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/ Colormap • Page 8181 • {1/84} (1)Friday, 8 December 2000 [Open session] [The accused entered court] [The witness entered court] (5) --- Upon commencing at 10.34 a.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Good morning, ladies and gentlemen; good morning to the technical booth and to the interpreters; good morning to the Prosecution. I see that you're all out in full force, and the Defence counsel as well. Good morning, General Krstic. (10)We are running a little over an hour late. Why, Madam Registrar? Can you give us an explanation? THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Mr. President. Apparently there was a problem with General Krstic's wheelchair and ... [French interpretation] JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Okay. Thank you. Mr. Petrusic, (15)is there a problem with respect to General Krstic's health? Could you bring us up-to-date?
MR. PETRUSIC:
[Int.] Good morning, Mr. President, Your
Honours. The health problem of General Krstic is a constant one. It has
been present for some time now, and I should like to state that before
(20)this Trial Chamber and the public.
In the course of yesterday, General Krstic was to have had a
medical examination, a medical checkup, because, according to
General Krstic, he is experiencing the same problems he had 15 days ago
when surgical intervention was performed on him.
(25)During the course of yesterday, for let me say technical reasons,
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Thank you, Mr. Petrusic. As you
(25)know, this is always an overriding preoccupation of ours. We would like
(10)
WITNESS: RADOVAN RADINOVIC
[Resumed] MR. CAYLEY: Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours ... [French interpretation] JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Well, you've made progress, (15)Mr. Cayley, progress indeed. MR. CAYLEY: Am I still getting the French translation? No. I'm not. Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours, counsel. • CROSS-EXAMINED by Mr. Cayley: • Q.: Good morning, General. (20) • A.: Good morning.
• Q.: General, we left off yesterday where we were talking about the
Krivaja 95 document, which we will leave for the moment, and we also spoke
a little about the responsibilities of the Chief of Staff of a VRS corps,
specifically the Drina Corps.
(25)What I'd like to do with you very briefly is to go through some of
• A.: Yes. • Q.: You further said in your evidence, and again I'll quote, "When he," and you're referring to the commander, "is prevented from being on (15)the spot, he does not have to write out an act or document designating a deputy, so the Chief of Staff on the basis of this automatic mechanism takes over in the absence of command." Is that also correct, General? • A.: It need not be so, but it can be so, but it need not be. (20) • Q.: When wouldn't that be the correct position?
• A.: That is basically correct, but the commander for certain
assignments can request that the Chief of Staff be authorised and be the
de facto commander, which is what happened with the Zepa operation. He
was appointed commander of the operative group and thus did not use his
(25)right of deputy. And this automatic mechanism of commanding when -- in
• Q.: Now let's talk about, specifically about Operation Krivaja 95 and (5)the Drina Corps, and you said in your examination-in-chief, and you were referring here to General Krstic, and this is at page 8019, "And in his role at that post," referring to General Krstic, "was to plan the Operation Krivaja 95, and from the forward command post as Chief of Staff to supervise its implementation, the course of the operation." (10)Do you agree with that statement, your own statement? • A.: Yes. • Q.: And finally you said two lines down, "In his role," again referring to General Krstic, "of Deputy Commander of the Drina Corps, General Krstic could have, when the Corps Commander was not around, then (15)he could have realised the function of command." Do you stand by your statement, General? • A.: Yes, in the absence of the commander. • Q.: Let's move now, General, to a different subject. You said in your evidence in-chief that as a matter of military convention, that attacking (20)forces must normally always be much stronger than defending forces, and you said that normally an attacker should be seven to ten times stronger than a defender in terms of manpower. Is that a correct summary of your evidence?
• A.: He need not be, but that is the ratio forces which ensures the
(25)certain taking over, taking control of towns which are well-fortified
• Q.: If we take the situation in Srebrenica, what would your opinion be as an expert military man as to the multiple, the ratio, that should have applied in that particular case? How much stronger should the VRS forces (5)have been than the Muslim forces within the enclave, in your opinion? • A.: For the assignment that the command of the Drina Corps had set in his order for active combat activities, active combat, in my view, the multiple, the ratio between the VRS and the Muslim forces in the enclave was 1:2.8 to the advantage of the Muslims. The question now arises -- (10) • Q.: General, General. • A.: -- whether I have calculated that properly. • Q.: You've misunderstood my question. What I asked you, and it may well be that I didn't make it clear enough, in your professional opinion as a military man, what should, what should the ratio have been between (15)the attacking force and the defending force? Not what it was in actual fact, but what should it have been?
