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REPUBLIC OF CHECHNYA
Land area: The land area is disputed.
Population: 750,000-950,000 (1996 estimate)
President: Aslan Maskhadov.
Head of interim Russian administration: Akhmed-Haji Kadyrov
Overview:
The main dispute is whether Chechnya should remain part of the Russian Federation. The country remains unrecognised by most of the outside world, although relations were established with some former Soviet republics and Middle Eastern States. Chechnya maintained trading relations with a wider range of states.
Language:
The Chechen and Ingush languages are closely related and are both of the Veinakh Caucasian group. In March 1992, it was decreed that Chechen would switch from the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet. Many people still speak Russian, especially those who lived in exile in Central Asia.
Cultural Religious Differences:
The Chechen and Ingush are by tradition Sunni Muslims. Sufi influence is strong. Although Islam came relatively late, being introduced from Dagestan in the 17th century, the Chechens and Ingush fiercely resisted Russian and, later, communist attempts to suppress Sufism. Jihads were declared against Bolshevik rule. Deported to central Asia in 1944, the Chechens and Ingush retained their faith and, when they returned to the Caucasus after 1957, Sufism remained more powerful than official Islam. The KGB made repeated efforts to stamp out unofficial Islam but the tight clan and family structure of society meant that people still lived by sharia or traditional tribal law. With only seven official mosques in the later Soviet era, religious practice took place in private homes. It was not until 1990 that mosques and Koranic schools reopened in villages.
Although there was a religious colouring to politics and the independence movement,
Chechnya has not implemented Islamic rule in practise. Former president Dudayev's
statements veered between declarations that the state would remain secular and
would be a bridge between the Muslim and Christian worlds, to calls for an Islamic
regime. Some tensions persist between followers of the Qadiri Sufi brotherhood
in the lowlands and those of the Naqshbandi Sufi brotherhood in the mountains.
The Russian minority is of Orthodox Christian background, and had limited opportunities
to practise, but the upheavals have led to a large Russian exodus.
President Aslan Maskhadov:
A child of the Chechen diaspora, the result of Stalin's forced resettlement of the entire people in 1944, Aslan Alievich Maskhadov was born in Kazakhstan in 1951. On leaving school, he joined the army, graduating from the Tbilisi Higher Artillery College in 1972. He went on to command a regiment, before being posted as a Colonel to the Lithuanian capital Vilnius. There his forces took part in the military suppression of local nationalists. It was also in the Baltic Military District that Maskhadov developed his contacts with fellow Chechen Dzhokar Dudayev.
In 1992, after Dudayev had established his secessionist Chechen state, Maskhadov joined him. He became the rebels' Chief of Staff in December 1993. Maskhadov rose as a political as much as military figure. He played a part in the summer 1995 talks with the federal authorities and, following the assassination of Dudayev in April 1996, further negotiations in Nazran in June 1996 and Novye Atagi in June and July. He signed the Khasavyurt Accords for the rebels in August and then became Prime Minister of the interim government in October 1996, before being elected with 59 per cent of the vote in January 1997.
Akhmed Kadyrov:
Akhmed Kadyrov is the Mufti, or senior Islamic cleric in Chechnya. He was born in the village of Tsentoroi, east of Grozny. A relatively moderate Muslim, although tough and outspoken, he supported the independent Chechen state proclaimed by former leader Djokar Dudayev and the resistance to the Russian invasion of 1994-96. However, as Chechen President Maskhadov proved unwilling or unable to limit radical Islamic militias, especially Wahhabists, Kadyrov found himself becoming increasingly isolated and at risk. He became a target for the Wahhabists, whom he in turn denounced in ever-stronger terms. In recent years, he has been the target of at least seven assassination attempts.
In 1999 he finally broke with the Maskhadov regime when he negotiated the bloodless surrender of the city of Gudermes to the invading Russians. The Maskhadov regime condemned him to death as a traitor. Kadyrov still retains considerable religious and moral authority within Chechnya, ironically in part precisely because of his resistance to Wahhabism. Many Chechens, even within the resistance, are uncomfortable with their ultra-Islamic stance and the influx of non-Chechen fighters to their ranks.
