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/ Colormap • Page 7885 • {1/100} (1)Tuesday, 5 December 2000 [Open session] [The witness entered court]
--- Upon commencing at 9.22 a.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Good morning to the technical booth and interpreters. Good morning to the Office of the Prosecutor; I see that you're all there. The Defence counsel and the Judges are here, too. (10)Good morning, Professor. Good morning, Witness. We shall be taking up your testimony where we left off. Let me remind you that you will be continuing under oath in answering questions put to you by Mr. Visnjic. Please proceed, Mr. Visnjic. Your witness. (15) MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Thank you, Mr. President.
WITNESS: RADOVAN RADINOVIC
[Resumed] • EXAMINED by Mr. Visnjic: [Continued] • Q.: [Int.] General Radinovic, we're going to continue from (20)where we left off.
MR. VISNJIC:
[Int.] And to do that, I should like to ask
the usher to give us Defence Exhibit 426, and to prepare documents -- 425,
and to prepare documents 426 and 427. So the next exhibit is Exhibit 425.
Could the usher turn to page -- to paragraph 4, which is page 6 on
(25)the Serbo-Croatian version.
• A.: In point 4, according to doctrine, this conceptual part, the concept of a decision, and as I said, in point 4 in the documents for command, the basic idea or concept is set out by -- that is to say, the command document sets this out. (10)In paragraph 4 of the directive of the Supreme Commander, the operations to be carried out are implemented -- are noted, and they are in this section here. They are set out in this paragraph here. They mention the strategic operation in 1995, Prozor, Spreca, and so on. That is an operation at the operational level. But none of those operations listed (15)here were carried out. They were not planned, and they were not executed. • Q.: I should now like to ask you to look at page 8 of the directive, the section which refers to the Drina Corps. Have you found it? That is the English version. MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Could the usher please find that (20)part of the document and place it on the ELMO. It is page 10 of the English version, and page 11 as well later on. Page 10 now and page 11 later. • A.: Yes, I've found it. This section relating to the Drina Corps --
MR. VISNJIC:
[Int.] Could you turn the page over,
(25)please.
(15) MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Would the usher now place on the ELMO Exhibit -- Prosecution Exhibit 426. We need page 3. THE WITNESS: [Int.] I just have an additional document here, not the main one. I just have the attachment to the basic document. I haven't got the basic document, if it is directive 7/1 that (20)we're talking about. MR. VISNJIC: [Int.]
• Q.: The exhibit number was 426. It is directive 7/1, issued by the
Main Staff of the VRS. I haven't got a copy myself now, but could you
find the section which refers to the Drina Corps. I think it is on page 3
(25)or 4.
• Q.: Could you wait for it to be placed on the ELMO, please. Thank you. (5) • A.: In this point, point 4, for the Drina Corps, it is expressly -- the following is expressly stated: The forces of the East Bosnian Corps and the Drina Corps, with reinforcements from the Herzegovina and Sarajevo-Romanija Corps - and I stress - should, as soon as possible, realise the tasks from the Spreca operation, Operation Spreca 95, cut off (10)and destroy enemy forces east of the Vis-Stolica line, and in this way create conditions for continuing the attack towards Tuzla and Zivinice, that is to say, completely outside the zone of responsibility and any of the enclaves. It is that point up there, north-west of Zvornik. So there's no mention made at all in this directive, in directive (15)7/1, which should be the concretisation of the directive from the Supreme Commander, and with tasks specified, and the tasks that should be considered operative. However, as we see in this directive, there is nothing at all which could lead us to the Krivaja 95 operation. • Q.: Could you now look at a separate paragraph which relates to the (20)Drina Corps itself.
• A.: We come to the tasks of the units and the Drina Corps, one of
them. It is point 5.3, paragraph 5.3. And it is the task of the Drina
Corps under paragraph 5.3 to defend and exert active combat activity in
the north-western part of the battlefield and to prevent the breakthrough
(25)of the enemy on the tactical axes, and demonstratively and with the
• Q.: General Radinovic, in the previous document, directive 7, there is
(20)a sentence which mentions -- which makes mention of the enclaves. It is
the portion where the Drina Corps comes. However, in directive 7/1, in
the portion which relates to the Drina Corps, the enclaves are no longer
mentioned.
Bearing in mind the relationship of the directives, and you said
(25)that 7/1 should be an elaboration of directive 7, how do you explain that?
(20) • Q.: General Radinovic, how long -- how much time is necessary for an operation to be well planned and organised? MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] And I should like to ask the usher to prepare Prosecution Exhibit 427 in the meantime.
• A.: In answer to that question, I can say the following, that is to
(25)say, I would say the same thing that General Dannatt said in his expert
• Q.: General Radinovic, you have before you Prosecution Exhibit 427. It is a preparatory order number one dated the 2nd of July, 1995. In the context of the time necessary for planning, which is otherwise stated in the last paragraph of this order, how can you comment, the time which was (20)spent for the planning and preparation of Operation Krivaja 95?
• A.: In the last paragraph of this document, the last point on page 2,
and that's this here, this last paragraph, the commander of the Corps
orders that all the forthcoming activities with regard to the planning of
combat activities in all variations, and the drawing up of all necessary
(25)combat documents be completed by the 3rd of July, 1995, and the documents
MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] May the witness now be given Prosecution Exhibit 428 to look at. (20) • Q.: General Radinovic, what are the objectives of the Operation Krivaja 95, that is, the objective of the order for combat action? • A.: I'm sorry, I don't have the document. • Q.: Let us wait for the document, then.
• A.: Yes. May I? On page 2, this is the B/C/S version, in paragraph
(25)4, we have the same conceptual part of the decision, that is, the concept
• Q.: I believe it has. The Chamber is familiar with the geography.
• A.: So the line in question was Predol, Divljakinja, Banja Guber,
Zivkovo Brdo, Alibegovac, Kak. So that was the immediate task. And the
(15)next task was to reach the line going along Bojna and Siljato Brdo.
So no mention is made in this part, which refers to the objectives
of the operation by the Drina Corps commander, of the attack on the town
itself. What is stated here is that they should reach certain features,
certain lines, which will, militarily speaking, deactivate the enclave and
(20)which will enable them to prevent all military activities which were being
launched from the Muslim army from the enclave of Srebrenica throughout
the period when the area functioned as a protected area, which was
especially -- which became especially obvious during the Grasshopper
operation.
(25)The objective is further on articulated in paragraph 3, where it
(20) • Q.: So we have talked about the main concept and the plan for the Krivaja 95 operation. General, let me ask my question. I would like to know which planning documents, which supporting documents you came across during your studies, during your analysis. (25)
• A.: Well, I found this planning document which is called the
• Q.: What can you -- what is the conclusion that you can make on the (15)basis of that? • A.: Well, this is the consequence of the fact, which is beyond dispute for me, that this operation was extorted by the Grasshopper operation, so an operation which was not a result of a long-term planning but an operation which was an immediate response to the situation and the (20)developments that were taking place in the spring of 1995, and that is why they were allocated only one day for planning that operation. So they were not able to make a quality overall plan for the operation, which -- the fact which must have affected the operation itself.
• Q.: Bearing in mind what we have discussed so far, could you tell us
(25)what were the specific events that actually provoked, that entailed the
• A.: I believe I have already answered that question in part when I said that the events were numerous, the events that were taking place during the last ten days of the month of June; namely, the terrorist (5)activities and the incursions of Muslim forces into the rear of the VRS, a huge amount of losses inflicted to the VRS, according to the documents and testimonies from the Muslim side. On the 15th and the 16th of June, for example, a whole brigade was infiltrated into the rear of the 1st Podrinje Brigade, which resulted in the killing of 40 troops. (10) MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Could the usher please prepare D67 for the witness, please. • A.: May I continue, please? • Q.: Please do, General. • A.: So if you link that with the events which were taking place in the (15)immediate vicinity of the enclave of Srebrenica, and from the enclave of Srebrenica, one can conclude that the Operation Krivaja 95 was planned as a response to such events and that the objective was to prevent such incidents from reoccurring. In this document here we can see a report of the commander of the (20)28th Division, which was addressed to the commander of the 2nd Corps. The report was written on the 30th of June, 1995. In this report the commander of the 28th Division is informing his commander of the activities of his units and formations in the immediate vicinity, that is, in the rear of the Serbian positions around the enclave. (25)
• Q.: General Radinovic, the Trial Chamber is familiar with the contents
• A.: Yes. This is precisely such a document. It speaks about that. • Q.: I should now like you to link this document with the orders, if you can remember, issued by the VRS, and which we discussed yesterday, D88 and D153, orders of the Drina Corps, signed by General Zivanovic, (10)concerning the inspection of troops and the order issued to the Milici Brigade, and so on and so forth. • A.: Yes, I remember that document. In his order, to achieve better quality control over the area, General Zivanovic orders visits of all of the units and he orders the responsible individuals to report to them by (15)the 25th of June. In his document he makes mention of an incident involving an incursion of the brigade, of a Muslim brigade, into the rear of the 1st Podrinje and the 5th Podrinje Brigade. And he requests his commanders to carry out an inspection of their troops, inspection of the positions, and to see if the line is properly fortified and so on, and to (20)report to him about such visits by the 25th of June. And indeed, he was briefed about what has been accomplished to that effect by the 24th of June, by one of his commanders, and the same was probably done by other commanders, but that was the kind of report that I had access to.
