Site hosted by Angelfire.com: Build your free website today!

IRIAN JAYA (WEST PAPUA, NEW GUINEA): THE QUEST FOR INDEPENDENCE-MAY 16, 2000 TO MAY 20, 2000

THE RECORD
MAY 16, 2000 TO MAY 20, 2000

=======================================================

Subj: KABAR-IRIAN: [EN] OPM supporters greet Megawati
Date: 5/20/00 10:55:49 AM Central Standard Time
From: admin@irja.org
Sender: owner-kabar-irian@irja.org
Reply-to: admin@irja.org
To: kabar-irian@irja.org

Too much mail? Try our digest version. Info available at
http://www.irja.org/conf.htm

Jakarta Post
May 20th, 200
National News

OPM supporters greet Megawati in
Jayawijaya

JAYAPURA, Irian Jaya (JP): About 10,000 supporters of the Free Papua
Movement (OPM) thronged Wamena Airport in Jayawijaya regency, Irian Jaya,
shortly before Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri's departure to
Jayapura on Friday afternoon.

Many waved the OPM morning star flag and raised proindependence banners,
demanding a dialog with the Vice President.

"Welcome, Mother of West Papua Liberation in Baliem Valley", and "Mbak
(Mrs.) Mega, return the political rights of the Papua nation", read the
banners.

It was Megawati's father, Sukarno, Indonesia's first president, who led
the country in freeing the territory from the Dutch on May 1, 1963.

Sukarno named the province West Irian. Ten years later his successor,
Soeharto, renamed it Irian Jaya. And now, President Abdurrahman Wahid,
during a visit to Jayapura at the New Year, decided to call it Papua as
demanded by locals.

Security and police forces apparently were not anticipating such a large
turnout. Only 17 military and 30 police personnel were employed to
safeguard the airport.

Reverend Obet Komba told the Vice President that the huge gathering was
evidence that demands for independence were not just the aspirations of a
few as often claimed by the government.

Komba urged the central government to pave the way for Papua's
independence from Indonesia.

"We want to win our independence through dialog, not through destructive
ways," Komba said.

Komba also told the Vice President that Papuan people would hold the Papua
People's Congress in Jayapura from May 29 to June 3. He expressed hope
that the congress would be used as a forum between the central government
and OPM.

Megawati, who arrived in the regency from Merauke on Friday morning,
delivered her speech from the back of an open pickup.

In her remarks she avoided touching on the independence issue. She just
asked the people to live in peace.

She said she decided to visit the province for the second time after her
election as vice president in October because she wanted to know more
about people's living conditions there.

"I come here to see your real situation," she said, as quoted by Antara.

Megawati's reluctance to respond to their demand to separate from
Indonesia apparently upset several protesters.

Soon after her departure several protesters ran amok. They ransacked the
official residence of Regent David Antonius Hubi.

After a brief visit in Jayapura, the Vice President and her entourage
continued their trip to Sentani regency. Megawati did not hold a public
forum there.

During her visit to Irian Jaya she is scheduled to visit 11 regencies.

Separately, Irian Jaya Police Chief Brig. Gen. S.Y. Wenas assured on
Friday that police would fully guard the planned Papua's People Congress.

He said police fully supported President Abdurrahman Wahid's decision to
allow the people to organize the congress.

"They do not even need a permit from police, because this congress is a
forum for the people to convey their aspirations," said Wenas.

Wenas expressed his hope that the congress would proceed
peacefully. (eba/prb)

KABAR IRIAN ("Irian News") www.kabar-irian.com
NOTE: "All items are posted for their news/information content. They are
not necessarily the views of IRJA.org or subscribers. "

=======================================================

Subj: KABAR-IRIAN: [EN] Indonesian Settlers Starve
Date: 5/20/00 10:54:21 AM Central Standard Time
From: admin@irja.org
Sender: owner-kabar-irian@irja.org
Reply-to: admin@irja.org
To: kabar-irian@irja.org

Too much mail? Try our digest version. Info available at
http://www.irja.org/conf.htm

Friday May 19 12:33 PM ET
Report: Indonesian Settlers Starve
JAKARTA, Indonesia (AP)

At least 17 people moved to Indonesia's easternmost province of West
Papua in resettlement programs have starved to death in recent
weeks, the official Antara news agency reported Friday.

The victims were residents of two resettlement projects in Bonggo
district, near the provincial capital of Jayapura, about 2,300 miles
east of Jakarta, the agency said.

The new settlers had come from Java, Bali and other islands in
Indonesia, said Ramli Rahman, a lawyer at the local Legal Aid
Foundation. The settlers claimed that the West Papua lands allotted
for them by the Indonesian government are arid and unproductive, he
told the agency.

Rahman said his office in Jayapura was currently housing 224
families of the migrants who are trying to return to their home
islands.

The Indonesian government's program was initiated in the 1960s to
bring in migrants from the country's other provinces so it could
blunt demands for independence from the indigenous population.

KABAR IRIAN ("Irian News") www.kabar-irian.com
NOTE: "All items are posted for their news/information content. They are
not necessarily the views of IRJA.org or subscribers. "

To unsubscribe send an email (leave subject blank) to majordomo@irja.org
that says: unsubscribe kabar-irian

You can also un/subscribe at http://www.irja.org/conf.htm

=======================================================

Subj: MEGAWATI NEVER PROMISED TO SUPPORT PAPUA MOVEMENT
Date: 5/20/00 5:18:26 PM Central Standard Time
From: iris@matra.com.au (Anne Noonan)
To: reg.westpapua@gn.apc.org

MEGAWATI NEVER PROMISED TO SUPPORT PAPUA MOVEMENT, SAYS REGIONAL
Saturday, May 20, 2000/12:44:34 AM

PDI-P LEADER

Jayapura, May 19 (ANTARA) - A regional Indonesian Democratic Party
of Struggle (PDI-P) leader here refuted
certain local people`s claims that PDI-P leader Megawati Soekarnoputri
had once promised to support the separatist cause in Irian Jaya.

Yance Fery Kogoya, chairman of the PDI-P`s Jayawijaya sub-dictrict
chapter, said the claims were totally baseless and nonensensical because
Megawati never made such pledge.

Speaking to the press at Wamena airport on Friday afternoon after
joining a party welcoming Vice President Megawati, Kogoya also denied
that PDI-P`s general election victory in Irian Jaya was due to Megwati`s
alleged campaign promise to back local aspirations for an independent
Papua.

"I need to make it plain that Megawati never made such kind of a promise
prior to last year`s general election," he said.

"All people know that it was former president Soekarno who led
Indonesia`s struggle to liberate Irian Jaya (from Dutch colonial rule).
So it`s inconceivable that Megawati (a daughter of Soekarno) would undo
the result of her father`s struggle," Kogoya said.

He said as a leader of the PDI-P in Irian Jaya, he knew well the
important things Megawati had said during the last year`s general
election campaign.

"So, if certain elements in this province now expect Megawati to support
the Free Papua cause, that is only wishful thinking," he said.

-----------------------------------------------
Australia West Papua Association, Sydney
PO BOX 65
Millers Point, NSW
Australia 2000
Tel/fax 61 2 99601698
iris@matra.com.au

=======================================================

Subj: KABAR-IRIAN: [EN] US AID Accused of Cutting Funding to Indonesian conservationists
Date: 5/18/00 2:03:50 PM Central Daylight Time
From: admin@irja.org
Sender: owner-kabar-irian@irja.org
Reply-to: admin@irja.org
To: kabar-irian@irja.org

Too much mail? Try our digest version. Info available at
http://www.irja.org/conf.htm

(edited by Admin for brevity)

Inter Press Service
ENVIRONMENT: US AID Accused of Cutting Funding to Indonesian
Conservationists
By Danielle Knight
WASHINGTON, May 15 (IPS)

The US Agency for International Development (AID) is cutting funding
for Indonesian environmental groups because of their criticism of US
mining corporations, according to environmentalists here and in
Indonesia.

''We strongly urge the US State Department to support Indonesia's
fragile democracy rather than protect sweetheart deals for American
corporations,'' says a letter by Friends of the Earth sent to
Secretary of State Madeline Albright.

After JATAM h(an Indonesian Envrionmental NGO)held a workshop in November
1999 condemning Newmont's actions, Muhammed says he received a call from
the US Embassy inquiring whether the funds used in the workshop were
derived from US AID. According to Muhammed, the Embassy said they received
a complaint from Newmont protesting the use of US taxpayers' money to fund
a campaign against a US company.

Kim Walz, a spokeswoman for US AID, confirmed that JATAM's funding
was not renewed.

''Doubts were raised about JATAM's ability to give impartial
assistance to communities and we determined that this was harmful to
US goals,'' she told IPS.

Another Indonesia environmental group's funding may also be on the
chopping block because of its criticism of mining operations in
Irian Jaya, the name given to the western half of New Guinea,
according to Friends of the Earth here.

Known as Walhi, or Friends of the Earth Indonesia, the environmental
group says Freeport McMoRan's Grasberg Mine in Irian Jaya, has
devastated more than 100 kilometres of rainforest. They accuse
Freeport of dumping toxic mine waste into nearby rivers causing fish
caught by the Amungme tribe to die.

With copper, gold, and silver deposits reportedly worth more than 60
billion dollars, Grasberg is one of the world's largest mines and
remains the country's single largest source of tax revenue.

Indonesia's environmental groups are hardly the only critics of
Grasberg.

The mine's impact sparked an international outcry and prompted the
US Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) which was helping
finance the mine, to conduct an independent environmental audit of
Grasberg.

According to OPIC, the mine ''has created and continues to pose
unreasonable or major environmental, health or safety hazards with
respect to the rivers that are being impacted by the tailings, the
surrounding ecosystems, and the local inhabitants.''

Like Walhi, the Indonesian Minister of Environment and several
Indonesian parliamentarians are calling for an independent
environmental audit of Freeport's operations. Some officials have
raised the possibility of renegotiating the corporation's Contract
of Work with the government.

In the past several weeks, according to Friends of the Earth, US
Ambassador to Indonesia Robert Gelbard has publically praised
Freeport's environmental record and personally intervened to cut off
funds for JATAM and Walhi. The latter has received about 400,000
dollars since 1997 from US AID.

Walz, with US AID, says this is untrue.

''There has been no pressure whatsoever,'' she told IPS. ''The
Ambassador has not discussed this with US AID.''

She says that she can neither confirm nor deny that Walhi's funding
will be cut. ''Walhi is up for routine renewal and they are
currently in negotiations,'' she says.

An environmental letter writing campaign here urging the US State
Department to continue funding Walhi has reportedly yielded more
than 6,000 letters, according to Friends of the Earth.

''The Indonesian people are making valiant and courageous efforts to
establish a clean, effective and responsive government, to enforce
the rule of law, to create a just society and to safeguard
Indonesia's unique natural heritage,'' says the letter.
(END/IPS/EN/DV/IP/dk/da/00)

KABAR IRIAN ("Irian News") www.kabar-irian.com
NOTE: "All items are posted for their news/information content. They are
not necessarily the views of IRJA.org or subscribers. "

To unsubscribe send an email (leave subject blank) to majordomo@irja.org
that says: unsubscribe kabar-irian

You can also un/subscribe at http://www.irja.org/conf.htm

=======================================================

Subj: KABAR-IRIAN: [EN] NDONESIA: HUMAN RIGHTS AND INDEPENDENCE ACTIONS IN IRIAN JAYA
Date: 5/18/00 2:03:52 PM Central Daylight Time
From: admin@irja.org
Sender: owner-kabar-irian@irja.org
Reply-to: admin@irja.org
To: kabar-irian@irja.org

Too much mail? Try our digest version. Info available at
http://www.irja.org/conf.htm

Embargoed for release:
00:01 GMT May 17, 2000

For more information contact:
Joe Saunders (New York) (O) +1 212 216 1207 (H) 1 718 398 8893
Mike Jendrzejczyk (Washington) (O) +1 202 612 4341 (H) 1 301 585
5824
Urmi Shah (London) (O) +44 20 7713 1995
Jean-Paul Marthoz (Brussels) (O) + 32 2 732 2009

NDONESIA: HUMAN RIGHTS AND INDEPENDENCE ACTIONS IN IRIAN JAYA

(New York, May 17, 2000)�Human Rights Watch today called on
Indonesian authorities to stop harassing organizers of peaceful
rallies in Irian Jaya, where a popular pro-independence movement has
publicly emerged over the past two years. But the international
rights group also welcomed steps the new administration of
Abdurrahman Wahid has taken toward respecting basic rights in the
province.

