Computational criteria for the identification of mental states

C.1 Our identification of computations in an entity, or rule-governed transformations that take it from one state to another, is a necessary condition for our being able to ascribe cognitive mental states to it. Justification.

C.2 All natural entities and natural processes can be described according to Wolfram's computational stance: that is, the set of natural entities which perform computations is universal. Justification.

C.3 Our identification of rules that describe an entity's behaviour (as per Wolfram's computational stance) is not a sufficient condition for our being able to ascribe cognitive mental states to that entity. Justification.

Intentional systems criteria for the identification of mental states

I.1 Our ability to describe an entity's behaviour according to the intentional stance is a necessary condition for our being able to ascribe cognitive mental states to it. Justification.

I.2 The set of entities which can be described by Dennett's intentional stance is not universal in scope, but includes all organisms (and their parts). Justification.

I.3 Our ability to describe an entity in terms of Dennett's intentional stance is not a sufficient condition for our being able to ascribe cognitive mental states to that entity. Justification.

I.4 Our ability to identify behaviour in an organism that can be described using the intentional stance is not a sufficient warrant for ascribing mental states to it. Justification.

Biological criteria for the identification of mental states

B.1 An entity must be alive in order to qualify as having cognitive mental states. Justification.

B.2 A necessary condition for our being able to ascribe cognitive mental states to an entity is that we can identify the following features: (a) basic needs, essential to its flourishing; (b) internal relations between the parts (i.e. new physical properties which appear when they are assembled together); (c) dedicated functionality, where the parts' repertoire of functionality is dedicated to supporting that of the unit they comprise; (d) a nested hierarchy, where the parts are hierarchically ordered in a nested sequence of functionality; and (e) stability - the parts are able to work together for some time to maintain the entity in existence as a whole. These conditions enable us to impute a final cause or telos to the entity, and identify its various "selfish" or intrinsic ends. Additionally, we must be able to identify a master program that regulates the internal structure of an organism and the internal interactions between its components - i.e. a formal cause. Justification.

B.3 An entity must be an individual biological organism in order to qualify as having cognitive mental states. An evolutionary lineage of organisms cannot be meaningfully described as having cognitive mental states. Justification.

B.4 Being an organism is not a sufficient condition for having mental states. Justification.

B.5 An organism must have a central nervous system in order to qualify as having cognitive mental states. Justification.

Sensory criteria for the identification of mental states

S.1 An organism must be capable of encoding and storing information about its environment before it can be said to possess mental states.(Corollary of I.2.) Justification.

S.2 All cellular organisms sensory capacities, insofar as they possess sensors which can encode various states of information about their surroundings. Justification.

S.3 The possession by an organism of sensors which encode information about its surroundings is an insufficient warrant for saying that the organism is capable of cognitive mental states. Justification.

Memory-related criteria for the identification of mental states

M.1 All cellular organisms possess some kind of memory capacity, which enables them to detect changes in their environment. Justification.

M.2 The existence of memory in an organism is not a sufficient ground for ascribing cognitive mental states to it. Justification.

M.3 The existence of memory capacity in an organism is a necessary condition for ascribing cognitive mental states to it. Justification.

Flexible behaviour and the identification of mental states

F.1 Modifiable behaviour occurs among all cellular organisms. Specifically, in any cellular organism, the reaction to a stimulus is always indirect and modifiable (through the addition or removal of other stimuli). Justification.

Definition - "fixed pattern"
We can mathematically represent a pattern of behaviour in an organism by an output variable (say, z). A fixed pattern can be defined as a pattern where the value of the output variable z remains the same over time, given the same values of the input variables.

F.2 Behaviour by an organism which conforms to a fixed pattern or rule is not a sufficient warrant for ascribing cognitive mental states to that organism, even if stimulus-response coupling is indirect and modifiable (by the addition or removal of other stimuli). Justification.

