War II Part 1

Victory in the Marshalls paved the way to Tokyo

There were many bombs dropped during World War II. But few were as devastating to the Japanese as the one Admiral Chester Nimitz dropped on Dec. 6, 1943, when he proposed a radical revision of Operation Flintlock, the invasion of the Marshalls. Nimitz’s Central Pacific commanders recoiled in shock. Nimitz proposed to abandon their plans to take Maloelap and Wotje. Instead, he wanted to concentrate the forces for a strike at the heart of the Marshalls, Kwajalein Atoll. Most of the Pacific commanders opposed the bold new plan. They feared it was too risky to strike deep inside the perimeter of the Marshalls with several powerful bases and hundreds of airplanes within striking range.

Nimitz overrules others

Nimitz felt that carrier forces and land-based fighters and bombers from the Gilberts could eliminate Japanese air power. Kwajalein would be easier to take. And, with the world’s largest lagoon, would make a better staging base for future operations. Nimitz will prevail, and 50 years ago, with the most powerful invasion forces, seized Kwajalein Atoll. Considered by military historians as the most successful amphibious operation, the invasion of the Marshall Islands, code named Operation Flintlock, served as the model for future operations in the pacific and paved the road to Tokyo.

The Japanese expected to be attacked in the Marshalls, but not at Kwajalein, which was not as heavily defended as bases at Wotje, Maloelap, Mili, and Jaluit, a big payoff for striking at the center instead of the perimeter.

Significant operation

Operation Flintlock was one of the most significant operations in the Pacific Campaign. The seizure of the Kwajalein Atoll was the first capture of Japanese pre-war territory. It pierced the Japanese defense perimeter. It took strategic control of the Marshalls away from the Japanese. It severed Japanese lines of communication. It shortened the pacific campaign. Loss of American life was less than one percent.

Masterful planning, naval and air superiority, and heavy preliminary bombing characterized the operation. American forces assaulted Majuro, which was undefended, on Jan. 30, 1944, one day prior to the invasion. Two weeks after the seizure of Kwajalein Atoll, American forces captured Eniwetok.

Left to wither

Waiting for reinforcements that never came and continuously harassed by air raids, the remaining garrisons in the Marshalls were bypassed and left isolated, powerless, and doomed to "wither on the vine." With their eastern flank penetrated, the Japanese could not hold the Bismarks, Solomons, or New Guinea.

Ahead of schedule

Land-based air raids and reconnaissance flights enabled the neutralization and bypassing of Truk and allowed American forces to seize the Marianas and Philippines well ahead of schedule. The war was shortened and many American lives were saved. Many Japanese garrisons slated for invasion were effectively neutralized and bypassed. The drive through the Pacific was accelerated, and the seizure of the Marianas was advanced six to 12 months. The Marianas brought Japan within range of American B29s and the final blows to end the war.

A History of the strategy leading up to the invasion of the Marshalls

Strategic planning in the Pacific started at the turn of the 20th century with the American acquisition of distant possessions in the Pacific. In 1904, following Japan’s attack on Russia, Lt. Gen. Chaffee, Army Chief of Staff, proposed that the recently formed Joint Board (of the Army and Navy) provide war plans involving cooperation between the Navy and the Army in the event of war. That request gave rise to the color plans- a series of war plans designated as a specific color corresponding to a specific nation. The Orange plans, contingency plans for war with Japan, were reviewed and revised up through the ‘20s and ‘30s. They called for an assault through the Central Pacific. Military planners studied the Orange plans and applied them to their strategy in the Central Pacific campaign.

More than one color

The advent of the Axis coalition gave rise to another series of war plans, based on multiple nations- the Rainbow plans, Rainbow 5 called for alliance with Britain and outlined the American/British objectives at the outbreak of the war. It called for the Central Pacific offense to take a back seat to the war with Germany. The campaigns in the Pacific would be primarily defensive, with limited offenses until Germany was defeated. The defense of Australia and New Zealand was vital. Japan’s early success in the war invalidated the Rainbow 5 plan’s fundamental strategy and postponed the offensive provisions in the Pacific. Japan had weakened the U.S. Pacific Fleet, snatched the Philippines, Wake, Guam, the Gilberts, Malaya, Burma, and the Netherlands Indies, and advanced into New Guinea and the Solomons close to Australia.