"President Wahid government has taken a fresh approach and made a
long-overdue commitment to respecting basic rights in Papua, but the
reality still does not match the rhetoric," said Joe Saunders,
deputy Asia director at Human Rights Watch. "Protesters, including
some of Papua's leading citizens, continue to be targeted for
organizing peaceful rallies."

In a new 38-page report, "Human Rights and Pro-Independence Actions
in Papua, 1999-2000," Human Rights Watch details the eruption of
independence demands in the province following Soeharto's forced
resignation in May 1998, and documents the inconsistent and at times
repressive government response. (President Abdurrahman Wahid
renamed the province "Papua" in a visit on January 1, 2000, in
deference to the wishes of the indigenous population of the island,
but the Indonesian parliament has yet to officially endorse the name
change.)

The report in particular credits Wahid, who took office in October
1999, with releasing political prisoners and announcing that
peaceful political expression, including expression of
pro-independence views, would no longer be treated as a criminal
offense. Wahid has also stated unambiguously that the Indonesian
government would not recognize Papuan demands for independence.

Papua, Indonesia's largest province, comprising more than one-fifth
of the country's total land area, was first put under Indonesian
control in 1963. It was formally incorporated into Indonesia in
1969 in a still-controversial U.N.-approved process. For many years,
the province was categorized as a military combat zone and under an
effective state of martial law, ostensibly because of the threat
posed by the Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka or OPM),
an armed group engaged in a generally low-level guerrilla campaign
for independence. At the same time, many Papuans sought to express
their support for independence through peaceful means, notably the
symbolic public raising of the "Morning Star" flag which had first
flown openly when local people sought to free the territory from
Dutch colonial rule in 1961.

Under Soeharto, such flag-raising ceremonies and other
pro-independence manifestations were ruthlessly suppressed.
Demonstrators were forcibly dispersed and assaulted, and leading
activists were subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention. Such
activists frequently were prosecuted and imprisoned under harsh laws
dealing with subversion and rebellion, as well as the notorious
"hate sowing" articles of the Indonesian penal code.

Indigenous Papuans, who are Melanesians and darker-skinned than the
numerically and politically dominant Javanese and members of most
other ethnic groups in Indonesia, were also subject to ethnic and
racial discrimination. While Indonesian rule brought unprecedented
economic development, it also resulted in an influx of immigrants
from other parts of Indonesia and caused resentment among Papuans as
the benefits went disproportionately to foreign investors and these
immigrants. When Soeharto was forced from power in May 1998, many of
these long repressed sentiments could be made public for the first
time.

The strength of pro-independence sentiment was unmistakable as early
as February 1999, when 100 Papuan leaders met with then-President
Habibie to initiate what was being hailed as a "National Dialogue"
on Papuan concerns. But the leaders presented President Habibie
with a single demand: independence. This clearly shocked and
displeased the Habibie government, which had encouraged the National
Dialogue up to then, and the process was soon suspended.

In April 1999, the government reverted to the methods used during
the Soeharto era, attempting to round up independence supporters and
censor discussion of the subject. The crackdown included bans on
expression, assembly, and association, arbitrary arrests, and
widespread intimidation of independence supporters.

Since his election, President Abdurrahman Wahid has initiated a
number of reforms. Openly acknowledging the errors of the past, the
new administration released political prisoners, and moved quickly
to allow greater freedom, including open expression of
pro-independence views. In practice, however, the government has
been inconsistent. While it has permitted a number of peaceful
demonstrations, other such rallies have been forcibly dispersed by
police with resulting injuries to demonstrators. Likewise, even as
Indonesia's Minister for Law and Legislation announced on December
13, 1999 that all Papuan political prisoners would be released, five
men involved in a peaceful flag-raising which had taken place in the
town Genyem on July 1, 1999, were charged with rebellion by a state
prosecutor in Jayapura. Although those charges eventually were
dropped, authorities are now investigating a series of peaceful
flag-raising ceremonies held throughout the province on December 1,
1999 and nine people already have been named as suspects.

Urmi Shah
Press & Information
Human Rights Watch, London
Email: shahu@gn.apc.org
Tel: 020 7713 1995
=======================================================

**************************************************
Paul Barber
Email: plovers@gn.apc.org
Internet: www.gn.apc.org/tapol
Defending victims of oppression in Indonesia and East Timor,
1973-2000
**************************************************
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

KABAR IRIAN ("Irian News") www.kabar-irian.com
NOTE: "All items are posted for their news/information content. They are
not necessarily the views of IRJA.org or subscribers. "

To unsubscribe send an email (leave subject blank) to majordomo@irja.org
that says: unsubscribe kabar-irian

You can also un/subscribe at http://www.irja.org/conf.htm

=======================================================

Subj: AWSJ: Indonesia Will Discipline Freeport Unit
Date: 5/18/00 6:21:53 AM Central Daylight Time
From: plovers@gn.apc.org (Tapol)
To: reg.westpapua@gn.apc.org, u.braun@xcc.de, slliem@xs4all.nl, taylorjb@vax.sbu.ac.uk

Received from Joyo Indonesian News

Asian Wall Street Journal
May 17, 2000

AWSJ: Indonesia Will Discipline Freeport Unit

By PUSPA MADANI

Staff Reporter

JAKARTA - Indonesia said it will order PT Freeport Indonesia, a unit of
Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc., to cut back production at its Grasberg
gold and copper mine in Papua province, after a fatal landslide at a waste
rock dump there earlier this month.

The move indicates Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid's government
intends to get tough on the mining company, which once enjoyed close
relations with former President Suharto's administration. Environment
Minister Sonny Keraf said Wednesday that the cabinet had decided - after
hearing the results of an investigation by two ministries - that Freeport
must submit a comprehensive new plan and obtain government approval before
opening a new dump for the waste rock.

Freeport must also clean up "all destruction and pollution that had been
caused" by the sludge dumped into Wanagon Lake by the landslide. In addition,
Freeport must allow a criminal investigation by the police and government
officials into the four men's deaths caused by the landslide. And it must
compensate losses suffered by residents of a nearby village affected by the
incident.

Mr. Keraf said a letter including all the demands will be sent to Freeport
early next week at the latest. Today is a public holiday in Indonesia. "It
must be done as soon as possible to avoid further destruction of the
environment" caused by the waste rock, he said. He didn't say how much
production would be cut. Last week he had threatened to suspend production at
the site.

Mr. Keraf denied the government was singling out Freeport for punishment.
"This is not a personal matter. This is a matter of the nation. The
environment must be saved. Further destruction must be avoided," he said.

A Freeport spokesman, Mindo Pangaribuan, said dumping had stopped on the day
of the landslide, May 4. He said other locations were being sought for waste
disposal, all within the Grasberg area. "It's still inside the working
contract site and it has been part of the approved mining plan," he said.

Critics say Freeport ignored pressure from the central government to reduce
the risk posed by the dumping of waste into the basin after a similar,
nonfatal landslide at the site in 1998. The latest incident also has added
fuel to the demands from resource-rich outer regions such as Papua province
for greater control over such industries, as well as a bigger share of their
profits.

Freeport reached an agreement with Mr. Suharto's government in 1991 to extend
its contract to mine the Grasberg deposit until 2041. Last year, Freeport
produced 1.4 billion ounces of copper and 2.4 million ounces of gold. It made
net profit of $100.8 million.

**************************************************
Paul Barber
TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign,
25 Plovers Way, Alton Hampshire GU34 2JJ
Tel/Fax: 01420 80153
Email: plovers@gn.apc.org
Internet: www.gn.apc.org/tapol
Defending victims of oppression in Indonesia and
East Timor, 1973-2000

=======================================================

Subj: KABAR-IRIAN: [EN] Three Foreign Coys Explore New Sources Of Gas In Papua
Date: 5/18/00 2:04:04 PM Central Daylight Time
From: admin@irja.org
Sender: owner-kabar-irian@irja.org
Reply-to: admin@irja.org
To: kabar-irian@irja.org

Too much mail? Try our digest version. Info available at
http://www.irja.org/conf.htm

National News
Three Foreign Coys Explore New Sources Of Gas In Papua
Wednesday, May 17, 2000/12:45:49 PM
Sorong, Papua, May 17 (ANTARA)

Three foreign oil companies -- ARCO, British Gas and Irian Gas Oil
(IGO) -- have begun exploring new sources of natural gas in the
Indonesian province of Papua, formerly Irian Jaya.

ARCO has already found a huge deposit of natural gas in Weriagar
subdistrict, Manokwari district, the spokesman for the exploration
and production section of the state oil and gas company, PT
Pertamina, said here Wednesday.

The Australian company has thus begun making preparations for
exploitation, the spokesman said.

British Gas has been exploring Bintuni subdistrict, also in
Manokwari, and the US-based Irian Gas Oil the upper part of Tami
river in Jayapura district, near the province`s border with Papua
New Guinea.

If the exploration of the three companies succeeds, Papua will be
the country`s largest source of liquefied natural gas, the spokesman
said.

KABAR IRIAN ("Irian News") www.kabar-irian.com
NOTE: "All items are posted for their news/information content. They are
not necessarily the views of IRJA.org or subscribers. "

To unsubscribe send an email (leave subject blank) to majordomo@irja.org
that says: unsubscribe kabar-irian

You can also un/subscribe at http://www.irja.org/conf.htm

=======================================================

Subj: KABAR-IRIAN: [EN]
Date: 5/17/00 3:25:40 PM Central Daylight Time
From: admin@irja.org
Sender: owner-kabar-irian@irja.org
Reply-to: admin@irja.org
To: kabar-irian@irja.org

Too much mail? Try our digest version. Info available at
http://www.irja.org/conf.htm

National News
UNICEF To Extend Rp 1.7 Billion To Manokwari
Tuesday, May 16, 2000/3:47:28 PM
Manokwari, Irian Jaya, May 16 (ANTARA)

The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) will extend Rp 1.7
billion to improve mother-and-child health care in Manokwari
district, Irian Jaya province, a local official has said.

"The fund will be used for the mother-and-child health care program,
as well as to supply instruments for midwives, medicine and health
equipment," head of the local health office, Abdul Kadir, said here
Tuesday.

This year's assistance is larger than last year's Rp 109 million,
Kadir noted.

He further said that the government this fiscal year will also
extend Rp 1.4 billion to support Irian Jaya's social safety net
program for health.

The fund will be used to improve basic health services and
nutrition, eradicate contagious diseases, improve the quality of
integrated mother-and-child health care, and provide supplemental
food, he said.

KABAR IRIAN ("Irian News") www.kabar-irian.com
NOTE: "All items are posted for their news/information content. They are
not necessarily the views of IRJA.org or subscribers. "

To unsubscribe send an email (leave subject blank) to majordomo@irja.org
that says: unsubscribe kabar-irian

You can also un/subscribe at http://www.irja.org/conf.htm
=======================================================

Subj: HRW: Human Rights and Indpendence Actions in Irian Jaya
Date: 5/17/00 1:47:28 AM Central Daylight Time
From: plovers@gn.apc.org (Tapol)
To: indonesia-act@igc.apc.org, u.braun@xcc.de, slliem@xs4all.nl, taylorjb@vax.sbu.ac.uk, robinr@quaker.org.uk, jonathan.head@bbc.co.uk, reg.westpapua@gn.apc.org, u.braun@xcc.de, slliem@xs4all.nl, taylorjb@vax.sbu.ac.uk

