From Dôgen to Wilson: A Comparison of Five Separations
In E. O. Wilson’s Consilience, he lists five designations by which science defines itself: repeatability, economy, mensuration, heuristics, and finally consilience (Wilson 58). These are, according to Wilson, the main characteristics by which science (described as “freedom from a cognitive prison”) is separated from everything that isn’t science (described by Wilson as “wrong, always wrong”) (Wilson 49). Although a comparison of these five factors with the writings of the 13th century Japanese monk Dôgen Kigen may at first seem piecemeal, it is through these very pieces that the two systems of modern science and Zen Buddhism can be investigated, in a way that exposes their respective epistemologies and approaches.
The initial factor in Wilson’s list is “repeatability,” described as “The same phenomena … sought again, preferably by independent investigation, and the interpretation given …is confirmed or discarded by means of novel analysis and experimentation (Wilson 58). This entails ingrained notions of persistence, duration, and substance; reality itself is repeatable because it is permanent, constant, and within a certain framework of possibilities, unchanging. For Dôgen, this very assumption of repeatability assumes too much, as stated in his work Gakudô Yôjin-Shû, or “Guidelines for Studying the Way”: “Indeed, when you understand discontinuity the notion of self does not come into being, ideas of name and gain do not arise” (Tanahashi 31). In a way Dôgen’s outlook is the antithesis of Wilson’s “repeatability,” because the ingrained patterns of foundationalism or positive realism are not to be trusted, and in fact should be uprooted, leaving non-substantiality, impermanence, and interdependence to such a degree that nothing can be repeated, because nothing exists in and of itself to begin with (Abe 57).
Wilson’s second aspect of the unique identification of science is economy, which he describes as abstraction of information into its simplest form, “yielding the largest amount of information with the least amount of effort” (Wilson 58). Yet this construct is built on the premise that such an abstraction can be perceived by any mind in identical ways, and that this information applies directly to a reality that stays constant. The goal in Wilson’s “economy” is to extend control over the information that science is built on; with Dôgen, however, reality itself is in fact interdependent with the perception of it, and no amount of information presented in any form will be free from the perception of it (Maraldo 115). Dôgen seems to be writing from the standpoint that recognition or analysis of any given object is irrelevant, a distraction to keep the deluded mind from applying the effort necessary to break free from the delusion (Maraldo 117). In this way, effort is vital, and with effort, the needed information reveals itself, as stated in the Bendôwa, or “On the Endeavor of the Way”: “What can be met with recognition is not really realization itself, because realization is not reached by a deluded mind” (Tanahashi 146).
The third description of the unique quality of science that Wilson provides is mensuration, or universal measurement that allows for generalizations (Wilson 58). This entails a second presumption of traditional science: that not only is reality something separate from the scientist who observes it, but that it can be measured in a universal sense. In Dôgen’s Genjô Kôan, or “Actualizing the Fundamental Point,” he stresses how reality’s ultimate shape and size totally depend on the person who measures, and is never independent of this: “Though there are many features in the dusty world, you see and understand only what your eye of practice can reach. In order to learn the nature of the myriad things, you must know that although they may look round or square, the other features of oceans and mountains are infinite in variety; whole worlds are there” (Tanahashi 71).
Wilson’s fourth description of aspects is heuristics, as the inspiration for further discovery (Wilson 58). Yet this discovery is based on the notion that something exists outside of us that needs to be studied. Not to negate all science, what Dôgen advocates in his writings involves a stability that does not entail aversion or attachment. In this way, the aspects of logical positivism relevant in Wilson’s perspective need to be witnessed clearly, so that science can be used without the attachment (science as the only real “glue” for the consilience of human knowledge) or the aversion (the negation of all science, which does nothing constructive either). The very interconnectedness, impermanence, and interdependency of things that we perceive are all factors stressed again and again in Dôgen’s writings, not with reductionism, rationalism, or any -ism at all. It is only when we can be complete without projecting –isms on reality or on each other, that something really new can be discovered; something new, but also something already present, that which Dôgen refers to as the buddhadharma (Maraldo 117).
Connectivity and correspondence are nice, but if experience faces us with neither, we must respond. Bodhidharma, the first Zen Patriarch, addressed this when he said, “Do not struggle against adversity. After all, it makes sense” (Stryk 230). Wilson’s adversity in this case, his struggle, seems to be with the very mystery of an experience that is not always connected, not always corresponding with other experiences. When this imposed order breaks down, science protects itself with Kuhnian “revolutions;” but Dôgen’s insistence is on a surrender to stillness, not a thirst for revolution. Nothing needs to be added; all things perform their function, in life and in death. To say that this is ethical and not epistemological tends to cast our own defining boundaries over the meaning of Dôgen’s works, something that he seems to consistently advise against. Although Wilson and Dôgen obviously approach existence with different standpoints and motivations, many aspects of the latter’s thoughts can help in seeing that a culture can contribute timeless value without science, and that science is not the only way to understand existence.
Works Cited
Abe, Masao. A Study of Dôgen: His Philosophy and Religion. Ed. Steven Heine. Albany: State U of New York P, 1992.
Maraldo, John C. “The Practice of Body-Mind: Dôgen’s Shinjingakudô and Comparative Philosophy.” Dôgen Studies. LaFleur, William R., ed. Studies in East Asian Buddhism, no. 2. Honolulu: U of Hawaii P, 1985. 112-130.
Stryk, Lucien, ed. World of the Buddha: A Reader-From the Three Baskets to Modern Zen. New York: Doubleday, 1968.
Tanahashi, Kazuaki, ed. Moon in a Dewdrop: Writings of Zen Master Dogen. New York: North Point P, 1985.
Wilson, Edward O. Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge. New York: Random House,1999.
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