• Q.: During -- while you were preparing your analysis, did you come
(25)across any indications that active combat operations were being prepared
• A.: You should bear in mind one particular fact which is of the essence for every single army in the world. Every army, by definition, are in the best state of preparation when they carry out offensive activities. Nobody likes defensive activities, because it implies (10)relinquishing the initiative to the enemy, and this does not -- nobody likes that. But I must say that I haven't come across any single piece of evidence, any single indication, neither in the documents nor through the conversations with the people who were involved in one way or the other in (15)this operation, which would indicate that by the end of June 1995, anybody had any thoughts about executing such an operation. There were no conditions whatsoever to launch an operation of that kind. The situation at the front line was very difficult, and especially in the area of responsibility of the Drina Corps. So there was no talk whatsoever about (20)the possibility of launching such an offensive.
JUDGE RIAD: General, you just -- if I understood rightly, you
said there was no way, neither in the documents, there was nothing
indicated -- I'm sorry, I want to read it, that by the end of June 1993 --
1995, anybody had any thoughts about executing an operation of that kind
(25)by one -- from one way or -- with the people who were involved in one way
• A.: I'm afraid I have been misinterpreted. My response was to the
(5)question whether throughout my preparations for this testimony and while I
was studying this matter, whether I had come across any indication to the
effect that the VRS, that is, the Drina Corps, was preparing an offensive
operation around the enclaves. That was the question that I was
responding to. And I said, that was part of my answer, that the nature of
(10)every army is to be offensive, not to wait, because armies like to have
initiative. Soldiers do not like defensive approach. However, in the
month of June, 1995, the VRS was in a defensive position, and I didn't
come across any single document which would indicate that offensive combat
activities were being prepared.
(15)Second, I said that neither in the conversations with people who
were involved in the operation did I come across such indication. And
yesterday I told you that I had spoken with the people who had been
involved in the operation on the Serb side, unfortunately. I did not have
an opportunity to discuss it with the people who were involved in the
(20)operation on the other side, but that was not possible, unfortunately. So
from the conversations with those individuals I made a very firm
conclusion that there was no talk at the time about launching an operation
of that kind.
So that was the essence of my answer. I don't know whether it has
(25)come across this time.
• A.: Yes. JUDGE RIAD: -- involved [Realtime transcript read in error (5)"going"] in one way or the other, only of the VRS? Thank you. • A.: Yes. MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] • Q.: General Radinovic, I don't know whether you have exhibit number P428, the order for combat activities. (10) JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me, I want to correct the transcript of what I said. I didn't say "going" one way or the other; I said, "people involved in one way or the other." Thank you. MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] • Q.: General, in the order for active combat activities, a provision (15)was made for a forward command post? • A.: If you will allow me before you proceed with your question, because I didn't fully answer your previous question regarding objectives. In paragraph 5 of the order issued by the commander when setting out the objectives, he said the objective of the units which -- involving (20)the separation of the enclaves and the shrinking of the territory of the enclaves. So you have this specific mention made in the title, that is, the reduction, to reduce the territory, to reduce them in size. So that is something that should be taken into account while assessing the objectives of the operation. (25)
• Q.: Mention is made of the forward command post at Pribicevac in this
• A.: Command posts refer both to the actual space, the actual location,
(5)and the facility from which command and control is executed over the units
involved in combat operations. These facilities include facilities for
work, for rest and recuperation, and some support buildings, as well as
facilities intended to provide protection for the command post.
Command posts can be divided into the basic command post, the rear
(10)command post, the forward command post, and reserve command posts. The
command post in itself is the most developed one in the sense of the
quality of the facilities that it has. It has to be on such a location in
terms of space and have such conditions to be able to provide quality and
relatively comfortable conditions for work of the command on the execution
(15)of their tasks. So that is the basic idea of a command post.
In order to accomplish that task, groups of commanding officers
are assigned to a specific command post. We have the command group, the
support group, and then the protection unit, and other necessary elements.
Of course, the command group is the most important one. It also includes
(20)the operational part, that is, the operation room, where all the necessary
information is being gathered and collated, where the creative part of the
operation is taking place, where necessary supporting orders are being
drafted, and all other activities undertaken that have to ensure a good
execution of an operation.
(25)We have the commander there, assistant commander for intelligence,
• Q.: Which parts of the command of the Drina Corps were at the forward command post of Pribicevac?
• A.: You mean the command? The command of the Drina Corps, you mean.
At the forward command post of the Drina Corps, there was the
(25)Corps Commander; the Chief of Staff of the Corps; the assistant for the
• Q.: Did the commander of the Drina Corps during the Krivaja operation, was he at the forward command post all the time?
• A.: I did not study that problem for the simple reason that it is up
(10)to the personal assessment of a commander whether he's going to spend all
his time at the forward command post or whether he's going to make
periodical tours of the units in combat, to the logistics portion, or
whether he's going to be at the basic command post or in the region of the
units who are the main forces of the Corps to carry out defensive
(15)operations towards Tuzla and Kladanj.
So the Corps Commander need not be at the forward command post all
the time, but what is most important is that the command functions. And
when the commander isn't on the spot, he has his Chief of Staff who
replaces him, and this is an automatic mechanism. When the commander is
(20)absent, the Chief of Staff de facto takes over the command so there are no
breaks or pauses in the system of command, regardless of whether the
command is at the forward command post or is absent from it. It is
important to know that the forward command post is the spot from which the
units are commanded, the units in the operation are being commanded, for
(25)which the forward command post was established in the first place.
(5)
• A.: In the order of the commander, in point 4 of that order, the
conceptual part that we commented in response to your previous question,
is it explicitly says that the main forces of the corps should continue to
exert defensive action at the outer areas of the zone of responsibility
towards Tuzla and Kladanj, and those are the main forces, the bulk of the
(10)troops. And only part of the free forces should execute the Krivaja 95
operation, and not even all those free forces, but a portion of them.
In the order we saw that it was explicitly stated which these
forces were. It was a combat group from the Zvornik Brigade, in fact,
which went along the Zeleni Jadar-Srebrenica axis and was active there.
(15)It is the combat group from the 2nd Romanija and Bratunac Brigades as
well, and the Milici Brigade. And the Bratunac Brigade, the Milici
Brigade link up forces but don't actually take part in the operation, so
they link up the forces and engage forces of the 28th Division.
So in the Krivaja 95, to all practical terms, it was forces below
(20)the number of a brigade, which means two and a half battalions perhaps,
two and a half battalions took part. The equivalent would be about three
battalions, which is far below the equivalent of a serious brigade.
So in answer to your question, I can say, in summing up, that they
were very restricted forces, just part of the free forces and in our
(25)doctrine these are called auxiliary forces.
• A.: Well, the forces of the 28th Division, at their positions, at the
(5)positions they were at, were there for a long time. They held those
positions for a long time, that is to say, from May 1993 -- of course,
those forces -- not all the forces were there in 1993 that were there in
1995. They grew in number. But they were there from 1993, to all
practical purposes, so they were there for two whole years in those
(10)positions, regardless of whether they were there throughout or whether
they came later on.
But we can say quite certainly that they had enough time to
prepare their defence positions very well. That means to become
entrenched, a high degree of fortification and protection; to protect the
(15)facilities, the existing facilities, and adapt them as protection against
fire power. They had enough time to do all the reconnoitring they needed,
to study the methods and dynamics of defence, to study all these things.
They had enough time to do this very well, if they wanted to, of course.
Whether they did so or did not, I don't know, but with regard to the
(20)persistence that they defended Srebrenica, I do not think they did avail
themselves of all that.
They were engaged in their defence in a circular system. They
were in an encirclement, which is an unfavourable indicator of their
condition, this encirclement. The fact that they were in an encirclement
(25)means that they were at a disadvantageous position.
• Q.: What would be the overall ratio of forces between the BH army and
the 28th Division on the one side and the others taking part in the
(25)Krivaja 95 operation?
