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(1)Tuesday, 4 April 2000
[Open session]
[The witness entered court]

--- Upon commencing at 9.45 a.m.
(5) [The accused entered court]

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Good morning, ladies and gentlemen; good morning counsel for the Prosecution, for the Defence. General Krstic, good morning. I hope the interpreters can hear me. Yes, it (10)seems so. Good morning to your sound engineers. We shall resume the Krstic case. We have the same witness, and Mrs. Malagic will continue her testimony today. Good morning, Mrs. Malagic. Have you had a (15)good night's rest?

THE WITNESS: [Int.] Good morning. Yes, I did.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well. You will now continue to answer questions that (20)Mr. Cayley will be asking of you.

MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President. Good morning, Your Honours; good morning, counsel.

WITNESS: MIRSADA MALAGIC [Resumed]
[Witness answered through interpreter]

(25) • EXAMINED by Mr. Cayley: [Cont'd]

• Page 1981 • {2/123}

(1) • Q.: Mrs. Malagic, first of all, I would remind you that you are still under a solemn oath, the same oath that you were under yesterday. Secondly, if I can just refresh your memory (5)as to the point in time that we arrived at during your testimony. If you recall, you were telling the Judges about your journey from Potocari to Kladanj, and you had arrived at a point in time on the road between Bratunac and Konjevic Polje, where you saw a large (10)group of men in a meadow near Sandici. Can you continue with your account of events from that point in time to when you arrived in Kladanj?

• A.: Yes. When we passed by that meadow, where they were there and I already knew that they were our (15)men who had been captured by Serb soldiers, the bus did not stop again. We proceeded to Nova Kasaba, then via Milici, Vlasenica. In Vlasenica, the bus stopped because it had a failure, at least that is what the driver said, a tyre evidently. So they changed the (20)tyre. And a Serb soldier came onto the bus but did not talk. He simply brought three apples and gave them to children who were sitting in the front seats and left the bus. And then the driver was back and we went on. When we arrived at a place, I believe it's (25)called Tisca, I'm not quite sure, the buses stopped

• Page 1982 • {3/123}

(1)there and the driver told us we could get off the bus and proceed on foot. We got off there. There were again Serb soldiers by the buses to meet us, and as there were no more men on the bus, that I was in, there (5)were only women and children, and they simply pointed which direction that we should proceed. And at some point our folk will be waiting for us, as they put it. So we proceeded and as people said if there happened to be men on the bus or young girls, then they (10)were separated by Serb soldiers, but I did not see that. And we continued in a column, I don't know how many kilometres that was, until we reached the demarcation line, as we were explained. We were first met by UNPROFOR soldiers. I (15)believe it was a Pakistani, but I can't remember. And that was right at the entrance to Kladanj. They met us there with some food, with hot drinks, of course if people were up to eating at all. There were also some Red Cross vehicles for people who had fallen ill and (20)were too weak to proceed by themselves. After an hour or so, I'm not quite sure because we had no watches, buses arrived and they took us on further towards Dubrave. At nightfall, with my son Adnan Malagic, (25)other people I arrived at Dubrave. There we were met,

• Page 1983 • {4/123}

(1)or rather me specifically, my husband's sister, who had been in Zivinice since earlier days. I did not spend the night there. They took me up there and took me over to Zivinice, and that's where I spent that night. (5)The next morning we registered at a school and I stayed there until we were put up in houses that were built by UNPROFOR. And that was the end of that unfortunate journey, I shall call it. As for my testimony, I (10)should like to finish it by saying something which is very important for me, and I believe for this Court too. With the fall of Srebrenica, rather when it was taken by Serb soldiers, when the Serb soldiers took that so-called protected area by the United Nations, (15)from the face of the earth were wiped off three generations of men in the cruellest way possible. I can corroborate it by a fresh example from my family. My father-in-law, Omer Malagic, born in 1926, his three sons, one of whom was my husband, Salko (20)Malagic, born in 1948. His two brothers, Osman Malagic, born in 1953; Dzafer Malagic born in 1957. His three grandsons, that is, my two sons Elvir Malagic born in 1973; Admir Malagic born in 1979; and my brother-in-law's son, Samir Malagic's son, born in (25)1975.

• Page 1984 • {5/123}

(1)There are hundreds of such families in Srebrenica and throughout eastern Bosnia, and to my mind this testifies to the scale of the genocide committed by Serb soldiers, commanded by the then (5)General Ratko Mladic, Stanislav Krstic, and others. I can't remember all their names. Thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to say what I had -- to say all this before this august Tribunal. Thank you for hearing what I had (10)to say.

• Q.: Mrs. Malagic, I don't want to dwell in your grief over your loss, but there are a couple of final exhibits that I'd like to show you and for you to confirm some matters in those exhibits.

(15) MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could first of all be shown Prosecutor's Exhibit 80. If the usher could turn to the page on that list, which is highlighted in yellow, there is a name highlighted.

• Q.: Mrs. Malagic, I just want to return to a (20)point in time near the beginning of your testimony, when you stated that the last that you saw of your son Elvir was on a truck, a UN truck, travelling between Srebrenica and Potocari. Can you look at that list in front of you and identify the name that's been (25)highlighted on that list?

• Page 1985 • {6/123}

(1) • A.: You mean my son's name only? Elvir Malagic, do you ...

• Q.: If you could, please.

• A.: I don't understand.

(5) • Q.: Is your son's name listed on that long list of names? Do you see your son's name there?

• A.: I do. I do. Elvir Malagic, 1970. This is an error. He was born in 1973, in Voljavica, Bratunac. Yes, this is my son. I saw him on the (10)truck, as I told you. He raised his hand to greet me and other relatives who were in the UNPROFOR compound at that time. After the fall of Srebrenica, I heard, they've confirmed that he was there, and the UNPROFOR (15)soldiers, as I was told, were the ones who made this list. This list turned up in Tuzla once, and I saw it. When we went to the UNPROFOR base, somebody met us there, I don't know who it was, a soldier, I don't know what rank he was, a military, and he said that he did (20)not quite understand, that his superior was not there and that he could not understand how did that list turn up in public and who had made it and left it there.

MR. CAYLEY: Finally, if the witness could be shown Prosecutor's Exhibit 81.

(25) • Q.: Mrs. Malagic, you earlier said in your

• Page 1986 • {7/123}

(1)testimony that your husband Salko and your son Admir went to the woods with the other men at the time of the fall of Srebrenica. How old was Admir at this time?

• A.: He was 15 and five months.

(5) MR. CAYLEY: Mr. Usher, if you could place the photograph.

• Q.: Could you just very quickly, Mrs. Malagic, identify the man in this photograph.

• A.: Yes. This is my husband, Salko Malagic.

(10) • Q.: Mrs. Malagic, thank you very much, indeed, for your patience. The Defence will have a few questions for you, and also the Judges.

MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Thank you, (15)Mr. Cayley. Mrs. Malagic, now you will be answering questions that Mr. Petrusic will ask you. He's the Defence counsel for General Krstic. Mr. Petrusic, you have the floor.

(20) MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Good morning, Your Honours; good morning, my learned friends.

• CROSS-EXAMINED by Mr. Petrusic:

• Q.: Good morning, Mrs. Malagic. I will ask only one question, and it has to do with the final questions (25)by Mr. Cayley.

• Page 1987 • {8/123}

(1)Mrs. Malagic, was it your conclusion, when you said that it was all General Mladic's and General Krstic's fault?

• A.: In my view, these military who committed the (5)genocide, who in a couple of days' time saw -- shot dead, and in all sorts of ways to do away with the thousands of men, must have done it at the orders of their Generals. One man could not do it. But I do believe that they could have issued such orders.

(10) MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] I have no further questions, Mr. President.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Cayley, any additional questions?

MR. CAYLEY: No, Mr. President.

(15) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Judge Fouad Riad.

JUDGE RIAD: [Int.] Thank you, Mr. President.

• QUESTIONED by the Court:

(20) JUDGE RIAD: Good morning, Mrs. Malagic. We are very aware and compassionate with your great grief and we admire your courage. I would like just to see things a little bit more clearly, and I have one general question or two and two specific questions. (25)You gave us a nutshell of the generations

• Page 1988 • {9/123}

(1)which were exterminated. You started by your father-in-law, Omer, who must be an elderly man; then your husband and his brother, Salko and Osman; then your sons, Admir and Elvir. But we didn't reach Adnan, (5)who was 11. So to start, was Admir and Elvir in the fighting brigades? Were they more or less militarily involved in anything, or were they taken just because they represented the youth, the Muslim youth?

• A.: My children, and there were thousands of them (10)like that in Srebrenica, in 1992, in April 1992, for instance, Admir Malagic was in the sixth grade only, he was barely 12 at the time, and when Srebrenica fell he was 15 years old only, and thereby, under any rule, under any norm, any regulation, he simply could not be (15)a soldier. And my other son and the youngest one were not soldiers. As in 1993, early 1993, when UNPROFOR entered the protected area of Srebrenica, or rather when Srebrenica was already proclaimed a safe haven, then as (20)everybody there knew it, they pursued demilitarisation. And those who were combatants, who had some weapons, handed them over to UNPROFOR soldiers. So that all those lads did not have any weapons, they were bare-handed, barefoot. They had no (25)clothes. And I do not think they were soldiers. They

• Page 1989 • {10/123}

(1)had nothing to defend themselves with. They believed that they would be protected; they believed that UNPROFOR would shield them and that perhaps we would be taken to a place, to a destination where, if nothing (5)else, then life would be guaranteed to us. And Adnan Malagic, my youngest son, I did not mention him, well, because he crossed over with me, but thank you for remembering him in the end. The traumas he suffered, believe me, there are still effects of all (10)those traumas today.

JUDGE RIAD: Of course. But are you convinced that all of them have disappeared, or just up to now you are in search of them?

• A.: We mothers, wives, sisters, we're still (15)looking for our missing, and we hope. But deep down, after all these years, I think we fear that they are no longer among the living.

JUDGE RIAD: In fact, you mentioned that when you saw men taken by Serb soldiers into the (20)interrogation house, you said they never came back. You are just deducing that from the events, or there are certain proofs that nobody came back?

• A.: Yes, I have proof too. I did not go into those houses, even though there were women who were (25)with me there, whose -- and it was their children and

• Page 1990 • {11/123}

(1)they were taken away, and these women simply could not let them -- could not let it go, who pursued the truth and went around neighbouring houses and they spoke to people and talked to those who saw men beheaded, heads (5)separated from bodies. They saw blood in those houses. On the road to the village of Budak, they saw very many men with their throats slit. One of my closest neighbours told me, when we met in Tuzla, how a Serb soldier and two others had (10)taken them towards Budak and told them to wait for a moment. But then other Serb soldiers came up, and he knew one of them and they greeted one another, and that Serb soldier asked him why he was waiting there, and he said he was waiting for those Serb soldiers who brought (15)him there with other neighbours. However, he pointed at those Serb soldiers who were aligned by that house, and he said, the Serb soldiers said, "No, these are all butchers. They are waiting to butcher you all, so get away." And then he, the Serb soldier whom I did not (20)know and I did not see them, they took them to the trucks and that man reached Tuzla and lives there today. And there are many such stories. Whether they will all appear before this Court to tell what (25)they saw with their own eyes, I don't know. But I did

• Page 1991 • {12/123}

(1)not go into those houses because I simply couldn't do that. But from such stories, I realise that only the worst things happened there.

JUDGE RIAD: So this applies to all (5)generations of men, in your assessment.

• A.: Yes.

JUDGE RIAD: What about women?

• A.: According to unofficial sources, it is thought, but I am not sure about the figure, that about (10)1.000 women did not arrive from Potocari, mostly young women, and that about 650 children, below the age of 12, were also missing, those who were with their mothers in Potocari. This is an unofficial record, but there are some women who saw children who were slain, (15)amongst the -- in a maize field, because maize had been sewn there beyond the Zinc Factory. In the morning, that maize field was all surrounded, and there were military who did not allow anyone to enter the field. I did not see that, but these are figures, (20)testimonies of women who did not see their children. There were women at Potocari who suffered, neighbours broke down and who said that the children were snatched from their arms and slain before them.

JUDGE RIAD: My last question is concerning (25)the buses. You said something rather interesting. You

• Page 1992 • {13/123}

(1)said you saw many buses with headquarters in Serbia. So these buses came from Serbia, not from Bosnia? Thank you very much.

• A.: Yes. Yes, the headquarters of these (5)companies was in Serbia, even before the war. Strela, Sabac, Raketa, Titovo Uzice, Lasta from Belgrade, and a number of others, those who maintained regular transportation to Srebrenica; for instance, Raketa from Titova; Uzice, had a regular line with Srebrenica, so (10)on and so forth.

JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me. My question: Did they come specially for this purpose, or were they serving before the war? Were they on line all the time, or did you discover that they were coming for the (15)purposes of transporting the refugees or the condemned? Do you understand my question? Were they new to the area?

• A.: I do. I do understand. Yes, those buses, I know they came specially for the purpose, for us, to (20)take us away. There was a long, long column of buses, and this to me is a fact, because during the war, while we were in Srebrenica, not a single bus, or rather not a single vehicle save the UNPROFOR vehicle appeared in Srebrenica. There was absolutely no traffic. Nothing (25)worked. There was absolutely nothing, I already said

• Page 1993 • {14/123}

(1)that. I do not think that a civilised world knows a life like that. We never saw those buses until the fall of Srebrenica, that is for those three years, and then they were all aligned in columns, only to (5)transport us from there towards Kladanj.

JUDGE RIAD: Mrs. Malagic, thank you so much. I'm sorry to ask you questions which might stir up such bad memories, but you're a lady of great courage. Thank you.

(10) THE WITNESS: [Int.] Thank you, Your Honour, and I should like to thank all of those who make it possible for us to come here, and if nothing else, say what happened, to find some relief in saying what happened to us, to try to show you what happened (15)when Srebrenica fell, and simply to wish that may Srebrenica never happen again anywhere. Thank you.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Thank you, Judge Riad. Mrs. Malagic, I believe that Judge Wald also (20)has some questions for you. Judge Wald.

JUDGE WALD: Mrs. Malagic, I just have one question. Your son that was on the UN transport, going from Srebrenica to Potocari, and you didn't see him (25)again. When you got to Potocari, did you make

• Page 1994 • {15/123}

(1)inquiries, did you -- I'm sure you looked around yourself to see if you could locate him, and you weren't able to. Is that right?

• A.: I looked for him in Potocari, although there (5)were so many people that it was very difficult. But, yes, I made some inquiries among people I knew. But across that barricade, as I called it, or rather the UNPROFOR compound, we simply couldn't enter because UNPROFOR soldiers wouldn't let us in. So that when I (10)arrived in Potocari, I did not see him again because those who were in the compound could not come out, and we could not get in. We had no access until we were made to board buses.

JUDGE WALD: So it is your belief or (15)assumption that your 15-year-old son was put on the buses with the men in Potocari; is that right?

• A.: Well, I suppose so. I suppose so, according to others who were there. They were also separated and taken away from Potocari by separate buses.