• A.: If we take into account the fact that the Muslim forces in the
Srebrenica enclave had more than two years, that is to say, a full two
years to prepare for their defence, then we would be able to conclude that
(20)it was a good defence with all the rules applicable, shelters for the
manpower; features for reconnaissance; for firing; bunkers for minefields;
all other obstacles necessary for preparing settlements, settled outside
the enclave, that is to say, outside the town proper on the boundaries of
the enclave; resistance points for long-term defence; the preparation of
(25)the flanks and other positions; and everything that tactics implies for
• Q.: General, I'm going to interrupt. (15) • A.: -- went against it. • Q.: I think you're actually wandering away with your answer from the question that I asked, and I'll repeat it. In your opinion as a military man, what should, what should the ratio have been between the attacking force and the defending force? (20)Now, you've laid out for the Judges that the Muslims were well dug in. They had very good defences. You're the General. You tell the Court what the ratio should have been between the attacking forces and the defending forces. If you can't answer the question, then just say, "I'm sorry, I don't wish to answer that question." (25)
• A.: I can answer it and I will answer it, but I'm just trying to tell
(15) • Q.: General, the 28th Division had between 8.000 and 10.000 men; is that correct?
• A.: Well, in my analyses, I had two types of sources in arriving at
the figures that the 28th Division had. One of my sources were
intelligence sources obtained by the army of Republika Srpska. That was
(20)one type of source.
In that regarding, I had at my disposal a document sent by the
Commander of the Milici Brigade to the Commander of the Drina Corps and
some other intelligence sources which the corps collected itself. It is
according to this data that the Milici Brigade, this intelligence
(25)information that the Milici Brigade sent, in the Srebrenica enclave,
(20)
• Q.: General, excuse me. I don't want to go through the history of the
Territorial Defence in Srebrenica. The number that you've given me is
fine, 5.000 to 6.500 men. If, please, Exhibit 160 -- do you have your
report handy, General? Do you have it with you, your report you produced
on Srebrenica? It's Defence Exhibit 160.
(25)If you could please turn to page 25 in your edition.
• Q.: General -- MR. CAYLEY: If you could move it up, please, Mr. Usher. (5) • Q.: General, if you could read paragraph 2.9 of your report. • A.: "The Infantry Division consisted of the -- the 28th Infantry Division consisted of five brigades and a corresponding number of mountain and police units, the total numerical strength being between 10.000 and 12.000 men. The numbers of the brigades and the routes on which they were (10)engaged were as follows: "The 280th Brigade on the route Potocari-Srebrenica. "The 281st Brigade on the route Podgaj-Borovac-Suceska. "The 282th Brigade on the route Zeleni-Jadar-Bojna-Srebrenica. "The 283rd Brigade on the route Podravno-Bucje-Viogora. (15)"The 284th Brigade on the route Ravni Buljim- Milacevici-Potocari." Let me just say that the number of the brigades -- • Q.: General, read to the end of the paragraph. • A.: I will. I just wanted to say that, in different documents, I came (20)across different numbers for the brigades. • Q.: Please read the paragraph to the end and then I'll ask you a question about these figures.
• A.: "The mountain battalion and police forces were located in
Srebrenica, Potocari, and Suceska in the role of the commander's reserve
(25)of the 28th Infantry Division. The total number of men under arms in
• Q.: Now, General, you would agree with me that there is a variance (5)between your report, what you told Mr. Visnjic, and what you're now telling me, what you're now telling this courtroom in cross-examination. In your report, in the 28th Division, you say that there were 10.000 to 12.000; to Mr. Visnjic you said there were 8.000 to 10.000; and now to the court you're saying 5.000 to 6.500 men. Which is the correct (10)figure, General? How many combatants were there within the enclave of Srebrenica?
• A.: Sir, you'll have to be patient and hear my whole answer in view of
the document. I said that I had at my disposal documents, intelligence
documents of the units of the Drina Corps.
(15)The second type of document that I had at my disposal were the
documents of the Muslim army. Those documents, as far as I know, as far
as I know, the Defence sent to the Prosecution; and as far as I know, it
was requested by the government in Sarajevo to check out those documents.
And when I did my expertise, I was not able to know at the time whether
(20)this would be contested. I didn't think that there would be any trouble
in checking out the documents.