Definition - "flexible behaviour"
If a program governing some aspect of an organism's behaviour changes over time, such that the value of an output variable z is no longer the same for the same inputs, whether because of a change in the function(s) which define the value of z, or the parameters of the function(s), or the conditions in the program under which the function(s) are invoked, then the behaviour described by z is flexible.

F.3 The occurrence of flexible behaviour in an organism is a necessary condition for ascribing cognitive mental states to it. Specifically, only flexible behaviour in an organism can be regarded as a manifestation of a cognitive mental state. (Corollary of F.2.) Justification.

F.4 All organisms exhibit flexible behaviour, to some degree. Justification.

F.5 The occurrence in an organism of flexible behaviour does not provide a sufficient warrant for the ascription of mental states to it. Justification.

F.6 Internally generated flexibility of behaviour (i.e. the ability to modify patterns of information transfer, by means of an inbuilt mechanism) is a necessary condition for the existence of cognitive mental states in an organism. Specifically, flexible behaviour by an organism must be internally generated (i.e. the organism must be able to modify its patterns of information transfer, by means of an inbuilt mechanism) before it can be regarded as a manifestation of a cognitive mental state.Justification.

F.7 The presence in an organism of flexible behaviour patterns that are acquired through an internal mechanism does not provide a sufficient warrant for our being able to ascribe cognitive mental states to it. Justification.

F.8 Internally generated flexible behaviour appears to be confined to organisms with central nervous systems. It is found in most but possibly not all phyla of animals with central nervous systems. (Flatworms may not be capable of it, but many other phyla of worms are.) Justification.

Learning criteria and the identification of mental states

L.1 Habituation and sensitization appear to be confined to eukaryotes, or organisms with a nucleus in their cells. Justification.

L.2: The existence of memory in an organism is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for learning. Justification.

L.3: Learning should not be attributed to an organism unless it displays a change in its pattern of behaviour which it is able to reproduce on a subsequent occasion. Justification.

L.4 The ability of an organism to undergo habituation and sensitization is not a sufficient condition for learning. Justification.

L.5 The occurrence of non-associative habituation and sensitization in an organism does not provide a sufficient warrant for the ascription of mental states to it. (Corollary of Conclusion F.2.) Justification.

L.6 The occurrence in an organism of flexible behaviour is not a sufficient condition for learning. Justification.

L.7 The capacity for associative learning in an organism is a sufficient condition for its being able to engage in internally generated flexible behaviour. Justification.

L.8 Associative learning appears to be confined to organisms with central nervous systems. It is found in most but possibly not all phyla of animals with central nervous systems. (Flatworms may not be capable of associative learning, but many other phyla of worms are.) Justification.

L.9 The ability of an organism to undergo associative learning (classical and/or instrumental conditioning) is a sufficient condition for its being able to learn, in the proper sense of the word. Justification.

L.10 An organism must be capable of learning before it can be said to have cognitive mental states. Justification.

L.11 A capacity for learning in an organism does not provide a sufficient warrant for our being able to ascribe cognitive mental states to it. Justification.

L.12 A capacity for associative learning in an organism does not provide a sufficient warrant for our being able to ascribe cognitive mental states to it. Justification.

L.13 The occurrence of blocking in an organism does not provide a sufficient warrant for our ascription of cognitive mental states to it. Justification.

L.14 The occurrence of so-called higher-order forms of associative learning in an organism do not, taken by themselves, warrant the conclusion that it has cognitive mental states. Justification.

L.15 The capacity for rapid reversal learning in an animal does not, by itself, warrant the ascription of mental states to it. Justification.

L.16 Progressive adjustments in serial reversal tests constitute good prima facie evidence that an animal is trying to adjust to sudden changes in its environment, by rapidly revising its expectations. Justification.

L.17 An animal's ability to form categorical concepts and apply them to novel stimuli indicates the presence of mental processes - in particular, meta-learning. Justification.

L.18 An animal's ability to identify non-empirical properties is a sufficient condition for its having mental states (intentional acts). Such an animal can apply non-emprical concepts, by following a rule. Justification.