• A.: Yes, there are standards. They exist generally in war doctrine,
(5)and we have a doctrine about that too. In latter-day doctrine, attacks on
inhabited areas are to be avoided, for two reasons: First, because
settlements are prepared for long-term defence and they rely on buildings
and basements and cellars, which can be well adapted to provide defence
and protection. So populated areas are resistance points of the first
(10)order, and in principle they are not attacked.
Let me remind you of the Israeli aggression on Lebanon in 1982.
Israel blocked Beirut but did not attack Beirut. Of course, not only for
those reasons, but it never entered anybody's mind to attack Beirut.
So in principle, towns are not attacked, and latter-day doctrine
(15)states this, because they are very strong fortification and can be used
for long-term resistance. That is the first reason.
The second more important reason is that by attacking towns with
highly destructive systems and weaponry, there would be heavy losses
sustained in human lives on the side of the defenders, and this could
(20)never be justified through the principle of military effectiveness.
So that is one serious reason why towns are not attacked. But if
towns were to come under attack, then the ratio of forces between the
attacker, they must be -- the attacker must be more superior, 7 to 10
times more -- 7 to 10 times stronger, because it is very difficult to take
(25)control of a town, so you would have to be far stronger. Well-fortified
(10) • Q.: And this brings me to my last question before the break. The existing ratio of forces, did it guarantee success of the attack on Srebrenica or was the takeover of Srebrenica planned at all, in view of the existing ratio of forces? • A.: In the existing ratio of forces, it was absolutely not realistic (15)to plan the takeover of Srebrenica. Nobody in the command system of the Drina Corps could have had this, may I use the term, "mad plan" of taking over Srebrenica. No, it would have not entered anybody's mind because an attack on Srebrenica was absolutely not feasible in view of the forces that existed on the 6th of July, 1995. (20) MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, may I suggest a break at this point? JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, that is a good proposal. We shall reconvene at 11.00. --- Recess taken at 10.39 a.m. (25)
--- Upon resuming at 11.01 a.m.
MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Thank you, Mr. President. • Q.: General Radinovic, could you give us just a brief description, (5)because the Chamber has heard a lot of evidence to that effect, of the main course of the events and the developments during the Operation Krivaja 95, bearing in mind the internal structure of the combat activities; and also if you can give us your definition of the operation in question. (10)
• A.: Pursuant to the order of the Drina Corps Commander, the main axis
of attack was along the Zeleni Jadar-Srebrenica line, so that was the main
axis of combat operation. The main feature that needed to be taken
possession of was Zivkovo Brdo, which was on the route of advance of the
2nd Combat Group from the 2nd Romanija and Birac Brigades. In response to
(15)one of your questions I said Bratunac Brigade. No, they were from the
Birac Brigade. The main feature that had to be occupied was Alibegovac,
and also the Kak feature which was also on the route of advance of those
units.
The attack started in the morning hours of the 6th, and the
(20)weather conditions were very bad. It was raining all the time, so
practically speaking there were no specific actions. Some reconnaissance
work was still being done on certain locations, some regrouping of
forces.
My apologies to the interpreters. I tend to get carried away.
(25)So one can say that the dynamics, that the rhythm of advance was
(5)
• A.: Well, the only conclusion that one can draw is the one which would
confirm what I have just said about the scope and the intensity of the
operation. In the Srebrenica Operation 1995, the forces that were
committed were below the level of a brigade, whereas in 1993 the forces
that were deployed were those of the strength of four brigades.
(10)Let me just remind you that there were two guard brigades at that
time: The 1st Guards Brigade from Bijeljina, with the code-name Mauzer,
and one of the Protection Regiment, forces of the Milici Brigade. All
those forces were deployed for the purposes of that operation, and they
can -- they were in the strength of four brigades at that time. That
(15)number of troops was necessary in order for the town of Srebrenica to be
occupied, and that is the ratio of the forces that I spoke about,
7 to 10:1.
Srebrenica was the objective of the attack in 1993. The VRS had
the intention to take control of the town of Srebrenica, thereby gaining
(20)the control of the overall area of central Podrinje. Yesterday we spoke
about the reasons why that operation was never completed, and in response
to your question here, I can just say that those forces were such that it
was possible for them to take possession of the town, whereas the forces
that were committed for the purposes of the Krivaja 95 operation were not
(25)such as to guarantee the success of the takeover of the town. And from
• Q.: General Radinovic, the 28th Division, how persistent was it in its defence of the town of Srebrenica?
• A.: Well, that's a different story. I don't think that they were very
persistent in their defence. There were, I think, operational and
(10)tactical possibilities for the town of Srebrenica to be fiercely
defended. I am familiar with certain relevant testimonies to that effect,
and I am familiar with the document issued by the UN Secretary-General
where he stated that the forces of the 28th Division were not able to put
up a fierce defence of the town of Srebrenica for a long time period. I
(15)cannot agree with that, and I have a number of data which can support my
conclusion. I know that the Secretary-General based himself on the report
submitted to him by his soldiers, but when I spoke about the ways a town
can defend itself, I wanted to say that Srebrenica was able to prepare
adequate defence with its forces despite the fact that the area was
(20)restricted and despite the fact that their combat readiness was not at the
highest level.
For the purposes for the defence of town of Srebrenica, it was
quite enough -- what the 28th Division had at their disposal was quite
enough, including mine and ordnance equipment, adequate ammunition and
(25)weapons, because such operations were low-intensity operations, without
MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, could I make an objection? (15) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Cayley.
MR. CAYLEY: I make this objection before we get on to matters
which are really more germane, more material to the case. The General is
making very sweeping, broad statements about matters. He's giving his
opinion. And he makes statements in such a fashion - I'll give you an
(20)example in a moment - without any specific basis for that opinion.
He said to us earlier on, I think yesterday in his testimony, that
he's relied on documents and speaking to a number of people and
Prosecution exhibits; but a statement that he's just made where he states
the 28th Division had sufficient equipment, sufficient ammunition to
(25)defend the enclave, could he identify for the Prosecution how he actually
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Visnjic, you have heard this request for clarification. I should also like you to try and streamline the answers of your witness and to have him tell us the sources for his (10)conclusions, and tell us if he reached his conclusions after the events. It is very easy to draw conclusions later on, post facto; however, we have to try and place ourselves in the relevant situation in space and time. We need to hear very clear opinions of this witness, including the foundations for his answers, because after all, he is an expert witness, (15)and we have to know what the bases for his answers is. I hope that I was clear enough, Mr. Visnjic, and the witness has also heard me, I hope. Is that all, Mr. Cayley, that you wanted to object to? MR. CAYLEY: Yes, Mr. President. I think you've been very clear. (20)It's just a specific basis for what the witness is saying, as Mr. Butler did. He would come forward to you with a conclusion, and then he would produce a document to actually support his conclusion. So that's all I'm asking for, thank you.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Yes, go ahead, Mr. Visnjic.
(25)Please continue.
• Q.: General Radinovic, did the forces and positions of UNPROFOR, were they the object of an attack target? No, I withdraw that question. Could you tell us more specifically the sources which allowed you (20)to make the conclusions you have been making about the weapons and fire power of the forces of the 28th Division?
• A.: Well, first, I did not -- let me say that I did not base my
conclusions only on the documents that I studied for this particular
occasion alone. There is something that we call a standard when an army
(25)is being established. We know the standards. We know what a detachment,
• Q.: Were the forces of UNPROFOR targets of the VRS? • A.: No, they were not. And in the documents that I have had occasion to study and see and consult for this expert opinion, the positions -- the (5)UNPROFOR positions were not the target of attack. And the documents of the superior command with the Drina Corps, it is explicitly stated that the UNPROFOR forces must not be the target of attack. And that they were not the target of attack, indeed, is borne out by the fact that most of the UNPROFOR forces passed through the front lines of the Drina Corps and (10)behind them -- they were behind them in the rear, and losses were prevented in this way. And we know that a member of the Dutch Battalion unfortunately was killed by the Muslims in Srebrenica, unhappily. But luckily, we do not have any data, and I think that is true, that we did not sustain any -- (15)that the Dutch Battalion did not sustain any casualties from the Serbian side. • Q.: How do you assess the efficiency and effectiveness of UNPROFOR with respect to the combat activities in and around Srebrenica?
• A.: UNPROFOR did not have any combat, did not undertake any combat
(20)activities. That is a fact, and there is no need to go into that. It did
not act against the forces of the Drina Corps which attacked towards
Srebrenica. However, I think that we must stress the fact at this point
that the other UNPROFOR forces were not active either, in the sense of
preventing - I say preventing - a serious operational crisis around
(25)Srebrenica.
• Q.: What was the relationship of the BiH army towards UNPROFOR, that is to say, what were the -- what was the 28th Division's relationship towards UNPROFOR, its attitude towards UNPROFOR?