(20) JUDGE WALD: Thank you for coming, Mrs. Malagic.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mrs. Malagic, I do not have any questions for you. My colleagues and counsel for the Prosecution and Defence (25)asked all the questions that I needed answers to. But

• Page 1995 • {16/123}

(1)is there something that you would like to say and have not had the opportunity of answering? If there is anything else you wish to add, you may do so now, Mrs. Malagic.

(5) THE WITNESS: [Int.] I simply want to thank you once again. Yesterday afternoon, when I returned from here, I went out to walk around your city, that is what I wanted to tell you. I couldn't really see much, but (10)what I really liked, what caught me eye, was a monument that we visited and that was a monument to women, that is, women awaiting sailors who never come back. And the monument to those wives touched me profoundly. I should like to find this statue and take it to Bosnia (15)with me. Perhaps it could be likened to mothers and wives of Srebrenica who have been waiting and hoping for all those years, except that we followed different roads. We could turn to our empty forests. We saw our sons and our husbands off to those woods and never (20)found out anything about them again, whether they are alive or dead, where are their bones lying. Many mothers have died hoping against hope, and it is quite possible that all the other mothers would end up like that because their numbers are dwindling every day. (25)Thank you once again.

• Page 1996 • {17/123}

(1) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] We share your grief, Mrs. Malagic, and the grief of all other people, and I hope that in your misfortune you nevertheless have a feeling for -- to manage to (5)overcome this suffering, and independently of who are the responsible for this, they are no doubt a disgrace to humanity. But, Mrs. Malagic, I hope you will be able to find hope again and that you will continue along with (10)this sensibility that you gave evidence of today. Thank you very much and a safe journey home.

THE WITNESS: [Int.] Thank you very much.

THE REGISTRAR: [Int.] (15)Mr. President, there are two exhibits. We need to know what will happen to them.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mrs. Malagic, will you please wait for a moment while he resolve this. (20)Mr. Cayley.

MR. CAYLEY: Yes. Thank you, Mr. President. In respect of Prosecutor's Exhibit 80, that will be admitted into evidence by another witness, but I would like to make application for admission into evidence of (25)the photograph, which is Prosecutor's Exhibit 81.

• Page 1997 • {18/123}

(1) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes. Mr. Petrusic, any objections?

MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] No, Mr. President.

(5) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well. Exhibit 81 is admitted, and we are still waiting for the Exhibit 80, is it, to be tendered yet. Very well. This exhibit is admitted. Mrs. Malagic, thank you very much once (10)again.

THE WITNESS: [Int.] Thank you.
[The witness withdrew]

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] I see that Mr. Cayley is going to take the floor.

(15) MR. CAYLEY: Yes, Mr. President. We do have another witness. It's Major Franken, who was the second in command of the Dutch Battalion. We do need to bring in a Dutch interpreter, who will be assisting him but not actually -- a Dutch/English interpreter who (20)will be assisting him, not actually translating for him. So I don't know whether you want to take a five-minute break or whether the interpreter can walk straight into the courtroom. However you wish.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Are there (25)any protective measures?

• Page 1998 • {19/123}

(1) MR. CAYLEY: No.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] No. So we will be sitting in open session. I should perhaps take this opportunity, (5)Mr. Cayley, and ask you something concerning the decision that is still pending; namely, the lack-of-contact decision. So perhaps we should have a break now, and then later on proceed with the witness. Who is going to speak about this decision, or (10)actually the application? I actually made a mistake, I told you I would not be here today. Actually, I will be absent tomorrow, and today the Chamber, because it is sitting in full composition, can make the ruling. I don't know whether Mr. Harmon wishes to take the floor (15)about this application, and then after we could perhaps have a break.

MR. HARMON: Yes. I will be glad to inform the Chamber of the Prosecutor's position in respect of the defendant's motion. (20)The counsel for the Defence and I had an opportunity to discuss the suggestion by the Chamber after the break. We have concluded that the position of the Prosecutor is one that we would like to put forward jointly, that is, no contact after the witness (25)is sworn -- I should say after the direct examination

• Page 1999 • {20/123}

(1)is concluded, and we both agree that we would not pursue the issue, we would not like to see the issue of the Prosecutor having contact with the Defence witnesses as a condition to the contact being (5)permitted, and vice versa, that the Defence would have contact when the Prosecutor has contact with witnesses brought by the Prosecution. So our view is, if you will, the original position, and I think both counsel and I would tender (10)that to the Chamber as the positions upon which we have agreed.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Visnjic.

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, (15)I can just confirm what my learned colleague, Mr. Harmon, has just stated. But if I may add, yesterday we heard reasons, we heard arguments of the Prosecution regarding your proposal. I should only like to put forward arguments of the Defence. We (20)believe that your proposal is the best solution, and if today were the first day of the trial, I think that this suggestion, this proposal, would be the best way to proceed. However, for the reason that I mentioned yesterday, having to do with the number of witnesses (25)that have already been heard, I think that the

• Page 2000 • {21/123}

(1)Prosecutor and the Defence have managed to find a solution which is, at this moment, satisfactory to both parties and acceptable to both. So again, as I say, in principle, I do (5)believe that your suggestion is the best solution. However, bearing in mind our current position, I think this solution, as it has been put forth by the Prosecution, is in the interests of both parties.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Thank you (10)very much, Mr. Visnjic. Having heard your views and arguments, we shall make a ruling later on. I hope that it will be possible for us to find a convenient moment today, this morning, but perhaps after the break we should proceed (15)with the witness, with the testimony right away, and I hope that later on we will have an opportunity to announce our ruling. And now I think we should have a 20-minute break. Mr. Dubuisson, after we have come back, I hope (20)that the witness will already be in the courtroom.

--- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

--- On resuming at 10.58 a.m.
[The witness entered court]

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] We're going (25)to resume the hearing.

• Page 2001 • {22/123}

(1)Can you hear me, sir?

THE WITNESS: Yes, I can.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Will you please read the solemn declaration that the usher will (5)give you.

THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Please be (10)seated. Let me just remind the interpreter that we consider this as a continuation of his previous work, and he's also still under an oath. Thank you, sir, for coming to testify before the Tribunal. First of all you're going to answer (15)questions put to you by Mr. Cayley. Mr. Cayley, you have the floor.

MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President.

WITNESS: ROBERT ALEXANDER FRANKEN

• EXAMINED by Mr. Cayley:

(20) • Q.: Major Franken, we are speaking the same language in the courtroom. There are interpreters between us. So I will go slowly and set a pace which allows for good translation, but if you could try and take a pause between my asking a question and you (25)answering it, it also gives you a moment to think about

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(1)a response.

• A.: Okay. I will try.

• Q.: Your name is Robert Alexander Franken; is that correct?

(5) • A.: That's correct.

• Q.: And you are Dutch by nationality.

• A.: That's correct as well.

• Q.: And you were born on the 24th of August, 1950.

(10) • A.: That's correct, sir.

• Q.: And you are a Major in the Dutch army; is that correct?

• A.: That's correct again.

• Q.: I think you are an infantry officer by (15)specialisation and career in the Dutch army; is that correct?

• A.: That's correct.

• Q.: Am I right in saying that you joined the Royal Dutch army in 1970.

(20) • A.: That's correct.

• Q.: And I think you've held many positions over 30 years, including commander of a mechanised infantry company, operations officer in an armoured brigade, a tactics instructor at the infantry school, chief of (25)training at an infantry training unit, staff officer

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(1)concerned with logistics and intelligence at battalion and brigade level. Have you done all of those jobs within the Dutch army?

• A.: That's correct, sir.

(5) • Q.: I think you are also trained as an airborne officer, and those wings on your chest, I think, indicate that; is that correct?

• A.: Yes.

• Q.: At the time of the events with which this (10)Court is concerned, you were the 2 IC, the second in command, or the deputy commanding officer of the 1st Netherlands UN Infantry Battalion in Srebrenica.

• A.: That's correct.

• Q.: And I think you yourself were based in (15)Srebrenica from January of 1995 until July of 1995.

• A.: Yes, in the area of Srebrenica, actually in Potocari.

• Q.: Could you explain to the Judges the mission of the Dutch Battalion within the Srebrenica enclave?

(20) • A.: Yes, I can. We were -- our mission was to deter any attack on the safe area of Srebrenica by presence, to demilitarise the area of the enclave, and to support NGOs and other humanitarian organisations in their task, in a humanitarian way.

(25) • Q.: Now, you confirmed to me a moment ago that

• Page 2004 • {25/123}

(1)you were the deputy commanding officer of the battalion. Can you explain to the Judges your responsibilities as the deputy commanding officer or second in command of the battalion?

(5) • A.: Yes. In fact, I was in charge of all internal affairs of the battalion and a big part of the operational affairs. Next to my duty as a DCO, I was the SFOR of the battalion and my mission was to take care of all logistics. So I had a double function, (10)more or less. It's usual in a Dutch battalion that a commander sets a couple of directives within which his staff operates, and that's what I did.

• Q.: You've used a couple of acronyms. SFOR, can you explain to the Judges what is meant by SFOR?

(15) • A.: That's the staff officer responsible for the logistics, all logistics. That means food, fuel, ammunition, medical care, et cetera.

• Q.: When you use the acronym "DCO," this means deputy commanding officer.

(20) • A.: Sorry for that, but it's a military habit to talk in abbreviations.

• Q.: Who was the commanding officer of the Dutch Battalion?

• A.: That was Colonel Karremans.

(25) • Q.: As the deputy commanding officer, where were

• Page 2005 • {26/123}

(1)you based for most of the time?

• A.: HQ in Potocari.

• Q.: When you say in the headquarters, were you based in the operations room?

(5) • A.: Yes. I was not always present in the operations room, but actually the operations room always directly reported to me, and when there were events I went to the operations room and my place was in that room.

(10) • Q.: Now, the operations room was, I think, the nerve centre of the battalion; is that correct?

• A.: That's correct, sir.

• Q.: And there were reports flowing into that operations room from the various locations of Dutch (15)soldiers around the enclave; is that correct?

• A.: That's correct.

• Q.: Now, the reports that were written, did you read many of them, all of them, the reports that were received?

(20) • A.: No, not all of them. The duty officer reported the most essential ones to me, and then I heard the story and if I wanted, once in a while, I read them. But it was a hell of a lot of information, so the crew of the duty room selected that, analysed (25)it, and gave me the analysis of the information.

• Page 2006 • {27/123}

(1) • Q.: You mentioned a moment ago, and I just want to clarify it for the record, you said, and I'll paraphrase what you said, the commanding officer set the mission of the battalion and you essentially, as (5)the deputy commander, ensured with the other officers that that was implemented; is that correct?

• A.: That's correct.

• Q.: You were the most senior officer amongst all of the other officers, as the deputy commander.

(10) • A.: That's correct as well, sir.

• Q.: Did you act for Colonel Karremans in his absence?

• A.: Yes, that was one of my tasks.

• Q.: Now, you mentioned a moment ago that the (15)mission of the UN Battalion in Srebrenica was the demilitarisation of the enclave. Can you explain to the Judges whether, to your knowledge, the enclave was ever demilitarised successfully by the Dutch Battalion?

• A.: No, it was not, sir. We had a minor amount (20)of small arms in the so-called weapon collection point, but the mass of small arms was still in the enclave. The problem was that we tried, the battalions who were there before us and we as well tried to demilitarise the enclave, but there were a couple of problems in (25)that; one of which was that we were not allowed to

• Page 2007 • {28/123}

(1)enter private houses. When we saw somebody with a gun, with a weapon, we followed him, we tried to catch him, but the very moment he went into a house, we had to stop and call in the local police to see whether the (5)weapon was still in the house. We tried that a couple of times, but the result always was that the so-called CIVPO, the civilian police, came out and said that there were no weapons. On three or four occasions, we succeeded to (10)catch somebody in the open field and we took his weapon. The procedure then was that he got a receipt, and the weapon was brought to the weapon collection point.

• Q.: What other weapons, apart from light weapons, (15)were in the weapons collection point?

• A.: There was a T-55. A T-55 is a main battle tank. As far as we knew, there was no ammunition for that tank. Some artillery pieces and some self-made artillery pieces, for instance, a rocket pod, something (20)that's normally under an aeroplane or helicopter, an armed helicopter, and they mounted that on two wheels and probably tried or used it as an artillery piece.

• Q.: Just to make the record absolutely clear. You were concerned with disarming Muslims within the (25)enclave.

• Page 2008 • {29/123}

(1) • A.: That's correct.

• Q.: Now, Major Franken, had you been a Muslim within the Srebrenica enclave, would you have handed in your weapon?

(5) • A.: Seeing the fact that as the enclave started or was organised, they were surrounded by pretty heavily armed Serbs. There was a minor unit -- in fact, a minor unit of the UN around, being a battalion, which is for that area and that kind of terrain a very (10)small unit to do anything, seeing the fact that that unit did not have the order to defend the enclave but to deter, I would not have delivered my weapon, sir.

• Q.: So you would have kept your weapon had you been a Muslim within the enclave in Srebrenica?

(15) • A.: Yes, that's correct.

• Q.: Now, the Bosnian Muslim soldiers or individuals who had weapons within the enclave, what was the military structure to which they belonged; do you know?

(20) • A.: Yes, we knew. Initially it was called the 8th Operational Group, but later on it was called the 28th Division. It had a division structure, so it was a division with four brigades and lower levels, as far as we could see. There was below brigade was the (25)company level, led by non-trained commanders, but that

• Page 2009 • {30/123}

(1)was on paper. Actually, there was not a real structure and there was not, let's say, any discipline in that unit. We found that out on several occasions, where all arrangements made with divisional headquarters, or (5)the divisional leaders, were not followed by local commanders. In the end phase, a couple of times we had to ask the Chief of Staff of the division to go to a Muslim position, to get them to reason, to get them that far so that we could move with our APCs to another (10)position, because they, in most of the cases, wouldn't let us, although the division said that we had freedom of movement to move our forces around as we wished.

• Q.: Now, you mentioned that there was a divisional headquarters. Did you ever visit the (15)divisional headquarters?

• A.: I've been at the gate of it, at the door of it.

• Q.: Could you describe that divisional headquarters to the Judges?

(20) • A.: Yes. It's more or less a conference room with no maps inside. There were no communications inside. Just a room with some desks, that was about it, and in it were, at that moment and later on we found out that the division staff was not more than (25)about ten guys.

• Page 2010 • {31/123}

(1) • Q.: Now, you're a professional army officer, you've been in the army for 30 years. Did it look like a divisional headquarters to you?

• A.: No, absolutely not, because normally, you can (5)imagine that a divisional headquarters is about around 100 officers and NCOs and different specialisations who have their maps, their gear, more or less. There is a concentration of communication means, et cetera. So it didn't look at all like a divisional headquarters, as I (10)know it.

• Q.: Now, you mentioned in your evidence that at one time you had to call for the intervention of the Chief of Staff --

• A.: That's correct.

(15) • Q.: -- of the 28th Division, in essentially coercing the brigades within that division to obey commands given by the divisional headquarters. I want you to turn your mind to another discussion that you had with the Chief of Staff of the 28th Division, when (20)you discussed with him the prospect of the enclave being attacked. Can you tell the Judges about that conversation?