Kadyrov was appointed as head of the temporary administration in the republic in mid-2000, effectively making him the Moscow-sanctioned leader of the Chechen republic.
Conflict in Chechnya:
Historical Overview:
The area of the North Caucasus inhabited by the Chechen and Ingush was conquered by the Russian Empire in 1859. The conquest was fiercely resisted with the active involvement of the Sufi brotherhoods.
A short-lived North Caucasian Emirate was crushed and the Bolsheviks occupied the area in 1920, although resistance continued for another decade. Autonomous regions were created for the Chechens in 1922 and for the Ingush in 1924. These were later combined and in 1936 the region was upgraded to an autonomous republic. Attempts were made to crush Islam.
A major revolt broke out in 1940 and in 1942 the revolt's leader Hasan Israilov issued a declaration stating that the people would welcome the Germans only if they were prepared to recognise Chechen-Ingush independence. For revenge, Stalin ordered the deportation of all Chechen and Ingush nationals to central Asia as `nations of betrayers' in 1994, although the area had not been invaded by the Germans. Russians and Ukrainians were resettled.
In 1957, the Chechens and Ingush were allowed to return and a new autonomous republic was named. They were allowed certain concessions, including the right to trade and own land which led to the growth of a powerful business network throughout the Soviet Union.
Deteriorating relations with Russia:
Russia's President Yeltsin had already opposed moves towards independence and decreed a state of emergency in late 1991, despatching a small force to Grozny. This was so small that the Chechens prevented them leaving the airport. Two days later the Russian Duma overturned Yeltsin's decision to use troops and they were withdrawn. However, 70,000 volunteers from within Chechnya and from the North Caucasus arrived in Grozny to fight the Russians and there was political backing from other former Soviet republics and Middle Eastern states.
Russian backing for the opposition to Dudayev, combined with growing crime and instability, led to a coup attempt at the end of March 1992, when pro-Russian rebels seized TV and radio stations. After two deaths, popular support for the coup evaporated and the attempt ended, aided by mediation from Sufi leaders.
Dudayev's defiance of President Yeltsin persisted, to the intense annoyance of the Kremlin. Throughout 1994, the Yeltsin regime tried to unseat Dudayev by actively backing local clan leaders who opposed the former air force general. Russian money, cut off to the rebel republic in 1991, began to flow into the coffers of Umar Avturkhanov, a former communist official who controlled the town of Znamenskoye in Nadterechny District. In August 1994, Avturkhanov set up a provisional council which was envisaged to be the post-Dudayev regime. Despite Russian supplies of cash and weapons and some popular support, Avturkhanov failed to make much headway outside his home territory.
In divided Chechnya, Dudayev also faced opposition from former Russian parliamentary speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov, from an influential Chechen clan, as well as from a local gangster Ruslan Labazanov. Armed clashes between faction members increased.
Russian patience with Dudayev and the lack of success of the Provisional Council ran out at the end of 1994. Senior Russian military leaders, including the then defence minister Pavel Grachev, visited the North Caucasus in November 1994 to prepare the ground for the Russian invasion.
With the command based in Mozdok in North Ossetia, Russian Army, Interior Ministry and special forces invaded on 11 December 1994 from three directions in a combined operation.
Russia's First Military Operation against Chechnya (1994-1996):
The Russian military operation into Chechnya was launched on 11 December 1994 following President Yeltsin's decision to set up a task force to disarm the `illegal armed bands' and restore `constitutional government' in Chechnya.
From the start, Yeltsin's action was criticised and condemned by the Russian parliament, senior officers in the Russian Defence Ministry, the Russian public, many Western leaders and world opinion. The president was, however, supported by a narrow hardline clique within the Security Council and the government, including the then foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev and finance minister Boris Fedorov who voiced doubts regarding Grachev's professional judgement and ability.