>Embargoed for release:
>00:01 GMT May 17, 2000
>
>For more information contact:
>Joe Saunders (New York) (O) +1 212 216 1207 (H) 1 718 398 8893
>Mike Jendrzejczyk (Washington) (O) +1 202 612 4341 (H) 1 301 585 5824
>Urmi Shah (London) (O) +44 20 7713 1995
>Jean-Paul Marthoz (Brussels) (O) + 32 2 732 2009
>
> INDONESIA: HUMAN RIGHTS AND INDEPENDENCE ACTIONS IN IRIAN JAYA
>
>(New York, May 17, 2000)�Human Rights Watch today called on Indonesian
>authorities to stop harassing organizers of peaceful rallies in Irian
>Jaya, where a popular pro-independence movement has publicly emerged
>over the past two years. But the international rights group also
>welcomed steps the new administration of Abdurrahman Wahid has taken
>toward respecting basic rights in the province.
>
>"President Wahid government has taken a fresh approach and made a
>long-overdue commitment to respecting basic rights in Papua, but the
>reality still does not match the rhetoric," said Joe Saunders, deputy
>Asia director at Human Rights Watch. "Protesters, including some of
>Papua's leading citizens, continue to be targeted for organizing
>peaceful rallies."
>
>In a new 38-page report, "Human Rights and Pro-Independence Actions in
>Papua, 1999-2000," Human Rights Watch details the eruption of
>independence demands in the province following Soeharto's forced
>resignation in May 1998, and documents the inconsistent and at times
>repressive government response. (President Abdurrahman Wahid renamed
>the province "Papua" in a visit on January 1, 2000, in deference to the
>wishes of the indigenous population of the island, but the Indonesian
>parliament has yet to officially endorse the name change.)
>
>The report in particular credits Wahid, who took office in October 1999,
>with releasing political prisoners and announcing that peaceful
>political expression, including expression of pro-independence views,
>would no longer be treated as a criminal offense. Wahid has also stated
>unambiguously that the Indonesian government would not recognize Papuan
>demands for independence.
>
>Papua, Indonesia's largest province, comprising more than one-fifth of
>the country's total land area, was first put under Indonesian control in
>1963. It was formally incorporated into Indonesia in 1969 in a
>still-controversial U.N.-approved process. For many years, the province
>was categorized as a military combat zone and under an effective state
>of martial law, ostensibly because of the threat posed by the Free Papua
>Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka or OPM), an armed group engaged in a
>generally low-level guerrilla campaign for independence. At the same
>time, many Papuans sought to express their support for independence
>through peaceful means, notably the symbolic public raising of the
>"Morning Star" flag which had first flown openly when local people
>sought to free the territory from Dutch colonial rule in 1961.
>
>Under Soeharto, such flag-raising ceremonies and other pro-independence
>manifestations were ruthlessly suppressed. Demonstrators were forcibly
>dispersed and assaulted, and leading activists were subjected to
>arbitrary arrest and detention. Such activists frequently were
>prosecuted and imprisoned under harsh laws dealing with subversion and
>rebellion, as well as the notorious "hate sowing" articles of the
>Indonesian penal code.
>
>Indigenous Papuans, who are Melanesians and darker-skinned than the
>numerically and politically dominant Javanese and members of most other
>ethnic groups in Indonesia, were also subject to ethnic and racial
>discrimination. While Indonesian rule brought unprecedented economic
>development, it also resulted in an influx of immigrants from other
>parts of Indonesia and caused resentment among Papuans as the benefits
>went disproportionately to foreign investors and these immigrants. When
>Soeharto was forced from power in May 1998, many of these long repressed
>sentiments could be made public for the first time.
>
>The strength of pro-independence sentiment was unmistakable as early as
>February 1999, when 100 Papuan leaders met with then-President Habibie
>to initiate what was being hailed as a "National Dialogue" on Papuan
>concerns. But the leaders presented President Habibie with a single
>demand: independence. This clearly shocked and displeased the Habibie
>government, which had encouraged the National Dialogue up to then, and
>the process was soon suspended. In April 1999, the government reverted
>to the methods used during the Soeharto era, attempting to round up
>independence supporters and censor discussion of the subject. The
>crackdown included bans on expression, assembly, and association,
>arbitrary arrests, and widespread intimidation of independence
>supporters.
>
>Since his election, President Abdurrahman Wahid has initiated a number
>of reforms. Openly acknowledging the errors of the past, the new
>administration released political prisoners, and moved quickly to allow
>greater freedom, including open expression of pro-independence views.
>In practice, however, the government has been inconsistent. While it
>has permitted a number of peaceful demonstrations, other such rallies
>have been forcibly dispersed by police with resulting injuries to
>demonstrators. Likewise, even as Indonesia's Minister for Law and
>Legislation announced on December 13, 1999 that all Papuan political
>prisoners would be released, five men involved in a peaceful
>flag-raising which had taken place in the town Genyem on July 1, 1999,
>were charged with rebellion by a state prosecutor in Jayapura.
>Although those charges eventually were dropped, authorities are now
>investigating a series of peaceful flag-raising ceremonies held
>throughout the province on December 1, 1999 and nine people already have
>been named as suspects.
>
>
>
>
>Attachment Converted: "H:\Eudora\Attach\Paprept.wpd"
>
Urmi Shah
Press & Information
Human Rights Watch, London
Email: shahu@gn.apc.org
Tel: 020 7713 1995
=======================================================

**************************************************
Paul Barber
TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign,
25 Plovers Way, Alton Hampshire GU34 2JJ
Tel/Fax: 01420 80153
Email: plovers@gn.apc.org
Internet: www.gn.apc.org/tapol
Defending victims of oppression in Indonesia and
East Timor, 1973-2000
**************************************************

======================================================= BR>
Subj: HRW: Human Rights and Indpendence Actions in Irian Jaya
Date: 5/17/00 1:44:56 AM Central Daylight Time
From: plovers@gn.apc.org (Tapol)
To: indonesia-act@igc.apc.org, u.braun@xcc.de, slliem@xs4all.nl, taylorjb@vax.sbu.ac.uk, robinr@quaker.org.uk, jonathan.head@bbc.co.uk, reg.westpapua@gn.apc.org, u.braun@xcc.de, slliem@xs4all.nl, taylorjb@vax.sbu.ac.uk

>Embargoed for release:
>00:01 GMT May 17, 2000
>
>For more information contact:
>Joe Saunders (New York) (O) +1 212 216 1207 (H) 1 718 398 8893
>Mike Jendrzejczyk (Washington) (O) +1 202 612 4341 (H) 1 301 585 5824
>Urmi Shah (London) (O) +44 20 7713 1995
>Jean-Paul Marthoz (Brussels) (O) + 32 2 732 2009
>
> INDONESIA: HUMAN RIGHTS AND INDEPENDENCE ACTIONS IN IRIAN JAYA
>
>(New York, May 17, 2000)�Human Rights Watch today called on Indonesian
>authorities to stop harassing organizers of peaceful rallies in Irian
>Jaya, where a popular pro-independence movement has publicly emerged
>over the past two years. But the international rights group also
>welcomed steps the new administration of Abdurrahman Wahid has taken
>toward respecting basic rights in the province.
>
>"President Wahid government has taken a fresh approach and made a
>long-overdue commitment to respecting basic rights in Papua, but the
>reality still does not match the rhetoric," said Joe Saunders, deputy
>Asia director at Human Rights Watch. "Protesters, including some of
>Papua's leading citizens, continue to be targeted for organizing
>peaceful rallies."
>
>In a new 38-page report, "Human Rights and Pro-Independence Actions in
>Papua, 1999-2000," Human Rights Watch details the eruption of
>independence demands in the province following Soeharto's forced
>resignation in May 1998, and documents the inconsistent and at times
>repressive government response. (President Abdurrahman Wahid renamed
>the province "Papua" in a visit on January 1, 2000, in deference to the
>wishes of the indigenous population of the island, but the Indonesian
>parliament has yet to officially endorse the name change.)
>
>The report in particular credits Wahid, who took office in October 1999,
>with releasing political prisoners and announcing that peaceful
>political expression, including expression of pro-independence views,
>would no longer be treated as a criminal offense. Wahid has also stated
>unambiguously that the Indonesian government would not recognize Papuan
>demands for independence.
>
>Papua, Indonesia's largest province, comprising more than one-fifth of
>the country's total land area, was first put under Indonesian control in
>1963. It was formally incorporated into Indonesia in 1969 in a
>still-controversial U.N.-approved process. For many years, the province
>was categorized as a military combat zone and under an effective state
>of martial law, ostensibly because of the threat posed by the Free Papua
>Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka or OPM), an armed group engaged in a
>generally low-level guerrilla campaign for independence. At the same
>time, many Papuans sought to express their support for independence
>through peaceful means, notably the symbolic public raising of the
>"Morning Star" flag which had first flown openly when local people
>sought to free the territory from Dutch colonial rule in 1961.
>
>Under Soeharto, such flag-raising ceremonies and other pro-independence
>manifestations were ruthlessly suppressed. Demonstrators were forcibly
>dispersed and assaulted, and leading activists were subjected to
>arbitrary arrest and detention. Such activists frequently were
>prosecuted and imprisoned under harsh laws dealing with subversion and
>rebellion, as well as the notorious "hate sowing" articles of the
>Indonesian penal code.
>
>Indigenous Papuans, who are Melanesians and darker-skinned than the
>numerically and politically dominant Javanese and members of most other
>ethnic groups in Indonesia, were also subject to ethnic and racial
>discrimination. While Indonesian rule brought unprecedented economic
>development, it also resulted in an influx of immigrants from other
>parts of Indonesia and caused resentment among Papuans as the benefits
>went disproportionately to foreign investors and these immigrants. When
>Soeharto was forced from power in May 1998, many of these long repressed
>sentiments could be made public for the first time.
>
>The strength of pro-independence sentiment was unmistakable as early as
>February 1999, when 100 Papuan leaders met with then-President Habibie
>to initiate what was being hailed as a "National Dialogue" on Papuan
>concerns. But the leaders presented President Habibie with a single
>demand: independence. This clearly shocked and displeased the Habibie
>government, which had encouraged the National Dialogue up to then, and
>the process was soon suspended. In April 1999, the government reverted
>to the methods used during the Soeharto era, attempting to round up
>independence supporters and censor discussion of the subject. The
>crackdown included bans on expression, assembly, and association,
>arbitrary arrests, and widespread intimidation of independence
>supporters.
>
>Since his election, President Abdurrahman Wahid has initiated a number
>of reforms. Openly acknowledging the errors of the past, the new
>administration released political prisoners, and moved quickly to allow
>greater freedom, including open expression of pro-independence views.
>In practice, however, the government has been inconsistent. While it
>has permitted a number of peaceful demonstrations, other such rallies
>have been forcibly dispersed by police with resulting injuries to
>demonstrators. Likewise, even as Indonesia's Minister for Law and
>Legislation announced on December 13, 1999 that all Papuan political
>prisoners would be released, five men involved in a peaceful
>flag-raising which had taken place in the town Genyem on July 1, 1999,
>were charged with rebellion by a state prosecutor in Jayapura.
>Although those charges eventually were dropped, authorities are now
>investigating a series of peaceful flag-raising ceremonies held
>throughout the province on December 1, 1999 and nine people already have
>been named as suspects.
>
>
>
>
>Attachment Converted: "H:\Eudora\Attach\Paprept.wpd"
>
Urmi Shah
Press & Information
Human Rights Watch, London
Email: shahu@gn.apc.org
Tel: 020 7713 1995
=======================================================

**************************************************
Paul Barber
TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign,
25 Plovers Way, Alton Hampshire GU34 2JJ
Tel/Fax: 01420 80153
Email: plovers@gn.apc.org
Internet: www.gn.apc.org/tapol
Defending victims of oppression in Indonesia and
East Timor, 1973-2000

=======================================================

Subj: Indonesia Official to Quit If US Pressures on Freeport Policy
Date: 5/17/00 1:42:56 AM Central Daylight Time
From: plovers@gn.apc.org (Tapol)
To: reg.westpapua@gn.apc.org, u.braun@xcc.de, slliem@xs4all.nl, taylorjb@vax.sbu.ac.uk

Received from Joyo Indonesian News

Indonesia Official to Quit If US Pressures on Freeport Policy

JAKARTA, May 16 Antara/Asia Pulse - The Director General of General Mining
Affairs Surna Tjahja Djajadiningrat says he is ready to resign if the US
government pressures Jakarta against his policy over PT Freeport Indonesia
(FI).

He recently imposed a restriction on the company, a US gold and copper mining
firm operating in Irian Jaya, for dumping its over-burden waste into Lake
Wanagon.

"So far, there has not been any pressure from the United States," he said in
connection with his policy issued after the occurrence of a landslide on May
4 at FI's Grassberg waste material dumping location in the Jayawijaya
mountain range which caused flooding in its mining site and the disappearance
of four workers.

The incident was the third of its kind to have occurred in the past two years.

Surna said as long as FI could offer no alternative to handling its
overburden waste, the restriction would remain.

Earlier, Surna said FI's mining operations were expected to last for two more
months after the ban on the dumping of its overburden waste.