• A.: Yes. It was a hypothetical conversation, where the question was asked by the Chief of Staff of (25)the 28th Division what the UN or what DutchBat would do

• Page 2011 • {32/123}

(1)when the enclave was attacked. I said that we would be defending our positions because we were only allowed to do self-defence, and I mean by "positions," our observation posts. And during that conversation, we (5)came to the idea that when it would happen, it would be possible that Muslim forces covered the areas between the observation posts, which I remarked with, "I understand what you mean, but then it would be that way that they would stay out of sight of the observation (10)posts and it would look like a ring around the enclave." That's the general idea of that conversation, sir.

• Q.: Did that defence ever actually materialise in reality?

(15) • A.: No. Well, locally it did, but in the overall situation, it did not. Essential for something like that is that when your neighbour is going away, that means when the Muslim forces would withdraw, they inform you, but they never did. So that's one of the (20)reasons our OPs found themselves back in the midst of Serb forces.

• Q.: Now, you've just mentioned Serb forces, and I'd now like you to turn your mind to the Bosnian Serb army. (25)Do you recall, prior to the fall of the

• Page 2012 • {33/123}

(1)enclave, the officers within the VRS with whom you were dealing?

• A.: Yes. It was, as far as I know, the official liaison, Colonel Vukovic, he came from Skelani Brigade, (5)and there was a Major Nikolic who belonged to the Bratunac Brigade. The position of Major Nikolic is a bit unclear because when he was asked he gave a different job every time. He said he was just a liaison of the Bratunac Brigade on one occasion, and on (10)the other occasion he said he was the second in command of the Bratunac Brigade. Then again he said he was the commander of the Bratunac Brigade, and then he said, "I'm the ops officer of the Bratunac Brigade." So we couldn't place him really on a job, but obviously he (15)belonged to the Bratunac Brigade. Colonel Vukovic never gave away what his real function was. He always said he was the official liaison of the Serb armed forces to DutchBat.

• Q.: Now, you mentioned at the beginning of your (20)testimony that the mission of the UN within the enclave was to deter Serb attacks and to demilitarise Bosnian Muslim forces within the enclave, and you've stated in your evidence that you never successfully demilitarised the enclave. (25)Now, did the Bosnian Serbs ever make

• Page 2013 • {34/123}

(1)representations to you about this failure to demilitarise the enclave?

• A.: In general, they did often, but I remember two special occasions where they complained to us that (5)Muslim forces did kill Serb soldiers, and that was on occasion in the area of about four or five kilometres south of Zeleni Jadar, that is between the enclave Sabar and the enclave of Srebrenica, where Serb soldiers went into an ambush allegedly led by Bosnian (10)soldiers. The second occasion was a report of our OP Mike, observation post Mike, I should say, where they reported battle noises, we called it, by night and during the morning and they saw burning houses in the (15)area directly north of OP Mike, being Serb territory.

• Q.: Let's go back to the first incident, which was in May of 1995, and if you could look at the map next to you and if you could point out to the Judges with a pointer the area in respect of which this (20)complaint was made.

• A.: It's out of the map, sir.

• Q.: It's off the map.

• A.: It's further down south than the map shows.

• Q.: Could you indicate with the pointer the (25)direction it is in.

• Page 2014 • {35/123}

(1) • A.: Indicate here?

• Q.: No, just on the map.

• A.: Yes. It would have been around here
[indicates], this area.

(5) MR. CAYLEY: Let the record show that the witness is indicating south of Zeleni Jadar, on Prosecutor's Exhibit 1E.

• Q.: Now, who complained about this ambush?

• A.: Major Nikolic did, sir.

(10) • Q.: Did anybody in DutchBat see any evidence of this ambush taking place?

• A.: No, we did not. You must consider the terrain is hilly, so in a horizontal site, it is one kilometre away, but there is a hill in between it, and (15)anything can happen at the other side and you won't see or hear it.

• Q.: Now, in respect of the second complaint, who did you hear that complaint from?

• A.: Again, Major Nikolic, sir.

(20) • Q.: You've indicated, in fact, that members of DutchBat actually observed that alleged incident taking place; is that correct?

• A.: The consequences of it, burning houses. Yes, correct.

(25) • Q.: Do you recall any other complaints during

• Page 2015 • {36/123}

(1)your time period, from the Bosnian Serbs?

• A.: No. As I said before, it was repeatedly a complaint that we didn't disarm the Bosnian soldiers but never related to a certain event, as far as I (5)know.

• Q.: Now, the other way around. Do you recall whether there were ever any complaints made by Bosnian Muslims in respect of Serb action against the enclave?

• A.: Yes. Not in the way that they complained (10)about Serb raids, as we called actions like this, but they complained that the Serbs were crawling forward into the area of the Srebrenica enclave. The problem with that was that there were three boundaries of the enclave: there was a UN boundary; the Serbs had their (15)own boundary which was about two kilometres within the boundary of the UN; and, of course, the Bosniaks and Muslims, had their own boundary which was about two or three kilometres outside the UN boundary. So it was very hard to bring over a complaint from one party to (20)another, because at the very moment you came, you got territory within the enclave, the only issue we had was the UN boundary, which was not fully acknowledged by both parties. There was one occasion south of OP Romeo (25)where it was clear that the Serbs crossed the UN

• Page 2016 • {37/123}

(1)boundary, and we managed to get them back to their own side of the confrontation line.

• Q.: And I think -- you don't need to get up, but on the map behind you, OP Romeo is the point that I (5)think is marked -- it's on the right-hand side of the boundary marker of the enclave.

• A.: It's this one [indicates] And the Serbs directly south, alongside the road, going down to the city of Srebrenica, they took positions there and they (10)were clearly out of their area and within the area of the UN enclave. I say "UN enclave," I mean the area marked by the UN boundary.

• Q.: Do you recall when that took place?

• A.: It should have been somewhere around April, I (15)suppose, sir.

• Q.: April of 1995.

• A.: That's correct.

• Q.: Let's move ahead in time to the 11th of July, 1995.

(20) • A.: Yes.

• Q.: I think you find yourself in the operations room of the battalion in Potocari. Do you recall the reports that you started to receive at that time?

• A.: Yes. In fact, it started, the confrontation (25)with the Serbs started from the night before. We got

• Page 2017 • {38/123}

(1)reports of pretty massive shelling of the city. We got reports from B Company, who found out that the 28th Division has disappeared from his flanks. And the problem was that in the morning, the Bosnian civilians (5)overran the compound of B Company, so the HQ of the company, in fact. And the commander of B Company tried to organise it again by sending a patrol out and trying to get the people in the direction of Potocari. That's, in fact, when the second time, the move of the (10)civilians in the direction of Potocari started. In that phase, we had contact with Serb forces, not being -- yeah, well, some infantry, but mainly tanks. That's about the situation in the morning of the 11th, sir. (15)The situation on our own side was as well that we were expecting and we thought we would get some air support in order to equalise our combat, our lack of combat power, I should say. That's generally describing the situation on the morning of 11th.

(20) • Q.: And when you say "equalise," equalise with whom?

• A.: With the Serb forces confronting us.

• Q.: You said at the beginning of the answer to my question, that you heard reports of pretty massive (25)shelling of the city, and you also said that at that

• Page 2018 • {39/123}

(1)time, to your knowledge, the 28th Division had vanished, had disappeared.

• A.: That's correct.

• Q.: Why was there shelling of the city taking (5)place?

• A.: It's strange you ask me that question, but there was not any military objective other than the so-called telegraph, post and telegraph building, where a part of the HQ of the 28th Division was, but that was (10)not in the city, that was in the northern part of the city. The city itself did not give any military objective in that stage, other than, of course, the UN forces. But then again it was at random shooting at the city.

(15) • Q.: From your recollection, what was the calibre of the artillery and mortars? And if you can remember to pause between question and answer. I'll try and go more slowly myself.

• A.: Mainly it was a bigger -- calibres of around (20).100 millimetres. I did deduce that from the explosions we heard and we saw. So it was heavy artillery.

• Q.: Any other weapons being used, Major Franken, apart from heavy artillery?

(25) • A.: Tanks were used, not only on the positions of

• Page 2019 • {40/123}

(1)our own forces but also used to shoot into the area of the city.

• Q.: From your recollection, thinking back now to July of 1995, do you have any recollection of the (5)number of shells that fell on the city on that day?

• A.: Yes, I remember that I ordered B Company to stop reporting every single explosion, and it was -- when we reached the figure of about 200.

• Q.: Now, you stated in an earlier response that (10)there was no military objective by this stage that would require this level of firing, and I'll ask you the question again: In your opinion, what was the reason for this very heavy shelling?

• A.: There could have been two reasons, but was (15)the same effect: killing people or trying to raise a panic by killing people. And I mean by "people," I mean civilians, women and children.

• Q.: You've stated in your evidence that civilians essentially overran the compound of B Company, based in (20)Srebrenica. Do you recall what orders you gave to B Company after you received the reports about the heavy shelling of the town?

• A.: The commander of B Company came himself with the suggestion that he was not in control of his own (25)compound anymore, as you can imagine, because the

• Page 2020 • {41/123}

(1)shelling was on the very location of the compound itself as well. So I agreed on him going aboard his APC and command his company from there, and try to get the refugees in the direction of Potocari. We prepared (5)the arrival of the refugees before because there was, as I told you before, a move of refugees in that direction. So Major Otter, a Dutch officer being the compound commander, was ordered by me to prepare that and to guide the refugees through a safe route, into (10)the direct area of our HQ. I say "safe route" because the whole road and our own compound was the very site of the Serb artillery and tanks.

• Q.: When you say that -- you said the final sentence, "I say safe route because the whole road was (15)the very site of the Serb artillery and tanks," can you explain what you mean by that?

• A.: Well, I was convinced of the fact that as soon as the Serbs would see that mass of refugees approaching, they would open fire. They did that (20)before in the city. And on one occasion we were warned that they would not allow us to have refugees on our camp.

• Q.: Now, after you issued the orders to Major Otter, can you recall what took place?

(25) • A.: Yes. Well, the next report, or the essential

• Page 2021 • {42/123}

(1)report that I got from B Company was that there was Serb infantry in the high grounds west and east of the city, so they, what we call, out-flanked us. As I said before, the 28th Muslim Division was gone, so we had no (5)neighbours on our left and right side. At that point, there was no use in keeping on defending the city of Srebrenica, it was being left by the refugees, and I, in fact, changed the intent of the mission not to defend Srebrenica but try to protect the (10)refugees by withdrawing at the end of the refugee column, in the direction of Potocari, and Captain Groen, who was the company leader of that company, got orders from me to take positions in the south on part of Potocari, facing the Serb advance from the city of (15)Srebrenica.

• Q.: Sir, am I right in saying, from your testimony, that B Company essentially withdrew on the tail of the refugees, as they moved towards Potocari.

• A.: That's correct. I wanted absolutely to (20)prevent Serb infantry free access to those masses of refugees.

• Q.: What did you, at the time, believe would happen if the Serb infantry got in amongst the refugees?

(25) • A.: Seeing the experience with the shelling of

• Page 2022 • {43/123}

(1)Srebrenica and the history on the Serb side, not directly in the area of Srebrenica, I suggested that, or I expected them to start killing, or things like that.

(5) • Q.: Now, you also stated earlier in your testimony that B Company was to withdraw and take up new positions to the south of Potocari; is that correct?

• A.: That is correct.

(10) • Q.: And by doing that, what did you hope to achieve?

• A.: To gain time, first, and secondly bring those people together on a smaller area where we would at least be able to try to control it. If you are in an (15)area like Srebrenica, the village or city of Srebrenica and Potocari, you need a hell of a lot of troops to control it. With the means we had and the number of troops we had, it was absolutely impossible. So the only thing I could do was concentrate.

(20) • Q.: You stated earlier in your evidence that one of the missions of the battalion was to deter Serb attacks on the enclave. At this point in time, did you, with the commanding officer, consider making a stand at Potocari?

(25) • A.: We shortly did, but if you do not consider

• Page 2023 • {44/123}

(1)the fact that I had about 150 combat-trained soldiers over there, you do not consider the fact that I had about 16 per cent of ammunition that I should have had, and even for anti-tank and mortar ammunition, those (5)percentages were much lower, and seeing the fact that I was in the midst of 30.000 civilians, our positions where we had to defend them were about 20 or 15 metres away from that mass of civilians, mainly women and children, starting to fight was no option.

(10) • Q.: Very briefly and to theorise, in your opinion, Major Franken, what would have happened if the Dutch army would have mounted a Defence in Potocari?

• A.: We would have had a massacre, and I mean a massacre between women and children, who were mainly (15)the mass of refugees. The Serbs already proved that they didn't respect anything about civilians or non-combatants. They fired at them with artillery in Srebrenica; they fired on them with artillery on the way down to Potocari and further on. By means of -- by (20)communication means of one of our OP crews, we used a radio of one of the APCs, after we had one air support, close air support mission in the afternoon of the 11th, the message came down from the Serbs that if we didn't stop opposing them, specially if we didn't stop with (25)air support, they would fire on our compound and on the

• Page 2024 • {45/123}

(1)refugees in Potocari, and they said they would kill our POWs. By that the time we had about 50 POWs, crews of our OPs -- sorry, observation posts who were captured by the Serbs. And I believe that he would start firing (5)on that crowd, absolutely.

• Q.: Two questions to clarify matters. When the Serbs made this threat, were they in a position to carry it out?

• A.: Yeah, they were. As far as we counted, there (10)were about 35 pieces of artillery, with heavy calibre confronting us, a couple of multiple-launch rocket systems, tanks. So he didn't have to fight with us, he could withdraw and shoot us to pieces without us being able to do anything. I didn't have heavy equipment; I (15)didn't have artillery; I didn't have any means to oppose their artillery, seeing the fact that I didn't get defensive air support.

• Q.: You spoke very briefly about POWs that were taken from your observation posts. Who are you (20)speaking of?

• A.: Crews of a couple of OPs. We had the -- yeah, well, all the OPs in the south were already taken by the Serbs, and one exception was OP Delta, observation post Delta, and the other observation posts (25)all were either captured by the Serbs or were ordered

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(1)by me to stay there in their position until they were contacted by the Serbs. The reason for that was the experience we had with the withdrawal of OP Foxtrot and the killing of one of our soldiers at a roadblock (5)within the enclave.

• Q.: So these POWs were UN Dutch soldiers.

• A.: Dutch soldiers, that's correct.

• Q.: When the Serbs threatened to kill these people, did you take that threat very seriously?

(10) • A.: I didn't believe at that moment that they would put them against the wall and shoot them, but I was convinced of the fact that they would use them as a shield against whatever, air support or things like that. They did that before.

(15) • Q.: Major Franken, let's move now to the next day, to the 12th of July, and if you can tell the Judges the first significant event that you recall from that day.

• A.: Yes. NCO, the commanding officer, (20)Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans was ordered by Mladic at 10.00 in Bratunac for another meeting, and at the very same time, it appeared to be the start of an infantry tank attack from the area OP Papa, so directly north of our HQ --

(25) • Q.: Could I interrupt you. Could you just

• Page 2026 • {47/123}

(1)indicate to the Judges on the map that is there.