Two great commands

On March 30, 1942, the Joint Chiefs organized the Pacific theater into two commands-the Southwest Pacific under Gen. Douglas MacArthur in Australia and the Pacific Ocean Area under Nimitz in Hawaii. The primary mission of the two commands was to defend communication lines between the U.S. and Australia, contain the Japanese, and prepare for amphibious offensives. In early 1942 the U.S. sent a substantial number of forces to Australia.

Time to strike

By the middle of 1942, Japan had overextended herself and was defeated at Midway and in the Coral Sea. Crippled by the loss of four aircraft carriers and hundreds of planes, the Japanese fleet no longer advanced. The time was ripe for the Allies to take the offensive.

Pacific forces began their advance through the Solomons and New Guinea and halted Japan’s southward expansion. At the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, Adm. Ernest King and Gen. George Marshall persuaded the British to keep offensive pressure on the Japanese in the Central Pacific by utilizing resources already available in the Pacific and not hurting the primary offensive in Europe. Offensive pressure in the south would also help keep Australia and New Zealand secure.

Trident Conference

On May 11, 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff met at the Trident Conference to re-examine the Pacific Strategy. They proposed a Central Pacific offense, which included the Marshalls. The Central Pacific offensive, as opposed to the southern route leading to the Philippines preferred by MacArthur, was shorter and more direct. It did not require as many troops and supplies, utilized the U.S. Fleet to its best advantage, and would isolate Japan from her overseas empire.

Battle-tested troops

By the end of May 1943, American war planners had proposed the invasion of the Marshalls for October. However, the assault required two divisions of "battle-tested shock troops with amphibious training" since it would be the first U.S. assault against a fortified atoll. The only qualified troops available were the 1st Marine Division in the South Pacific. Transferring those troops would deprive those regions of their only amphibious divisions with combat experience and presented several political and military risks. The Joint planners and JCS agreed that MacArthur’s campaign should not be interrupted, but concluded that the Central Pacific drive could be launched anyway. The Joint War Plans Committee was ordered to prepare a plan to assault the Marshalls for November or December.

Not an easy task

The committee had to produce a plan that would not interrupt MacArthur’s operation. Yet they required his troops for an invasion of the Marshalls. Unable to solve the problem, they presented a new plan that called for seizure of the Gilberts as an alternate course of action. The Joint Chefs agreed to assault the Gilberts in November 1943, as a prelude to a drive in the Marshalls. Seizure of the Gilberts would require fewer troops and would provide air bases to be used in strikes against the Marshalls and Carolines.

Lessons learned

The seizure of Tarawa validated American amphibious doctrine. But casualties were high. American planners had underestimated the strength of the Japanese island fortress. The naval artillery couldn’t penetrate the concrete and steel bunkers overlaid with coral and coconut logs. Preliminary naval and air bombardment was inadequate. Most Japanese weapons were still operational when the men reached the shore. Tactical and logistical deficiencies also hampered the assault. In addition, hydrographic information was inadequate.

The battle at Tarawa tested an amphibious doctrine that had never been used, and the lessons learned would be applied to Kwajalein. The experience gained at Tarawa, coupled with the expansion of U.S. arms in the Pacific, made the almost perfect amphibious operation at Kwajalein possible.

Operation Flintlock—Southern Kwajalein Atoll

Fifty years ago, U.S. forces undertook one of the most complicated campaigns in military history-the assault and capture of major Japanese naval and air bases in the Marshall Islands. Out of the battles, which involved landings on 30 islands, arose a new and highly successful mode of amphibious warfare that sped the end of World War II.

Jan. 30, 1944

Kwajalein Island lies battered and burning tonight after two days of pulverizing naval bombardment and intensive bombing and strafing by land- and carrier-based planes. The fires of destruction on Japan’s principal naval base in the Marshalls are visible to men of the 7th Infantry Division (the "Hourglass Division"), veteran troops who wait for D-Day aboard vessels of the Southern Attack Force. Roi and Namur islands, center of Japan’s air power in the Marshalls, are under attack from planes and ships of the Northern Attack Force, while men of the 4th Marine Division, not yet tried in battle, also wait for D-Day.

This afternoon, the battleships Massachusetts, Indiana, and Washington pounded Kwajalein with 1,000 rounds of 16-inch ammunition-an average of one 250-pound shell every 15 seconds of the four-hour bombardment. The attacks on Kwajalein, Roi, and Namur began early yesterday. Though weather was squally and skies were overcast, planes from the carriers Cowpens, Montery, and Bunker Hill, positioned southwest of Kwajalein, took off an hour before sunrise for the first bombing run on Kwajaleins airfield and nearby buildings. Despite intense and accurate anti aircraft fire, the bombing and strafing continued over the entire island throughout the day.