My report -- the findings in my report were based on the documents
of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the staff of the armed forces of
Srebrenica, number 657-8-1/93, dated the 8th of June, 1993. It is the
(25)situation report on the free territory of the staff of the supreme command
• Q.: General, General, General -- (15) • A.: Do you want me to tell you the documents or not? • Q.: It's not necessary for you to give lists and lists and lists of documents. You're an expert. You have come here. You have told this Court that you have assessed all of the material that has been made available to you. On the basis of that material, what is the correct (20)figure; an approximate figure, but what is the correct approximate figure for the number of Muslim fighters that were in the Srebrenica enclave in July of 1995?
• A.: The correct figure of the Muslim fighters in Srebrenica was,
according to the documents that I wanted to read out to the end when you
(25)interrupted me - I don't know why, it was for you to be able to check them
(10) • Q.: Your report is incorrect, isn't it, General? The written report is incorrect? • A.: May I kindly request that you take care that the report is based on documentation or assessment. This is based on documentation. And in my oral testimony, I bore in mind the fact that there were indices, (15)pointers, to the fact that parts of the forces from Srebrenica were sent to the operation around Sarajevo in the spring of 1995. And we have testimony about that in the book by Sefer Halilovic who was at one time the Commander-in-Chief of the VRS and of the BiH, and I thought that this fact should be taken into account and that the number 10.913, to that (20)number should be added the police forces, and that this should be reduced to the number that I quote here which I think is more realistic than the figure mentioned in the Muslim documents that were sent to the superior commands. • Q.: General -- (25)
MR. CAYLEY: Madam Registrar, if we could have Defence Exhibit
• Q.: General, which is the realistic figure? You've given the Judges three different figures: The figure in your report; the figure that you provided to Mr. Visnjic, which was 8 to 10.000; and then the figure that (5)you've just given to me in cross-examination, which is 5 to 6.000 and is, in fact, based on this VRS intelligence report. Which is the most realistic figure, in your view? Just give me the numbers, General; I don't want any explanation. Just in your expert opinion, which is the most reliable figure? (10)
• A.: It's very difficult for me to provide a precise answer to your
question, and that is why during the examination-in-chief I only gave an
assessment of that figure and not a figure which can be based on
documents.
I could not be precise as regards the total number because I don't
(15)know how many soldiers left for the Sarajevo operation from the Srebrenica
enclave. It could have been 1.000, 2.000, but it could have been also
more. And that is the reason why I gave you the number which was given by
the intelligence service of the VRS, and also the number which was given
by the BiH army, and also my assessment as to what it would be logical to
(20)expect concerning the men under arms in Srebrenica.
That is the reason why the number that I gave to this Chamber is
an assessment reached on the basis of the situation and the number of
soldiers who were registered, and also on the basis of the number of the
soldiers which were seconded for the Sarajevo operation, and on the basis
(25)of information which was given by Sefer Halilovic in his book, "The
• Q.: Now, General, if you look at this report in front of you, and I'm (5)summarising it - this is a VRS report which I assume you must have seen last night which is why you've changed the figures - you'll see this is a VRS report of June 24th from the Milici Brigade. It states that there were 5.000, 5.000 armed soldiers, 550 soldiers from the East Bosnian Battalion, and then I think -- sorry, from the manoeuvring task force, and (10)350 soldiers from the East Bosnia Light Infantry Battalion, of which 3.000 it states were armed, mainly with local and foreign-made small arms. Now, you would agree with me that when one places this piece of evidence against your report, which states that there were 13.000 armed people in Srebrenica, and your evidence to Mr. Visnjic, that your evidence (15)is in fact a gross exaggeration of the reality on the ground at the time, isn't it?
• A.: No. The number of soldiers that I gave was calculated on the
basis of the Muslim documentation, and it was my assumption that they had
no reasons to lie to their superior command, but that they had an accurate
(20)insight into the actual number of soldiers.
As to the information provided by the Commander of the Milici
Brigade, in the first paragraph of his order concerning intelligence data
about the enemy, something that I cannot consider reliable enough, I think
that the information that is given by a subordinate command to its -- to
(25)superior command is far more reliable. This is something that is done on
(15) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Visnjic. MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, while we still see this page on the screen, I have to say that General Radinovic said in response to my answer that the number was between 8.000 and 10.000 and not between 6.000 and 7.000, as far as I can recall. And not 13.000. I'm (20)sorry. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes. What line are you talking about, Mr. Visnjic? We have a number of figures here on the screen. What is the number of the line that you wish to correct? Has it disappeared already? (25)
MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, I can actually correct the situation
(5) MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, it's on page 14, line 24. The error was in the question put by my learned colleague Mr. Cayley. That is why I wanted to react, but it's gone. It's no longer on the screen. I just wanted to correct the record. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] I think that the transcript (10)speaks for itself. I remember that General Radinovic said in response to your question 10.000 or 8.000. That was the answer that I remember as being given by General Radinovic. I hope that the record is clear. Thank you very much, Mr. Visnjic. Mr. Cayley, please continue. (15) MR. CAYLEY: • Q.: General, you stated in your evidence to Mr. Visnjic that two and a half battalions of the Drina Corps took part in operation Krivaja 95. Could you please give me a proximate figure for the number of men from the Bosnian Serb army who would have been engaged within those two and a half (20)battalions?