**************************************************
Paul Barber
TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign,
25 Plovers Way, Alton Hampshire GU34 2JJ
Tel/Fax: 01420 80153
Email: plovers@gn.apc.org
Internet: www.gn.apc.org/tapol
Defending victims of oppression in Indonesia and
East Timor, 1973-2000

=======================================================

Subj: Shareholders' Critique of Freeport Environmental Audit [Pt 2 of 2]
Date: 5/17/00 1:43:50 AM Central Daylight Time
From: plovers@gn.apc.org (Tapol)
To: reg.westpapua@gn.apc.org, u.braun@xcc.de, slliem@xs4all.nl, taylorjb@vax.sbu.ac.uk

Received from Joyo Indonesian News

-Part 2 of 2-

Comments and concerns with the Montgomery Watson Audit that the Seattle
Mennonite Church [shareholders] submitted to Freeport McMoRan Copper and Gold
at its Annual Meeting on 4 May 2000

===============

6.7.2 pp. 6-14/15 Regarding studies and monitoring of the tailings
disposal area, MW provides no assessment of the seriousness of PTFI's
failures to carry out the following :

� Data are not stored in a database that allows easy access and compilation
for analyses.
� Data on coastal nekton and plankton sampling have not been completely
analyzed
� PTFI has not developed a routine program for sampling mangrove invertebrates
� Benthos monitoring sampling was carried out in 1997 but the number of
stations were too few to draw firm conclusions
� Crocodile and turtle habitat and impacts have not been fully addressed
� The last biodiversity survey was completed in 1997
� Environmental monitoring and management at the portsite has been
inadequate and reporting has not been comprehensive or focused.

The results of this failure of PTFI and FCX to carryout baseline surveys
and studies is that it becomes increasingly difficult to identify adverse
impacts to the Ajkwa estuary from every increasing levels of mining and
dumping of tailings.

p. 6-15 MW notes the management and monitoring program for the ADA levee
system and concludes that the management of the entire ADA "meets or
exceeds the state-of-the practice for tailings containment systems." This
report does not include any breeches of the levee system or explain why
PTFI's attempt to raise the existing 2 meter cross levee to a height of 5
meters failed. (p. 3-4). How can MW make this conclusion? What recent
levee system failures have taken place? What emergency levee failure plan
did MW review? What is the worst case scenario in the event of a levee
failure?

p. 6-17 MW states under "7. Continuously manage, monitor and study the
conservation of ecosystems and biodiversity within PTFI's COW area." MW
concludes that "PTFI is diligent with the monitoring and study of
ecosystems and biodiversity within the COW and Project Area and has
fulfilled this commitment." How can MW reach this conclusion when on p.
6-15 it states that PTFI has not done a biodiversity survey since 1997?

p. 6-17 MW continues to show its bias by concluding that "PTFI has taken
proactive steps to implement efforts for clean technology. This commitment
is manifested in efforts to implement the Molecular Technology Recognition
(sic.) . . ." MW at this points ignores the fact, noted elsewhere (p.
3-10) that the MRT is not operating "due to sediment plugging".

6.7.3 p. 6-18 This section states that MW was able to read the latest
internal audit. Does this imply that MW was unable to review all the
internal audits?

p. 6-18 MW only states that PTFI has formed an Environmental Advisory
Council that met in the first quarter of 1999. Please identify who is on
this Committee, how often it meets, and what recommendations it has made to
PTFI.

p. 6-18 PTFI committed to stop using CFC substances by the end of 2000.
However, PTFI now says it can not meet this commitment. As a result, "GOI
has modified the requirements." This appears to be a persistent pattern.
PTFI makes a commitment, can not meet its commitment, and the GOI modifies
the requirements. This is not living up to the terms and agreements of its
commitments.

p. 6-18 MW claims that PTFI has satisfied their commitment on greenhouse
gas emissions. However, MW provides no quantitative data on either
reporting or targets. Once again, the reviewer has no way of
substantiating these conclusions.

p. 6-19 MW claims that PTFI has addressed the reclamation program
commitment and is working toward the reclamation of 16 ha in the mine area
as stated in the 300K RKL. There is no data provided to show whether PTFI
will have 16 hectares of reclamation in the mine area in the year 1996-2000
period as required. As previously, stated, if the discussion on page 6-23
is understood, PTFI has not reclaimed the 16 hectares of overburden
stockpiles by Year 2000 as required. Therefore it can not be in material
compliance with this requirement.

p. 6-19 MW states that PTFI voluntarily committed to the GOI to assist
with the development of aquaculture in the Timika area. Aquaculture is an
environmentally destructive activity. What environmental impact
assessments have been carried out by PTFI?

p. 6-19 MW states that it is not aware whether approval to use the Wanagon
Catchment Basin for sludge disposal has been granted. Why didn't MW pick
up the phone and find out?

p. 6-19 MW states that PTFI designed and built a treatment plant for the
ARD using MRT and that they are in the process of testing these
technologies. Why didn't MW disclose in this section that the MRT is not
working?

p. 6-20 MW states that PTFI begun collecting data for the Alpine Lakes
Water Balance Study but has not satisfied this commitment to complete this
study.

p. 6-20 MW states that PTFI has not satisfied the commitment to monitor
the air quality at the lime plant and that the lime plant exhaust stack is
not equipped with monitoring equipment, therefore, continuous measurements
cannot be conducted. MW has concluded that the current ore body has
undiscounted future revenues of approximately $US 44.3 billion and that
adequate funds are available for mine closure and reclamation. Why then
are there no monitoring equipment installed on the lime plant?

p. 6-20 MW states that PTFI has met the commitment of the reclamation
requirements discussed in Section 4.0. However, as previously noted, PTFI
has not reclaimed the 16 hectares of overburden stockpiles by Year 2000 as
required. How can MW conclude that PTFI is compliance with this requirement?

p. 6-20 MW states that a Tailings Review Committee (Panel) has been
established. MW fails to disclose the membership of this Committee
(Panel), the number of times they have met or any recommendations they have
made. Therefore, there is no way of knowing how PTFI has met this commitment.

p. 6-20 MW states that "The Quarterly and Annual Reports do not adequately
report on what is occurring in the marine and offshore areas. Information
on seawater quality was also not addressed in the reports." MW provides no
explanation for why this data is missing. Nor does MW explain how water
quality changes can be tracked when baseline data has not been collected.

p. 6-21 MW states that PTFI will provide DOME with copies of all satellite
imageries obtained by PTFI. Has this been done? Did MW examine these
satellite images?

p. 6.7.5 p. 6-22 MW states that the 1996 Dames & Moore environmental
report addressed "perceived significant and/or controversial issues". Why
does MW label these issues as "perceived"? Is it MW's conclusion that none
of these issues were real?

p. 6-23 MW states that "PTFI has maintained a comprehensive monitoring
system that extends from the mine site and process area to the Arafura
Sea." This is another one of MW general conclusions that is not supported
by statements found elsewhere in the audit. For example, on p. 6-15 it
states, "The last biodiversity survey was completed in 1997." while on p.
6-20 it states, "The Quarterly and Annual Reports do not adequately report
on what is occurring in the marine and offshore areas. Information on
seawater quality was also not addressed in the reports." Thus the facts do
not support the conclusions given by MW.

p. 6-23 MW states that "PTFI has fulfilled all commitments relative to
rehabilitation and reclamation. This obligation has included the
reclamation of 75 hectares per year adjacent to the ADA and 16 hectares of
overburden stockpiles by Year 2000." Nowhere in the audit does MW confirm
that PTFI has completed the reclamation of 16 hectares of overburden
stockpiles. (p. 6-13 "PTFI is working toward that goal. . .") And nowhere
is there any information given on the 75 hectares reclaimed adjacent to the
ADA. In fact, it is unclear why any land adjacent to the ADA would need to
be reclaimed in the first place.

p. 6-24 MW states that a CD-ROM with all biodiversity studies is available
upon request. Is this an English language CD-ROM? Please send a copy of
this CD-ROM.

CHAPTER 7 ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING

7.1 p. 7-1 MW is concerned that too much data is being generated under
the monitoring plan. MW has failed to address the software component of
database management and focused only on the "manpower" requirement.

p. 7-2 MW discusses the surface water sampling locations along the river
system. Again, there are no maps provided to show the location of any of
the sampling or monitoring stations.

p. 7-2 MW states that "S-260 has historically exhibited the highest
concentrations of dissolved copper - in the range of 0.02 to 0.05 mg/L.
Though these concentrations are higher than background concentrations, they
are still below the levels generally considered acutely toxic to most
aquatic species. From location S-260 and downgradient dissolved copper
concentrations are lower." MW provides no additional data and took no
samples of their own to verify this information. The US EPA and Australia
New Zealand Environmental Consultative Council (ANZECC) recommended maximum
concentrations of copper to protect freshwater aquatic ecosystems of 0.0029
and 0.005 mg/L respectively. The levels found in the ADA appear to be far
higher than these limits. In addition, MW has failed to address chronic
impacts on aquatic ecosystems. As a result, MW has failed to provide an
adequate review of environmental impacts from dissolved copper.

p. 7-4 MW states, "Total suspended solids entering the estuary area are
still at level that could impact the local biotic community from strictly a
sediment standpoint. For example, TSS at sample point EM-270 in 1998 was
in the range of 80 mg/L." Does TSS still exceed drinking water standards
in the ADA?

p. 7-4 MW states, ". . .the presence of sulfate is indicative that the
process is maybe taking place as well as other natural processes that could
led to elevated sulfate levels." However, on page 7-5, it states,
"Elevated sulfate levels are measured in the downgradient wells." How can
MW suggest that elevated sulfate levels "is maybe taking place" when PTFI
has already measured elevated sulfate levels?

p. 7-5 MW states, ". . .the transfer conveyor from the bulk storage
building to the ships showed some spillage at transfer points. The
conveyor was down for repairs at the time of the site visit." MW fails to
indicate whether this spillage entered into water bodies or the extent and
volume of the spillage they observed. It is interesting that MRT and the
conveyor system was out of commission just when the audit team made their
site visit. What effort was made to revisit these areas at a later date?

p. 7-5 MW mentions pumping of bilge water and discharge of ballast . What
are the regulations and internal (PTFI) policies on these activities?

p. 7-5 MW states that copper concentrations in the vicinity of the port
are below 0.1 mg/l. Isn't this still, far higher than the US EPA and
Australia New Zealand Environmental Consultative Council (ANZECC)
recommended maximum concentrations of copper to protect freshwater aquatic
ecosystems of 0.0029 and 0.005 mg/L respectively?. The levels found in the
port area appear to be far higher than these limits.

pp. 7-5/6 MW states that a study of sediment samples in the estuarine
environment was carried out by PTFI in 1997 and compared to the Australian
and New Zealand Environment and Conservation Council guidelines. However,
no data or study results are presented. This is yet another example of MW
merely describing PTFI studies without verification or analysis of the
results.

7.1.1 p. 7-6 MW states, "Montgomery Watson did not believe it was
necessary to independently collect and analyze samples during the audit
even the audit scope clearly allowed for sample collection and analysis to
occur."
Independent sample analysis was one of the key components contained in the
environmental audit scope of work. Failure to carry out independent sample
analysis renders the entire environmental audit useless and is yet another
example of PTFI's refusal to allow or commit to a real outside independent
audit.

7.2.1.2 p. 7-8 MW states that PTFI has placed more emphasis on monitoring
fish and invertebrates that are highly mobile and can not be accurately
used to evaluate tailings disposal influences on aquatic environment or
biota. This report verifies that PTFI has been monitoring the aquatic
system since 1990 and yet persist in monitoring those species least likely
to show impacts and ignore those species most likely to show impacts.

p. 7-8 MW states that ". . .the analysis of the copper concentrations in
mollusks and macrobrachiuim (fresh water shrimp) should be compared with
these species in non-impacted areas to determine if these copper levels are
due to the PTFI operations." This seems imply that these organisms show
elevated levels of copper but there is nothing in the text nor are their
any studies cited to document that this is the case. This appears to be
another example of PTFI information that has been withheld from the
environmental audit.

7.2.1.3 p. 7-9 MW states, "The results that have been documented in these
reports [Quarterly Environmental reports] seem to be inconsistent in
fulfilling the PTFI commitment to determine the trace metals contained in
several fish tissues as stated above. In these Quarterly Reports
(1998-1999), the results did not mention bioaccumulation (Cu, As, Zn, HG,
Se and Pg) in fish tissues." What explanation does PTFI for not carrying
out this commitment?

7.2.2 p. 7-10 MW states, "Studies have concluded that the Cu and Ag were
good indicators of tailings presence and were clearly elevated in sediment
and water off the mouth of the tailings estuaries." Why has PTFI been so
slow to carry out chronic and bioaccumulation testing in the ADA and
estuarine areas?

7.4.3 p. 7-12 MW provides a general discussion of reclamation, but
provides no specific information on the reclamation sites that are suppose
to meet the reclamation goals. What specific review of reclamation sites
did MW make in both the overburden and ADA areas?