• A.: Well, it had a dual attitude, twofold. First of all, whether
(15)rightly or not, they expected UNPROFOR to protect them fully, completely,
and they were not concerned about the fact that they themselves were
launching sabotage and divisionary action in the rear of the Drina Corps
forces which directly led to the Krivaja 95 operation as a response. It
was the direct consequence of the sabotage and diversionary groups from
(20)the enclave and their activities. Had that not happened, the operation
would have not happened because all the documents point to the fact that
that was the main reason, and that unleashed the idea of having the
operation.
Second, when the activities had been undertaken, then the Muslim
(25)forces of the 28th Division expected the arms controlled in the hands of
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Cayley.
MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, I'm sorry to interrupt. I think you
know the objection I'm going to make.
(20)Here the witness is talking about the relationship between the
Dutch and the 28th Division. He's saying that the Muslims expected to be
protected, and that the relationship was not what it should have been.
Could he please identify what is his foundation for saying that? Can he
identify the testimony that's been heard by the Court, the documents, the
(25)specific documents that indicate this.
• A.: The killing of the member of the Dutch Battalion is a fact which testifies and speaks of the unacceptable relationship of the 28th Division towards members of the Dutch Battalion, for example. That is a fact which illustrates that most directly. I don't know what else would be stronger, (10)which argument would be stronger than the death of an innocent soldier who was there to protect the safe area and not there to lose his life or to put his life in jeopardy.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Yes, Witness, but the bad
relationships that you spoke about between the 28th Division and the
(15)UNPROFOR forces existed before the death of that soldier. Did they -- was
it because of those relations that the soldier lost his life or was it
because of the soldier's loss of life that the relationships were poor?
You must see this line of reasoning. So in order to say that relations
were bad between the 28th Division and UNPROFOR, or if you say that they
(20)weren't good, at any rate, you must have reasons for saying so, reasons to
back this up, and that is what Mr. Cayley is asking you: What is the
foundation for you to make that conclusion? The death of that particular
soldier, as I have demonstrated, does not show that, because your answer
does not establish a relationship before the killing and after the
(25)killing, cause and effect.
MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, you've actually articulated my thoughts, so I have nothing to add. (5) JUDGE RODRIGUES: I'm so sorry. [Int.] I do apologise for doing your work for you. Witness, you have heard the line our discussion has taken. What do you have to say in response? • A.: It is the principal responsibility of the Dutch Battalion, as a (10)part of the UNPROFOR mechanism, to ensure the regime of a safe area in Srebrenica. The principal responsibility of the 28th Division was to respect that regime. The 28th Division, as we have seen on the basis of a series of documents, did not respect that regime, and for me that is the most important pointer to unacceptable behaviour on the part of the 28th (15)Division and the principal responsibility of the Dutch Battalion, which was to ensure that the safe area be respected. That is to say that from the safe area, from Srebrenica, no combat activities were allowed towards the VRS. So that is the main indicator. Whether they had any emotional relationship towards the Dutch Battalion, that is not a subject of (20)discussion here; it is not important for what we're discussing. But their conduct was not proper. They did not respect the regime of the safe area, which they signed in the agreement of April and May 1993 and pledged themselves to do so.
MR. VISNJIC:
[Int.] Mr. President, I shall now attempt
(25)to help the witness respond to that question with a few documents, and
• Q.: One of the documents, General Radinovic, that you based your report on, was it the report based on debriefing in Srebrenica of the Dutch Defence Ministry? Was that one of your basic documents? (5) • A.: Yes. • Q.: Now, in that document, and I have the Serbian version -- that is to say, does the document speak of the relationship of the BH army towards the Dutch Battalion, if you happen to remember? • A.: Yes, it does. (10) MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, I can quote from the document which has already been introduced into evidence as a Prosecution Exhibit. Just by way of example of what Mr. Cayley is asking Mr. Radinovic to do: Mr. Butler was a very good witness in that respect. He had a lot of facts and figures in his head. I talked to General (15)Radinovic in preparation for his testimony, and there are two reasons for which he cannot fulfil Mr. Cayley's demands. The first is that he does not have all the sources with him at the moment, all the sources he used. And the second reason is that he can't remember; relying on his memory, he can't sometimes remember all those documents. Now, if the Prosecution (20)insists upon having each assertion backed up by its source and foundation, I propose that we do this later on in writing, and then the assertions could be supported by these written materials or it can remain open as an assertion without the corresponding foundation or support, if I can use that term. (25)
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] I would like to open up
MR. CAYLEY: I've had the opportunity, Mr. President, of consulting with Mr. Harmon, so the Prosecution speaks with one voice. The (10)reason that I ask this is not to be difficult but is simply, as I think you already understand, to facilitate an efficient cross-examination of the witness. Because unless we are aware of the foundation on which the witness bases his opinion, it makes it exceptionally hard to cross-examine him, because we simply have to kind of look up into the sky to try to (15)fathom out how he's come to a particular conclusion. Our view would be that that is not an acceptable way of presenting this kind of evidence, that the witness comes here, he testifies, he's cross-examined, and then subsequently the Defence produce some kind of written document which supports every written assertion he makes by (20)reference to a particular document. That is what he should be doing here and now as a witness, otherwise it makes the whole process ridiculous; it doesn't make it a proper kind of examination and cross-examination at all.
JUDGE WALD: I would like to just add to this. I think we have to
allow a certain amount of flexibility in expert opinion. As you know, in
(25)some jurisdictions, including our own, the expert does not always have to
JUDGE RIAD: Mr. Cayley, can I add, can I add some -- perhaps what
Judge Wald said. Of course, sweeping statements have got their weight
(25)before this Court or anywhere, and they are worth what they are worth, and
MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, if I could respond to what Her Honour -- (10) THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Judge Rodrigues, please. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] I apologise. I was saying that you spoke the same language and the interpreters have difficulties following you. If you don't make pauses between your interventions, we will have problems. I apologise, Mr. Cayley, for this interruption. (15)Please continue.
MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
If I could respond, Your Honour, to the comments that you made.
I'm not suggesting for one moment that every single assertion that he
makes has to be supported by a particular document or by reference to oral
(20)testimony, but I think - and I'm objecting now before we get on to matters
which we all know are going to be really material to this case - that
where he does come out with assertions, with propositions which go right
to the heart of the indictment, I think it's not unreasonable for him in
those particular instances to actually give evidential support for that
(25)particular statement.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] I think that we have just heard
(15)a very important argument from Mr. Cayley. I think that we are now coming
to the core of this issue. So far we have been discussing the framework.
We have to make a distinction: Either the witness is giving his personal
opinion or his opinion as an expert. He has to tell us about the
documents that he saw, and he has to tell us specifically on the basis of
(20)which documents he has come to that conclusion, the conclusion that he
makes as an expert witness, otherwise I think that we will be allowing the
Prosecutor to interrupt the Defence constantly. This is the basic
requirement for his cross-examination. He needs to have some sources on
the basis of which he can conduct his examination.
(25)I don't want the witness to think that we are now discussing his
JUDGE WALD: I feel compelled to add one thing more. I think we
have to keep in mind the difference between a fact witness and an expert
witness. A fact witness gives you a lot of documentation. An expert
witness is called as an expert witness precisely because he is thought to
(25)have the experience and the academic training which allow him to give a
(10) MR. CAYLEY: I agree with you. JUDGE WALD: Okay. MR. CAYLEY: I agree with you on that. JUDGE WALD: I just wanted to draw that -- I'm not irritated, but I wanted to draw that distinction so we keep it in mind. (15) MR. CAYLEY: That is exactly what -- I'm sorry, because the interpretation has got to catch up. Your Honour, what is exactly the point that I make, and if the witness had said that, I would never have jumped to my feet and caused all this delay. If he says, "I'm a Lieutenant General. Based on all my (20)experience over the years, I can't point to any particular document, but I can tell you as a professional soldier, this is my opinion" that's all I ask for.
JUDGE RIAD: Mr. Cayley, I would like to reassure you that -- to
trust the good judgement of the Bench, and when certain things are just an
(25)inference, we know it's an inference. When he says, for instance, the
(5) MR. CAYLEY: I apologise, Your Honour, if you think I'm doing your job, but that fact was actually drawn out by the President. The actual fact of the death of the soldier was brought out by the President on the questioning of the witness. Prior to that it was based on apparently nothing at all. (10) JUDGE RIAD: We can draw the same conclusions, so don't you worry. MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Your Honour. MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, if you will allow me to -- in reply to this issue that was broached by Mr. Cayley very briefly.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Mr. Visnjic, we have to bear in
(15)mind that we are in front of an expert witness, what my colleague Judge
Wald has just pointed out, and the objective of this testimony is not fact
but the evaluation of the facts made by this witness, which is implied by
the very concept of expert witnesses. Very often it is very difficult to
speak about evaluations without having adequate facts attached to it.