• A.: So this area [indicates], alongside this road, our HQ was here [indicates], marked as "UN base," and the attack came from the area Yellow Bridge, as we (5)call it. So the surroundings of OP Papa, observation post Papa, I should say.

MR. CAYLEY: I think the witness has adequately explained his movements with the pointer and that's on Prosecutor Exhibit 1E.

(10) • Q.: So you observed an infantry tank attack, or an infantry attack supported by armour --

• A.: That's correct.

• Q.: -- coming from OP Papa. Can you describe to the Judges, in your opinion, as a military man, how (15)well-organised that attack was at the time?

• A.: Very well organised. It looked like a kind of demonstration, in fact. They were -- well, I wouldn't perform an attack like that in that way, but it looked very disciplined. They were -- the intervals (20)between the attacking soldiers were correct, they were correctly dressed. It was obvious that there was a coordination between the tank and the infantry next to them. So that looked like a regular attack, performed by trained and regular troops.

(25) • Q.: Now, you said in response to one of my

• Page 2027 • {48/123}

(1)earlier questions that Colonel Karremans was at a meeting. Was he present when this attack took place, or was he absent from the UN compound in Potocari?

• A.: He was absent, sir. He was in Bratunac with, (5)as far as I know, General Mladic.

• Q.: Do you see any significance in that absence?

• A.: Well, probably they tried to intimidate the battalion again. There's no logic behind it, as far as I know.

(10) • Q.: When did Karremans return from the meeting in Bratunac?

• A.: Would have been around half past eleven, 12.00.

• Q.: When he returned, did you speak with him?

(15) • A.: Yes, of course. He debriefed me about what was discussed over there. He gave the demands Mladic made concerning what was called the evacuation of the population, and, well, he didn't finish debriefing and the first buses and trucks appeared.

(20) • Q.: When you say "the first buses and trucks appeared," can you explain what you mean by that to the Judges?

• A.: Colonel told me that the UN supposedly agreed upon the execution of the evacuation by Serb forces and (25)that -- so the BSA, the VRS army, would perform that

• Page 2028 • {49/123}

(1)action. The time he mentioned was as of 1600 hours, as I recall well, but the very moment he told me that we got a report that there were a hell of a lot of buses and trucks appearing from the direction of Bratunac, (5)over the road going to the Potocari area.

• Q.: Now, you've said in response to my question that the evacuation was to be carried out by Serb forces. Who in the Serb forces was to carry out the evacuation?

(10) • A.: At that moment I did not know any name, but later on I understood that we were ordered by the UN to support or to facilitate that evacuation, and I was ordered by Colonel Karremans to see for Acamovic, he was somewhere outside the gate, to coordinate logistics (15)support as far as it was applicable. And then I met that Colonel and he said that he was in charge, he said he was a G-4, so a logistics officer, and he said that he came from Pale.

• Q.: Can you recall anything of the conversation (20)that you had with Colonel Acamovic?

• A.: Yes. Well, he demanded transport and he demanded fuel. Well, as is probably known, we didn't have any fuel, and I didn't grant him transport as well. I thought it was a very bad idea to have UN cars (25)with Serb drivers on it, riding around.

• Page 2029 • {50/123}

(1) • Q.: Now, you're an officer of significant experience, and now as your memory serves you, at the time at what level, at what operational level, did you think that Acamovic was working at when you were (5)speaking to him?

• A.: If you see the problems that the Serb forces were confronted with, being what we call a mopping up operation within the enclave, they had to counter the outbreak of the 28th Division in the general northern (10)direction, and we're talking about 10.000 men going out, of which 50 per cent are probably armed. The organisation of the evacuation, the transport, securing the routes, arrangements to be made at the crossing point of Kladanj, I think there were four up to six (15)brigades at least involved, so we're talking about corps level at least.

• Q.: Major Franken, you said in your evidence that at the time you thought it was a very bad idea to have UN cars with Serb drivers riding around. What decision (20)did you, in fact, make in respect of UN transport and the refugees?

• A.: Well, we were confronted with the fact that they started the evacuation without any coordination with us. So the first thing I did was ordered two (25)officers, being Major Boering, our liaison officer, and

• Page 2030 • {51/123}

(1)our personnel officer, Captain Voerman, to take a jeep and to go with the first convoy wherever they went and whatever would happen, stay with them. Then we rapidly organised an escort. We gathered all the small (5)vehicles we had, jeeps, I mean, and manned them with an NCO, or an officer and a soldier, and every time a couple of buses left we tried to escort them, and "escort" means, in fact, ride along with them.

• Q.: Can you explain to the Judges what actually (10)happened after you ordered this to take place?

• A.: It looked like in the beginning that we succeeded in executing that escort, but pretty soon it proved that it went wrong, that the escort vehicles were either stopped by more or less regular forces, (15)with the excuse that "We are responsible for your security. It's not secure over here, so you can't ride on." The buses could. And otherwise they were robbed or hijacked by militia-like types. So the amount of small vehicles I had with the battalion decreases (20)pretty rapidly.

• Q.: When you say "stopped by more or less regular forces," which forces are you referring to?

• A.: Well, you could say Rambo-types, wearing half uniforms, not looking like a military unit but a bunch (25)of robbers.

• Page 2031 • {52/123}

(1) • Q.: On which side of the conflict did these forces belong to?

• A.: On the Serb side, obviously.

• Q.: Now, how many vehicles did you lose to this (5)activity, that you can recall?

• A.: In total we lost about 33 vehicles, but I think concerning the convoys, it would be about 15, 16 jeeps, I suppose. But the figures are somewhere in the documents, the exact figures, but that's what I recall (10)now.

• Q.: Why do you think they were taking the jeeps? Why were they stopping the Dutch escorts from accompanying the buses?

• A.: Because they didn't want anybody to be (15)around; that's obvious. Otherwise they can't think of any reason to stop them, because we were not a threat, we were not a military potential. One jeep with two guys in it is nonsense. And so obviously they didn't want us to witness whatever would happen.

(20) • Q.: Now, when you'd lost 16 jeeps, did you think that there was any kind of significance or planning that somebody had actually decided that this was to happen?

• A.: It was obvious that the word was out to (25)frustrate the convoy escort, and the regular forces, as

• Page 2032 • {53/123}

(1)far as we could judge, used the excuse of being responsible for the safety of our personnel. And the other ones didn't use any excuse; they just took the men's gear, their weapons, and their cars.

(5) • Q.: Did you make any complaints?

• A.: Yes, I did. I did complain several times to a Colonel Jankovic, who in the meantime appeared to be the central figure on the Serb side, and he said he would look after it, but he also said that he did not (10)have all militia, et cetera, under control. So they would look after it, and if I gave the exact figures, et cetera, et cetera, and locations where they were stolen, they would take care of it, but they never did.

(15) • Q.: When you got this response from him, what did you think?

• A.: "Nice response," but probably that nothing would happen. And it proved out that nothing would happen -- I'm sorry, nothing did happen.

(20) • Q.: Now, you stated the number of vehicles in total that you lost. Do you, in summary, recall anything else that was lost by the battalion to Bosnian Serb forces?

• A.: Yes. We lost the APCs of the observation -- (25)APCs, armoured personnel carriers, which were posted at

• Page 2033 • {54/123}

(1)the observation post taken by the Serbs, and we lost about three APCs by a hit, or near-hit, of tanks.

• Q.: Do you recall any other losses of the battalion in terms of equipment?

(5) • A.: Yes, of course. We lost a hell of a lot of small arms. Of course, all the POWs lost their small arms. There was outposts I had around the perimeter of Potocari were robbed by militia. Weapons were taken, flak jackets were taken. Initially we sent out the (10)escort with weapons, but they lost their weapons pretty quickly, so in the end I sent them out without a weapon. So I suppose that about 150 -- the amount of 150 small arms were lost by the battalion.

• Q.: Let's return to the subject of Potocari. Can (15)you recall the state of the refugees at this time?

• A.: Yes. Partially in great fear, the major part resigned, not responding, not reacting; just being there.

• Q.: Now, at this time you were in the battalion (20)operations room, and I think also making rounds outside the compound and inside the compound.

• A.: That's correct. I did that at least twice a day, to keep in contact with reality, so to say.

• Q.: You mentioned earlier a company attack by VRS (25)soldiers mounted on the compound. Do you recall when

• Page 2034 • {55/123}

(1)the Serb soldiers actually arrived outside the UN compound in Potocari?

• A.: Personnel in that attack force should have been around, let's say, 11.00, they stopped at the (5)red/white tape that we drew around the factories and locations where we had the -- where the refugees were concentrated, and pretty quickly next to that, what I called second and third echelon militia-like types appeared.

(10) • Q.: What did these second and third echelon types do when they got to your compound?

• A.: In the beginning they were -- sorry. In the beginning they were pretty well controlled by the regular troops who were part of that attacking force. (15)There was a group of about between 15 and 20 soldiers in different uniforms who wanted to enter the compound and started opening -- well, by force opening the fence around the compound. I stopped them and they said they wanted to enter. It was a unit -- or a unit -- it was (20)a group of Serbs partially in blue uniforms and with dogs.

• Q.: Major Franken, just to ask you, if you could try --

• A.: Slow down.

(25) • Q.: -- and slow down. I realise you're used to

• Page 2035 • {56/123}

(1)giving orders at a rapid pace, but if you could try and slow down a bit, then it makes the interpreters' task easier and they get a more accurate translation of what you're saying, they're able to do that.

(5) • A.: Okay. I'll try.

• Q.: You said in your evidence that a group of 15 to 20 soldiers arrived, you stopped them, and they said they wanted to enter, and then you were describing the unit. Could you carry on with the description and then (10)explain what happened? And pause.

• A.: I will. They made clear to my men who were posted over there that they wanted to enter the compound. It was reported to me, so I left the OPs room and went to the very spot that was on the western (15)side of our compound, near the road. They made it clear that they wanted to enter. I said no, asked for somebody who spoke English. One of the soldiers spoke more or less English, and I asked what they wanted. They wanted to control the compound, whether there were (20)BiH soldiers or military units within our compound. Seeing the fact that I couldn't start a fight over there, with the same reasons I had before, I said, "Okay. You can come in, but accompanied by me, and only two or three of your men. So give me the (25)commander and we'll make a round." After some

• Page 2036 • {57/123}

(1)discussion within their ranks, they agreed upon that and I took them along. They had a quick round over the compound and then left through the same hole in the fence as they came in.

(5) • Q.: Can you describe the uniforms that these individuals were wearing, if you recall?

• A.: As far as I remember, they were the standard camouflage uniforms. A couple of them looked like, well, what we call the Rambo uniform, so part of it (10)green, part of it camouflage jackets. And there were five or six of them in blue uniforms, dark blue uniforms, and those were the guys with the dogs.

• Q.: Do you recall what kind of dog they had with them?

(15) • A.: Mainly German Shepherds.

• Q.: How did the people, the Bosnian Muslims that were inside the compound, react when these individuals entered?

• A.: They only got the Muslims inside, within the (20)big hall where they were, the big -- what do you call it? -- hall, the big hall? I brought them to a corner and I didn't grant them to go inside. I said, "I don't want a panic over here." People who saw them, of course, were in fear. They saw, as I gathered, about (25)10 or 12 UN soldiers around them, and then I went away

• Page 2037 • {58/123}

(1)as quick as possible, and they hadn't been there longer than about, I think, 30 or 45 seconds.

• Q.: Now, Major Franken, the refugees that were present inside the compound and outside the compound, (5)were they mainly women and children, or men, women and children? Can you remember the approximate proportion of the refugees?

• A.: The main part were women and children. We, for the occasion of a list -- probably we will speak of (10)that -- next to it there were about 300, 350 men within the compound, and we estimated that there were 500 to 600 men outside the compound. The rest were women and children.

• Q.: The 500 or 600 men outside the compound, by (15)this time were you aware, in the operations room, from the walk-abouts that you'd had, what was taking place with the men?

• A.: Yes. One of the demands or rules Mladic gave us was -- or his intents, he told us that he intended (20)to separate the men between 16 and 60 years to check whether they were war criminals or soldiers. So it was obvious that they were going to separate the men from the women. And as it is, in the procedure, there's nothing wrong, because it's a normal procedure when you (25)have a great amount of prisoners, is to separate them.

• Page 2038 • {59/123}

(1)But I had my thoughts -- no, I had my fears about what was going to happen to the men afterwards.

MR. CAYLEY: If, Mr. Registrar, we could have Prosecutor's Exhibit 5/17 at the ready.

(5) • Q.: Major Franken, can you tell the Judges, from your recollection, what actually happened to the men?

• A.: They were separated and they were interrogated in a house about 300, 400 metres outside of our main gate. In an increasing amount, I got (10)reports that the interrogation was done with physical violence, and I sent down first the UNMOs, United Nations Military Observers, who were -- we had a party of UNMOs within the enclave -- to check whether the amount of men that went into the house was the same (15)that came out. When they were came out, they were brought into a blue bus, and that bus went with the other buses outside the enclave. We tried to escort specifically that bus, but we failed in that, because we were (20)stopped by Serb forces, or a column of 20 buses going through a village or a city like Bratunac, if you have one or two jeeps with them, you can't control it, and you only can see outside the city that a couple of buses are gone. So we didn't manage to escort the blue (25)bus. Even when we rode next to it, we were stopped by

• Page 2039 • {60/123}

(1)OP Papa, or somewhere in Bratunac we were stopped by Serb forces, and then the bus vanished.

MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could be shown Prosecutor's Exhibit 5/17, and if it could be placed on (5)the ELMO.

• Q.: Major Franken, do you recall this building?

• A.: That is the White House, what I was talking -- that I was talking about. It's this one
[indicates] Sorry. This is the White House.

(10) MR. HARMON: The witness is indicating on Prosecutor's Exhibit 5/17 that the photograph represents the White House.

• Q.: What happens at the White House? This is for the purposes of making the transcript absolutely (15)clear.

• A.: Sorry. I misunderstood your question. Say it again, please.

• Q.: Could you explain to the Judges what you saw taking place at the White House?

(20) • A.: Yes. Well, men were brought there. They had to leave their gear, their personal belongings outside, and then were interrogated. A couple of my officers went down there. I sent down there the UNMOs. The reports then were that they were not friendly, but (25)nothing serious happened. But going into the 12th, it

• Page 2040 • {61/123}

(1)got more serious, it got more violent. In the end we were not able to send down a patrol. Every time I got a report, I tried to send down a patrol to the White House. But by the end of the 12th, it was obvious we (5)were not in control anymore, because our patrols were stopped by armed Serbs and outnumbered our forces without, so we couldn't approach the White House anymore.

• Q.: From your memory at the time, why did they (10)want to stop the Dutch patrols moving around the White House, Major Franken?

• A.: I suppose for the same reason as they stopped our escorts: They didn't want witnesses.

• Q.: Now, you said earlier in your testimony that (15)it's normal procedure to separate individuals when you have a large number of individuals. Is it normal procedure, as far as you're aware, in international law, under military law, to use violence when you interrogate people?