Chapter 8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1.2 p. 8-3 MW states that "Over time, and as the upper reaches of the
ADA are raised, the fraction of tailings that is deposited in the Ajkwa
Estuary and Arafura Sea will increase to approximately one third." How
does the Environmental Risk Assessment (ERA) intend to measure impacts when
so little background data has been collected?

p. 8-3 MW states that "Concentrations of sulfate higher than background
have been noted in some of the wells, but no trends have been noted."
Once again, this section is purposefully vague. It does not identify the
well sites (and the discussion on pp. 7-4/5 does not adequately identify
the location or number of well sites, either) or specific concentrations.
Why did MW fail to recommend the installation of additional groundwater
wells when on p. 7-4 it states that the general direction of groundwater
flow under the ADA is toward the Timika side of the river system?

8.1.4 pp. 8-6/7 MW states that ". . .the [sanitary treatment] plants were
well operated, in compliance with effluent standards, but in some
situations, hydraulically overloaded." How can these plants be well
operated, in compliance with effluent standards and hydraulically
overloaded? Are discharge monitoring reports prepared for these plants?
Did MW review any such plants? How many water quality discharge violations
have occurred at these plants since 1997?

8.1.5 p. 8-7 MW states that "Ash from the incinerator is disposed in the
landfill. The ash has been tested and found to be non-hazardous under B3
standards." Would this ash be hazardous under US EPA standards?

p. 8-8 MW states that PTFI is currently assembling data on tailings to
submit to BAPEDAL to support an exemption of tailings as a B3 waste. .
.Montgomery Watson believes that obtaining this exemption is very important
to the PTFI operations and believes that, for technical and environmental
reasons, the exemption should be granted." The purpose of an environmental
audit is provide an independent review of plans, management and operation.
MW has crossed the line by promoting PTFI policies and lobbying on behalf
of PTFI in a blatant attempt to influence BAPEDAL policy.

8.2 p. 8-9 MW states that "PTFI has established significant resources to
cover closure and reclamation . . ." MW has failed to analyze other mine
closure problems elsewhere in the world or even other mines in Indonesia or
Papua New Guinea. In addition MW has failed to evaluate the likelihood
that heap leaching of mine tailings will occur given the high content of
copper and gold remaining in the tailings.

8.3 p. 8-10 MW states that ISO 14001 will achieve international standards
in the environmental industry. MW has failed to disclose that ISO is a
voluntary industry generated set of standards that contain no enforcement
mechanism.

In conclusion, the environmental audit produced by MW is barely more than a
promotional brochure for PTFI. It falls far short of the comprehensive
environmental audit that is required for an operation of this scope and
adverse impacts.

=================

1 May 2000

RE: Montgomery Watson Environmental Audit of PTFI Copper and Gold mining
operation in West Papua, Indonesia

The following is a list of specific references of concerns taken from the
MW Environmental Audit that show serious shortcoming that undermines PTFI
and MW assertion that PTFI's environmental systems and programs are
comprehensive and effective and that they have fulfilled their
environmental commitments and requirements. (p. E-11)

3.2.2 p. 3-4 MW stated that PTFI was unsuccessful at raising the
existing 2 meter cross levee to a height of 5 meters. What impact does
this have on the ADA?

3.3.1 p. 3-9 PTFI has installed groundwater-monitoring wells between
overburden stockpiles of the northern Grasberg Fairy Lakes. But pumps have
not been installed.

3.3.1 p. 3-9 ". . .neither a hydrologic model nor monitoring wells have
been developed to demonstrate that groundwater contamination outside the
process area is not occurring."

p. 3-10 "The MRT [Molecular Recognition Technology plant] was found to be
chemically effective but is currently not operating due to sediment plugging."

3.3.4 p. 3-12 MW states that PTFI is minimizing the infiltration of water
and sulfide oxidation within overburden. MW provides no discussion or
evaluation of how this is being carried out. In fact, MW admits, "The
final design criteria for these two important management practices
(blending ratios and cover design) for prevention of ARD will be developed
based on the outcome of current studies."

p. 3-13 "The current strategy is to use Type 2 material to cap overburden
during the limestone deficit period. It is not clear that the Type 2
[non-acid forming] material will be effective in minimizing ARD production
by either limiting oxygen diffusion or water infiltration into reactive
waste stock."

p. 3-13 This section raises questions concerning whether capping of the
OBS with Type 1 (limestone) will sufficient to adequately buffer Type 3, 4,
5 and 6 rock types.

3.4 p. 3-14 MW states that coal ash from the power plant (location
unspecified) had overflowed the contained area and flowed into an adjacent
mangrove swamp and that "some loss to the adjacent area was not considered
a major problem. Also that vehicle tracking of the ash outside the
contained area was noted. What evidence is there showing that fly ash from
the coal plant is not hazardous?

6.4 p. 6-4 MW states that routine field visits be conducted to assure
that program implementation is according to plan. Why are routine field
visits not being carried out?

p. 6-4 MW states that the results of environmental inspections were not
necessarily communicated to the operations personnel.

6.5 pp. 6-4/5 MW states that the Environmental Management Manual was last
updated in April 1998 but the EMM has not been kept current. What parts of
the EMM are out of date?

6.6 p. 6-5 MW states that under PTFI's internal audit, findings and
response to non-compliance issues and failures to follow Best Management
Practices are reported directly to senior FCX management.

6.6 pp. 6-5/6 MW states that "communication by PTFI with certain
government agencies, such as BAPEDAL, were ineffective and that as a
result, relationships have suffered and misunderstandings have arisen."

6.7 p. 6-6 MW states that "There are, however, some conditions and/or
practices that were exceptions to conformance with regulatory and other
requirements such as AMDAL commitments." However, MW does not identify
what these exceptions are. This is another example of the lack of
disclosure in MW's environmental review.

p. 6-8. MW states that the concentration of copper immediately below the
Wanagon Catchment Basin was measured between 0.021 and 48 mg/L in the first
quarter of 1999 and, "therefore is also out of compliance with water
quality standards".

p. 6-8 MW states that "for a significant part of 1998, the Wanagon
Catchment Basin pH level was below 6.0 as stipulated in the 300K RKL
commitment."

p. 6-10 MW states that the TCLP testing of tailings did not meet the
standards in PP18 but does meet the standards in the new PP85 (October 1999).

p. 6-11 MW states that the First Quarterly Report 1999 and the Annual
Report 1998 did not include seawater quality data.

p. 6-12 MW states that "Based on the 1999 RKL/RPL Quarterly Reports,
vibration level monitoring has not been addressed.

p. 6-13 MW states that under Director General of Mines Decree No.
693K/008/DDJP/ 1996 for Mitigation of Erosion during Mining and
Reclamation, the Cartenz Overburden Stockpile would have 16 hectares of
reclamation in the mine area in the year 1996-2000 period. "PTFI is
working toward that goal and is in material compliance with this
requirement." MW has provided no evidence that PTFI will meet this goal.
Therefore it can not be in material compliance with this requirement.

p. 6-13 MW states that under Government Regulation 19/1999 on Control of
Pollution and/or Degradation of the Sea, "(1) any responsible person of any
undertaking and/or activity that may cause sea pollution is obligated to
undertake measures to prevent sea pollution." According to MW, PTFI is
"clearly implementing measures to reduce the impact of the tailings
disposal on the marine ecosystem." Impacts may be reduced, but this
government regulation states that measures must be taken to "prevent" sea
pollution. Therefore, PTFI can not be in material compliance with this
requirement.

6.72 pp. 6-14/15 Regarding studies and monitoring of the tailings disposal
area, MW provides no assessment of the seriousness of PTFI's failures to
carry out the following :

� Data are not stored in a database that allows easy access and compilation
for analyses.
� Data on coastal nekton and plankton sampling have not been completely
analyzed
� PTFI has not developed a routine program for sampling mangrove invertebrates
� Benthos monitoring sampling was carried out in 1997 but the number of
stations were too few to draw firm conclusions
� Crocodile and turtle habitat and impacts have not been fully addressed
� The last biodiversity survey was completed in 1997
� Environmental monitoring and management at the portsite has been
inadequate and reporting has not been comprehensive or focused.

6.7.2 p. 6-16. MW states that

� PTFI has developed a program for sampling mangrove invertebrates, but it
needs to be expanded
� The number of organisms of each species analyzed from each site has been
variable, reducing the quality of statistical comparisons.

p. 6-17 MW section states under "7. Continuously manage, monitor and study
the conservation of ecosystems and biodiversity within PTFI's COW area."
MW concludes that "PTFI is diligent with the monitoring and study of
ecosystems and biodiversity within the COW and Project Area and has
fulfilled this commitment." How can MW reach this conclusion when on p.
6-15 it states that PTFI has not done a biodiversity survey since 1997?

p. 6-18 PTFI committed to stop using CFC substances by the end of 2000.
However, PTFI now says it can not meet this commitment. As a result, "GOI
has modified the requirements." This appears to be a persistent pattern.
PTFI makes a commitment, can not meet its commitment, and the GOI modifies
the requirements. This is not living up to the terms and agreements of its
commitments.

p. 6-20 MW states that PTFI begun collecting data for the Alpine Lakes
Water Balance Study but has not satisfied this commitment to complete this
study.

p. 6-20 MW states that PTFI has not satisfied the commitment to monitor
the air quality at the lime plant and that the lime plant exhaust stack is
not equipped with monitoring equipment, therefore, continuous measurements
cannot be conducted.

p. 6-20 MW states that "The Quarterly and Annual Reports do not adequately
report on what is occurring in the marine and offshore areas. Information
on seawater quality was also not addressed in the reports." MW provides no
explanation for why this data is missing.

p. 7-4 MW states, "Total suspended solids entering the estuary area are
still at level that could impact the local biotic community from strictly a
sediment standpoint. For example, TSS at sample point EM-270 in 1998 was
in the range of 80 mg/L."

p. 7-5 MW states, "Elevated sulfate levels are measured in the
downgradient wells."

p. 7-5 MW states, ". . .the transfer conveyor from the bulk storage
building to the ships showed some spillage at transfer points. The
conveyor was down for repairs at the time of the site visit."

7.1.1 p. 7-6 MW states, "Montgomery Watson did not believe it was
necessary to independently collect and analyze samples during the audit
even the audit scope clearly allowed for sample collection and analysis to
occur."

7.2.1.2 p. 7-8 MW states that PTFI has placed more emphasis on monitoring
fish and invertebrates that are highly mobile and can not be accurately
used to evaluate tailings disposal influences on aquatic environment or
biota. This report verifies that PTFI has been monitoring the aquatic
system since 1990 and yet persist in monitoring those species least likely
to show impacts and ignore those species most likely to show impacts.

p. 7.8 MW states that ". . .the analysis of the copper concentrations in
mollusks and macrobrachiuim (fresh water shrimp) should be compared with
these species in non-impacted areas to determine if these copper levels are
due to the PTFI operations."

7.2.1.3 p. 7-9 MW states, "The results that have been documented in these
reports [Quarterly Environmental reports] seem to be inconsistent in
fulfilling the PTFI commitment to determine the trace metals contained in
several fish tissues as stated above. In these Quarterly Reports
(1998-1999), the results did not mention bioaccumulation (Cu, As, Zn, HG,
Se and Pg) in fish tissues."

7.2.2 p. 7-10 MW states, "Studies have concluded that the Cu and Ag were
good indicators of tailings presence and were clearly elevated in sediment
and water off the mouth of the tailings estuaries."

8.1.2 p. 8-3 MW states that "Over time, and as the upper reaches of the
ADA are raised, the fraction of tailings that is deposited in the Ajkwa
Estuary and Arafura Sea will increase to approximately one third."

p. 8-3 MW states that "Concentrations of sulfate higher than background
have been noted in some of the wells, but no trends have been noted."

8.1.4 MW states that ". . .the [sanitary treatment] plants were well
operated, in compliance with effluent standards, but in some situations,
hydraulically overloaded."

p. 8-8 MW states that PTFI is currently assembling data on tailings to
submit to BAPEDAL to support an exemption of tailings as a B3 waste. .
.Montgomery Watson believes that obtaining this exemption is very important
to the PTFI operations and believes that, for technical and environmental
reasons, the exemption should be granted."