• A.: I said that there were two and a half battalions that took active
part in the first echelon of the attack, but the Bratunac Brigade troops
and the Milici Brigade troops were in contact with the enemy. There was
one company of the Vlasenica Brigade and the Skelani Battalion. So if I
(25)remember it correctly, and I think I do, I said that this would be the
• Q.: General, how many men approximately, how many men approximately (20)were there in that light VRS brigade? Do we just take 5.500 and divide by 2.8? Is that how we get to the figure? • A.: No. No.
• Q.: So how many men? General, you're an expert. You're a lieutenant
general. You know how many men are in these. Give me a figure. One,
(25)two, three? Approximately.
• Q.: So if we include not just the active participants but, of course, as you say, all of those who were, to quote you -- there were many more, (10)you said. There were many more. "However, as regards overall control of the enclave, there were many more." What was the total figure? Two thousand plus what, General? Give me an approximate figure. • A.: Sir, I did not calculate that ratio of forces because it was not essential for my analysis. It would have been necessary for me to make a (15)new calculation and to take into account what were the forces which could have exerted a certain amount of influence. What I calculated was the ratio of forces engaged in the attack, who participated in active combat, and that was the ratio of forces that I came up with. If you want me to make a calculation for something else, (20)then you have to give me some additional time to do that. I need some time to make an appropriate calculation if you want me to speak about another context. I don't want to play with figures here. I don't think you do either. I cannot -- • Q.: I'm not -- General, I'm not -- (25)
• A.: -- just present you with figures off the top of my head.
• A.: On the basis of the documents concerning combat activities in and around Srebrenica, less than 2.000 members of the VRS took part in that operation, in those activities. (10) • Q.: So less than 2.000. And based on the Milici Brigade document that -- • A.: Yes. • Q.: -- we've just seen -- JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Visnjic. (15) MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, I have an objection which might be helpful for my learned colleague and his questions. The General said that on the basis of the documents concerning active combat activities. This word "active" is left out from the interpretation and that is likely to cause problems. What we're talking about here are (20)active combat activities. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Cayley, please continue. MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
• Q.: General, so based on the Milici Brigade document which you
actually quoted the figure earlier and then subsequently said it was
(25)unreliable, which states the VRS themselves state that there were about
• A.: The figure that you have in the document about armed Muslims is
(5)not correct. If you consider the relevancy of the document, this is an
order issued by the Commander of the Milici Brigade, that is, one of the
commanding officers of a tactical unit within the Drina Corps, and this
particular data is not accurate.
The number of men under weapons in the enclave, that is, the
(10)number of troops of the 28th Division, exceeds by far the figure given
here, and I can give you the exact figure as to how many men were under
arms. I can also be specific in terms of the kind of weapons that they
had.
According to Muslim sources, I have the relevant information,
(15)including the type of weapons that they had in the Srebrenica enclave, and
I thought that for the purposes of assessing the strengths of the Tactical
Group that it was enough to have in mind the overall situation and the
tactical context so that we can get an accurate picture of everything else
that followed from that fact and what is the subject matter of these
(20)proceedings.
I didn't expect an expert military discussion about tactical
issues. Of course, I am ready to engage in such a discussion, of course,
but you will have to provide me with the relevant information.
The number was higher than 3.000, and the figure that you have in
(25)this document is absolutely not correct.
• A.: No, no. I studied the documents which were issued by the Muslim commanders to their superiors, and those figures are more correct than the ones estimated by the Dutch Battalion. Muslim officers were trying to conceal the information regarding (10)the number of soldiers and the type of weapons from the Dutch because, according to the agreement, they were supposed to hand over those weapons, which they didn't do. And this is common knowledge to everybody, including the commander of the Dutch Battalion at the time and other relevant factors within the United Nations. (15) • Q.: So in giving the figures of Muslim troops in the enclave, you've relied exclusively on Muslim documentation and have ignored all other documentary and oral testimony?