(20)I think we can find a compromise solution here. Once we get to
the most important aspects of the case, we have to know if there are -- if
the opinion in question is a personal opinion or if it's an expert
opinion. Since we are here to judge the facts, one has to support those
facts with evaluations and opinions.
(25)So I should like to ask Mr. Visnjic to bear that in mind while
MR. VISNJIC:
[Int.] Yes. Thank you, Mr. President. But
(5)if you will allow me to expose a very brief aspect that I think is
important and should be taken into account while assessing the value of
testimony of Mr. Radinovic. I'm glad that Mr. Cayley mentioned a
comparison of this testimony with the testimony of Mr. Butler and
Mr. Dannatt, although Mr. Dannatt's testimony was not as detailed as
(10)Mr. Butler's.
It was allowed for the witness to have 60 hours to deal with this
issue, but believe me, in view of the quantity of documentation and in
view of the nature of -- I'm sorry, my colleague has just corrected me:
80 hours. In view of the quality of the documents and in view of the pace
(15)with which the documents -- the witness received the documents, this
precise analysis which was carried out by Mr. Dannatt and Mr. Butler, we
would need an additional two or three months in order to comply with the
requests of the Prosecutor.
Bearing in mind our very restricted resources -- and I must say
(20)that I do understand the situation of my learned colleagues from the
Prosecution, but they also have to put themselves in our shoes. Bearing
in mind our restricted resources, the very little amount of time, and the
nature of the subject matter, it is my opinion that this witness has put a
huge amount of effort in order to comply with the conditions and
(25)requirements which were posed by the Chamber in respect to his testimony.
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Visnjic, I really think we need a break at this point. It is 12.00. It is high noon, and we're going to have a break now, and when we come back we will take up the issue (10)once again. THE WITNESS: [Int.] Mr. President, Your Honours, can you just allow me two sentences? JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] After the break, General. After the break. (15) THE WITNESS: [Int.] Maybe it would be more useful for you to hear it now, if you will allow me. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] No, I'm sorry, General. After the break. We will come back at 1.00. (20) --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.01 p.m. --- On resuming at 1.03 p.m.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Professor Radinovic, you wanted
to say a few words. I apologise for not allowing you to do so before the
pause, but I had some urgent business to attend to. I agree that for
(25)purposes of economy, that might have been better, but would you like to
THE WITNESS:
[Int.] Yes, Mr. President. To avoid
repetition of situations of this kind, may I explain how I have understood
my role in this trial to be, what I have understood it to be like? And
(5)perhaps this explanation would be useful.
I'm a military expert dealing in military strategic synthesis. Of
course, I do not do this arbitrarily. I do not devise strategic synthesis
arbitrarily but on the basis of analyses, comparative analyses, study of
documents, but of course also basing it on my experience and the great
(10)knowledge and experience that I have gained in the many years that I have
worked in the field, in my professional field.
I am not the type of witness of Mr. Butler. I have enormous
respect for Mr. Butler and the enormous effort that he made in writing his
expert report, but I am not that type of analytical witness. I am a
(15)witness of the type of General Dannatt, and that is how I understood my
role. So for all of my assertions, I, of course, do have arguments to
back them up as foundation, but in the kind of synthesis that I make, it
is absolutely not possible to say each and every time which source I base
my assertion on.
(20)I have been -- I have said here that I gained the impression that
the relationships between the 28th Division and UNPROFOR in Srebrenica
were not good relations. I assumed that that was sufficient -- that it
was sufficient to illustrate that. And I, of course, have arguments to
back my opinion up. I have the plan of attack, the document of the plan
(25)of attack on the UNPROFOR camp devised by the Muslim command in November
(25)
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Professor Radinovic, thank you
MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] No, Mr. President, perhaps we did not understand each other. It wasn't a question of payment or reimbursement. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Let us move forward. What is (10)the problem now? If it wasn't a problem of reimbursement, then let's move on. I was just trying to -- right, you say that it wasn't a matter of payment. Very well, very well. MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] No, Mr. President, that is not what I meant. The remark was with respect to the time necessary. That was how (15)I understood the problem, but the General put me right there. He knows what he meant, so he presented his view.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Mr. Visnjic, what we're going to
do now is the following: You are going to continue your examination of
the witness, your examination-in-chief of this witness. Try to explain to
(20)us the foundation for his opinions, and do not lose from sight that the
object of the testimony is for the Trial Chamber to assess matters, and
the Prosecution will be able to cross-examine on the basis of the
foundation presented. But for the Prosecution to be able to do that and
to have the minimum -- the minimum must be furnished so that the
(25)Prosecution knows where it stands and can use that information during the
JUDGE RIAD: I have a comment, Mr. President. General Radinovic, you are a professor, and you can apply, of course, the method -- I'm going to say it's not anything you don't apply. (5)When we listen to you, we'd like to know, to make things easier for us, to differentiate between facts and between your personal inferences. For instance, you can say -- tell us that the 28th Division was well armed. You know it's a fact; you know about it. When you told us, for instance, that the 28th Division was hostile to the UNPROFOR, I took (10)it as a fact. Then when Mr. Visnjic asked you to develop it and to give the reason, you said because they killed one man. That's not fact any more, it is your own inference. I accept it, too, but if you just tell us, "This is my inference," we don't even need to ask you why. That's your conclusion, and then you can proceed and know what is your conclusion (15)as an expert, but -- and what are the facts which don't require -- the way you do when you teach. Thank you. MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] • Q.: General Radinovic, when did the forces of the Drina Corps succeed in their planned targets? (20) • A.: The Drina Corps forces achieved the goals of their Operation Krivaja 95 when they reached the line Kak-Alibegovac-Zivkovo Brdo, when they took possession of those dominant heights above the enclave. And that I say on the basis of the documents and what happened between the 9th and 10th of July. (25)
• Q.: When was the decision taken to extend -- expand the objectives of
• A.: That decision was made by the sole person authorised to do so, that is to say, the Supreme Commander, the president of Republika Srpska (5)in his role as Supreme Commander. • Q.: On the basis of what? • A.: On the basis of documents, documents which at the command post of the Drina Corps were sent by one of the assistants of the Main Staff of the VRS informing them that the president of the republic agreed, was in (10)agreement, that the activities continue, and that they enter Srebrenica. That is the document dated the 9th of July, the evening of the 9th of July, and it came from the Main Staff and was dispatched to the Drina Corps command. Do you want me to produce the document? MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] It is Prosecution Exhibit 423 for (15)the benefit of my learned colleagues for the Prosecution. • Q.: General Radinovic, what forces of the VRS entered Srebrenica? How many troops, and what do you know about that?
• A.: I was not able to ascertain exactly how many soldiers entered
Srebrenica; however, I did have occasion to see a videotape when the
(20)commander of the Main Staff, together with some of his commanding
officers, entered Srebrenica. There was a very limited number of soldiers
there, and quite simply, you can't see soldiers moving in file. You don't
see the combat weapons; combat formation isn't seen. And as I don't know
these facts, I can conclude that there were not many soldiers. Several
(25)dozens.
(10) • Q.: Who did the forces of the Drina Corps encounter when they entered Srebrenica? • A.: From that document, that is to say the videotape which I saw, I was able to conclude that they did not come across anyone in Srebrenica, that is to say that Srebrenica was empty. (15) • Q.: Where was the civilian population at that time, and where was the 28th Infantry Division; do you know about that? • A.: The civilian population had been gathering in the Potocari UNPROFOR base, and the members of the 28th Division in the region of these villages of Susnjari and Jaglici, and that is in this region here. May I (20)get up to indicate it on the map? [Indicates] • Q.: The withdrawal and grouping and formation of the retreating members of the 28th Infantry Division, that is to say, what was the nature of that withdrawal? I'm thinking of them going to the village of Susnjari, and on what do you base your assessment? (25)
• A.: I can conclude that the withdrawal of the forces of the 28th
• Q.: This withdrawal, could that have taken place on the day Srebrenica was taken control of itself? (15)
• A.: No, that couldn't have occurred on that same day, quite simply
because from that large circle and encirclement, had there not been within
the organisation of the 28th Division, had this not been agreed, then what
would have happened was that some portions of the 28th Division, that is
to say, the forces who were in the direct contact line, they would have
(20)been encircled and captured or destroyed. As that did not happen, I
assume that this action of withdrawal was done in a planned fashion, in a
timely fashion, which means that it took place during the 10th.
So those are my analytical assessments on the basis of which I can
conclude that this whole withdrawal process lasted for a day to a day and
(25)a half.