-End-

**************************************************
Paul Barber
TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign,
25 Plovers Way, Alton Hampshire GU34 2JJ
Tel/Fax: 01420 80153
Email: plovers@gn.apc.org
Internet: www.gn.apc.org/tapol
Defending victims of oppression in Indonesia and
East Timor, 1973-2000

=======================================================

Subj: Shareholders' Critique of Freeport Environmental Audit [Pt 1 of 2]
Date: 5/17/00 1:43:33 AM Central Daylight Time
From: plovers@gn.apc.org (Tapol)
To: reg.westpapua@gn.apc.org, u.braun@xcc.de, slliem@xs4all.nl, taylorjb@vax.sbu.ac.uk

Received from Joyo Indonesian News

Received by Joyo on May 16, 2000

-Part 1 of 2-

Three sections:

- Cover letter;

- Brief comment on collapse of Freeport's Wanagon dump site ["Overburden
Stockpile"]

- Comments and concerns with the Montgomery Watson Audit that the Seattle
Mennonite Church submitted to Freeport McMoRan Copper and Gold at its Annual
Meeting on 4 May 2000

================

-cover letter:

Dear Joyo: You are certainly more than welcome to run this short note with my
name. I am also including below a copy of the comments and concerns with
the Montgomery Watson Audit that the Seattle Mennonite Church submitted to
Freeport McMoRan Copper and Gold at its Annual Meeting on 4 May 2000. You
are welcome to distribute this as well. - David E. Ortman

======

-comment on collapse of Freeport's Wanagon dump site ["Overburden Stockpile"]

From: David E. Ortman, Seattle ,WA (206) 789-6136
(representing Seattle Mennonite Church, FCX Shareholders)

So much for Freeport's Environmental Audit prepared by Montgomery Watson
which called Freeport's operations world class and state of the art:
"PTFI has incorporated modern, state-of-the practice geotechnical stability
techniques in siting and designing the Wanagon and Carstenz OBSs
[Overburden Stockpiles]" p. 3-8.

Freeport now blames heavy rain at the mine site and overburden stockpile
area. The Montgomery Watson Environmental Audit said the opposite, "The
mine site does not receive the quantity of rain or the intensity of rain
that would place a high priority on a storm water management plan for the
mine. " p. 7-3

==========

(Submitted to Freeport McMoRan Copper and Gold at its Annual Meeting 4 May
2000)

1 May 2000

TO: Freeport McMoRan Copper and Gold
FR: David E. Ortman
% Seattle Mennonite Church
3120 NE 125th
Seattle, WA 98125

The following is a review of the December 1999 External Environmental Audit
of PT Freeport Indonesia Operations in West Papua, Indonesia by Montgomery
Watson Indonesia (MW). In most respects, this environmental audit is
inferior and less comprehensive (if that is possible) than the 1996
Environmental Audit conducted by Dames & Moore. There is almost a complete
lack of actual data, no useful maps showing monitoring or sample sites, and
many of the conclusions of compliance are not supported by the text. Most
serious is MW refusal to carry out any independent sampling, even though
this was specifically highlighted as a key component of the scope of work.

There is no separate analysis of the Executive Summary since these concerns
are repeated in the body of the audit. A response from Freeport McMoRan
Copper and Gold would be appreciated.

Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION

p. 1-5. MW states that "The tailings are discharged to the Akjwa River
system for management in the Ajkwa Deposition Area (ADA)". This is
incorrect. The tailings are discharged to the Akjwa River, but the impacts
extend beyond the ADA into the Akjwa River estuary and Arafura Sea. This
section is contradicted on p. 3-7 where it states that 5-10% of the
suspended solids enters the estuary system downstream from the ADA and that
this portion will increase in the future.

p. 1-5 MW states that in 1972, there were no native settlements around the
Timika Area. What documentation exists to support this statement? What
geographical scope is considered the Timika Area?

1.2 p. 1-7 MW fails to disclose that ISO 14001 is a voluntary, industry
derived standard with no enforcement mechanisms.

p. 1-9 MW states that the audit team flew to Irian Jaya on September 19
and completed the on-site portion of the audit on September 28. Nine days
is not a sufficient time period in which to conduct a comprehensive on-site
audit.

Chapter 2. ENVIRONMENTAL SETTING

2.1 p. 2-1 MW states that PTFI was awarded a Contract of Work in 1967.
What legal standing did this COW have given that during this time, West
Papua was denied self-determination by the government of Indonesia and
local peoples were denied democratic elections?

Chapter 3. WASTE AND OVERBURDEN MANAGEMENT

3.1 p. 3-1 MW states that PTFI does not intend to leach this material in
the future for copper recovery. Given the high levels of copper remaining
in the tailings in the ADA and Wanagon Overburden Stockpile, it is critical
that future leach treatment be evaluated for adverse environmental impacts.
Even if PTFI would not undertake such a process, it is likely that such
treatment would be undertaken by other entities.

3.2 p. 3-2 MW states that PTFI has initiated a comprehensive
Environmental Risk Assessment (ERA) to model and assess environmental
effects and potential consequent human and ecological risk that might
result from tailings disposal. PTFI began operations in 1973 almost
thirty years ago and immediately began having an impact from its tailing
disposals on the downstream river estuary system. How does PTFI intend to
carry out an ERA given the fact that no evidence has been presented showing
that PTFI has any baseline data upon which to base an Environmental Risk
Assessment? What environmental and biological data from prior to 1973
does PTFI intend to use to establish a baseline?

3.2.1 p. 3-3. Montgomery Watson has fundamentally biased its report.
Mining tailings are now listed as toxic and hazardous waste unless they
fall under the TCLP toxicity criteria. Rather than carry out independent
sampling, as allowed for under this audit, Montgomery Watson, either under
pressure from PTFI or for other reasons, refused to carry out any
independent sampling. Instead, MW asserts that "The proper classification
of tailings under PP85/1999 as a non-hazardous waste is important
technically and commercially to the PTFI operation." MW then proceeds to
draw unreferenced conclusions about other mines throughout the world. No
where does MW state that their review covered mines with the copper content
of the West Papua deposits. A proper environmental audit would have
stated, "Mining tailings that exceed TCLP standards are listed as toxic and
hazardous waste and would have a major adverse impact on the Ajkwa River
ecosystem. Therefore, in order to protect the environment from further
long term damage, independent analysis must be conducted to determine the
extent to which mining tailings exceed TCLP standards."

p. 3-3 MW also states that the tailings discharge complies with all
chemical criteria for disposal to Group B (drinking water standards). MW
has presented no evidence or studies that demonstrate that the Group B
(drinking water standard) is met at the point of discharge. In addition,
MW continuously ignores the US EPA and Australia New Zealand Environmental
Consultative Council (ANZECC) recommended maximum concentrations of copper
to protect freshwater aquatic ecosystems are 0.0029 and 0.005 mg/L
respectively. The 1996 D&M Environmental Audit documented that "In the
tailings affected river, there is a general increase in dissolved copper in
the lower river and estuarine sections, with ranges typically 0.03-0.05 mg/L".

3.2.2 p. 3-4 MW states that PTFI was unsuccessful at raising the
existing 2 meter cross levee to a height of 5 meters. What impact does
this have on the ADA? MW provides no evaluation of the Tailings Incident
Action Plan. This is typical of MW's report that describes existing
documents without providing any analysis.

3.2.3 p. 3-4/3-5 MW states that PTFI has committed to sampling of fish
and vegetation, and analyses to determine tissue metals concentrations and
that this RPL requirement has been addressed by PTFI. This appears to be
contradicted by the discussion on page 7-9 where it states, "The results
that have been documented in these reports seem to be inconsistent in
fulfilling the PTFI commitment to determine the trace metals contained in
several fish tissues." This is another example of MW's conclusion not
backed up by evidence.

p. 3-5 MW also states that established vegetation growth on tailings has
complied with closure requirements discussed in Section 4.0 This appears
to be contradicted by the discussion on p. 6-19 where it states that PTFI
is still working toward reclamation of 16 ha in the mine area. This is
another example of MW's conclusion not backed up by evidence.

3.2.4 p. 3-5 MW states that in 1994, various options for management of the
tailings using the Ajkwa River transport system were studied and that based
on the results of this study a Tailings and River Management Plan was
implemented in November. How could a Tailings and River Management Plan be
developed and implemented in such a short time frame?

p. 3-5 MW states that this tailings management system, tailings
deposition accelerates the natural land building process. The type of
massive land wasting associated with the PTFI mining operations is not a
"natural land building process". Rather it is an accelerated land
destroying process. MW states that the only options considered were
pipeline and river transport, and both land and ocean deposition. MW has
utterly failed to evaluate a mining scenario carried out a much reduced
rate which would dramatically decrease the adverse impacts downstream.
Therefore, MW conclusion on p. 3-6 that the current tailings disposal
methodology is "validated" is erroneous and faulty.

3.2.5 p. 3-6 MW states that PTFI is operating in a location where "few
large-scale mines have successfully operated in the past." However, MW,
despite its supposed completion of hundreds of third party audits and
environmental impact assessments for both industrial and mining
developments around the world, fails to list even a single lesson learned
or any explanation of what PTFI is doing differently from the large-scale
mines that have not operated successfully in the past.

p. 3-6 MW states that deposition of the tailings is contained within the
ADA. As previously stated, this is incorrect. The tailings are discharged
to the Akjwa River, but the impacts extend beyond the ADA into the Akjwa
River estuary and Arafura Sea. This section is contradicted on p. 3-7
where it states that 5-10% of the suspended solids enters the estuary
system downstream from the ADA and that this portion will increase in the
future.

p. 3-7 MW states that the site conditions "technically support the
modified ADA plan." Again, MW has utterly failed to evaluate a mining
scenario carried out a much reduced rate which would dramatically decrease
the adverse impacts downstream. Therefore, MW conclusion on p. 3-6 that
the current tailings disposal techniques are "technically support the
modified ADA plan" is erroneous and faulty.

p. 3-7 MW states that PTFI has completed state-of-the practice designs,
hydrologic analyzes and developed operations and contingency plans for the
ADA. MW provides no real evaluation of any of these items. This is typical
of MW's report. It offers description without analyses.

p. 3-7 MW states that "PTFI has implemented a comprehensive site
characterization of the levee dike footprint to accurately estimate
foundation conditions." If this is the case, why was PTFI unsuccessful at
raising the existing 2 meter cross levee to a height of 5 meters?

p. 3-7 MW states that the ADA serves as a physical and chemical control
for the majority of the tailings. What percentage of chemical control is
not contained by the ADA?

p. 3-7. MW summaries this Chapter by stating that the ERA will address the
questions of impacts of tailings into the estuary area. However, since
5-10% of the suspended solids enters the estuary system downstream from the
ADA how can PTFI determine a baseline to measure adverse impacts?

3.3 p. 3-8 MW states that the overburden management techniques are
compared to international practice for large, international mine sites.
However, MW does not provide any information or reference any other mines
that they have reviewed or compared. Nor has MW drawn any comparisons with
the nearby Ok Tedi mine in Papua New Guinea. Nor have they addressed how
dumping tailings into rivers can be done in Indonesia when similar
operations, called tabletop mining, have been found to violate the US Clean
Water Act.

p. 3-8 MW also points out a continued flaw in MW audit where they mention
"a number of reports describing overburden characterization" but fail to
footnote, reference or provide titles to these reports.

p. 3-8 MW states that there is a degree of risk associated with the
construction and operation of the Wanagon OBS. However MW fails to
quantify or characterize this risk. MW also fails to present a worst case
scenario or analyze PTFI's response plan.

3.3.1 p. 3-9 MW states that PTFI has installed groundwater-monitoring
wells between overburden stockpiles of the northern Grasberg Fairy Lakes.
But pumps have not been installed. MW has failed to provide a clear
picture of where PTFI has installed monitoring wells. No table or map
showing these sites appears in the audit. This section also states ". .
.neither a hydrologic model nor monitoring wells have been developed to
demonstrate that groundwater contamination outside the process area is not
occurring." This is a serious shortcoming that undermines PTFI and MW
assertion that PTFI's environmental systems and programs are comprehensive
and effective and that they have fulfilled their environmental commitments
and requirements. (p. E-11)

p. 3-9 MW states that leachate is treated with lime prior to flowing to
the Wanagon collection basin in order a pH of at last 6. Since MW refused
to carry out any independent analysis (even though they were allowed to do
so), what confidence is there that this is a factual statement?

p. 3-10 MW states that no evidence has been gathered indicating that
sludge generated from the treatment process is escaping the Wanagon
collection basin. This appears to be a backhanded way of saying that "no
evidence has been gathered". What evidence did MW review regarding
migration of Wanagon basin sludge?

p. 3-10 MW section states that long-term water quality will meet
Indonesian Group B at locations where the water is first likely to become a
regular source of drinking water. What water quality parameters are being
violated upriver from such locations? This section further states that
"this plan is contingent upon Freeport developing a suitable treatment
system before draining of the collection basin and the effective collection
of other sources of ARD." What confidence is there that PTFI can carry out
such a plan when their current Molecular Recognition Technology (MRT) is
not operating due to sediment plugging? How did MW verify that the MRT is
"chemically effective" if it was not operating during the audit?