(20) • A.: No, absolutely not. It is forbidden, and in fact there's an international law that says that a POW, or somebody in that group who looks like a POW, is only entitled to give his name, his rank, and his registration number, and that's it, and you're not (25)allowed to force him to say more, in any way.

• Page 2041 • {62/123}

(1) • Q.: Why did you conclude that there was violence taking place in the White House?

• A.: Reports from my post that there was -- they saw a man outside being beaten up: "We heard noises, (5)we heard yelling," et cetera.

• Q.: Those types of noises were heard coming from the White House?

• A.: Cries.

MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, do you wish to (10)break at this point?

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Cayley. I think this is a convenient time, so that the witness can have some rest as well. A 20-minute break.

(15) --- Recess taken at 12.03 p.m.

--- On resuming at 12.25 p.m.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Cayley, you may continue. We have two hours of work left. We will divide the remaining time in two parts, with a (20)break in between, halfway through, so you will know when to ask for a break. You may continue now, Mr. Cayley.

MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President.

• Q.: Major Franken, if I could first of all remind (25)you again to take a pause between my question and your

• Page 2042 • {63/123}

(1)answer, and if you could speak slowly. It's very, very clear, in English, what you're saying, it's just it's a little bit too rapid to give the fullest translation that the interpreters want to give. (5)You said earlier in your testimony that Colonel Karremans had been to Bratunac on the morning of the 12th of July, to meet with General Mladic. Do you recall that?

• A.: That is correct.

(10) • Q.: Do you recall with whom Colonel Karremans went to that meeting with?

• A.: Yes, with two of our liaison officers, Major Boering and Warrant Officer Rave.

• Q.: Did anybody else accompany Colonel Karremans (15)on that trip; do you recall?

• A.: As far as I know, not, sir.

• Q.: Were there any representatives of the Muslim refugees?

• A.: Yes. That is correct. The representatives (20)of the Muslim community were present, three people were there.

• Q.: Do you recall the names of any of those people?

• A.: There was Mister, as I know him, Mandzic, the (25)father of one of the interpreters of the UNMOs. I

• Page 2043 • {64/123}

(1)don't know his name. I don't recall his name, I should say. And a lady, whose name I can't recollect, but I've still got a picture with her.

• Q.: Now, it's the second person that you (5)mentioned that I want you to concentrate on, and you said, I think in your evidence, that he was the father of one of the interpreters of the UNMOs. After Colonel Karremans returned, did you have any contact with that man?

(10) • A.: Yes. I had contact with him on the evening of the 12th. He asked to speak to me.

• Q.: Can you tell the Judges the content of that conversation that you had?

• A.: Yes. He asked me to stop the evacuation, (15)because he feared everybody would be killed by the Serbs. I answered that I feared, in fact, for the men as well but that, in fact, he asked me to make the choice between thousands of women and children and the men. And then he answered that he understood what I (20)meant, and he agreed and went away.

• Q.: If we can explore this a little bit more. You said that you feared for the men as well but that you had to make a choice at the time.

• A.: That is correct.

(25) • Q.: And I think I'm correct in paraphrasing your

• Page 2044 • {65/123}

(1)evidence if I say that you had to choose between thousands of women and children and the men that were at the White House.

• A.: That is correct, sir.

(5) • Q.: If you had stopped the evacuation of women and children, what did you think, at the time, would happen?

• A.: There were, in fact, two possibilities which I estimated as being realistic. One of them was the (10)worst case, that Mladic would start firing upon them or try to bring down the role of DutchBat to zero, so we didn't have any influence at all more; secondly, he could freeze the situation. Our logistics situation was devastating. We did not have food and, more (15)important, we did not have water for 30.000 men, people. There were no medical supplies. We didn't have the necessary -- What do you call that? -- hygienic insulations, so we couldn't have sustained that situation longer than about two or three days.

(20) • Q.: Now, you said in your evidence that you were concerned that Mladic would start firing upon "them." Who do you mean by "them"?

• A.: I mean the refugees outside the camp, sir.

• Q.: Now, you say that after you had this (25)conversation with this gentleman, the father of one of

• Page 2045 • {66/123}

(1)the interpreters of the UNMOs, that he understood what you meant.

• A.: Yes. He understood obviously the problem we had, the decision I had to make, and he supported the (5)decision we took. That's the impression I got of his answer.

• Q.: Do you recall that man's name at this point?

• A.: Ibrahim. Sorry. I can't recall exactly.

• Q.: I'll lead you.

(10) • A.: He was one of the three representatives of the civil population.

• Q.: Was his surname, his last name, Nuhanovic?

• A.: That's correct, sir.

• Q.: So Mr. Ibrahim Nuhanovic.

(15) • A.: That is correct.

• Q.: Now, you just stated in your evidence that you discussed with him the problems with the men in the White House. Did you take a decision at this time in respect of those men who were in the compound?

(20) • A.: Yes, I did. I tried to give them some protection in a way Amnesty International uses. Anonymous victims don't -- are not really -- it is not possible to protect or to do something about anonymous victims, so I suggested to the committee to register (25)all the men between the age 16 to 60, because that was

• Page 2046 • {67/123}

(1)the age group Mladic told us he would check, register them, make a list of it, and make the list public, as we did, at least as we intended.

MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could be shown (5)Prosecutor's Exhibit 80, please.

• Q.: Major Franken, could you look through that document -- I've shown it to you before -- and could you tell the Judges the nature of that document?

• A.: Yes. It is a list of the major part of the (10)males in the -- between the refugees within our compound, we registered their name, their first name, year of birth, and place of birth, to give them an identity. I counted them and signed them, and afterwards I see I did some bad counting, but anyway, (15)that's the nature of that list.

• Q.: In fact, I think it says that there are 239 in total, but I've counted them and I make it 251. But be that as it may, you say in your evidence that you arranged this in order to give these men protection. (20)At the time, what did you believe they needed protection from?

• A.: It was obvious that the men were not arriving in the Kladanj area, on the evening of the 12th. We checked that, at least at HQ. I asked there whether (25)there were men between the masses of refugees coming

• Page 2047 • {68/123}

(1)across at the Kladanj crossing point. So at least they were kept in a kind of concentration camps. In the worst case, they were killed. And I tried by this list to make them known to the world and perhaps give them (5)some protection by giving the Serbs the problem that there were known people. They could be checked. We knew who they were, who they are. That was the general idea with this list, sir.

• Q.: Did you tell anybody about this list, apart (10)from the Muslims who you were dealing with inside the compound?

• A.: I told the Serbs that I had the list, that I registered the men, and I sent it by fax to the HQ of Sector North-east, which was our direct higher echelon, (15)a UN HQ -- sorry, a UN headquarters. And I faxed it to what we call the Crisis Staff here in The Hague, so that is a Dutch headquarters, with the request to make it known.

• Q.: And to your knowledge, was this list (20)published in any way?

• A.: No. It disappeared in some drawers or in any bureaucratic swamp or whatever.

• Q.: Were all of the men inside the compound on this list?

(25) • A.: No. As reported to me by the committee,

• Page 2048 • {69/123}

(1)about 70, 7-0, 70 of them did not want to give their name.

• Q.: You stated earlier in your testimony that there were, I think you said, between 600 and 900 men (5)outside the compound. Did you consider them at all while you were making this list?

• A.: Yes. The idea was to register them as well, but at the very moment that our committee and interpreters who we needed to speak to the men came (10)outside of the compound, they were intimidated by the Serbs, and the lady, being a member of the committee, was intimidated in such a harsh way that she got a nervous breakdown and was to be brought to the hospital, and was further in the period she stayed (15)there as a patient. So after that, our -- well, the people didn't have the guts to go out. They didn't have the courage to go out anymore. So that failed. The registration of the men outside the compound failed.

(20) MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could be shown Prosecutor's 28/13.1, and if you could also get ready Prosecutor's 62 and 5/3.

• Q.: Major Franken, do you recognise this man?

• A.: This is the man known to me as Colonel (25)Jankovic.

• Page 2049 • {70/123}

(1) MR. CAYLEY: Just for the purposes of the record, this is Prosecutor's Exhibit 28/13.1, and the witness has identified the individual as Colonel Jankovic.

(5) • Q.: Did you have occasion to speak with Jankovic?

• A.: On several times --

• Q.: At about this time, on the 13th of July.

• A.: Yes. I spoke to him and -- that's correct, yes. I had a contact with him.

(10) • Q.: Do you recall what you spoke with him about?

• A.: All the details, the arrangement, and I thought that this was the occasion where I informed him of the existence of the list, that I informed him that we had registered all men in the convoys.

(15) • Q.: Now, you said earlier that you thought that the procedure, that the treatment of the men that they be separated was normal, and I think in that respect you were thinking of prisoners of war. Did Jankovic say to you anything about prisoners of war at that (20)time?

• A.: I asked him, on several occasions, what -- where the men went. First he answered that there was no problem, they went to a POW camp and would be treated correctly, and he told me that ICRC was (25)monitoring the operation. The information we got from

• Page 2050 • {71/123}

(1)the UN as well. That's, in fact, his answer when I asked him about the men. At least twice I protested about the treatment the men got at the White House, and he said he'll go in for it and arrange it, but nothing (5)happened.

• Q.: Did he ever indicate to you the number of prisoners of war that were under VRS protection?

• A.: Yes. We came to the -- and how exactly I do not know, but we came to speak about the outbreak of (10)the 28th Division, and he told me that they already had 6.000 POWs.

• Q.: Do you recall on what date you had that conversation with him?

• A.: It must have been on the 14th, sir, but I (15)don't exactly recall when, because I had quite a lot of meetings with Colonel Jankovic.

• Q.: When you say "the 14th," you mean the 14th of July, 1995.

• A.: Yes. Yes.

(20) MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could be shown Prosecutor's Exhibit 62.

• Q.: This is an exhibit that I've previously shown to you. Do you recognise this image?

• A.: Yes. The building you see is the so-called (25)White House. The road in front of is the road from our

• Page 2051 • {72/123}

(1)main gate to -- the road that goes from right to left -- is the road from -- sorry. The road on this side [indicates], OP Papa Bratunac, going in that direction, the direction of Srebrenica, (5)Potocari-Srebrenica. This is the so-called White House, and this I have seen [indicates] It was the burning of the personal belongings left behind, probably by the men who were separated and went to the White House. I was reported that they were setting (10)fire to their belongings, and that's what I saw.

MR. CAYLEY: For the purposes of the record, the witness pointed to the building that can be -- the outline of the building which can be seen in the centre of the photograph and indicates that that was the White (15)House and that the objects burning on the left-hand side of the photograph were the belongings -- the personal belongings of men who had been separated and went to the White House.

• Q.: You saw that and that was reported to you as (20)well in the operations room.

• A.: That's correct.

• Q.: At about this time, Major Franken, do you recall any reports that you received from soldiers within the battalion about events that had happened (25)outside the compound during the 12th and 13th of July?

• Page 2052 • {73/123}

(1) • A.: Yes. On one occasion, it was reported to me that they found nine dead men, dead bodies, in an area directly south of the White House, near a brook, and they were obviously executed, because the positions of (5)the bodies gave no occasion whatsoever that it would have been as a consequence of combat. And the second report I got was through Colonel Karremans, that a soldier of C Company, being at a post in the area of the Zinc Factory, that's one (10)of the -- there was a zinc industry, and one of the buildings we used for the refugees to take shelter, and he reported that he saw an actual execution of one Muslim man by two Serb soldiers.

• Q.: Major Franken, if we can just return briefly (15)to the first incident, and if that exhibit can be removed and Exhibit 5/3 placed on the ELMO. Who reported to you, Major Franken, in respect of the nine bodies by the brook?

• A.: It was Lieutenant, now Colonel Koster.

(20) • Q.: If you recall, on Prosecutor's Exhibit 5/3, the area where he stated to you that those bodies were found.

• A.: Yes, I can. It was in this area, sir
[indicates]

(25) MR. CAYLEY: Let the record show that the

• Page 2053 • {74/123}

(1)witness is --

• Q.: Could you point the pointer back there again, please?

• A.: Sure.

(5) MR. CAYLEY: The witness is indicating a clump of trees to the bottom -- to the middle right-hand side of the picture and about seven or eight centimetres to the right of two houses which are prominently situated in the centre of the photograph, (10)just next to the road that runs through Potocari.

• Q.: Thank you, Major Franken. The second report that you heard about in respect of an individual -- let's see your exact words from the transcript -- that I think a soldier had seen (15)somebody executed at the Zinc Factory. Did you take that report seriously at the time?

• A.: Yes, I did.

• Q.: Why?

• A.: Well, I can't imagine somebody reporting (20)something grave like that just for fun, out of imagination, and the situation was so grave that it was an absolute reality, or a possibility that it could have happened, and there was no reason for me to doubt the words of that soldier.

(25) • Q.: Did you know that soldier?

• Page 2054 • {75/123}

(1) • A.: I don't know him by name now. He didn't report it directly to me so I didn't speak to the soldier. I got the report in a briefing from Colonel Karremans.

(5) • Q.: If we could now move ahead in time to the 17th of July of 1995, and I want you to cast your mind back to a delegation who arrived at the compound. And if you can tell the Judges who came on that day and what they did within the UN compound.

(10) • A.: Yes. The meeting was arranged concerning the transfer of 59 patients and wounded of MSF, Medecins Sans Frontiers, who were still in the compound, and a number of wounded still in the Bratunac Serb hospital. It was arranged that ICRC would take them over from me (15)and bring them to a safe area, and I don't mean a safe area in Srebrenica, I mean a safe territory. On that occasion, a Serb delegation came. The leader was Colonel Jankovic; there was one civilian who appeared to be, later on, the mayor, the new mayor (20)of Srebrenica; Major Nikolic was there with a bodyguard; not by name known, a Colonel of the Serb forces; and a Lieutenant-Colonel, being a lawyer, as he indicated himself. And on my side there was later on Mr. Mandzic, one of the three members of the civilian (25)committee, my G-5, a warrant officer Rave, and later on

• Page 2055 • {76/123}

(1)the ICRC delegation. That's the, as far as I remember, the complete crew in that room at that moment.

• Q.: Who were these patients, these wounded people that you refer to?

(5) • A.: Initially those were patients and wounded evacuated from the civil hospital in Srebrenica, and we tried before to bring out all the wounded during the evacuation that failed at the crossing point in Kladanj, for several reasons. When they returned, they (10)were not brought into the -- no, wrong. The Serbs did not allow us to bring them back to the compound partially, but took a couple of them to the hospital in Bratunac. We left the Dutch doctor to watch over them there, and there were still 59 wounded and patients (15)within the compound, and we're talking about those 59 wounded and patients of the MSF and the patients still in the hospital in Bratunac.

• Q.: These people were local Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica.

(20) • A.: Yes, that's correct.

• Q.: Now, this meeting took place in order to facilitate their evacuation, and can you explain to the Judges what you had to do in order to facilitate that evacuation?