Despite the uproar at home and abroad, President Yeltsin claimed justification for his decision to eliminate the allegedly ``corrupt, criminal and unconstitutional regime'' of President Dudayev by military means with reference to the threat to the internal integrity (tselinost) of the Russian state. There was the need to eradicate what the Russian power ministries regarded as the brooding ground of organised crime and state terrorism following a series of spectacular raids and hijacks by Chechen `bandits' throughout 1993 and 1994.
Finally, Yeltsin claimed there were strong economic arguments: oil and the strategic road and rail communications south to the Transcaucasus and beyond. In the end, these factors outweighed the lessons of history and endangered Russia's fragile relationship with the other neighbouring North Caucasian peoples. The decision also appeared to ignore the hidden dangers of embarking on a winter campaign in hostile terrain with an untried, hastily assembled scratch force.
The Chechnya military operation was co-ordinated by the Joint Command of Groupings of Forces of the Russian Federation in Chechnya from its headquarters in Mozdok. The Joint Command comprised units and formations from the Ministry of Defence, Ministry for Internal Affairs, Federal Counter-intelligence Service (Federal Security Service) and OMON elements. Later, units from the construction troops and railway troops were moved into the area of military operations to carry out essential reconstruction work. Initially, Russian forces in Chechnya were initially estimated to be 10,000-15,000 strong - they later increased to around 35,000.
Between December 1994 and July 1995, control of the Joint Command changed five times, dictated by the course of operations and periodic top-level reassessment of the role of Russian forces in Chechnya. By March 1995 Colonel General Anatoly Kulikov became commander of Russian troops in Chechnya - his appointment provided the first indication that Russia believed a military victory was in sight, and operations would be scaled down accordingly.
The initial plan of attack was for three columns (groups) to converge on Grozny: Northern - commanded by Lieutenant General Lev Rokhlin; Western, commanded by Major General Ivan Babich; and Southeastern, commanded by Lieutenant General Vladimir Popov. Stubborn opposition by Chechen fighters, supported by the local population, stalled the advance from the west and southeast. Given the embarrassing military stalemate, the General Staff decided to draft into the area of operations elements of the three naval infantry divisions located respectively with the Northern, Pacific and Baltic fleets.
Apart from local opposition, from the beginning things went wrong with the Chechnya operation, causing consternation and widespread caustic criticism from senior wartime veterans angered by images of the bodies of young soldiers and officers `rotting on the streets of Grozny'. The Russian Defence Ministry put a brave face on matters, with repeated claims of victory. It endowed the operation with an aura of glory in defence of the Homeland, with some 20 awards of `Hero of the Russian Federation', and over 5,000 other decorations for bravery - many posthumous.
The March-April 1995 withdrawals implied that responsibility for internal security had devolved to the rapid reaction special purpose division of the internal troops of the Ministry for Internal Affairs under the control of Lieutenant General Anatoly Shkirko, units of the FSB and OMON.
Following the fall of Grozny in late January 1995 and the occupation of the remaining larger towns by Russian forces, and with the remnants of the Chechen fighters being pounded and hounded into submission amid the foothills of the Caucasus, it was widely expected that Dudayev's supporters would turn their anger on the defenceless Russian population.
On 14 June 1995, Shamil Basayev, a 30-year-old Chechen rebel commander (who had fought on the Abkhaz side during fighting in Georgia in 1992), led a band of Chechens in seizing a large group of hostages in the southern Russian town of Budennovsk. More than 140 hostages were killed before the Russian authorities eventually allowed the rebels safe passage to the mountains of southern Chechnya.
A fourth senior security organ, the Federal Border Troops Command, was swift to deny any responsibility for laxity demonstrated by border post officials in allowing Shamil Basayev's group to proceed on to Budennovsk.
The war continued into 1996 with an attack on the town of Kizlyar, led by Chechen rebel `Lone Wolf' Salman Raduyev. However, on 31 March of that year, Boris Yeltsin announced a new peace plan. With presidential elections pending, Yeltsin was keen to secure peace. An opinion poll by the All-Russian Centre for Public Opinion stated that the electorate considered an end to the fighting in Chechnya their highest priority.