3.3.2 This section also points out a continued flaw in MW audit where they
mention "extensive studies have been conducted to evaluate the volume and
sequence of dumping activities and potential measures for controlling ARD",
but fail to footnote, reference or provide titles to these studies.

Table 3.1 Why does Table 3.1 mislead the reader by labeling Type 1
overburden as Acid consuming material, but Type 3-6 as only "potentially"
acid forming. When overburden has a NAG >55 kg H2SO4/t, isn't this
considered acid forming (not "potentially" acid forming)?

3.3.3 pp. 3-11/12 MW states that "At the present time, ARD is being
produced and is characterized by water quality from the East Stream prior
to the addition of lime." Is this the only site where ARD is being
produced and characterized?

3.3.4 p. 3-12 MW states that PTFI is minimizing the infiltration of water
and sulfide oxidation within overburden. MW provides no discussion or
evaluation of how this is being carried out. In fact, MW admits, "The
final design criteria for these two important management practices
(blending ratios and cover design) for prevention of ARD will be developed
based on the outcome of current studies." Although PTFI persists in
increasing the production rate and disposal of overburden blending ratios
and cover design have still not been finalized.

p. 3-13 MW states, "The current strategy is to use Type 2 material to cap
overburden during the limestone deficit period. It is not clear that the
Type 2 [non-acid forming] material will be effective in minimizing ARD
production by either limiting oxygen diffusion or water infiltration into
reactive waste stock." Is it correct that MW has identified type 2 rock as
1.2 rather than non-acid forming as presented by PTFI. If this is the
case, why was Table 3.1 not corrected?

p. 3-13 MW section raises questions concerning whether capping of the OBS
with Type 1 (limestone) will sufficient to adequately buffer Type 3, 4, 5
and 6 rock types. What review did MW carry out of the potential of
lateral water movement through the OBS that would not be buffered by the
Type 1 cap?

p. 3-14 MW section states that ARD (which should really be called Acid
Mine Drainage) "is one of the most difficult problems facing the mining
industry." MW fails to provide any insight into approaches that have
worked or failed in other mining operations.

3.4 p. 3-14 MW states that coal ash from the power plant (location
unspecified) had overflowed the contained area and flowed into an adjacent
mangrove swamp and that "some loss to the adjacent area was not considered
a major problem. Also that vehicle tracking of the ash outside the
contained area was noted. What evidence is there showing that fly ash from
the coal plant is not hazardous?

p. 3-15. MW states that PTFI "has a policy in place not to use any PCB
oils or PCB contaminated oils in the operations. There are currently no
PCB transformers in use." However, MW does not disclose that PCB
transformers have been buried in the past nor are known locations of past
PCB disposal identified. Why did MW fail to identify past disposal
practices of PCBs?

p. 3-16. MW states that PTFI has a state-of-the-art incinerator for
burning B3 medical waste. MW fails to provide any analysis of the
emissions from this incinerator. Given the large amount of plastics that
occur in medial waste, dioxin production remains a concern. What review
did MW give to incinerator emissions?

Chapter 4 MINE CLOSURE/RECLAMATION PLAN

4.1.2 MW states that Grasberg and Ertsberg open pits will be
decommissioned without significant modification. Leaving open pits in
place does not meet the definition of reclamation. What studies have been
carried out for stabilizing these pits and refilling?

4.2 p. 4-3 MW states that PTFI has demonstrated a strong commitment for
sustainable development. Given the tremendous increase in population and
resource pressure that has resulted due to the scale and rapid extraction
of the mining operation, how can PTFI's operation be considered sustainable
development? What studies have been carried out to determine the carrying
capacity of this area?

pp. 4-3/4. MW states that a fund of $100 million will be set aside by 2041
for mine closure and reclamation. What is this factor in discounted
dollars? Give that mining sites in the U.S. (e.g. Bunker Hill, ID) are
facing billions of dollars of clean up costs, how can MW maintain that a
few million dollars is a prudent mine closure and reclamation plan AND TO
SUPPORT ON-GOING MONITORING ACTIVITIES AFTER MINE CLOSURE, unless the idea
is to walk away with minimal work? What is the estimated costs of the
on-going monitoring activities after mine closure?

4.3.1 p. 4-4 Under what permit conditions would PTFI be forced to close
down its mining operations?

4.3.2 p. 4-5 Why has MW made no reference or identified any independent
Indonesian inspections during the past three years. What independent
Indonesian inspections have taken place?

p. 4-6 MW states that the current ore reserves has undiscounted future
revenues of approximately 44.3 billion dollars. Out of this PTFI has
committed $56 million to date in support of the Integrated Timika
Development Plan which was found to be a failure in 1997. How does
committing only 1% of gross revenues to the local people from whom this
land was appropriated constitute social or environmental justice?

Chapter 5 LEGISLATIVE SETTING AND COMPLIANCE

5.1 p. 5-1 MW states that the laws and regulations that PTFI has had to
comply with have greatly changed over the thirty-two year period of their
activities in Irian Jaya. Does PTFI agree that additional regulations may
be imposed on its mining operations?

5.2.3 p. 5-5 MW states that ". . .PTFI initiates the required studies and
EIAs in response to regulations." Does this mean that PTFI would carry out
no studies on its own?

5.2.4 p. 5-6 MW lists the April 1967 PTFI Contract for Work. How can
this COW be considered valid when it was signed at a time when sovereignty
of this area was in dispute?

Chapter 6 PTFI ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

6.1 p. 6-1. This section states that MW "understands that PTFI is seeking
ISO 14001 certification in the Year 2000." Why did MW fail to disclose
that ISO is a voluntary industry initiated standards system with no
independent enforcement process?

p. 6-2 MW states that both PTFI and FCX have adopted and implemented
comprehensive environmental objectives and environmental policies. Please
explain any differences between the objectives and policies issued by PTFI
and FCX.

pp. 6-2/3 MW describes PTFI's Mission Statement and states that under each
topic PTFI has committed to specific goals and actions. However, these
specific goals and actions are not listed. None the less, MW concludes
that all goals "have been effectively acted upon. . ." How can a reviewer
conclude that this is the case when this information is not displayed?

6.4 p. 6-3. MW states that based on our [MW] observations, both Mr. Marsh
and Dr. Susetyo are well informed on the environmental issues of the PTFI
operations. . ." How can MW arrive at this conclusion based on mere
observation? Where any interviews conducted with either of these two
individuals?

6.4 p. 6-4 MW states that routine field visits be conducted to assure that
program implementation is according to plan. Why are routine field visits
not being carried out?

p. 6-4 MW states that the results of environmental inspections were not
necessarily communicated to the operations personnel.

6.5 pp. 6-5/6 MW states that the Environmental Management Manual was last
updated in April 1998 but the EMM has not been kept current. What parts of
the EMM are out of date?

6.6 p. 6-5 MW states that under PTFI's internal audit, findings and
response to non-compliance issues and failures to follow Best Management
Practices are reported directly to senior FCX management. In what areas
have internal audits turned up non-compliance issues and failures to follow
Best Management Practices?

6.7 p. 6-6 MW states that "There are, however, some conditions and/or
practices that were exceptions to conformance with regulatory and other
requirements such as AMDAL commitments." However, MW does not identify
what these exceptions are. This is another example of the lack of
disclosure in MW's environmental review.

p. 6-7 MW claims that "There is a clear distinction between compliance
requirements versus commitments such as those made in the 300k AMDAL or the
previous 1996 External Environmental Audit . . .Commitments may be
voluntary. . ." Please identify all PTFI commitments that PTFI
considers voluntary.

6.7.1 p. 6-7 MW describes sulfate levels (e.g. 976 to 1,446 mg/L at sample
station No. 54 in 1998) at various sample stations. However, MW provides
no maps or locations for these sampling stations, making it impossible for
the review to evaluate this information. Please provide a map showing the
location of all sampling stations referenced in this report.

p. 6-8. MW states that the concentration of copper immediately below the
Wanagon Catchment Basin was measured between 0.021 and 48 mg/L in the first
quarter of 1999 and, "therefore is also out of compliance with water
quality standards". What accounts for this dramatic fluctuation in
readings during the first quarter of 1999?

p. 6-8 MW states that copper levels drop downstream from Lake Wanagon and
achieve water quality standards at sampling station No. 57 and at the
Otomona Bridge sampling station. Do copper levels meet US EPA and
Australia New Zealand Environmental Consultative Council (ANZECC)
recommended maximum concentrations of copper to protect freshwater aquatic
ecosystems are 0.0029 and 0.005 mg/L respectively at these locations?

p. 6-8 MW states that "for a significant part of 1998, the Wanagon
Catchment Basin pH level was below 6.0 as stipulated in the 300K RKL
commitment." When was this problem first brought to the attention of
BAPEDAL? What enforcement took place? Were any penalties paid?

p. 6-9 MW again states that water in the Ajkwa River and ADA meets US EPA
and World Health Organization drinking water standards for metals,
including copper. Do copper levels meet US EPA and Australia New Zealand
Environmental Consultative Council (ANZECC) recommended maximum
concentrations of copper to protect freshwater aquatic ecosystems are
0.0029 and 0.005 mg/L respectively at these locations? Does water in the
Ajkwa River and ADA meet TSS standards for drinking water?

p. 6-9 MW states that the Wanagon overburden stockpiles are "potential ARD
generation sources." Why does MW persist in labeling these areas
"potential ARD generation sources" when they are known to be ARD generation
sources?

p. 6-10 MW states that PTFI refuses to do any groundwater monitoring at the
downstream Wanagon stockpile before the Kucing Liar tunnel is operated. MW
"has assumed the above conditions have been approved by DOME." Why didn't
MW pick up the phone, contact DOME and confirm this rather than taking
PTFI's word for this?

p. 6-10 MW states that the TCLP testing of tailings did not meet the
standards in PP18 but does meet the standards in the new PP85 (October
1999). Please identify all other instances where PTFI failed to meet
requirements that were later relaxed to allow PTFI to come into compliance.

p. 6-11 MW states that according to the First Quarterly Report 1999,
copper ranging from <0.005 to 0.024 at EM-270 and <0.005 to 0.011 at
EM-340. Is it correct that this is well above the US EPA and Australia New
Zealand Environmental Consultative Council (ANZECC) recommended maximum
concentrations of copper to protect freshwater aquatic ecosystems of 0.0029
and 0.005 mg/L respectively?

p. 6-11 MW states that the First Quarterly Report 1999 and the Annual
Report 1998 did not include seawater quality data. Why was this data not
collected? Did this violate any requirement or commitment by PTFI?

p. 6-12 MW states that "Based on the 1999 RKL/RPL Quarterly Reports,
vibration level monitoring has not been addressed. Why was this data not
collected? Did this violate any requirement or commitment by PTFI?

p. 6-13 MW states that under Director General of Mines Decree No.
693K/008/DDJP/ 1996 for Mitigation of Erosion during Mining and
Reclamation, the Cartenz Overburden Stockpile would have 16 hectares of
reclamation in the mine area in the year 1996-2000 period. [Note, on page
6-23 this is defined as the reclamation of 75 hectares per year adjacent to
the ADA and 16 hectares of overburden stockpiles by Year 2000. It is now
Year 2000.] "PTFI is working toward that goal and is in material compliance
with this requirement." MW has provided no evidence that PTFI will meet
this goal. If the discussion on page 6-23 is understood, PTFI has not
reclaimed the 16 hectares of overburden stockpiles by Year 2000 as
required. Therefore it can not be in material compliance with this
requirement.

p. 6-13 MW states that under Government Regulation 19/1999 on Control of
Pollution and/or Degradation of the Sea, "(1) any responsible person of any
undertaking and/or activity that may cause sea pollution is obligated to
undertake measures to prevent sea pollution." According to MW, PTFI is
"clearly implementing measures to reduce the impact of the tailings
disposal on the marine ecosystem." Impacts may be reduced, but this
government regulation states that measures must be taken to "prevent" sea
pollution. Therefore, PTFI can not be in material compliance with this
requirement. MW failure to identify this as a serious problem casts doubt
on MW's credibility.