• A.: For the Muslim side, the main problem was the pull-out of the
forces of the troops of the 28th Division, their regrouping; that is to
say, the troops had to be gathered at certain holding points, see what the
(10)situation was, what kind of problems they were facing, and try to see what
they can do next, what would be their next step. The commanding officers
had to gather at one particular location where they were supposed to agree
on what to do next.
Now, whether it was possible to make an overall plan to that
(15)effect, that remains unclear. However, there must have been a kind of
contact between the commander or whoever was in command at the time with
the subordinate brigade commanders, and the brigade commanders had to
contact their subordinates in turn in order to agree on the route that
needed to be taken and the kind of formation that would follow that route
(20)for the purposes of the pull-out. So that was the main problem that the
Muslim side had to resolve after the entry of the Serb forces into the
town of Srebrenica.
There was an even more serious problem with which they were faced
at the time, and that was what to do with the civilian population that had
(25)gathered around the UN base in Potocari or inside the base itself,
• Q.: General Radinovic, the transfer of the population, was it (20)something that could be realistically expected in that operation? • A.: In view of my insight of the situation, the moving out of the population was not something that could be expected. • Q.: Did it constitute a desirable military objective of the VRS?
• A.: No. The moving out of the civilian population from Srebrenica
(25)could by no means constitute a desirable objective of the VRS. Now, what
MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Can we have 404, footnote 73, presented to the witness, and can we also prepare Prosecution Exhibits 39A and B. • Q.: General Radinovic, to your knowledge, who first had the initiative (15)to move out the civilian population from the UN base in Potocari? Who was the first person who came up with such an idea?
• A.: According to what I know, I think that the initiative for the
moving out of the civilian population from Srebrenica came from the
president of the presidency, Osman Suljic, who signed a document to that
(20)effect, that is, the presidency of the Srebrenica municipality. The
document in question is dated the 9th of July, 1995, and it was issued in
1900 hours.
President of the presidency, Mr. Osman Suljic, addresses
himself -- I'll try to paraphrase the document. "Since the aggressor
(25)enemy entered the town of Srebrenica at 1800 hours from the direction of
• Q.: If we place this document in the context of the time, that is at (15)the time where the order was expanded to the effect that Srebrenica should be attacked. • A.: Yes, this document was issued before that, obviously, before it was ordered for the troops to actually enter the town of Srebrenica.
MR. VISNJIC:
[Int.] Could the usher please give to the
(20)witness the Prosecution Exhibit 39, and to put the page 9 - I believe it
is the same page in both versions - on the ELMO.
Your Honours, the document in question is a transcript of a video
clip which we have seen on a number of occasions here during this trial.
It is a video footage of the first meeting between General Mladic and
(25)Colonel Karremans.
(5) • A.: This conversation was conducted between Colonel Karremans and General Mladic. Colonel Karremans speaks through an interpreter, and he says that there is a lot of weapons. There's a huge amount of weapons in the enclave, and that the weapons had been smuggled from outside of the enclave. He goes further on to state that he had put that many times in (10)the information to the higher military authorities and nationals in Tuzla and Sarajevo. The reason for that, says he, is because the Dutch Battalion didn't -- was not able to defend the enclave and to have a full control over its territory. It's difficult for me to follow this because there are both (15)versions of the text here. He refers at one point to a request which was made on behalf of the civilian population, because he was not in a position to demand anything. He says that the command in Sarajevo had said that the enclave had been lost, which we can link up with this request for the moving out (20)of the civilian population that we have just seen, and Colonel Karremans is asking for this to be ensured.
• Q.: General Radinovic, have you come across any document of the VRS,
or before the 11th of July did you come across any indication that the
moving out of the civilian population from Srebrenica had been planned,
(25)anything that would speak to that effect?
• Q.: Had that been planned, would certain documents have surfaced to (5)that effect, the documents that were actually part of the overall planning of the Krivaja 95 operation?
• A.: I fully agree with General Dannatt on this issue. This issue is
discussed in the portion of his report when he says that the moving out of
the civilian population is a very complex step to take, and that an
(10)overall plan is necessary which would include provisions for the
accommodation and so on and so forth. So there should have been a number
of such documents, and I fully agree with his claim to that effect.
However, I must add one more thing. Such a comprehensive plan
could not be articulated or submitted to the Drina Corps for execution
(15)without at least something of those documents being exposed to the
public. I don't think that such a document could be drafted without
necessarily making it public because it would involve a great number of
participants, and such a plan would not -- it wouldn't be possible to
conceal such a plan because there would have been a number of individuals
(20)who would have to be familiar with such a plan.
So as regards the planning documents for the Krivaja 95 operation,
there should have been something which would speak to that effect, on
condition that such a plan had indeed existed. I didn't find anything of
that kind, and on the basis of that, I can conclude that those who were
(25)involved in the planning of the Krivaja 95 operation, that is to say, the
MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] I should like the usher to prepare Defence Exhibit 154, OTP Exhibit 404, footnote 125, 126, and 127, and 128. • Q.: General Radinovic, when was the first contact made, that is to (5)say, the first actions, the first steps that were taken to that respect, that is, for the purposes of the moving out of the civilian population from Potocari? • A.: In view of what I had at my disposal, I first came across such indicators in the documents which date from the evening hours of the 11th (10)of July, that is, the documents originating from the meeting that took place in the Fontana Hotel between the representatives of the VRS and the Dutch Battalion. On the 12th of July, we see many more of such documents, and I'm referring to the request of the Drina Corps Commander, for means of (15)transportation, for vehicles. • Q.: I believe that the usher has just prepared some documents for you.
• A.: Yes. The Drina Corps command on the 12th of July, 1995, addresses
itself to its subordinate brigades - the 1st Zvornik, the 1st Bratunac
Brigades, the Romanija Motorised Brigade, the 1st Bratunac Light Infantry
(20)Brigade, the 1st Birac Brigade, the 5th Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade -
whereby it requests or, rather, orders that all available buses and vans
in ownership -- which are property of the VRS units, that they should be
placed at the disposal of the Drina Corps command on the 12th of July,
1995.
(25)The said buses are to be forwarded to Bratunac, the sports
• Q.: I don't think we need to discuss the details of this document, (5)General Radinovic. The document 154 is actually the same document as Prosecution Exhibit 404, footnote 125; it's just that it has come to us from a different source. As regards 404 and footnotes 125, 126, 127, and 128, it is actually a range of documents which speak about the same issue, and I (10)should like to hear your very brief comment on that. MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] And if we can have just one of those documents placed on the ELMO so that we can see by way of illustration what we are talking about. • A.: I believe I have already read this document. This is the same (15)document. Yes, Major-General Zivanovic for the 12th of July. This is exactly the same document. • Q.: Can we just hear your comments of the remaining three documents, OTP 404, footnotes 126, 127, and 128.
• A.: Secretariat for Defence in Zvornik, on the basis of a request
(20)issued by the general staff of the VRS on the 12th of July for the
purposes of mobilising a certain number of buses, they request for such
buses to be placed at their disposal -- all of the buses from the
municipality, Zvornik, Visegrad, Vlasenica, Milici, and Bratunac and, if
necessary, from other municipalities as well. A request is being made
(25)here that the vehicles, that is to say, the drivers of the vehicles should
• Q.: When did that start, and how long did that operation last? • A.: In accordance with the documents sent by General Zivanovic and the Ministry of Defence, one can conclude that the moving out of the (15)population started on the 12th, in the afternoon hours of the 12th of July, and on the basis of the documents that I had an opportunity to study, the operation was completed on the 13th of July by half-past seven p.m. • Q.: What were the mechanisms that were employed to that effect, the (20)mechanisms of the United Nations, and what was their situation?
• A.: Well, the Dutch Battalion was in a very difficult situation
because they had received this very high number of people there. And in
view of the fact that its mission was to ensure protection of the safe
area, they had a very weighty responsibility to bear. I'm not going to
(25)make any assessment as to how successful they were in accomplishing that
• Q.: In the documentation that you studied, which relates to the period (20)immediately after the moving out of the population, did you come across certain parts which stressed the irregularity of the moving out of the population? And here I mean the documents of the United Nations or some of its organs.
• A.: Yes, I did encounter some. In the Secretary-General's report it
(25)talks about that, the UN Secretary-General's report, that there were
• Q.: General Radinovic, do you know of any other example where the population moved out in the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina? Apart from this instance in Srebrenica, was there any other example and occasion? (10)
• A.: Well, unfortunately there were instances when the population moved
out, and this was something that was continuously apparent as the result
of the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As soon as an army, one army or
the other had established control in certain parts of the territory, all
those who did not consider that army to belong to them, they left the
(15)area; they moved out. So this moving out of the population is a regular
occurrence of the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Let me give you some examples which confirm my thesis. For
example, the Neretva River Valley, including Mostar. Mostar is a large
town compared to the size of the former Yugoslavia. All the Serb
(20)population left, from Capljina to Konjic; they all moved out. The Croats
from Central Bosnia, they were moved out and escorted by the VRS army, and
this moving out of Central Bosnia was the result of the Muslim activities
there, not the Serb activities. The Serb army helped the population to
shift and move out, without any serious repercussions.