(25) • A.: Yes, it was made clear to me that the Serbs

• Page 2056 • {77/123}

(1)wanted a declaration in which the representative of the civilian committee declared that everything went according to the rules during the evacuation. At the very moment it was presented to me, the declaration (5)was, it's called the Serbo-Croatic [sic] language. So I said -- they asked me to sign it as a witness. I said that I wanted to have it translated because I was not going to sign any declaration in Serbo-Croat, seeing the fact that I don't speak or can't read the (10)language, and I had my own interpreters translate it into English. Meanwhile, it was made clear to me that the transport and the operation and the transport of the wounded on our compound and the wounded in the Bratunac (15)hospital would be favourably influenced by that declaration, to say, facilitate it, accelerate it, the procedure, et cetera. So I had it --

• Q.: Major Franken, if I can interrupt you at this point --

(20) • A.: Sure.

• Q.: -- and just show you Prosecutor's Exhibit 86. Major Franken, do you recognise this document?

(25) • A.: Yes. This is a document, a list with names

• Page 2057 • {78/123}

(1)and birth years, et cetera, made by the MSF, as being part of the standard procedure for getting a clearance for a movement through VRS territory.

• Q.: And the 59 individuals listed on this list, (5)who are these people?

• A.: These are the same 59 people that I spoke of, the 59 patients of MSF, in their custody, on the compound.

• Q.: Were all of these people evacuated from the (10)UN compound?

• A.: In the end, yes. The problem was ICRC did not have enough capacity on the spot to transport the people, so they asked me to provide transport for seven men and I granted that. I sent that truck with those (15)seven men down to Bratunac. I had it accompanied by an UNMO Major De Haan. In Bratunac, he transferred them to the ICRC again.

• Q.: Did you subsequently hear reports in respect of those seven men?

(20) • A.: Yes. It proved out that ICRC was not taking them with them, for reasons not known to me. They stayed in Bratunac. ICRC would monitor them, so overlook them. I spoke to you before about the doctor still in the Bratunac hospital, and he was called away (25)for lunch or whatever, and when he came back, the seven

• Page 2058 • {79/123}

(1)men had disappeared. When he asked for them, he was told that he better not ask if he wanted to return safely to the compound.

• Q.: The doctor, who was he?

(5) • A.: Colonel Schouten. He was one of our surgeons.

• Q.: He was a Dutch army surgeon?

• A.: Correct.

• Q.: Do you have any idea to this day where those (10)seven men went to?

• A.: I fear they have -- well, at least they disappeared. Whether they are still in some kind of a camp, but probably they're dead.

• Q.: And these were all wounded individuals.

(15) • A.: That's correct.

• Q.: Indeed, if you look at the list in front of you, and you and I have reviewed this, and it's a combination of male and female, which is indicated by the "M" and "F," there are some elderly people, elderly (20)males on this list, are there not, Major Franken?

• A.: There are, absolutely. There is 1910, 1913, 1914, et cetera.

MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could now be shown Prosecutor's Exhibit 47A and 47B.

(25) • Q.: Major Franken, you were -- you began to speak

• Page 2059 • {80/123}

(1)of a declaration which you witnessed, and if you could place the document that you signed on the ELMO in front of you, and I think you also have an English translation that is also in front of you. 47A is the (5)official English translation; 47B is the field translation which you were referring to in your evidence, which you requested before you signed it, because you didn't understand the Serbo-Croat language. (10)Just to confirm, Major Franken, for the purposes of the transcript, is this the document that you witnessed?

• A.: That is correct. This is that document.

• Q.: I'd like to refer you to the -- what I would (15)call the operative paragraphs of this declaration. It states the following was agreed, and I want to ask you about each of these particular statements. The agreement states that: "The civilian population can remain in the enclave or evacuate, (20)dependent upon the wish of each individual." Major Franken, is that a real statement?

• A.: I understand that General Mladic made that statement, but hardly any realistic statement because the fate of those who wanted to stay, even if they (25)could, was, let's say, uncertain. And in the end,

• Page 2060 • {81/123}

(1)there was not a choice. Mladic ordered the population to go to Kladanj, period.

• Q.: If we could now move to the next section. "In the event that we wish to evacuate, it is possible (5)for us to choose the direction of our movement and have decided that the entire population is to evacuate to the territory of the County of Kladanj." Major Franken, is this true?

• A.: No, it is not. You can't say that the (10)committee or Mr. Mandzic did decide anything. It was dictated by Mladic that the evacuation would take place to the crossing point at the Kladanj county. There's not a choice, it was dictated.

• Q.: And the final paragraph: "It has been agreed (15)that the evacuation is to be carried out by the Army and Police of the Republic of Srpska, supervised and escorted by UNPROFOR."

• A.: That's about the same story. As far as I know, Mladic demanded that it had to be carried out (20)like this, and there has been, as far as I know, any contact between UN level. What level, I don't know. And they -- by consequence they ordered us to assist or to facilitate the evacuation. But it's not a choice that it was done by the army and police of the (25)Republika Srpska, it was one of the demands of Mladic,

• Page 2061 • {82/123}

(1)and obviously the UN was not able to counter that demand.

• Q.: It then states: "After the agreement had been reached, I assert that the evacuation was carried (5)out by the Serb side correctly and the clauses of the agreement had been adhered to." What do you say to that, Major Franken?

• A.: Well, it's not correct, and if you take the last sentence, I added there that it would have been (10)that way, as far as convoys actually escorted by UN forces are concerned, and none of them actually were escorted in the military sense of the word by UN forces. So that made for me this declaration absolutely worthless. Perhaps to make clear what I (15)mean, with an actual escort, if you have a party of ten buses going over a road, in covered terrain with a lot of crews, you almost have to put a UN vehicle between each bus to really escort them, to have constantly a view of what's happening on that convoy. As you know, (20)we were not able to do that. Our escort was, when it succeeded a few times, was just one jeep, riding alone.

• Q.: Now, you stated in response to my question that you added in a sentence, and I think you're (25)talking about the phrase in the very last paragraph,

• Page 2062 • {83/123}

(1)where it states: "As far as convoys actually escorted by UN forces are concerned." How did the Bosnian Serbs react when you added that phrase?

(5) • A.: There were two reactions: The Lieutenant Colonel who said he was a lawyer got mad and started a pretty frantic discussion with his colleagues, and Colonel Jankovic, well, reacted as, "Let it be." Those were the two reactions that I (10)could see.

• Q.: Now, you've stated in your evidence that you regard this declaration as absolutely worthless.

• A.: That is correct.

• Q.: Why did you sign it?

(15) • A.: Well, as I told you, the message came to me that in order to be sure that those 59 wounded and patients and the civilians, and the patients wounded in Bratunac, could get away with the Red Cross, the signing of this declaration would be in favour of the (20)procedure and accelerate the procedure. And in my opinion, making the declaration worthless, I could sign that with the effect that it at least favoured the routine with the wounded. That was my idea; that was my motivation to sign it.

(25) • Q.: We can leave that subject now, and I just

• Page 2063 • {84/123}

(1)have two areas that I want to briefly cover with you. I want you to think about the 12th and the 13th of July again, generally. The military operation that you saw taking place. You mentioned General (5)Mladic a moment ago. Were you aware that he was at the compound at Potocari on either of those dates, on the 12th and 13th of July?

• A.: He was not at the compound itself, he was at the area outside, so the Potocari parameter where the (10)refugees were. Yes, that was reported to me.

• Q.: In your opinion, why was General Mladic outside the compound?

• A.: Seeing the presence of Serb cameras, et cetera, it was some kind of public relations or what we (15)call media operations trick.

• Q.: Now, you mentioned earlier in your evidence that you assessed that this was a corps operation taking place.

• A.: Yes.

(20) • Q.: When you look back now, why do you assess that Mladic was present, since he was the chief of the Main Staff, the Commander in Chief of the army?

• A.: Well, propaganda or public relations issues, being the big hero of the Serb forces, showing off, (25)because where he appeared, there were cameras, as far

• Page 2064 • {85/123}

(1)as we know. But was he really in the lead there, I doubt that.

• Q.: When you say "in the lead," what do you mean by that?

(5) • A.: Actually commanding the troops on the spot, because that would be highly unusual in a military way. It's a high commander who passes all levels in between and then interfering with details, he's making a mess of an operation within a couple of hours.

(10) • Q.: Who, in your opinion, would have been in control of the operation that you're referring to?

• A.: Without naming a person, but it should have been the commander of the corps level who was involved in the operation, the commander and staff of that (15)corps. That would be a military norm.

MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could be shown Prosecutor's Exhibit 45.

• Q.: Major Franken, I've shown you this photograph previously. Do you recognise this man?

(20) • A.: Yes, I recognise this man by face.

• Q.: Do you know where you've seen him previously?

• A.: Yes. I must -- not an exact probability. Let's say it this way: Somewhere around the 12th, 13th, or 14th of July, and the most probable occasion (25)is when I met the first time with Colonel Ademovic

• Page 2065 • {86/123}

(1) [Realtime transcript read in error "Erdemovic"] outside the compound, because there was a circle of officers discussing things, and I'm sure that I saw this man there.

(5) • Q.: Major Franken, could you stand up and look around the courtroom and see if you recognise anybody.

• A.: Yes. That's the man [indicates]

• Q.: Can you describe what the gentleman is wearing?

(10) • A.: He was in a camouflage uniform.

• Q.: At the time that you saw him. Can you describe what he's wearing now?

• A.: Sorry. A dark suit, a dotted tie, and a light blue shirt.

(15) MR. CAYLEY: Let the record show, Mr. President, that the witness has identified the accused. Mr. President, I have no further questions for the witness. I can now offer him for (20)cross-examination.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Thank you, Mr. Cayley. I think that perhaps it will be better to now make a break, rather than do it during the (25)cross-examination. Therefore, we shall now make a

• Page 2066 • {87/123}

(1)15-minute break.

--- Recess taken at 1.11 p.m.

--- On resuming at 1.30 p.m.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Now, Major (5)Franken, you will answer questions -- excuse me. I do see Mr. Cayley.

MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, I'm sorry to interrupt you, but it was pointed out to me in the break, and it's now just disappeared off the (10)transcript, that at line 1, of page 85, the name of an individual was stated as "Erdemovic," and in fact what the witness said at the time was "Ademovic." You can't see it on the screen because it's scrolled over, but just I thought I would point it out to the Court, and I (15)think it can also be corrected in the transcript when the court reporter actually listens to the recording later.

THE COURT REPORTER: Yes.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well. (20)Thank you very much, Mr. Cayley. Yes. The transcript will be corrected. As I was saying, Major, you will now answer questions which Mr. Visnjic, I think, yes, Mr. Visnjic, the Defence counsel for General Krstic, will ask you. (25)Yes, Mr. Visnjic, you have the floor.

• Page 2067 • {88/123}

(1) MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Thank you, Mr. President.

• CROSS-EXAMINED by Mr. Visnjic:

• Q.: Major Franken, I should like us to go back to (5)the beginning of your stay in the protected area of Srebrenica, that is, the first months of your duty there. According to our information, you tried to normalise relations between the parties to the conflict on several occasions, and one of such attempts was to (10)establish trade between the parties. Could you tell the Chamber something more about that?

• A.: Yes, I could, although I was not personally involved in that action. It came to me that from the Serb side there was a proposal to open trade to the (15)enclave, on conditions like those already used in the area of Gorazde. I know that there were a couple of meetings concerning that proposal, which tried to arrange details for that trade. That is correct.

• Q.: Did it ever come to fruition? Was this (20)agreement, this understanding, put through?

• A.: No. In the end, it was not. There never was any formal trade between the Serbs and the Muslims within the enclave, in our period.

• Q.: Would you know, why was this proposal on the (25)Serb side rejected?

• Page 2068 • {89/123}

(1) • A.: The only thing I know is that it was rejected, rejected by the leaders of the 28th Division, then still called 8-0G. The formal reason was that they didn't want to trade with the Serbs. That is what (5)came to my ...

• Q.: Major Franken, in your view, would have this trade perhaps made the life of the civilian population easier? I mean, food supplies and whatever other necessities.

(10) • A.: If the trade would have concerned food supplies or medical supplies, it indeed would have enlightened the faith of the population.

• Q.: And in the end this was to be the trade in food, medicines, and similar things, according to the (15)proposal, rather than trading weapons.

• A.: Yes. But the same goal could have been achieved by allowing UN convoys to enter the enclave, which the Serbs did not.

• Q.: Major Franken, was there, in the Srebrenica (20)enclave, a kind of a black market, trade in foodstuffs and other necessities for the civilian population?

• A.: There was a market where things were traded, like cigarettes and things like that. That's correct.

• Q.: And was food also sold on that black market, (25)in addition to cigarettes, I mean food and other basic

• Page 2069 • {90/123}

(1)necessities?

• A.: Yes, in small amounts, it was.

• Q.: And from the information that you gathered, in one way or the other, would you know who was in (5)control of that black market?

• A.: Probably as we found out, there was some leadership of the enclave involved in the black market. We knew of the existence of a pony express, as we called it, between the enclave of Zepa and the (10)enclave Srebrenica.

• Q.: Could we infer then that they wouldn't be very happy if normal trade, normal commerce, were established between the Serb and the Muslim side?

• A.: Yeah, probably, I suppose. But don't ask me (15)that question, ask them.

• Q.: My next question relates to the situation regarding the taking of the OP Echo. Could you tell the Chamber when did that happen, and explain the situation which preceded -- which preceded the taking (20)of the OP Echo.

• A.: Yes. As far as I recollect, the attack on OP Echo was on the 6th or the 8th of June, June with "N," November. I got a report early in the morning, there was movement in the factory, in front of OP Echo, Serb (25)infantry was recognised. And then there was a voice by

• Page 2070 • {91/123}

(1)an amplifier, whatever you call a thing like that, who said that we had to leave OP Echo and there was a deadline, I suppose. As I recollect, the deadline was one hour or something like that.

(5) • Q.: Near that OP was a furniture factory or a timber processing plant. Were there any problems before between the Muslim and the Serb side regarding the use of that factory?

• A.: Yes. Muslims frequently tried to get in to (10)fetch wood or furniture, what was in that factory. They said that the factory used to be a Muslim factory. The Serbs always protested to the fact that the Muslims entered the factory. In fact, we tried to avoid that, that there was always trespassing into that (15)factory. By patrolling in the area, and actually we had a request to Serb forces to grant us material to close it down, so I mean barbed wire, et cetera, et cetera. As you probably know, the Serb forces actually (20)controlled the contents and the amount and the quantity of the convoys coming into the enclave. So I personally said to Colonel Vukovic, if you want us -- if you want to take out that possible source of conflict, then let us bring in equipment so we can (25)close down that factory for both the Serb and Muslim

• Page 2071 • {92/123}

(1)side. I never got that convoy granted.

• Q.: Who owned the factory at that time, or rather could you tell us in whose territory was the factory?

• A.: The factory, a small part was on the Muslim (5)side of the UN enclave and a major part was on the Serb side of the UN boundary of the enclave. So the boundary, UN boundary, went across that factory. In fact, we proposed to the Serbs to shift OP Echo further down southwards, on the very edge of the UN boundary, (10)but they did not grant us that. They didn't want that.

• Q.: And in consequence, after the attack on the OP Echo, this boundary shifted, or rather the OP Echo moved into the depths of the territory, towards the (15)town of Srebrenica.