-End Part 1 of 2 -

**************************************************
Paul Barber
TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign,
25 Plovers Way, Alton Hampshire GU34 2JJ
Tel/Fax: 01420 80153
Email: plovers@gn.apc.org
Internet: www.gn.apc.org/tapol
Defending victims of oppression in Indonesia and
East Timor, 1973-2000

=======================================================

Subj: KABAR-IRIAN: [EN]Re: Jailed activist 'followed the flow' (fwd)
Date: 5/17/00 1:08:33 AM Central Daylight Time
From: admin@irja.org
Sender: owner-kabar-irian@irja.org
Reply-to: admin@irja.org
To: kabar-irian@irja.org

Too much mail? Try our digest version. Info available at
http://www.irja.org/conf.htm

---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Tue, 16 May 2000 16:42:08 +0200
From: Charles Scheiner
To: reg.westpapua@gn.apc.org
Cc: susansky@omcs.com.au, etiscaus@downunder.net.au
Subject: Re: Jailed activist 'followed the flow'

Friends,

Just for the sake of accuracy, the description about why Saul didn't join
the IFET Observer Project in East Timor in the article below is totally
wrong. I was in Dili when Saul called from Kupang one or two days before
the East Timor vote, and I told him it was too late for him to join the IFET
observers in East Timor, the same instructions we had given to several other
observers who planned to arrive that late. Saul had been scheduled to arrive
more than a week earlier, and never contacted us from Australia. Having
heard nothing, we assumed he was not coming to East Timor.

At the time Saul called, IFET observers were in every subdistrict of East
Timor and certainly were not pulling out. We stayed in the territory for
more than a week longer, leaving on September 6 and 7 as TNI/militia
violence reached its peak. The reason I told Saul not to come was that it
took time to train newly-arriving observers, assess their capabilities,
obtain their UNAMET identification (it may even have been too late for that)
and place them in field teams. We stopped processing newly- arriving
volunteers a few days before Saul called from Kupang.

When Saul called, it was not safe for Australians to travel from Kupang to
Dili -- several had been threatened and turned back at militia roadblocks
the previous night. So even if IFET-OP had been able to accept him that
late, there was no way for him to get to Dili short of flying via Bali, and
all flights were full.

Saul obtained his visa to enter Indonesia/East Timor on the basis of
IFET-OP's UN accreditation and our submitting his name to UNAMET and the
Indonesian authorities, just like the other 140 IFET-OP observers. When I
told Saul not to come to East Timor, I believe he told me he would go
back to Australia (although I don't recall exactly); I expected him to do
so. Since he was not going to be a UN-accredited observer with our project,
his visa was inoperative and he had no legal right to be anywhere in Indonesia.

Saul's subsequent arrest in West Papua created problems for the IFET project
and the East Timorese people when Indonesian diplomats at the U.N. in New
York raised it as part of an effort to discredit the credibility of our
observers and their findings.

At the request of Saul's mother, IFET did not take any action or make any
statement regarding his case while he was in Indonesian custody. In fact, I
repeatedly offered to help her gain his freedom in any way we could, but his
Indonesian lawyer advised against public action, feeling that Saul would be
better off if it was not a political case. I still believe this was
incorrect, as it was already a political case, having been discussed in
several Indonesian newspapers and raised by Indonesian officials, including
Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, in various media and U.N. fora.

I apologize for all these details, but perhaps there is a lesson to be
learned here somewhere.

Charlie Scheiner
International Coordinator, IFET Observer Project

At 05:38 PM 5/11/00 +1000, you wrote:
> From AWPA
>The AGE 11/5/00
>
>Jailed activist 'followed the flow'
>
> By DENNIS SCHULZ
> DARWIN
> Thursday 11 May 2000
>
> As Saul Dalton was attempting to
> leave West Irian last year, he was
> apprehended carrying anti-Indonesian
> documents and a machete knife in his
> baggage.
>
> Convicted of visa violations, he served
> four months' prison in Timika and
> later in the capital of Jayapura.
>
> Mr Dalton, originally from
> Rockhampton, admits to his own
> naivete.
>
> While in Timika he accepted letters
> from pro-independence Irianese,
> promising them he would post them in
> Australia. One letter was found to
> contain hand-drawn maps addressed
> to the Australian Defence Force
> highlighting landing areas for a
> potential Australian invasion of Irian
> Jaya.
>
> To Indonesian authorities, they were documents
> that violated the provisions
> of Mr Dalton's visa.
>
> "I didn't do my research to find out that there
> were clauses (in my cultural
> visa) that say you're not allowed to involve
> yourself in anything political,"
> Mr Dalton said yesterday in Darwin.
>
> However, he maintains that while in Irian Jaya he
> never participated in
> pro-independence activities.
>
> That is a view questioned by freelance journalist
> Andrew Kilvert, whose
> Papuan sources reported that Mr Dalton's
> indiscreet manner had
> endangered locals involved in the independence
> movement.
>
> "Local people warned him about his behavior," Mr
> Kilvert said.
>
> A veteran of the Jabiluka protests in the Northern
> Territory, Mr Dalton
> elected to go to East Timor as a volunteer with
> the International Federation
> for East Timor, whose members acted as observers
> during the independence
> referendum.
>
> But Mr Dalton missed the referendum. Upon his
> arrival in the West Timor
> capital of Kupang he found out that IFET was
> already pulling out of East
> Timor. He then decided to visit West Irian, buying
> a ticket on the ferry.
> ...

***********************************************************
Charles Scheiner, U.N. Representative
International Federation for East Timor
P.O. Box 1182, White Plains, New York 10602 USA
Telephone:1-914-428-7299; fax:1-914-428-7383 hand:1-914-720-9205
Internet: cscheiner@igc.apc.org
PGP Key available on request.
For information on East Timor write info@etan.org
Check out ETAN's web site: http://www.etan.org
IFET East Timor observer project details can be found
at http://www.etan.org/ifet

KABAR IRIAN ("Irian News") www.kabar-irian.com
NOTE: "All items are posted for their news/information content. They are
not necessarily the views of IRJA.org or subscribers. "

To unsubscribe send an email (leave subject blank) to majordomo@irja.org
that says: unsubscribe kabar-irian

You can also un/subscribe at http://www.irja.org/conf.htm

=======================================================

=================================================

Subj: JP: Environmentalists demand Freeport's temporary closure
Date: 5/16/00 1:30:19 AM Central Daylight Time
From: plovers@gn.apc.org (Tapol)
To: reg.westpapua@gn.apc.org, u.braun@xcc.de, slliem@xs4all.nl, taylorjb@vax.sbu.ac.uk

Received from Joyo Indonesian News

Jakarta Post
May 16, 2000

Environmentalists demand Freeport's temporary closure

JAKARTA (JP): An environmental group demanded a temporary halt to operations
of mining company PT Freeport Indonesia following a May 4 accident which
resulted in four missing workers.

The chairwoman of the Indonesian Forum for the Environment (Walhi) Emmy
Hafild also announced on Monday the organization's plans to sue Freeport on
charges of environmental damage.

Walhi said Freeport had violated the 1997 environment law, and government
regulations on water pollution, rivers and management of toxic materials and
other harmful waste.

"We (Walhi) will be filing a lawsuit against the company this week and demand
a temporary closure of Freeport until the company meets requirements for safe
operation of its facility," Emmy said, adding that Walhi also wants a review
of Freeport's contract.

Walhi is not recommending the permanent closure of the company in Irian Jaya,
she said. "For who would take care of the environment rehabilitation then?"

Walhi also demanded that Freeport reduce its production scale to a safe
level.

Emmy said the Wanagon basin accident was caused because it could not
accommodate the waste from Freeport -- some 260,000 tons every day.

"Even at 33,000 tons during 1973 to 1990, the company's activities had a
devastating impact on the environment," Emmy told a press conference.

Emmy also said that an independent analysis was needed in order to determine
an acceptable production scale for the company.

The accident at the Grasberg mine in Tembagapura, Mimika regency was caused
by the slippage of overburden, which caused a wave of water and material to
overflow the Wanagon basin spillway and enter Wanagon Valley.

Company officials blamed four days of rainfall -- which reached an average of
40 millimeters a day -- as the cause of the accident.

Antara on Monday quoted Mimika regent T.O. Potereyauw as saying that the
search had continued for the four missing victims, but so far with no
results.

Walhi's report said 420 million tons of solid waste had been produced by
Freeport's mining operation since 1995, about 95 percent of which was dumped
in the Wanagon Valley.

Walhi activist Joko Waluyo, who observed the site after the incident, said
that the 50-meter high wave had also destroyed pig stys, vegetable gardens
and a burial ground of the Amungme tribe in Banti village, some 12 kilometers
downstream of the basin.

Emmy said that the earlier statement of Freeport's president director Adrie
Machribie's, which blamed heavy rain for the incident, was "unacceptable."

She said that Walhi had warned Freeport "years ago" about the possibility of
heavy rain damaging the dumping system but "Freeport said that they had
already calculated (the rain factor)."

Protest

Meanwhile in Jayapura, hundreds of Irianese students held a peaceful
demonstration at the local legislature demanding that the government re-
evaluate the company's Environmental Impact Assessment (AMDAL).

Spokesman for the demonstrators, Diaz Gwijangge, said "Wanagon Lake is a
sacred place for the Amungme tribe ... Freeport has been deliberately
destroying the tribe's spiritual lands and culture."

The protesters also demanded that Freeport stop dumping waste in Mimika's
Ajkwa River, saying that the practice has destroyed thousands of hectares of
mangrove and sago palm trees.

Yance Kayame, a member of the provincial council who met the students, said
that they were collecting data -- to be eventually submitted to non-
government organizations working on the environment -- to decide the
company's fate.

Legislators in Jakarta announced that Freeport's contract could be revised if
the company was found guilty of its involvement in the incident. Calls for a
temporary halt to production operations, such as those raised by Walhi, evoke
the controversy surrounding rayon and pulp producer PT Inti Indorayon Utama
in North Sumatra and gold mining firm PT Newmont Minahasa Raya in North
Sulawesi.

In both cases the government issued conflicting decisions, raising feelings
of insecurity among business operators. (08/eba)

**************************************************
Paul Barber
TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign,
25 Plovers Way, Alton Hampshire GU34 2JJ
Tel/Fax: 01420 80153
Email: plovers@gn.apc.org
Internet: www.gn.apc.org/tapol
Defending victims of oppression in Indonesia and
East Timor, 1973-2000

===================================================

RECEIVEC 5/16/00
-Subj: Re: KABAR-IRIAN: [EN] Dutch MPs in Papua - Margareet De Boer
Date: 5/15/00 3:34:54 PM Central Daylight Time
From: admin@irja.org
Sender: owner-kabar-irian@irja.org
Reply-to: admin@irja.org

Too much mail? Try our digest version. Info available at
http://www.irja.org/conf.htm

Anonymous writes:

The remarks in regard to, solving disagreements between Jakarta and the
Papuans without interference from outside, made by the Dutch delegation
leader Margareet De Boer is a typical representation of a very weak,
shamefully guilty and a dishonest government. She also expects us to
understand that decisions made from those years cannot be undone. She
forgets that those decisions made from those years are based on lies, deceit
and treachery. The Dutch goverment is a major party in those decisions and
blood is also on their hands.

Regardless of how western goverments potray to the world of their principles
of justice, it really boils down to MONEY and CONTROL. Put MONEY in to get
CONTROL and control to get MONEY. Facts are twisted, smoothed and shaded to
obtain MONEY and CONTROL. West Papua has been a victiom of this.

Now, the western goverments such as the dutch government do not want to
interfere when they were the ones that created this mess. It is time they
come out of their holes and fix up what they have done and also show to the
world that they have a backbone and can uphold their principles of justice
which currently is only words.

Truth will always surface at the end, justice will always be served
irregardless of methods and time.

KABAR IRIAN ("Irian News") www.kabar-irian.com
NOTE: "All items are posted for their news/information content. They are
not necessarily the views of IRJA.org or subscribers. "

To unsubscribe send an email (leave subject blank) to majordomo@irja.org
that says: unsubscribe kabar-irian

You can also un/subscribe at http://www.irja.org/conf.htm

IRIAN JAYA (WEST PAPUA, NEW GUINEA): THE QUEST FOR INDEPENDENCE-MAY 16, 2000 TO MAY 20, 2000

THE RECORD MAY 16, 2000 TO MAY 20, 2000

THE RECORD
MAY 16, 2000 TO MAY 20, 2000