Criteria relating to action and the identification of mental states

A.1 Behaviour by an organism must vary in response to non-random internal states before it can be regarded as a manifestation of a mental state. Justification.

A.2 Behaviour by an organism must vary in response to its internal states, as well as external conditions, before it can be regarded as a manifestation of a cognitive mental state. Justification.

A.3 An organism must be capable of directed bodily movements before these movements can be regarded as a manifestation of a cognitive mental state. Justification.

A.4 All cellular organisms are capable of directed movement. Justification.

A.5 The occurrence of directed bodily movement in an organism does not provide a sufficient warrant by itself for the ascription of mental states to it. Justification.

A.6 A capacity for local movement (locomotion) in an organism is not a requirement for its possession of mental states. Justification.

A.7 An organism must be capable of navigation (i.e. using its senses to steer itself around its environment) before its movements can be regarded as a manifestation of a cognitive mental state. Justification.

A.8 The occurrence of navigation and guiding sensors in an organism does not provide a sufficient warrant for the ascription of mental states to it. Justification.

A.9 An organism must have an action selection mechanism before it can be said to have cognitive mental states. Justification.

A.10 All cellular organisms possess an action selection mechanism of some sort. Justification.

A.11 The fact that an organism has an action selection mechanism, sensors to guide navigation, and a nervous system with reflexes, does not provide a sufficient warrant for the ascription of mental states to it. Justification.

A.12 The presence of centralised action selection, sensors to guide navigation, and a central nervous system in an organism does not provide a sufficient warrant for the ascription of mental states to it. Justification.

A.13 An organism must be capable of fine-tuning its bodily movements before it can be said to have cognitive mental states. Justification.

A.14 Only organisms with central nervous systems are capable of fine-tuning their bodily movements. Justification.

Representational criteria for the identification of mental states

R.1 A necessary condition for the ascription of beliefs to an organism is that it be capable of mis-representing events occurring in its surroundings. Justification.

R.2 The presence in an organism of Dretskean representations, defined as indicators acquired through learning which serve a biological function, does not provide a sufficient warrant for our being able to ascribe cognitive mental states to it. Justification.

Normativity criteria for the identification of mental states

N.1 An organism must be capable of self-correcting behaviour before it can be said to have cognitive mental states. Justification.

Sufficiency conditions for the identification of mental states

Definition - Operant conditioning
DF.1 An animal can be described as undergoing operant conditioning if the following features can be identified:

(i) innate preferences or drives;

(ii) motor programs, which are stored in the brain, and generate the suite of the animal's motor output;

(iii) an action selection mechanism, which allows the animal to make a selection from its suite of possible motor response patterns and pick the one that is the most appropriate to its current circumstances;

(iv) fine-tuning behaviour: efferent motor commands which are capable of stabilising a motor pattern at a particular value or within a narrow range of values, in order to achieve a goal;

(v) the ability to store and compare internal representations of its current motor output (i.e. its efferent copy, which represents its current "position" on its internal map) and its afferent sensory inputs;

(vi) direct or indirect associations between different motor commands, sensory inputs (optional) and their consequences, which are stored in the animal's memory and updated when circumstances change;

(vii) a goal or end-state, which is internally encoded as a stored memory of a motor pattern or sensory stimulus that the fly associates with attaining its goal;

(viii) a pathway for reaching its goal, which is internally encoded as a stored memory of a sequence of movements or sensory stimuli which allows the animal to steer itself towards its goal;

(ix) sensory inputs that inform the animal whether it has attained its goal, and if not, whether it is getting closer to achieving it (the latter part is optional);

(x) a correlation mechanism, allowing it to find a temporal coincidence between its motor behaviour and the attainment of its goal;

(xi) self-correction: abandonment of behaviour that increases, and continuation of behaviour that reduces, the animal's deviation from its desired state.

Animals that are capable of undergoing operant conditioning are bona fide agents that possess beliefs and desires. Justification.

