Irish
National
Liberation Army
(BY SWIFTY )
In a wide ranging and frank interview the INLA spells out exactly the circumstances surrounding the execution of Official IRA Member Jim Flynn, the use of informers by the RUC and divisions within the INLA.
With regard to the killing of Jim Flynn, it was pointed out that it was not a part of a feud with the Official IRA. They state that the action against Flynn was finally decided on "after we were informed by former members of the Officials, that he had murdered Seamus Costello."
Asked as to whether Flynn was acting as a maverick, the INLA said that "we
have no doubt that the instigators of Costello's murder still held rank within
the Workers Party. On the issues of informers the INLA view the whole process
as just another
attempt by the RUC to put anti-imperialist activists behind bars. In particular,
it says "the whole thing was started by Prior to pave the way for his 'initiative'
of rolling devolution."
In fact it states that "operations have intensified in the time the informers
came to prominence."
(In a seperate statement the INLA has supplied the Starry Plough with a list of operations carried out in recent months.)
Turning to the question of internal divisions, the INLA admit that while some divisions did exist, these have now been resolved and it is united and determined to carry out on and escalate the struggle against British Imperialism.
Throughout the INLA representative was at pains to point out that the forces of National Liberation can never be defeated in Ireland. The British Administration fail to comprehend the nature, strength and determination of the people who oppose the oppression and presence in Ireland.
Far from 'reeling' as Prior puts it, the INLA appears united, optimistic, and aware of the tasks it has to carry out.
Foreword
General Headquarters of the INLA rarely gives interviews. However, several topics are in such need of clarification that a representative of GHQ Staff agreed to an interview with the Starry Plough. In the following interview, we discuss with the INLA leadership the shooting of Jim Flynn, informers in the North and divisions within the INLA.
SP:
There has been a lot of media attention regarding the shooting of Jim Flynn
and the role of the Official IRA. What is your position on the Flynn shooting?
INLA:
First of all, let me make perfectly clear that the execution of Jim Flynn is
not part of a feud between the Workers Party/Official IRA and the INLA. Our
action against Flynn took place after we were informed by former members of
the Officials that he had murdered Seamus Costello. The ex-Officials who passed
on this information are basically Republicans, and they left the Workers Party
at the time of the hunger strike because they realised that their party did
not represent their own political beliefs. They were particularly disturbed
about the murder of Costello both because of his impeccable anti-imperialist
credentials and because of the circumstances surrounding his death.
SP:
What were the circumstances surrounding Costello's death?
INLA:
Well by this I mean the fact that Seamus Costello was shot years after a reconciliation
and truce had been reached between the INLA and the Official IRA. After the
murder of Costello, the Officials violated all of the usual Republican procedures
and the traditions. Instead of admitting their role in the murder, the Officials
assured us that none of their members were involved and that we were certainly
entitled to take action against the guilty
party. By saying this the Officials' leadership effectively set up Jim Flynn.
Even after Flynn was executed the Workers Party made claims to the press that he was a member of the IRSP, and denied any involvement.
SP:
So it is not true that Flynn acted on his own when he shot Costello?
INLA:
Of course not. The claim of Jim Flynn after the execution confirmed our suspicions,
based on our sources of information that he was acting under orders as a member
of the Official IRA. We have no doubt that the instigators of Costello's murder
still hold ranking positions within the Workers Party.
SP:
What, then is your attitude to the Workers Party/ Official IRA?
INLA:
Well of course we have serious political and tactical differences with the leadership
of the Officials. But we want to make it clear to the honest socialists and
anti-imperialists in that organisation that we had no intention of attacking
them or feuding with them. However, we must emphasise that we cannot sit back
and allow members of our movement to be murdered by a gang of thugs and reactionaries.
If there is now to be a feud, which unfortunately is possible, the responsibility
does not lie with us - it lies with the leadership of the Officials. Our volunteers
would rather die protecting our right to exist and to fight British imperialism,
than to be shot dead in our beds by the likes of the Official IRA and their
loyalist cohorts.
We know that the Official IRA, which is well armed, would turn its guns against those of us who are fighting for a Socialist Republic.