• A.: The boundary did not shift, but we were forced to leave the boundary. The UN boundary was still in its place, but we were not allowed to overwatch it. We could not overwatch it after the (20)attack.

• Q.: In your view, why was the OP Echo taken? What was the reason behind?

• A.: As we analysed it, the Serb forces wanted free use of the road [Realtime transcript read in error (25)"word"] to Zeleni Jadar in the general western

• Page 2072 • {93/123}

(1)direction going across or passing the mining areas south of the enclave. Sorry, I see here in the script that I'm wrongly translated. I said, the free use of the road in the direction of -- west of Zeleni Jadar, (5)in the western direction, going. I mean this one
[indicates] By having the area of the factory, the small parts but essential parts of that road within the Muslim territory were controlled by the Serb forces, and that's what we thought as the deeper reason after (10)the attack of Echo, or behind the attack of Echo.

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] For the record, the witness indicated the road leading from Zeleni Jadar to Milici, from Zeleni Jadar to the west and on to Milici.

(15) • Q.: And the enclave was attacked about a month later.

• A.: No. In fact, the enclave was attacked at the very moment the Serb forces attacked OP Echo.

• Q.: Yes. But was that attack directly related to (20)events which took place a month later?

• A.: Yes. We analysed it as being a test case, test case in the sense of will the UN react with air support as they -- because one of the criteria for air support was a direct attack on the UN force or a UN (25)establishment. That did not occur. There was no

• Page 2073 • {94/123}

(1)counterattack by Muslim forces, and there was not a real counterattack by UN forces. So we analysed it as being a test case for the following attack on the enclave in July.

(5) • Q.: You said that there were three boundaries, or rather three lines of conflict, three lines of confrontation. Could we then say that conflicts prior to July mostly took place along the boundaries of the enclave and were due to the fact that both sides (10)refused to recognise the boundary as conceived, as defined, by the other side?

• A.: Well, of course we can say anything, but it's not applicable because after the Serb forces attacked Srebrenica, there was no option that the boundary of (15)the UN enclave was in the city of Srebrenica. So if you state that the conflicts -- sorry. I have to correct that. You said that the conflicts prior to July. I misread that. Sorry.

• Q.: Yes.

(20) • A.: I suppose so, yes, that's correct.

• Q.: Major Franken, did you have the information that Muslim forces came out of the enclave and entered the Serb territory?

• A.: Yes. As I stated before, I had two actual (25)reports of incidents. That was the incident south of

• Page 2074 • {95/123}

(1)Zeleni Jadar, being an ambush where Serb soldiers were killed, and an action of Muslim soldiers north of our observation post Mike, as I stated before.

• Q.: Within the agreement on demilitarisation, was (5)it envisaged that your forces should go out of the enclave and either prevent or constrain Muslim forces, prevent them from leaving the enclave, or having some control over happenings outside the enclave?

• A.: No, it was not emphasised that we went out of (10)the enclave.

• Q.: You told us during your examination-in-chief about some of the difficulties that you encountered as you tried to demilitarise the enclave. In your view, what was the -- how many troops were needed in order to (15)demilitarise the enclave successfully? Did you feel that you were too short of men and equipment to completely demilitarise the enclave?

• A.: I've already stated that one of the reasons that we were not able to demilitarise was a juridical (20)problem as not being allowed to enter houses; that's one problem we had. The second problem was that if we wanted to do that quickly with the consent of entering houses, we would have needed two or three battalions, and I mean battalions of the size that we were.

(25) • Q.: In your previous statement, you described the

• Page 2075 • {96/123}

(1)type of weapons that used to belong to Muslim forces and that were controlled by your battalion. Could you tell us, to your knowledge, which armaments did the 28th Division have, which was not under your control?

(5) • A.: Mainly light armament, and I mean assault rifles of the type Kalashnikov, probably a number of machine-guns and light mortars.

• Q.: How did the Muslim forces come by, obtain their weaponry?

(10) • A.: We do not know. You can make all kinds of assumptions. We assumed that they came down with the so-called pony express from Zepa, and there were reports of helicopter landings. I should say "supposed helicopter landings".

(15) • Q.: Could you tell us, in your view, how strong was the 28th Division?

• A.: Combat power is not only a case of amount of weapons, but in our esteem, they had about 4.000, 4.500
[Realtime transcript read in error "5.000"] men (20)weaponed, armed with Kalashnikov or equivalents. No, that's wrong. I said 4.000 to 4.500.

• Q.: Apart from some observation posts, Muslims soldiers also dug trenches and fortified their positions. Was it in line with the technical joint (25)defence that you mentioned during your

• Page 2076 • {97/123}

(1)examination-in-chief?

• A.: I did not mention a tactical coordinated defence, I mentioned a hypothetical discussion about what would happen and what if. They dug trenches, that (5)is correct, but they did it, indeed, apart from the observation posts, and the observation posts were not an integrated part of those trenches.

• Q.: During your examination-in-chief, you mention an incident in which a Dutch soldier was killed.

(10) • A.: Yes.

• Q.: Could you tell us something more about the incident? And how did he die?

• A.: Yes. It concerns the crew who was in the position on OP Foxtrot, one of our observation posts in (15)the south-eastern part of the enclave. After being shelled for a couple of days, and a Serb attack withdrawal -- local withdrawal of the BiH forces, OP Foxtrot found itself amidst Serb infantry. They were allowed to withdraw to Srebrenica, and on the road back (20)to Srebrenica they encountered a Muslim roadblock. The commander of the APC didn't trust the situation because the men on the roadblock were very excited, they had weapons, and he ordered them to go, as we call it, under armour, so close all the hatches, and then (25)proceed. Obviously the gunner didn't succeed in

• Page 2077 • {98/123}

(1)closing his hatch as fast as necessary, and he was shot by one of the men at the roadblock. He came to the compound alive but died pretty shortly after.

(5) • Q.: And the barricade was put up by Muslim soldiers.

• A.: That is correct.

• Q.: In your testimony in chief, you said that your troops stayed at some OPs, observation posts, (10)until the arrival of the Serb troops. Could you tell us something about the instruction or the order that you received, directive, issued to that effect to your troops?

• A.: I did not receive an order, I gave the (15)order. Seeing the fact that we had problems with local BiH commanders performing their own war, not following the directives of their own division, I gave an order that they were to withdraw only in consent with the local BiH commander. The reason for that was the (20)killing of soldier Renssen. If they could not coordinate the withdrawal of their OP, then they had to stay in place and wait for things to happen, and in fact that meant wait until Serb forces made contact.

• Q.: Does that mean that you feared that the (25)Muslim forces might also treat the UN forces as hostile

• Page 2078 • {99/123}

(1)forces?

• A.: Not in general, but we were not sure where
[Realtime transcript read in error "whether"] they would or would not. (5)That's wrong. It's not "whether they would or would not," "where they would." So locally there were BiH commanders who allowed us to move with our APCs; on other spots, there were BiH commanders locally who did not want us to stay and not move. So where the (10)consent was not achieved, our troops had orders to stay in place.

• Q.: And do you know the reason why, at some point, the men of the 28th Division withdrew from the defence lines and left, abandoned the defence of (15)Srebrenica?

• A.: No. I can only guess.

• Q.: What is your opinion?

• A.: Well, later on we heard that the 28th Division broke -- tried to break out in the direction (20)of Tuzla, that could have been one of the reasons; and an order from their higher echelon to maintain the mass of the 28th Division and not sacrificing them in the defence of the enclave. But again it's all speculation, what I'm doing now.

(25) • Q.: I should like to move on to the 11th of July,

• Page 2079 • {100/123}

(1)that is, the period between the 8th and the 11th of July, while the enclave was exposed to an attack coming from the southern direction. Could you indicate on the map what were the (5)main lines of attack of the Serbian army?

• A.: Yes. And then I have to give that out of what was reported to me because we didn't have an overview over the complete enclave. We had an overview inside, around the area of Srebrenica. (10)The main axis of attack was, in fact, the road Zeleni Jadar in a northern direction.

THE INTERPRETER: Can the other microphone be switched on as well, please.

THE WITNESS: I need a microphone. This (15)one? Okay. I'll try it in this way.

• A.: The main axis of attack was the road between Zeleni Jadar and Srebrenica, so directly from the south, advancing in a northern direction. Later on there was an attack from the northern, but then (20)Srebrenica already fell. And we know of another axis of attack from the region of Zeleni Jadar, in a western direction, in this area [indicates], alongside the Jadar River, the valley of the Jadar River. But we didn't have -- we (25)only could monitor that till our OPs were taken out.

• Page 2080 • {101/123}

(1) MR. VISNJIC: [Int.]

• Q.: You testified that as your troops were withdrawing from Srebrenica, the B Company was following the refugees, trying to protect them from (5)possible contact with the Serb troops. In accordance with what you have just stated, the B Company was actually between the refugees moving towards Potocari and the Serb forces coming -- advancing from south, towards north. Could you tell (10)us, did any contact occur between the B Company and the Serbian army troops, and where exactly did the Serb troops stop?

• A.: There was contact between B Company and Serb troops. A position at the west of Srebrenica was under (15)fire of Serb tanks. On the -- already on the 10th -- on the evening of the 10th, an infantry came down to the city; we answered that with fire and they withdrew. And there was fire contact in the sense of artillery fire and tank fire.

(20) • Q.: So where did the Serb forces coming from the south stop?

• A.: [Indicates] They tried to come down the slope from this area [indicates], down to the city, and as we opened fire, they withdrew. And there was (25)fighting in the area of OP Hotel, which was an OP, an

• Page 2081 • {102/123}

(1)observation post, directly east of the city, about 600, 700 metres in front of that OP. There was fighting between BiH forces and Serb forces.

• Q.: On the 11th of July, your forces withdrew to (5)the Potocari base; is that correct?

• A.: That is correct.

• Q.: Did the Serb forces, which were attacking the town, also move in the direction of Potocari?

• A.: Not directly in front of us, but they did on (10)our flanks. That was, as I stated before, the reason that I ordered the company to withdraw.

• Q.: Could you tell us where, on the 11th of July, did the Serb forces stop?

• A.: I don't know the exact coordinate where they (15)were seen last, but it's in this area [indicates] I'm pointing to a location on higher grounds, parallel to the northern part of the city. It was the last report I got that Serb infantry was present. And we lost contact with Serb forces halfway down the road between (20)Srebrenica and Potocari.

• Q.: If I understand you correctly, Serb forces stopped at Srebrenica, or perhaps halfway towards Potocari, and that was your last contact with them. I'm referring to the Serb forces which were advancing (25)from the south, towards the north of the enclave.

• Page 2082 • {103/123}

(1) • A.: I couldn't state that they stopped. The only thing that I can say is that we lost contact with them, and the last report was on the location I gave you. Whether they entered Srebrenica, I do not know. We (5)couldn't see that because following withdrawing with the tail of the column of refugees, we in front had not more than 100, 150 metres line of fire because of the buildings, et cetera, et cetera. So whether in that moment there were Serb soldiers in the very town of (10)Srebrenica and in the area west and east, out of our sight, I could not state that.

• Q.: Thank you. You testified during your examination-in-chief about contacts with the United Nations headquarters. I assume it was Colonel (15)Karremans who maintained those contacts in general. And you also talked about their position about the evacuation. Could you tell us something more about that?

• A.: That's correct. It was Colonel Karremans who (20)had those contacts, so all the information I have is from hearsay, by briefings from his side. I know that in the morning of the -- the evening of the 11th or on the morning of the 12th, we got the order again to -- or again to defend the position Potocari. Colonel (25)Karremans informed the UN that it was impossible; I

• Page 2083 • {104/123}

(1)described the situation to you before, being in positions 20, 30 metres from a massive amount of civilians. I got through Colonel Karremans the message (5)that the UN ordered us to facilitate the evacuation, as it was called at that time. That's about all I can state about that.

• Q.: During the examination-in-chief, you gave us an estimate of males who were in your base in Potocari (10)and the number of men outside the base, outside the compound. As regards the first figure, I understand, more or less, how you managed to establish it, that it was thanks to the list and the registration that took (15)place. But could you tell me how you managed to assess the number of men outside the compound?

• A.: Yes. We -- it was assessed by the local guard commanders, officers of DutchBat who were in command outside the compound, and asked for it, gave me (20)that number. I've been down there myself. It was extremely difficult to make an estimation of that amount because it was one big crowd, and then it is difficult to esteem what exactly are males, et cetera. But we took that figure for -- reliable for granted
(25) [sic]

• Page 2084 • {105/123}

(1) • Q.: According to your estimate, how many refugees were there inside the base and around the base?

• A.: Well, we had about 5.000 refugees inside the base, and there were about 25.000, up to 30.000
(5) [Realtime transcript read in error "2.500, up to 3.000"] refugees outside the base.

• Q.: At the end of your testimony, you described how you saw General Krstic in the vicinity of the base, accompanied by a number of other high-ranking (10)officers. Could you remember the time of the day when it took place?

• A.: I said that it was at the meeting, at the first meeting I had with Colonel Acamovic, and it would have been on the 12th, afternoon, around 1400, 1500 (15)hours. But again it's four and a half years ago, so the esteem in time [sic], it was in that afternoon.

• Q.: My next question is probably equally difficult for you. Could you tell us approximately how long the General stayed in the area?

(20) • A.: No, I can't. I know that I was in that area for about ten minutes. I did not know that it was a general and General Krstic. I recognised the face. I was not introduced to him or anything like that. So I can't tell you, when I went away, whether this person (25)stayed or went away as well. I don't know.

• Page 2085 • {106/123}

(1) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Visnjic, I apologise for interrupting you, but as far as I can see on the record, on page 103, as regards the number of refugees, I heard the French (5)interpretation which was 25.000 to 30.000 refugees, and here I can see "2.500, up to 3.000." Could the witness once again tell us the number of refugees that were outside the base.

• A.: Yes, I can, Your Honour. "2.500" is the (10)wrong figure. The correct figure is 25.000, up till 30.000.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well, then. In this way, we can correct the transcript. Sorry I had to interrupt you, but I wanted to (15)intervene while it was still on the screen. Thank you.

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.]

• Q.: Let me go back once again to the time you saw General Krstic in a group of some other high-ranking (20)officers. Did you notice, did you observe, that he was giving orders at the time or was he involved in any other such activity?

• A.: There was a discussion going on. I can't say because I don't even have the slightest understanding (25)of Serbo-Croatic. But whether they were discussing any

• Page 2086 • {107/123}

(1)other issue, I don't know. But it was not a line-up, like issuing orders in a very formal way.

• Q.: Thank you very much, Major Franken.

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, (5)this concludes my cross-examination.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Thank you very much, Mr. Visnjic, for your questions. Mr. Cayley, do you have any additional questions?

(10) MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President. No, I have nothing to ask the witness in re-examination. Thank you.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Thank you, Mr. Cayley. (15)Judge Fouad Riad.

JUDGE RIAD: [Int.] Thank you, Mr. President.

• QUESTIONED by the Court:

JUDGE RIAD: Good morning, Major Franken, or (20)as you say in this country, "Goedemiddag."