At Roi and Namur, planes from the carriers Essex, Intrepid, and Cabot began their assault at dawn dropping 2,000-pound bombs on runways and scoring numerous hits on hangars, fuel dumps, and gun positions. Ninety-two Japanese aircraft were based on Roi, but U.S. planes at once gained command of the air, and after 0800, no Japanese planes were seen airborne. B-25s, flying from bases in the Gilbert Islands, joined in the attack to drop 23 tons of bombs on Kwajalein and 15 tons on Roi.

Jan. 31, 1944

After a series of highly successful amphibious landings, American troops are ashore tonight on four small islands near Kwajalein and on five islets flanking Roi and Namur. They are tightening the noose on these two major Japanese strongholds in the Marshalls. Every objective was gained, with U.S. casualties classified as very light. In actions today around Kwajalein Island (code name, Porcelain), U.S. troops captured Enubuj (Carlson), Ennylabegan (Carlos), Gea (Carter), and Ninni (Cecil) islands, and brought Gea Pass under U.S. control. American casualties were one dead, two wounded.

Forty-eight 105mm howitzers have been set up on Enubuj and are harassing Kwajalein, as heavier 155mm funs are rapidly being landed. The naval bombardment of Kwajalein defenses continues, and destroyer Wall is delivering harassing fire on Ebeye (Burton), Japan’s chief seaplane base in the Marshalls. It is known to harbor several hundred Japanese troops.

At the northern end of the atoll, the 25th Regimental Combat Team of the 4th Marine Division has secured five islets near Roi and Namur at a cost of 18 American dead, eight missing, and 40 wounded. Artillery has been established ashore, and North Pass is safe for the passage of ships.

As night falls, fresh landing troops are poised for tomorrow’s strikes against Kwajalein, Roi, and Namur, the main objectives of this invasion.

The action today began at dawn, when battleships Pennsylvania and Mississippi began firing on the western end of Kwajalein Island. By 0830, Enubuj, Ennylabegan, Kwajalein, Ebeye, and South Gugeegue (Beverly) were being systematically raked by the fire of four battleships, three cruisers, and four destroyers.

In preparation for landings by the 17th Regimental Combat Team on Enubuj and Ennylabegan, more than 2,000 rounds of 5-inch shells were poured on the two islands. Twenty-one tons of bombs and 50,000 rounds of .50 caliber ammunition were expended by 51 escort carrier planes in bombing and strafing runs.

U.S. troops captured Enubuj at noon, taking 20 prisoners after very light resistance. Within an hour, divisional artillery began coming ashore, and by 1800 the howitzers were registered on Kwajalein.

Opposed only by a few Japanese firing light rifles and automatic weapons, the 17th RCT captured Ennylabegan by 1300 without a single American casualty. Organization began immediately to set up supply dumps and repair stations.

The landing on Gea was made shortly after dawn by B Troop, a provisional unit made up of men of the 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop and Co B., 111th Infantry. After a short fight, the island was secured at 0930. Twenty-two Japanese were killed and one taken prisoner. American losses were one killed and one wounded.

Ninni, which, with Gea, guards an important entrance to the lagoon, was captured by A Troop at 1230 hours. The men first mistakenly landed on Gehh, next island northwest of Ninni, after fighting strong currents and off-shore winds in their rubber landing craft. The error was discovered after a brief reconnaissance, during which four Japanese were killed and two taken prisoner. When troops proceeded to Ninni, they found it unoccupied and took possession at once.

A unique part of today’s operation was the use, for the first time in the Pacific, of an underwater demolition team. At 1000 hours and again at 1600, this team worked its way within 300 yards of the beach at the western end of Kwajalein Island, where U.S. forces will land tomorrow. They were searching for underwater obstacles and anti-boat mines.

As light faded this evening, troops of the 32nd and 18th RCTs of the 7th Infantry moved from transports to LVTs. They are scheduled to make the initial landing on Kwajalein Island in the morning.

On to Feb 1st

H I S T O R Y
BEFORE WWII	DURING WWII	1944 BILL ILES	1944 CURTIS PARTCH	1947 ED SPILMAN	1950 - 1951 GENE WOOLIEVER	1951 - 1969	1970 - 1989	1990 - 1994	HISTORY COMES ALIVE