The peace plan included an implicit acceptance of the need to offer Chechnya a high decree of autonomy with the creation of a `Chechen Federation' within the Russian Federation. The plan also envisaged an amnesty for rebels, allowing them to lay down their weapons and return home. Dudayev's death in April 1996 was seen by the Russian leadership as a setback to the peace process. Dudayev, whose position as leader of the Chechen rebels was coming under threat, believed by early 1996 that his best strategy was to negotiate. His successor, Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, was not perceived by the Russians to be a strong enough leader to enforce a common policy of negotiation. However, a ceasefire and prisoner exchange was agreed between Yandarbiyev and President Yeltsin on 27 May 1996.
Although the deal may have proved to have been a timely political expedient for President Yeltsin in the run up to the presidential elections, the peace was broken by heavy fighting near Grozny in July. Perhaps of greater concern to President Yeltsin were two attacks on Moscow trolleybuses, also in July, claimed to have been masterminded by Salam Raduyev.
In August 1996, though, Alexander Lebed was able to conclude a peace accord with Rebel leader Maskhadov. Although Lebed was sacked from the Russian government soon thereafter, these `Khasavyurt Accords' proved a sufficient basis for a withdrawal of Russian troops and an uneasy truce between the two sides. The new Chechen government in turn agreed to suspend any decision on independence until 2001 and restore law and order to the region. More than 50,000 Chechens died during the conflict, and at least 160,000 lived as refugees abroad.
Significant Dates:
1944 Entire Chechen people deported to Siberia and Kazakhstan: 200,000
died in the process.
1956 Chechens allowed to return home.
1991 President Dudayev declared independence for Chechen-Ingushetian
Republic.
1992 Chechnya and Ingushetia split: political and armed disputes arose
between the two.
1993 Moscow continued covert campaign to destabilise Dudayev regime.
1994 Russian forces launched full-scale invasion of Chechnya.
1995 War continued; rebels launched cross-border incursion to Budennovsk
(Stavropol Territory) (June).
1996 War continued. Rebels launched raid on Kizlyar and Pervomaiskoye
in Dagestan (March). Dudayev was killed by a Russian attack (April). Dudayev's
successor, Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, agreed to meet Boris Yeltsin and signed a
ceasefire agreement (May). Peace accord concluded with Lebed (July).
1997 Aslan Maskhadov elected Chechen president (January).
1998 Russian Presidential Representative to Chechnya kidnapped (May).
State of emergency declared (June). Assassination attempt on Maskhadov (July).
State of Emergency declared (December).
1999 Russian general, Shpigun, kidnapped (March). Russian forces launch
cross-border strikes against Chechen rebels (June). Reinvasion of Chechnya by
Russian troops (September).
2000 Vladimir Putin elected President of Russia (March). Suicide attacks
kill and injure hundreds of Russian soldiers (June). Putin imposed direct rule
upon Chechnya (June).
2001 Rudnik Dudayev (former KGB) named as deputy to Chechen administration
(February). Kadyrov approved structure of future Chechen government (March).
Assessment:
Aslan Maskhadov's election as Chechen President in January 1997 was predictable, although the scale of his victory was striking. Of all the various candidates, he proved to have a winning combination of public profile, martial charisma, traditional appeal and behind-the-scenes backing. Maskhadov appears to understand that he must form a broad-based government if he is to hold the rebel coalition together and maintain the initiative.
Part of the reason why the rebels were so effective was Chechnya's strong tradition of local resistance to central control. Accordingly, Maskhadov tried to draw simultaneously on the support of the younger generation of rebel commanders, the small but important urban intelligentsia and the traditional leaders of the teip (clans) alike. In the northern lowlands, for example, Maskhadov won around 95 per cent of the vote. He did almost as well in the eastern Shali region. In the southern highland constituencies, though, he polled between 30 and 50 per cent.
