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Publications of the Center for Security Policy
No. 97-D 122
DECISION BRIEF
2 September 1997
Test The MIRACL Laser Against A Satellite: The Outcome Of The Next War May
Turn On A Proven American A.S.A.T. Capability
(Washington, D.C.): The New York Times gave front-page, above-the-fold treatment yesterday to a proposal by the U.S.
Army to test the Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRACL) against an Air Force satellite that has outlived its
design life and usefulness to the Pentagon. The reason for this prominent placement was only partially a function of the
dearth of other important news on Labor Day. More likely, it reflected the Times' adherence to the arms control theology
which holds that U.S. tests of directed energy or other weapons against satellites will lead to the "militarization of space," a
"space arms race" and/or precipitate new threats that will, on balance, add to -- not diminish -- threats to U.S. security
interests.
Such nostrums overlook several critical points:
Space Is Already a Critical Theater of Military Operations
If it is to prevail in terrestrial combat, the U.S. military must be able to dominate the theater of operations in space.
Operation Desert Storm may have had a very different outcome -- or at least been vastly more costly to the United States
and its coalition partners -- if Saddam Hussein had enjoyed timely access to overhead reconnaissance. With the advent of
commercially available satellite imagery and the proliferation of satellite technology, American military planners can no
longer count in the absence of a proven anti-satellite (ASAT) capability on having exclusive access to such data.
Proliferation of Systems with Inherent Anti-Satellite Capabilities
More and more nations are acquiring, along with the ability to put satellites into space, the ability to interfere with others'
satellites. A Report to the Congress on U.S. Policy on ASAT Arms Control submitted by President
Ronald Reagan on 31 March 1984 identified the following as among the techniques available for this purpose:
"maneuvering spacecraft...into the path of, or to detonate next to, another nation's spacecraft; direct ascent interceptors
such as exo-atmospheric anti-ballistic missiles; ballistic missiles with modified guidance logic; space boosters; homing
vehicles; directed energy weapons such as lasers and particle beams (either ground-based or space-based); electronic
countermeasures of sufficient power to damage or interrupt satellite functions; and weapons which could be carried by
manned space planes or orbital complexes."
Arms Control Would Not Help
Given this array of potential threats, it is clear that arms control cannot provide security for U.S. space assets.
If anything, by creating a sanctuary in space for hostile satellites, it could severely degrade American national security.
Reagan Had It Right
President Reagan's report -- the most comprehensive official assessment to date of the idea of trying to ban or otherwise
limit ASAT systems -- found that there were two show-stopping problems with such arms control proposals:
Definitional conundrums: The report pointed to insoluble definitional problems in devising any ASAT arms
control, noting that:
"...Many activities related to space give rise to capabilities inherently useful for ASAT purposes, for example, the
rendezvous and docking operations routinely conducted by the Soviets could be used to attempt to conceal development of
one or more types of ASAT techniques. Restricting the definition...could make an agreement easier to
verify, but ineffective in achieving its purpose of protecting satellites." (Emphasis added.)
Verification concerns: Even if a way could be found to define dedicated ASATs, the reality is that a wide
number of systems would retain the inherent capability to perform anti-satellite functions -- even if such dedicated
systems were banned or sharply constrained.
"In keeping with...[congressional] satellite survivability concerns, we need to recognize that 'ASAT capability' relates to
all systems capable of damaging, destroying or otherwise interrupting the functioning of satellites....Furthermore,
problems of weapon definition are compounded because some non-weapon space systems, including civil and commercial
systems, could have characteristics which would make it difficult to frame a definition to distinguish them."
Verification is especially problematic when it comes to monitoring covertly conducted tests of directed energy
weapons against satellites. In fact, in the early 1980s, the United States abandoned the so-called "Lazy Cat"
satellite program on the grounds that it would be unlikely to be able reliably to perform such a mission.
These problems are as intractable today as they were thirteen years ago. Should the United States ignore
such realities and enter into ASAT arms control treaties of one form or another, it can have no confidence that its satellites
will actually be protected against attack. It will, however, unilaterally be allowing its ability to neutralize threatening
satellites to be impinged upon -- if not, as a practical matter, precluded altogether.
The Bottom Line
Military use of space has been an accomplished fact ever since the first ballistic missile transited the heavens. It would not
start with the proposed test of the MIRACL laser against the third Miniature Sensor Technology Integration (MSTI-3)
satellite. (For that matter, these assets were used in an inconclusive low-power laser test last April.) And it assuredly
would not stop if the Clinton Administration chooses not to conduct the high-power experiment now being proposed by
the Army.
What will happen, however, is that the U.S. military will continue to lack confidence that it can control the use made of
space by future adversaries in order to determine the outcome of terrestrial conflicts. And nothing of consequence will have
been done to redress the growing vulnerability of some American satellites to hostile efforts to neutralize them. For these
reasons, the Administration should permit the utility of MIRACL for anti-satellite purposes to be demonstrated and steps
taken to bring on-line a robust anti-satellite capability (i.e., both directed energy and kinetic kill ASAT systems) at the
earliest possible moment.
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NOTE: The Center's publications are intended to invigorate and enrich the debate on foreign policy
and defense issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of all members of the
Center's Board of Advisors.