(25)There was an instance of moving out of the Muslim population in
• Q.: And finally, General Radinovic, how would you assess the moving out that took place on the 12th and the 13th of July, 1995 in Srebrenica? (10)How would you characterise it: as a planned operation, an operation planned in advance, or as an ad hoc operation? • A.: Looking at the initiatives that were taken to move the population out, and when I look at the documents that I had at my disposal for assessing this action, this occurrence - and all documents indicate that (15)the problem should be resolved and that this referred to the 12th, before noon - I am adamant in my conclusion that it was an ad hoc problem which occurred on the spur of the moment, completely an unplanned consequence of the Operation Krivaja 95, an unplanned consequence of the Krivaja 95 operation, and that is why it could not have been planned in advance, (20)planned beforehand, elaborated beforehand, and agreed upon beforehand, and all the necessary things secured for it to be implemented, precisely because it was an ad hoc operation. It was carried out with serious negative features which led to the consequences that are talked about in the documents. (25)
MR. VISNJIC:
[Int.] Mr. President, in view of our
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes. We're going to split up our afternoon work in two halves. We're going to have a 15-minute break now. (5) --- Recess taken at 1.55 p.m. --- On resuming at 2.11 p.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Visnjic, please proceed. You have until 3.00. MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Thank you, Mr. President. (10) • Q.: General Radinovic, before this Trial Chamber we have heard numerous testimony, exhibits, videotapes, and other evidential material speaking about the separation of military-abled men in Potocari on the 12th and 13th of July, 1995. Do you consider it legitimate to test the identity of the military-abled men? (15)
• A.: Yes, I do consider it legitimate to check up the identity of the
males, of the men. Now, why do I say that? Because in Srebrenica, the
28th Infantry Division was positioned at the BiH army, was based there,
and like any other army, it engaged in warfare.
Since the beginning of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, up until the
(20)time of the Srebrenica operation, the VRS had data on a number of members
of the 28th Division who had committed crimes. The command of the
Bratunac Brigade had a list, had in its possession a list of people, that
is to say, members of the 28th Division, who had been suspected of
committing war crimes, and this list was handed over to the Main Staff,
(25)the headquarters, that is to say, the command of the Drina Corps.
(5) • Q.: The representatives of UNPROFOR were informed about this on both meetings, on the 11th and on the 12th. No, I'm sorry, on the 12th, the evening of the 12th, and the following day. • A.: Yes. The commander of the Main Staff at the meeting directly imparted this information to the commander of the UNPROFOR battalion. (10) • Q.: General Radinovic, let us move on to another area now, and that is the pulling out and withdrawal of the 28th Division and the breakthrough. You said that the forces of the 28th Division had collected up in the village of Susnjari, and the Trial Chamber has sufficient other evidence about that, that this was on the 11th of July. (15)When these forces appeared on the periphery of the enclave, when did that happen? When did they appear on the periphery of the enclave?
• A.: There are two facts which are relevant in establishing when they
appeared. On the 11th, it is incontestable that those forces were
concentrated in that area and that they were preparing for a breakthrough.
(20)From the report of the Chief of Staff of the Zvornik Brigade who sat in
for the brigade commander who was at Zepa, that report was dated the 13th
of July, the 13th of July, which means that on the 13th of July, the Chief
of Staff of the Zvornik Brigade, assuming the role of commander, sent to
the command of the Drina Corps a report in which he clearly states that he
(25)knows that the column has started moving towards his zone of
• Q.: Do you have any information as to which forces of the 28th Division were there, how long the column was, what kind of weapons they had, and the composition of the column itself? • A.: This differs from one source to another. Serb sources assess (10)this -- Serb sources say that the number is between 10.000 and 15.000 and that a third were armed. In the testimony of Mr. Butler, the number of armed persons was lower. But I don't think that we need say specific numbers. The column was a numerous one and there was quite a considerable number of armed men. According to my analysis, if you look at the overall (15)men that the 28th Division had, if we know that they were not captured or did not surrender, then it would be quite certain that in that column there would be between 7.000 and 10.000 members of the 28th Division. • Q.: What operative formation were the forces of the 28th Division moving in, and what, according to military doctrine, is that action they (20)took called? How do you refer to it? What is the term used to denote it?
• A.: According to some information and certain data that I found in the
documents of the Chief of Staff of the Zvornik Brigade and his reports to
the command of the Drina Corps of the 13th and 14th - and he stresses that
the first combat contacts with the members of the 28th Division took place
(25)here, where you see the blue arrows, on the 13th - the bulk of the column
• Q.: The VRS also took certain action prescribed in military doctrine with respect to the combat formations of the 28th Division. What were those actions?
• A.: The expected combat actions in situations of this kind is to
(15)pursue the enemy. It is called "pursuing the enemy." And after losing
combat contact with the enemy, forces are established for pursuing,
pursuing forces. Pursuing columns, pursuing forces, pursuing detachments,
various pursuing formations are established and put into effect in
situations of that kind.
(20)Now, what is the characteristic feature here? For this process
and for an assessment of this entire complex of activities, that is to
say, the withdrawal of the 28th Division and all the consequences that
arose from that, it is highly unusual that the command of the Drina Corps
did not organise the pursuing of the enemy, pursuit of the enemy. Why he
(25)didn't do that, I cannot say. All I know is that he did not. Probably
• Q.: When was the first combat contact established of the 28th Division and the VRS in the zone of responsibility of the Drina Corps? When did this -- where did this happen, what were the conflicting, combatting parties, and what were the consequences for the VRS and, of course, for (20)the 28th Division?
• A.: I will adhere to the testimony of Mr. Ruez here. At the tip of
this first arrow there is a place called Bare, and Mr. Ruez claims that on
the 13th of July, that that was where the first serious settling of
accounts took place between the force -- with the forces of the 28th
(25)Division who were in retreat and the forces that were in control of that
• Q.: Let me give some additional information. It was Mr. Ruez's (15)testimony of the 14th of March, page 594 and 595, where he says that in the zone that you yourself mentioned in 1996, about 600 bodies were found when -- in the course of an operation conducted by, I think it was the Finnish experts, not linked to the Prosecution's activities. So in that zone, about 500 bodies were uncovered. It is assumed that they are Muslim (20)soldiers and that they died in battle because there were no other indicators. General Radinovic, could you tell the Trial Chamber what the depth of the area was that the 28th Division had to overcome, and what time they needed for that under the prevailing operative conditions? (25)
• A.: In my reply to your previous question, towards the end of it when
• Q.: General Radinovic, in response to my question you told and explained to the Trial Chamber what the VRS failed to do and what it should have done in pursuit of the enemy, but I think my question was what (15)action did the VRS take. Not what action it did not take, but what action did it take. How did it deal with the 28th Division?
• A.: The army of Republika Srpska applied a method which was available
to it at the time, which was open to it -- in view of the fact that the
Drina Corps immediately after the Srebrenica operation received an
(20)assignment to launch another operation for Zepa, they applied the method
of ambushes, ambushes at these lines, and they used the forces that were
available to them in the area.
So these ambushes and obstacles were placed immediately after the
ring around Srebrenica. The next one was positioned at the
(25)Kasaba-Konjevic Polje road, the following one is at Snagovo where the
MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] I'd like to ask the usher to prepare Prosecution Exhibit 540 and 550, Exhibits 540 and 550. • Q.: General Radinovic, in retreating from the zone of responsibility (10)from the Srebrenica zone, the 28th Division established combat contact with part of the forces belonging to the Drina Corps, and they were the forces of the Zvornik Brigade. What operative problems did the Chief of Staff of the Zvornik Brigade have to solve from the 13th of July, and how did he endeavour to solve the problems that arose? (15) • A.: I have a document that I've already mentioned dated the 13th of July. It is the Chief of Staff of the Zvornik Brigade in the role of commander, sending -- • Q.: I apologise, just one moment. It is Exhibit 540. MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Could the usher please place Exhibit (20)540 on the ELMO so as to facilitate the work of the Trial Chamber.