Maskhadov made it clear that he intended to create a moderate Islamic state, ``combining the norms of a secular society with the requirements of the Sharia law.'' Both he and Chechen Interior Minister Makhashev affirmed that Sharia law would only be applied to Muslims. When Maskhadov spoke of the need to restore law and order, he was not only offering ordinary Chechens the prospect of a more safe and stable existence. He was also signalling that he was prepared to tackle armed challenges to the new order, whether in the name of political opposition or simple banditry.
He had to juggle the rhetoric of nationalism with the practicalities of reconstruction. While Maskhadov initially suggested that a decision on independence could take place before 2001, the election of the bellicose President Putin in March 2000, coupled with the second Russian offensive, meant that such a decision would not be taken. Perhaps 30 per cent of the country's housing stock was destroyed or seriously damaged by the war. A generation raised as fighters needed work. The country's vital oil industry required rebuilding during a prolonged period of stability, which was not forthcoming.
Between 1997 and mid 1999, Moscow was prepared to work with Maskhadov, relying on the Chechens' need for reconstruction aid to temper any aspirations they might have towards full independence. Maskhadov, meanwhile, sought to control internal opposition, focusing particularly on ultra-nationalists and Islamists.
His efforts had only limited success. By mid-1999 he had begun to restore some order to much of the country, but the limits of his authority were revealed in August when Islamist rebels launched cross-border incursions into neighbouring Dagestan. To some in Moscow, these suggested that he was actually unable to control the country, raising questions about his usefulness as an ally. More specifically, Prime Minister Putin regarded this as an opportunity to establish a reputation for toughness. As a result, the alliance with Maskhadov was terminated and Russia launched a second invasion of Chechnya.
Russia's Second Military Operation against Chechnya (1999-):
The incursions into Dagestan by the group of Islamic rebels gave Russia an ideal pretext to once again intervene in Chechnya. The series of bombs in residential areas around Moscow, the origin of which remains unclear but was blamed on Chechen terrorists, added to the groundswell of opinion that called for the final suppression of the Chechen rebellion.
In September 1999, raids using commandos and air power were launched against Islamist rebel targets. This was soon expanded to include government installations such as Grozny's airport. By the end of the month Russian troops had crossed into northern Chechnya, ostensibly to set up a security zone north of the River Terek. In doing so they forced Maskhadov to mobilise his forces and triggered a new full-scale war.
The initial invasion was relatively successful for the Russians. Within a month of the initial invasion, they had seized most of the country. Lessons had been learned from the last Chechen debacle. Spearhead units of a much large force (100,000 strong) were made up of elite troops. They initially avoided getting bogged down in urban and mountain fighting where the guerrillas held the advantage, instead they stuck to the lowlands and wider valleys. Settlements were either bypassed or levelled with artillery and air power, in a programme of pacification by bombardment.
By the beginning of December 1999, Grozny was largely encircled and under heavy bombardment. The city was to hold out until February 2000, by which time it had been reduced to a hollow ruin and the majority of the rebel defenders had slipped through Russian lines to their strongholds in the southern lowlands. The Russians had also, for all their numerical superiority, been shown to be vulnerable to rebel counter attacks, one of which saw them briefly retake the Argun and Shali from federal forces in January 2000. This led to confusion and recriminations in the federal forces, and even more indiscriminate attacks on the Chechen population.
Following their successful seizure of Grozny, federal forces advanced into the highlands, seizing the remaining major town, Shatoi, at the end of February. The main military campaign began to be wound down, with Moscow suggesting that it would shortly begin to scale down its deployment, passing a greater share of the burden of the operation to the Interior Troops. By the middle of 2000, it was envisaged that the force would be reduced to a garrison of 16,000 regular troops and 15,000 Interior Troops - still a force almost as numerous as the initial invasion army of 1994.
Official figures (almost certainly underestimates) suggested that the total
cost of the war in its first six months was over 10 billion rubles (US$384 million).
It was estimated in August 2000 that 13,500 Chechen rebels had died in the conflict,
whilst ove 3,000 Russian servicemen had died and over 7,000 injured since late
1999.
Putin passed a decree in June 2000 imposing direct presidential rule on Chechnya.