We have definite proof that the Officials, besides the Costello killing, were involved and are involved in providing intelligence to the loyalist death squads, and it was exactly such intelligence that was responsible for the deaths of Miriam Daly, Ronnie Bunting and Noel Little.
Their decision to murder Costello, and to help in the murder of other leaders of the INLA and the IRSP, is definitely a political decision to try to wipe us out as a force for socialism. This will not happen.
We would encourage socialists and anti-imperialists within the Official movement to carefully reassess the position of their party, and to take the obvious step of joining us in our struggle against British terrorism and foreign imperialism.
SP:
Turning away from the Flynn shooting, we have been told that informers have
been a major problem both to the INLA and the IRA over the past year or so.
How has this affected the INLA?
INLA:
Informers litter Irish history and leave a bad taste in-anyone's mouth. But
in the present case, what happened is not so much that the informers told everything
that they knew, but rather that the RUC broke weak and disoriented men and instructed
them to say untrue things. The informers became a sort of ball in the middle
of the RUC's plans to frame activists they had wanted to put in jail for years.
Informers did exist and they provided a serious internal security setback but there is more to it than that.
SP:
How did the informers affect operations of the INLA?
INLA:
Well of course the likes of Prior have made statements to the effect that the
IRA and ourselves are 'reeling'. This could be no further from the truth. Our
operations have intensified in the time after informers came into prominence.
We have carried out operations in Derry, South Derry, Magherafelt and many other areas where we previously were not prominent. Our operations in Belfast have continued apace, and we are certain that the INLA is made up of dedicated volunteers who will never be beaten.
SP:
What do you mean more to it?
INLA:
For a start, we relieve the use of informers by the RUC was a well thought out
and systematic attempt to put away as many anti-imperialist activists as they
could.
It was a political decision taken at the top levels of government, and we think particularly that the whole thing was instigated by Prior to pave the way for his 'initiative' of devolved government. He wanted all opposition to his plan of a return to Stormont off the streets and behind bars. Let me just finish by saying that you can rest assured that in the coming months Prior and the whole British war machine will discover that the OM is alive and well and more determined than ever.
SP:
Finally, we have heard a lot in the press over the past year about 'Republican
feuds' and splits within the INLA. Can you explain the nature of these divisions?
INLA:
Let me say first that after intensive discussions and serious political analysis
any divisions which did exist in the INLA have now been sorted out.
I would not like to make accusations about or identify scapegoats for the divisions which existed in the INLA over the past months.. To do so would merely open old wounds and obstruct us in building a movement that is able to fight effectively for socialism in this country. In this context I must clarify certain things.
First of all, there were certain reports that referred to a so-called 'split' between the army and the party. This was never the case. If there were 'factions' within our movement they were not so easily defined. The army never attacked the party.
Second, claims that a faction of the army in Belfast were 'mad gunmen' who felt that 'politics comes only from the barrel of a gun' were and are untrue. As a revolutionary army, we realise that military action without political awareness is as useless as a gun with damp ammunition.
SP:
Why would such a misunderstanding arise in the first place?
INLA:
Possibly it came out of the fervour that surrounded the hunger strike in the
North. The circumstances of impending deaths threw up a sense of urgency which
was recognised by the INLA, and we acted on this sense of urgency.
Perhaps our militant fervour, and our desire to attack the enemy unceasingly was mistaken by some as a lack of political awareness, but the increased demands of the people during this period made military action both necessary and popular.
SP:
And is such militant action now outdated since the hunger strike is over?
INLA:
Certainly not. We made gains and established bases during the past year. As
long as the British presence remains it is our duty to continue to in"
tensify the armed struggle. This is also why unity of our movement is now so
vital.
SP:
And what is the attitude of the army toward the political party, the IRSP?
INLA:
We believe in the necessity of the IRSP as a political party, to provide the
most coherent analysis of imperialism in Ireland in order to organise the people
effectively. Along with the IRSP we have a common revolutionary strategy and
an awareness of the needs of the Irish people. We fully support the IRSP.