• A.: Thank you.

JUDGE RIAD: Of course, you are an officer of a high grade, especially when you were deputy commander with the UN, and in this quality, perhaps you can give (25)us some kind of global assessment of the events you

• Page 2087 • {108/123}

(1)lived at that time. My questions are very limited to three or four. The first, perhaps not in any order, the first concerning the evacuation. You heard Colonel (5)Karremans saying, I don't remember the words exactly, that the UN had agreed that this evacuation would be undertaken by the Serb forces. Is that right?

• A.: That's correct. That's what Colonel Karremans told me as well, sir.

(10) JUDGE RIAD: Yes. I put this in connection with other affirmations which you said. You said you -- considering the history, that is, you were saying that, considering the history of the Serb side, not directly in the area of Srebrenica but on the (15)whole, "I expected the Serb forces to start killing civilians indiscriminately." In other words, that would be delivering the Srebrenican people to their butchers, if I put your statement with the decision to let the Serbs evacuate them.

(20) • A.: That is correct, sir. I had those fears.

JUDGE RIAD: And then what did you call "evacuation"? Does it mean that all the people of Srebrenica were meant to leave, to be taken away?

• A.: That is correct as well, sir.

(25) JUDGE RIAD: Then that is another word called

• Page 2088 • {109/123}

(1)"deportation."

• A.: That is correct, but in the stage I made -- in that time frame, the word still was "evacuation" for me, so I used that word as well.

(5) JUDGE RIAD: So it was a planned deportation.

• A.: Yes.

JUDGE RIAD: Which the UN authorised.

• A.: That's, in fact, correct, sir.

(10) JUDGE RIAD: And which it was given to be performed by the Serbs.

• A.: That's what I was briefed by Colonel Karremans. That is correct, sir.

JUDGE RIAD: Now, you also spoke about the (15)demilitarisation, and the demilitarisation amounted to the fact of taking away all the weapons of the civilians of Srebrenica, of the enclave, but not of the Serbs surrounding the enclave.

• A.: Yes, that is correct.

(20) JUDGE RIAD: The Serbs surrounding the enclave were heavily armed.

• A.: Yes, sir.

JUDGE RIAD: And it was supposed to be a deterrent to any future, let's say, war between them.

(25) • A.: Yes. Our initial mission was to deter any

• Page 2089 • {110/123}

(1)offensive operation into the enclave, sir.

JUDGE RIAD: So by demilitarising one party completely and leaving the other party stronger and stronger, this is a deterrent?

(5) • A.: We had problems with our mission as well, sir.

JUDGE RIAD: Then we speak of your mission. Your mission also was unable to protect them.

• A.: That's correct, sir.

(10) JUDGE RIAD: So they are disarmed completely, with your mission unable to protect them, with the Serbs highly militarised, and according to your statement, which I will not repeat, they would kill civilians.

(15) • A.: That is correct, sir.

JUDGE RIAD: Now, the list of men which you spoke about, who were between 16 and 60, of course your view was to make it public.

• A.: That's correct.

(20) JUDGE RIAD: But it disappeared.

• A.: In the sector north-east, the HQ initially said that they didn't receive it. But from looking afterwards, they discovered that they did receive them but they didn't do anything with it. And the Dutch HQ, (25)a staff officer received it, didn't understand the

• Page 2090 • {111/123}

(1)meaning of it, allegedly called the battalion in the Potocari area and had a staff officer saying to them that he also didn't know what it was all about, and they put it in a drawer, sir.

(5) JUDGE RIAD: But it was also put in the hands of the Serbs.

• A.: No, the list was not given to the Serbs. I told the Serbs that I had registered all the men in the compound.

(10) JUDGE RIAD: You're sure it did not fall into their hands.

• A.: No, absolutely not, sir. Moreover, I brought the list with me, out of the enclave, in my underpants to be sure that it would not go in the hands of the (15)Serbs.

JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much. Thank you for coming.

THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Thank you (20)very much, Judge Riad. Judge Wald.

JUDGE WALD: Major Franken, you testified early on that when it became apparent that the UN had neither the ability nor maybe the will to defend (25)Srebrenica that you gave an order to guide the refugees

• Page 2091 • {112/123}

(1)on to Potocari. At that point did you or any of your superiors, to your knowledge, have any kind of a plan of what would happen when those 25.000 to 30.000 to (5)35.000 people got into Potocari on a very hot day, without -- I mean, suppose the Serbs had never come forward in any meeting with General Mladic to say, "We'll evacuate them." I mean, what was going to happen to them when they got there?

(10) • A.: Seeing the amount of supplies and the water, as the most important issue in this weather for little children, et cetera, there would have been a humanitarian disaster if there was not any resupply. That was one of the reasons that I gave Mr. Ibrahim -- (15)the father of one of the interpreters. Sorry, I lost his name again -- for our decision or for the impossibility to stop the evacuation at a later phase. If the Serbs wouldn't have done anything and just would have left us there with those 30.000 people, (20)where children were born, people were dying, without us having the logistics supplies, medical, eat, food, water, et cetera, yeah, it's almost cynical to say the problem would have solved itself.

JUDGE WALD: So to your knowledge there was (25)no plans afoot at the UN to try to mobilise

• Page 2092 • {113/123}

(1)humanitarian organisations or anything to do anything once they got up to Potocari.

• A.: No, seeing the fact that we got orders to defend the Potocari parameter, even if necessary with (5)defensive air support, and two hours later we got the order to facilitate the deportation, it was obvious there was no plan on the UN side.

JUDGE WALD: Okay. Later on you talked about a conversation you had in which you talked to the (10)father of the UN interpreter, and you two seemed both to recognise that there might be some kind of very tragic trade-off between what was going to happen to the men in Potocari and being able to get the women and children away on buses. (15)What kind of assurance, or why were you even convinced that the women and children on the buses would be okay?

• A.: Because I got that confirmed from the UN side, from the Kladanj area, where reports came in (20)through the HQ, headquarters, of sector north-east, that massively women and children were crossing the border and coming in. So I assumed that they were relatively safe.

JUDGE WALD: Okay. My last question is: As (25)far as the list of the 219 or 250 men that you compiled

• Page 2093 • {114/123}

(1)inside the compound, were you or anyone else, to your knowledge, ever able to find out later on whether any of those men survived, came out on the other side?

• A.: My hope was that -- well, I was not able to (5)check that because I went back to Holland, and that was it. But I hoped the UN or ICRC, or whatever organisation, would take it up and check whether they were still alive. But to my knowledge, nobody did.

JUDGE WALD: So you don't know.

(10) • A.: No.

JUDGE WALD: Okay. Thank you, Major Franken.

JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me. You said that nobody did survive, or you don't know?

(15) • A.: No. Nobody did pick up that list to check whether they did survive, sir. That's what I meant.

JUDGE RIAD: Thank you.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Thank you very much, Judge Wald. (20)Major Franken, I too have a couple of questions for you. At one point, in response to a question put to you by the Prosecutor, you said that somebody had said that no refugees would be allowed in the UN base.

(25) • A.: Somebody is -- it was a demand of General

• Page 2094 • {115/123}

(1)Mladic, he demanded that no refugees were to be let into our base. He said that and threatened with artillery if it happened.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] When did he (5)say that, on what date, more or less?

• A.: It was in the afternoon of the 11th, when the movement of the refugees already took place, and it was the same message in reaction to the close air support strikes over the city of Srebrenica, where he used one (10)of our APCs and communications and had that message brought to us by one of our own sergeants in English, but he had to read the text, sir.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] My second question for you is the following: You told us that (15)Colonel Karremans had informed you about what had been discussed at the meeting in Bratunac, and you said that he hadn't finished reporting what had been said at the meeting -- that before he had actually finished, trucks and buses started arriving in the base. (20)The wording that appears in the declaration that you signed, on the 17th of July, is "negotiate and attack." The purpose of the meeting was a negotiation. However, Karremans didn't provide an answer at all, and buses and trucks had already started (25)arriving. How do you explain that?

• Page 2095 • {116/123}

(1) • A.: Well, the meeting didn't have the character of a negotiation. It was Mladic who dictated exactly what he wanted. I heard that afterwards. And they already planned, obviously, the evacuation and had (5)their own time schedule. What they talked to us, told us, was not evident, was not relevant or not interesting.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] What you have just said, can it be related to the incidents that (10)took place at the OP Echo or not?

• A.: Just to understand your question well, sir. Do you mean that there was a bigger plan where Echo was the trial and the whole situation was, in fact, planned? Yes, that is to my conviction, sir. I'm (15)absolutely -- no, I'm not sure, but I'm convinced of that.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Because when you were speaking about the incident that took place at the OP Echo, you said that the incidents were (20)some kind of a test in terms of preparations. Did you mean to say a test or preparation for the upcoming attack? Can we interpret it that way?

• A.: No, sir. I did not foresee an attack within four weeks on the enclave. I just analysed it as being (25)a test case. One of the reasons I did so was that

• Page 2096 • {117/123}

(1)normally when you do an advance or an attack on key terrain, and OP Echo was key terrain, you keep up your momentum, you go on, as long as you don't get opponents. And after the attack on OP Echo, in fact (5)the road to Srebrenica was open. I ordered B Company to go down there like hell with a couple of APCs to block the Serb forces off, but as you can see on the map, on that occasion, show our uniform were established and we could go down south, almost to the (10)factory before we came to Serb forces. That's one of the reasons that I said it was not Srebrenica now, it must be a test case. But not foreseeing an attack on the enclave then.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] And my last (15)question, Major Franken: You compiled a list of men who were within the compound. I should like to know if you compiled that list before or after having seen the belongings of the men who had entered the white building being set on fire? Do you understand this? (20)Did you do it before or after their belongings were burnt?

• A.: It was before, sir. The trigger for me was the -- sorry -- increasing violence in the interrogation of the men. So I already stated that I (25)had the feeling in the late afternoon of the 12th that

• Page 2097 • {118/123}

(1)we were not in control in any way anymore, and that triggered me for this solution.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] I see. Well, thank you very much, Major Franken. Thank you (5)very much for coming here to testify. We understand and we share your feeling of powerlessness, of impotence, but perhaps -- and I do understand that your feelings, as a professional and as a human being, were deeply offended by what happened. But nevertheless we (10)wish to thank you for coming here to testify about these painful events. We hope that you will regain your peace and serenity in your country here. Mr. Cayley, I believe that we have to settle the exhibits now. We have to see what to do with (15)them. Perhaps Mr. Dubuisson could give us the numbers of these exhibits.

THE REGISTRAR: [Int.] This was the decision which concerns 80 and 86.

(20) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes. Mr. Cayley, 80, Exhibit 80 was already used, and you said that you would await another witness. I do not know whether this is the moment now, or do you still wish to wait?

(25) MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, you're quite

• Page 2098 • {119/123}

(1)right. Exhibit 80 is the list which the previous witness referred to and which this witness provided evidential foundation for, so I would apply for that to be admitted into evidence. And Exhibit 86 is the list (5)of the wounded in the compound, which again this witness recognised, and I would ask for that to be admitted into evidence, please.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Visnjic, any objections?

(10) MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] No, Mr. President.

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well. Thank you very much. Therefore, 80 and 86 are admitted. (15)Could we abuse the interpreters for another three minutes, please? Very well. The question is, indeed, whether I am or am not abusing it, but I shall nevertheless do it. We have to deliver the decision that we (20)discussed earlier, and I have to do it now. I'd also like to seize this opportunity to say that on Friday, on Friday, we shall begin the hearing at 10.00 because the Chamber will have another business to attend to, and therefore we shall then sit as of 10.00, so that (25)you can sleep a little longer. Yes, you can sleep a

• Page 2099 • {120/123}

(1)little longer. There is yet another matter, and that is that tomorrow, as I have announced, that is, a day where I shall not be able to attend, I will not be here (5)tomorrow, and Judge Riad, being the older of the two Judges, the senior of the two Judges, will be presiding. Before we take the decision, I should like to set free Major Franken. Thank you very much for coming (10)once again. Thank you very much. Usher, will you please help Major Franken.
[The witness withdrew]

JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Right. The decision of the Chamber regarding the contact of (15)parties with witnesses is as follows: A few days ago, the Defence raised a question of communication between the parties and the witnesses. According to them, the parties should no longer communicate with witnesses once the witnesses have (20)taken the oath. The Defence did not quote a specific reason but stated that it was merely for the sake of making clear the relations of the parties to the witnesses. The Chamber was informed by the parties that they had met (25)and agreed the contact would not be prohibited between a witness

• Page 2100 • {121/123}

(1)and the party representing it, except after the examination-in-chief of the witness. The parties confirmed the understanding during court session but after a suggestion of the Chamber (5)they changed their positions slightly. The Chamber believes that it should specify certain points. It notes first of all that no provision of the Statute or of the Rules regulates the matter. However, it believes that the procedure followed, (10)before this Tribunal, does not make part of any specific legal system under Rule 99a of the Rules, and that its application is to ensure the best presentation by the parties of their evidence so that the Chamber can arrive at the truth of the case (15)submitted to it in conformity with the solemn declaration as envisaged by Rule 90b of the rules. Moreover, the Rule 98, states that the Chamber may summon witnesses whose testimony is put in evidence with a view to establishing the truth. (20)Witnesses who appear before the Chamber, which ever party calls them - be it the Prosecution or the Defence, are no longer witnesses of one of the parties, but they are witnesses of justice. A party which (25)calls a witness has all the possibilities of

• Page 2101 • {122/123}

(1)communicating with the witness before the witness takes the oath and explain the procedure, specifically all that refers to this decision. However, from the moment the witness (5)has made the solemn declaration, this evidence may no longer have any particular link to either of the parties who may even unwittingly or subconsciously interfere with the spontaneity and the truth of the testimony as required (10)by the spirit of the Statute and the Rules of the Tribunal. The Chamber, knows with how much care, vigilance, and neutrality, the Victims and Witnesses Unit takes care of the health, security and the well-being of witnesses. Therefore there is no need (15)for the parties to have even for logistical reasons -- contact with any witness -- from the beginning to the end of his testimony. In view of the above , the Chamber (20)decides in accordance with the Rules 54, 99(G) and 90(G) of the Rules, that all contact between a witness and the parties shall be prohibited as of the moment when this witness takes the solemn declaration and up to the end of his appearance before the (25)Chamber, -- Unless under exceptional circumstances one party

• Page 2102 • {123/123}

(1)deems it necessary to contact a witness, this party shall then inform the Chamber prior to the contact and clearly state the reason and objective of its application. If the Chamber accepts this application, then the Chamber (5)will also specify the conditions under which this contact may take place. This is the decision of the Chamber. We discussed it at great length and we came to this decision, which in our opinion strikes a balance between (10)different requests and needs. And so this is the decision of the Chamber. I should like to thank the interpreters and all the personnel who were so kind as to stay a little longer so that we could give you this ruling. (15)Therefore, tomorrow at 9.30, the Chamber will be here with Judge Riad and Judge Wald, to continue the hearing of this case. Thank you very much. Have a nice afternoon. Thank you.

(20) --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.45 p.m., to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 5th day of April, 2000, the 9.30 a.m.