• A.: On the 13th, therefore, the command of the Zvornik Brigade, and
the Chief of Staff acting as commander, informs the command of the Drina
Corps that with the aim of blocking the groups retreating towards Tuzla
and -- from Srebrenica and Tuzla, and that the following measures were
(25)undertaken: that a platoon of the military police had organised an ambush
(25)
MR. VISNJIC:
[Int.] May we have Prosecution Exhibit 550
(5) • Q.: General Radinovic, when did the commander of the Zvornik Brigade return to his area of responsibility and what kind of steps did he take in order to improve the situation in his area of responsibility? • A.: This report also comes from the Chief of Staff acting as commander. It is dated the 14th of July, 1995 and it is a consequence of (10)an ambush which took place in his area of responsibility. He is informing the Drina Corps command that a group -- that is, that the column of Muslims is 3 kilometres long and that he is expecting that they should attempt to have contact with the forces of his brigade. He further on states: "Try to find some means of bringing in more intervention forces (15)early in the morning," otherwise he would be unable to defend his area of responsibility. This is an appeal issued by the brigade commander, and the Drina Corps command replied to his request by pulling out the forces of the Zvornik Brigade from the Zepa area and sending those forces back to the (20)area of responsibility of that brigade. And the commander in question is beginning to deal with the situation in his area of responsibility. This turned out not to be enough, and what ensued was a very complex operational situation which might have led to the separation -- to the splitting of the area of responsibility of that brigade in two parts. (25)
• Q.: How do you assess the situation in the area of the Zvornik Brigade
• A.: The intensity of the combat activities in the area of the Zvornik
Brigade from the 14th of July, then going on to the 15th, the 16th, and
(5)the 17th of July, is something that I can qualify as very high intensity.
So the highest level of intensity took place in the area where we can read
the date, the 16th of July, 1995, at the tip of the arrow there, in that
particular area. Those activities were taking place at such an intensity
that it was -- it could be expected that the 28th Division would suffer
(10)great losses. During those activities the Zvornik Brigade suffered losses
amongst their members. They had 39 killed in combat, 5 missing, who were
also probably killed, and over 200 men were placed en ordre de combat.
Let me give you an illustration to try to describe for you how
intense the attack was. It was the 4th Battalion of the Zvornik Brigade
(15)who found itself in the most difficult situation, where this arrow is on
the map. The forces of the 28th Division managed to pierce through the
positions of the 4th Battalion and to take up control of three trenches
and to capture a Howitzer battery and three mortars, and practically
speaking they were faced with the possibility of being wiped out from that
(20)particular area, the members of the 4th Battalion.
The brigade commander did something unusual. He opened up the
corridor for the members of the 28th Division to pass, and until the main
forces of the column had passed through, the corridor was not closed
again. The corridor would be closed again only on the 17th of July. And
(25)one can say that by the 17th of July, the main forces of the 28th Division
(5) • Q.: General Radinovic, do you have any information as to the type of losses of the 28th Division in the area of responsibility of the Zvornik Brigade at that time? • A.: From the documents that I had access to, from the material that I studied, I was not able to establish the exact number of individuals (10)killed in action. However, in view of the intensity of activities and the depth of the territory and the situation in which the members of the 28th Division found themselves, it is perfectly realistic to expect such losses to be very high. I would measure them in thousands, not in hundreds. But I cannot refer you to any specific document to that effect. (15)As regards the books that I studied and the testimony of the witnesses that took part in that pull-out, mention is made of very high casualties at at least two locations: the village of Bare and also at the location just above Snagovo, where you can again read this date, the 16th of July, 1995. So at those two locations, according to what I was able to (20)see from the documents that I studied, the 28th Division suffered greatest losses.
• Q.: General Radinovic, as regards the issuing of the order to break
through, what could the command of the 28th Division realistically expect
if there had been such a decision, that is, the decision to attempt a
(25)breakthrough? What could they realistically expect?
(5) • A.: I had an opportunity to read what General Sefer Halilovic said about it who was the Commander-in-Chief before General Delic. I think that he was actually right when he spoke about the behaviour and the conduct of the commander of the 2nd Corps and the Supreme Command of the BiH army. (10)The only permissible action when the 28th Division was ordered to attempt a breakthrough, and actually the only justified and possible method and approach was to find free forces and to have them launch an attack from the area, from the direction of Tuzla, and to start moving towards the forces of the 28th Division. (15)I know quite a few things about that matter, and I can say that if that had not been ordered, and if the 28th Division had indeed been ordered to attempt a breakthrough, the only thing that I can conclude is that they were actually sacrificed. And it was -- they were lucky to the extent that the Drina Corps forces were busy with the Zepa operation; (20)otherwise, had that not been the case, the consequences would be far worse. They would be annihilated.
• Q.: General Radinovic, you already told us that it was impossible to
establish the accurate number of Muslim combatants who were killed during
the breakthrough. What happened with the terrain afterwards? Was a
(25)proper clearing operation of the battlefield taken up? What is your
• A.: Well, I have to be very critical about the conduct of the forces
of the VRS and the units of the Drina Corps in that respect. There is an
obligation which is incumbent on the commanders of the local units which
(5)consists of proper searches of the terrain with the objective to locate
and find the remaining groups of the enemy forces, and also for the
purposes of discovering all kinds of obstacles that can be expected in the
theatre of operations.
As part of that action, the searching of the terrain, there is
(10)something that we call clearing up the battlefield. It is an action which
is designed to restore the terrain in question and to bring it back into
its former state. It also includes the location of bodies, first of all
bodies of people, and then corpses of cattle, and then it includes
subsequent burial of those bodies. Whether it was done or not I don't
(15)know. I believe it was.
However, and this is quite important, that there is no -- there
are no documents, there are no reports which would with a certain amount
of certainty tell us something about that particular activity. I haven't
crossed -- I haven't come across any single report which would contain
(20)data about the number of bodies collected and buried as a part of the
clearing up of the battlefield.
So that is a very serious obstacle when it comes to the need to
establish what happened in the area of responsibility of the Drina Corps,
in particular, in that part of the terrain where the members of the 28th
(25)Division attempted a breakthrough.
• A.: I had an opportunity to study an interim combat report of the commander of the Zvornik Brigade which was dated the 15th of July. • Q.: We will spend some more time discussing this particular document, if you can be brief and just tell me whether you know about it. (10) • A.: Yes, I know about the document, and I studied it. • Q.: Could you tell us if it was in the interest of the VRS to liquidate as many war prisoners as possible? • A.: No. • Q.: Why? (15)
• A.: That would be completely contrary to the interests of the VRS.
I'm now not talking about humanitarian and legal considerations which are
self-implied and understood; I'm talking about the operational aspect of
the operation.
At the time of the capture of the members of the 28th Division,
(20)the VRS had a number of prisoners at the Muslim side, prisoners of their
own. So the only factor which would force the Muslim side to accept an
exchange was the fact that there were as many war prisoners as possible on
the other side, so they needed to have enough people for an exchange.
So that would have been the main interest of the VRS, to have as
(25)many of prisoners of war as possible for the purposes of an exchange and
MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, I think that this (5)would be the convenient moment to adjourn for the day. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, indeed, Mr. Visnjic. We will call it a day, but I have to ask you before we finish how much time do you think you will still need to complete the examination-in-chief? MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, I'm running a little (10)late, but I hope that we will be able to finish the examination-in-chief tomorrow. At this point, I cannot tell you whether we'll be able to wind up by 1.00 or 2.00, but we will do our best to complete, to finish the examination-in-chief tomorrow. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] We will see. Are you sure that (15)we will be able to finish this tomorrow this week, because if the Prosecutor is going to dedicate the same amount of time as the Defence, I don't think that we will be able to finish with this testimony by the end of the week, but we will see about that tomorrow. Mr. Cayley, do you have any ideas as regards to time that you (20)think you will need for your cross-examination?
MR. CAYLEY: Well, I have to say, Your Honour, based on practice,
at least as much time as the Defence has taken; but I hope to try and move
to some of the more fundamental issues that the witness has spoken about
rather than spending a lot of time on the periphery, but probably at least
(25)three days.
MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, I believe that (5)Mr. Petrusic has more information about that. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Thank you. You know that we always try to make a programme and not to be caught by surprise at the end of the week. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Mr. President, the witness who was (10)supposed to arrive last week did not arrive on time because the flight was cancelled; however, yesterday afternoon I was informed that even that flight, due to weather conditions, had to be cancelled for today. So it will be only tonight that I will have information as to when he will arrive. (15)We will discuss the issue with the Prosecution. I don't know how long they intend to cross-examine this witness and the following witness. I don't know whether we should -- whether the whole matter will be -- will go over, will spill over next week, but I'm afraid that I will be able only tomorrow afternoon to inform you on the situation. (20)If we have only that witness next week, if he's the only witness that we would have for next week, maybe it would be a better idea to bring it back in January, but please allow me some time to try and find the reasonable solution together with my colleagues from the Prosecution this afternoon. (25)
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Yes, the reason I asked that
--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3:02 p.m., to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 6th day of December, (10)2000, at 9:20 a.m. |