The appointment of Akhmed-Haji Kadyrov to head a Chechen administration responsible
to Putin was dismissed as illegitimate by Maskhadov in a move bound to undermine
the future prospect of peace talks. During this period war in Chechnya was essentially
being fought on two fronts. As the Russian army continued their military attacks
on rebel hideouts, an increasingly bitter exchange escalated between Kadyrov
and Bislan Gantaniurov (his deputy) which threatened to seriously undermine
Putin's Chechen Administration.
In elections of August 2000 retired Interior Minister Major-General Aslanbek Aslakhanov was elected as the Chechen deputy in the Russian Duma. These elections were denounced by President Maskhadov as a `crime against the Chechen people.
Assessment:
Russian Strategy:
The Russians call the war a `counter-terrorist operation' aimed at `restoring constitutional order' in the Chechen republic. Russia has achieved a military occupation of most of Chechnya and imposed direct presidential rule from Moscow. However, the terrorist elements in Chechnya are probably stronger than in August 1999, even if President Aslan Maskhadov's field forces have been dispersed.
The Russians adopted an essentially reactive strategy, in part because many of the better airborne and similar units rotated out of theatre, leaving few light infantry genuinely able and willing to take the fight to the rebels in their highlands. While troop numbers were being maintained, there was a growing proportion of at best semi-trained troops, as well as serious supply and maintenance problems.
There is no evidence that in August 1999 anyone in Moscow really considered what sort of long-term political settlement in Chechnya would best serve Russia's interests, or whether military action was the best way to promote stability in the North Caucasus. In effect, and ignoring Russia's military experience in the region, they gambled that they could break Chechen resistance before their own resources were exhausted.
A basic element in the Russian plan was to frighten the Chechen population so that they would put pressure on the guerrillas to abandon their prepared defences in built-up areas.
Russian claims to have minimised civilian casualties ring very hollow in light of the civilian accounts of the bombardments and the pictures of devastation in Grozny and other towns. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that terrorism was more typical of Russian tactics than the Chechen guerrillas. In the short term, these tactics were effective - the guerrillas suffered some significant losses and were forced to abandon town after town.
However, the military situation was stalemated for much of 2000. The Russians claimed control over the country but failed to eliminate the remaining rebel forces, or prevent their re-supply efforts and terrorist attacks. Indeed, the rebels appeared to be embarking on a more radical terrorist campaign involving suicide bombings. Furthermore, they stepped up attacks on Chechen collaborators with the Russians. As many as 2,000 of the 2,500 Chechen fighters who laid down their arms in a previous amnesty had resumed hostilities against Moscow by September 2000.
In December 2000 Chief of General Staff Kvashnin announced that Russian forces were about to embark upon a new stage of attack involving the creation of smaller mobile units to be deployed in 200 Chechen towns and villages. This change in strategy signalled a move away from the large scale military operations against rebel forces that had consistently failed to defeat smaller bands of Chechen rebels.
Chechen strategy:
In response to Russian successes, the Chechen rebels changed their tactics, turning to classic guerrilla warfare and urban terrorism. By the summer of 2000 the Russians were faced by sniper attacks on their block houses, ambushes and road mines on their convoys, assassination of individual soldiers on the streets and suicide-bombings of their barracks. Replying with air strikes or artillery bombardments is unlikely to be effective but almost guaranteed to cause civilian casualties.
Among the mass of the Chechen population there is a mood of war weariness and despair, so that the guerrillas have less support than in the first war. More significant in the long term, perhaps, Chechen hatred for the Russians has grown and continues to motivate new recruits for the rebels.
Reconstruction:
Russian proconsul Nikolai Koshman suggested in January 2000 that reconstruction would cost 12 billion roubles (US$420 million). Officially, almost 8 billion roubles have been earmarked for reconstruction - less than the amount spent on fighting the war for one month. However, not only has much more damage been done since this initial estimate, it became clear that this only applied to areas already under federal control. The real figure will probably be three to five times this amount.
Although Russian military commanders stated that the military phase of operations in Chechnya had ceased by mid-2000, and the operation was entering a period of post-conflict reconstruction, the government have done little to embark upon the regeneration of the region.
