William David Ross (1877-1971) was a Scottish philosopher who was born in Thurso, Caithness. He served in the British Ministry of Munitions during World War I, and for his many acts of public service he was awarded a knighthood in 1938. He was a fellow at Oriel College, Oxford, becoming Provost of Oriel College in 1929, and then Vice-Chancellor of Oxford in 1941. He later served as president of the Union Académique Internationale, and as chairman of the Royal Commission on the Press. He died in Oxford in 1971. His writings included Aristotle (1928), The Right and the Good (1930), Foundations of Ethics (1939), Plato's Theory of Ideas (1951), and Kant's Ethical Theory (1954).
The Right and the Good is an investigation of the meaning of rightness and goodness, and it is an attempt to clarify the question of whether rightness and goodness are modes of conformity to moral duty. Ross examines the relation between the terms "right" and "good," and he describes how rightness and goodness may differ from each other. He also examines such questions as whether rightness may produce goodness, whether there are varying degrees of goodness, and whether things that are intrinsically good may be compared with each other in terms of their degree of goodness.
Ross explains that when the term "right" is used to describe motives or actions, it may be ambiguous, because it may refer to either the quality of being morally obligatory or the quality of being morally good. The quality of being morally obligatory may not always be the same as the quality of being morally good. For example, if an individual’s actions are motivated by a desire for expediency rather than by a desire for good, then that individual's actions may not necessarily be morally good.
Ross defines the term "right" to mean "morally obligatory," and thus he distinguishes its meaning from that of "morally good." Every act that is morally obligatory may not necessarily be morally good, and every act that is morally good may not necessarily be morally obligatory. Every act that is morally obligatory may not necessarily have good motives. Moreover, acts that do not have good motives may not be morally good. Moral rightness may be defined as a conformity to moral duty, but moral goodness may be an indefinable quality that transcends the limits of moral duty.
Utilitarianism may define actions as being morally right if they produce the greatest possible amount of happiness for the greatest possible number of individuals. If an action produces a greater amount of pleasure or happiness than would be produced if the action were not performed, and if the action produces more pleasure or happiness than some other action that could be performed, then it may be defined as being morally right. Hedonistic egoism and hedonistic utilitarianism define morally right actions as those that produce the greatest possible amount of pleasure or happiness. However, ideal utilitarianism defines morally right actions as those that produce the greatest possible amount of good.
Ideal utilitarianism holds that pleasure is not the only aim of moral conduct and that the ultimate aim of moral conduct is to produce the greatest possible amount of good. According to utilitarian theory, morally right action is a means to an end, and not an end in itself. However, a defect of ideal utilitarianism is that it may not provide an answer to the question of what type of moral duty should be complied with in order to produce the greatest possible amount of good. Another defect of ideal utilitarianism is that it may not be able to provide an answer to the question of how the greatest possible amount of good should be distributed among all the members of society.
In response to these defects of utilitarianism, Ross argues that the term "right" does not mean "productive of the best possible consequences."1 The rightness of an act is intrinsic to the act itself, and it is determined by the motives, and not the consequences, of the act. However, the intrinsic value of an act is determined by whether the motives of the act are good, bad, or indifferent. Any value that may be conferred on an act by its rightness or wrongness is not intrinsic to the act itself.2
Prima facie duty (apparent duty or duty at first glance) may not always be the same as actual duty, says Ross. A prima facie or conditional duty to perform an action in a given situation may be superseded by an actual or absolute duty to perform a different action in that situation. The moral rightness or wrongness of our actions may also depend on the perspective from which our actions are viewed. Actions may be viewed as prima facie right from one perspective, but as prima facie wrong from another perspective. Whether actions that are prima facie right from one perspective but prima facie wrong from another perspective are actually right or wrong for a particular situation may depend on whether they are more right than wrong or more wrong than right for that particular situation.
According to Ross, prima facie duties include (1) the duty that arises from our own previous actions, such as (a) the duty of fidelity (the duty to keep promises), and (b) the duty of reparation for wrongful acts, (2) the duty that arises from the actions of others, such as the duty of gratitude for the kindness of others, and the duty to reciprocate the generosity of others, (3) the duty to promote justice, (4) the duty of beneficence (the duty to promote the greatest possible amount of good), (5) the duty of self-improvement (the duty to improve the condition of society), and (6) the duty of non-maleficence (the duty not to harm or injure others).3
The term "good" may be used attributively or predicatively, and it may thus have a variety of meanings. For example, in the sentence, "That man is a good liar," the word "good" is used attributively to mean "skillful" or "successful." In the sentence, "This is a good knife," the word "good" is used attributively to mean "useful" or "efficient." In the sentence, "Knowledge is good," the predicate "is good" is used to mean "is admirable" or "is desirable."
The quality of "goodness" cannot be defined as merely whatever is desirable or whatever produces pleasure, because goodness may not always be desired and all pleasures may not necessarily be good. The quality of goodness may ultimately be indefinable; however, it is a consequential and not a fundamental quality, because it may be attributed to an object of perception only if that object has some other quality as a consequence of which the quality of goodness may be said to belong to that object.4
Aims that may be intrinsically good include virtue, knowledge, pleasure, and the allocation of pleasure to those who are virtuous.5 Virtue, knowledge, and pleasure may be combined as elements of moral, intellectual, and aesthetic experience.
Virtue, knowledge, and pleasure may be compared with regard to their degree of goodness, says Ross, but virtue and knowledge may be viewed as intrinsically better than pleasure. Virtue and knowledge may have a higher degree of goodness and a greater moral value than pleasure. Indeed, pleasure may lose its value if it detracts from virtue. The attainment of virtue may produce pleasure, but virtue surpasses pleasure in its degree of goodness and moral value.
The degree of goodness of a particular pleasure may be determined by the degree to which that particular pleasure is combined with knowledge or virtue. It may also be determined by the intensity and duration of that particular pleasure, and by the degree to which that particular pleasure conforms to other pleasures that are considered to be good.
Virtuous actions may be motivated by the desire to do what is right (i.e. required by moral duty), by the desire to produce some form of good, and by the desire to produce pleasure and prevent pain for other individuals. Malicious actions may be motivated by the desire to do what is wrong (i.e. not in compliance with moral duty), by the desire to produce some form of evil, and by the desire to produce pain and prevent pleasure for other individuals.6
Morally wrong or non-virtuous actions may in some cases be motivated by the selfish desire for a pleasure that is gained at the expense of others. The selfish desire for pleasure may be morally wrong if it prevents compliance with moral duty or if it interferes with producing some form of good. If an action has both virtuous and non-virtuous motives, then the moral value of the action may be determined by the degree to which virtuous or non-virtuous motives predominate in producing the action. Actions whose motives are predominantly virtuous may have greater moral value and be better than actions whose motives are predominantly non-virtuous.
1W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930), p. 34.
2Ibid., p. 132.
3Ibid., p. 21
4Ibid., p. 88.
5Ibid., p. 140.
6Ibid., p. 163.
Ross, W.D. The Right and the Good. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930.