Definition - Navigational agency
DF.2 We are justified in ascribing agency to a navigating animal if the following features can be identified:

(i) a goal or end-state, which is internally encoded as a stored memory of a visual stimulus that the animal associates with attaining its goal;

(ii) sub-goals, which are internally encoded as stored memories of visual stimuli that help the animal attain its goal;

(iii) a pathway for reaching its goal, which is internally encoded as a local vector or a stored memory of a sequence of movements which allows the animal to steer itself towards its goal;

(iv) exploratory behaviour, as the animal tries to locate food sites;

(v) visual inputs that inform the animal about its current position, in relation to its goal, and enable it to correct its movements if the need arises;

(vi) direct or indirect associations (a) between visual landmarks and local vectors; (b) between the animal's short term goals (landmarks) and long term goals (food sites or the nest). These associations are stored in the animal's memory and updated when the animal's environment changes;

(vii) the ability to store and compare internal representations of its current motor output (i.e. its efferent copy, which represents its current "position" on its internal map) and its afferent sensory inputs. Motor output and sensory inputs are linked by a two-way interaction;

(viii) fine-tuning behaviour: efferent motor commands which are capable of steering the animal towards a short or long-term goal. It has to be able to detect both matches (correlations between its view and the stored image of its goal) and mismatches or deviations - first, in order to approach its goal, and second, in order to keep track of it;

(ix) self-correction: abandonment of behaviour that increases, and continuation of behaviour that reduces, the animal's deviation from its desired state. Justification.

Definition - Agency in the context of tool use
DF.3 An animal can be described as using a tool intentionally if the following features can be identified:

(i) a goal or end-state, which is internally encoded as a stored visual memory involving a tool that the animal associates with attaining its goal;

(ii) motor programs, which are stored in the brain, and generate the suite of the animal's motor output;

(iii) a tool - that is, an item external to the animal, which it modifies, carries or manipulates, before using it to effect some change in the environment;

(iv) an action selection mechanism, which allows the animal to make a selection from its suite of possible motor response patterns and pick the one that is the most appropriate to its current circumstances;

(v) fine-tuning behaviour: an ability to stabilise one of its motor patterns within a narrow range of values, in order for to achieve its goal using the tool;

(vi) the ability to store and compare internal representations of its current motor output while using the tool (i.e. its efferent copy, which represents its current "position" on its internal map) and its afferent sensory inputs;

(vii) associations between different tool-using motor commands and their consequences, which are stored in the animal's memory;

(viii) a pathway for reaching its goal, which is internally encoded as a stored memory of a sequence of movements, coupled with sensory feedback, which allows the animal to steer itself (and its tool) towards its goal;

(ix) sensory inputs that inform the animal whether it has attained its goal with its tool, and if not, whether it is getting closer to achieving it;

(x) self-correction: abandonment of behaviour that increases, and continuation of behaviour that reduces, the animal's deviation from its desired state. Justification.

Definition - Agency in a social context
DF.4 We are justified in ascribing agency to a social animal if the following features can be identified:

(i) A personal goal or end-state, which is (at least qualitatively) the same as the goal which one's role model is also currently pursuing or has pursued in the past;

(ii) Behaviour which is modelled on that of a knowledgeable individual (the role model or trainer);

(iii) Sensory capacities: the ability to discriminate between individual conspecifics, as well as between members and non-members of one's group;

(iv) Memory capacity: the ability to keep track of the status of individuals within one's group, and remember one's past interactions with them (book-keeping);

(vi) Flexible behaviour: the ability to acquire new patterns of behaviour from observations of other individuals;

(vii) Learning: the ability to learn from observing the behaviour of other individuals (observational learning) and to acquire new knowledge that is specific to one's group (traditions);

(viii) Fine-tuning (controlled, modulated activity): the ability to adjust one's social behaviour to take account of differences between individuals, as well as changes in a given individual's behaviour;

(ix) Representation: the ability to represent another individual as useful, reliable role model, to be followed in the pursuit of important objectives such as food. As well as representing a certain individual as a model, the observer needs to be able to represent the activity of following the role model's example as a means of attaining its own ends;