The December 2000 appointment of Vladimir Yelagin (a former governor of Orenburg) as Minister for Reconstruction in Chechnya was heralded by Moscow as proof of their commitment to rebuild the war-ravaged republic. However, their primary goal in Chechnya undoubtedly remains the achievement of a final military victory.
Widespread looting across the region has also undermined attempts at reconstruction.
Akhmed Kadyrov:
Kadyrov's record suggests that he is genuine in his desire to bring peace to
Chechnya and save it from being the battleground between equally alien Wahhabi
extremism and Russian imperialism. Moscow has a poor record on retaining Chechen
allies and could easily alienate him by too obviously treating him as mere `window
dressing'.
Despite his good intentions, Kadyrov is likely to be squeezed between the rebels,
and a Kremlin with little real desire for anything short of a complete military
victory. A day after Kadyrov's appointment, a close ally of his, Iman Umar Idrisov,
was murdered by rebel gunmen. Rebel vice president Vakha Arsanov has reportedly
placed a US$250,000 bounty on Kadyrov's head.
Future Prospects:
While reconstruction drags, the civilian Chechen population will be consigned to a life in refugee camps and shanty towns - ideal breeding grounds for a new generation of rebels and terrorists. Russian forces are thus likely to continue to be involved in a dirty, low-intensity guerrilla war in the Caucasus for years to come.
By mid-2000 Senior Russian officers began to realise that they were no longer fighting their sort of war. The more far-sighted probably always realised that they could not win a total victory in Chechnya and that they would face a prolonged insurgency. However, the issue has always been the level of insurgency that would remain in Chechnya and the size of the counter-insurgency force that would be required to deal with it.
Although Russian troops had confined the rebels to the southern mountain ranges, the Chechens retained the ability to attack Russian targets (as indicated by the use of suicide bombers to strike at Russian checkpoints and military camps throughout mid-2000). The security of Russian forces in the north Caucasus is, at best, precarious, and public support for ongoing Russian involvement in Chechnya is beginning to fall as the effectiveness of Russian tactics are questioned and the army continues to lose approximately 200 men every month.
Russia has no credible potential political allies, the rebels will take years to truly eliminate and its brutal tactics have won it few converts from the civilian population. Only the most optimistic of Russian official spokesmen, such as Deputy Chief of the General Staff General Valery Manilov, claim to foresee an end to the fighting, although they still claim victory in the campaign so far.
Kadyrov claimed that the conflict could last a further 10-20 years. As of December 2000 an estimated 40,000 federal soldiers remain stationed in Chechnya, and the `permanent' deployment of a specially trained unit, the 42nd Division, indicated that Moscow was prepared for a drawn out conclusion to the Chechen issue. Russia remains committed to a long term political settlement in Chechnya, and calls for a negotiated settlement escalated as the campaign wore on.
Putin recognised the need to move from military to social and economic measures in Chechnya, and made some attempts to initiate reconstruction in Chechnya. The 2001 State budget allocated 16 billion rubles for this purpose, and in January 2001 Putin transferred responsibility for the co-ordination of future military operations in Chechnya from the defence ministry to the FSB. Putin also pledged to decrease the number of Russian troops in Chechnya and close all refugee camps by 2002. Putin realises that failure to bring a decisive end to the conflict in the near future could undermine both his popularity and image as a Russian `strongman'. However, as Putin remains adamant that only unconditional rebel surrender is acceptable (as opposed to the possibility of negotiation or compromise with the Chechen rebels), an adequate solution remains as elusive.
In an attempt to demonstrate that Chechnya was gradually moving towards at least nominal stability, in February 2001 Kadyrov announced the formulation of a Putin-sanctioned regional government, the membership of which is listed below:
Prime Minister: Stanislav Ilyasov
Deputy Heads of Chechen Government: Vasilii Aleksender, Colonel Yuri
Em
Minister of Household Services: Abu Sugaipov
Minister of Science and Public Education: Lema Dadaev
Minister of Labour and Social Protection: Magomed Vakhaev