• A.: No, sir. You are interpreting my words erroneously. That was not
my intention. You're trying to put to me things that I didn't say. I
(20)said that I based myself on a number of sources, and that I took into
account the most reliable sources. The most reliable piece of information
for myself is the one which was given by the Muslim commander to his
superior command in Tuzla and Sarajevo because I think that he was not in
a position to lie to them. Everything else is far less reliable.
(25)So those information is the most reliable one. Mobilisational
(10) • Q.: Is the figure of 12 to 13.000 combatants quoted in paragraph 2.9 of your report, is that a reliable figure? • A.: On the basis of information contained in these documents, it is a reliable figure; however, from that figure I deducted the number of the soldiers who might have been in the Sarajevo theatre of operations (15)participating in the lifting of the blockade of Sarajevo. So the figure has to be corrected; a deduction must be made. I'm not sure about that number of soldiers, but that was my assessment, so that the overall figure for Srebrenica would be approximately 8.000. • Q.: Let's move on, General, and let's talk about Operation Krivaja 95 (20)itself. Now, you said in your evidence that the main feature that had to be taken by VRS forces moving into the enclave was the Alibegovac feature, and you said that the route of advance for that particular objective was on the route of advance of the Romanija Brigade. Do you recall that? (25)
• A.: That was the 2nd Battalion, the 2nd Combat Group which took that
• Q.: Could you turn to page 31 of your report, and if you could read out the -- this is paragraph 4.3, and it's at the top of page 31. MR. CAYLEY: Sorry, Mr. Usher, it's page 31. (5) • Q.: General, do you have page 31 in front of you? • A.: Yes. • Q.: Could you read the first sentence of paragraph 4.3, please, General? Paragraph 4.3, the first sentence, please, General. • A.: If I may, I should like to ask, unless that is contrary to the (10)procedure here -- I have been testifying for 5 days already, and I have serious problems with my throat. Could you perhaps read it out and it can be recorded in the transcript, and I will answer your question, if that is at all possible? If I were not 61 years old, I would have long exhausted my powers of speech. (15)
• Q.: I can do that, General. "Engaged forces from the Birac and 2nd
Romanija Brigade encountered unexpectedly strong resistance on their
routes of advance and they were late in carrying out their immediate
task."
THE INTERPRETER: Could you please slow down? Thank you. MR. CAYLEY: I'm sorry. • Q.: "Q. So my question was, when you reached this position at Alibegovac, it was no serious conflict with your unit? (10) • A.: No." Same witness said: "Q. On the way to Kiprovo or, rather, Alibegovac, did you encounter any resistance by the Muslim forces?
• A.: We had some minor resistance at Kiprovo."
• A.: Yes, I did because, that is to say, we had a direction of
(20)movement. There was no resistance from Muslim forces, so that
we took control of that feature easily."
Now, you would agree with me, General, that two eyewitnesses, two
members of the VRS actually engaged in the operation to take Srebrenica,
would have a more accurate recollection than the opinion that you give
(25)here? You'd agree with me that when you say that there was unexpectedly
• A.: Sir, it is not a question, it is your assessment of my expert
report. That is your right. It is your right to make those assessments,
(5)and it is up to the -- Their Honours to assess what is correct with
respect to truth and what is correct with respect to conduct.
If the time from the line of development, that is to say, when the
operation was launched on the 6th up until the entry into Srebrenica, and
especially up until they reached the line of the assignment itself which
(10)was ordered in the order for active combat activities, if four days went
by and such a small depth of territory, then I don't understand why such a
short space of time took so long to pass if there was over -- if there was
no resistance.
I personally feel that when an army moves into the attack, it
(15)wants to arrive at the line of the assignment as soon as possible which
was defined in the order in spacial terms. This particular brigade, that
combat group made up of the units from those two brigades, was rather
late, lagged behind, rather.
And from the documents that I studied for this purpose, I did not
(20)-- unfortunately, I wrote my report before those witnesses testified
here, so I did not study those testimonies. But to tell you the truth,
the witness who saw that might have gained that impression; however, the
fact remains that these forces reached the -- their line of their
assignment only on the 10th. Why? Well, I think it was because of the
(25)resistance that was offered by the defenders; otherwise, they would have
JUDGE RIAD: General, of course this is an inference. This is your inference, which is logical, but could it happen that they took some time not to appear in the eyes of the world that there is an invasion? (5) • A.: Well, sir, I can't enter into that type of speculation, Your Honour, because it runs contrary to my logics, and my mental composition is that of a soldier so I can't enter into that form of speculation. That is not my realm of endeavour. JUDGE RIAD: Thank you. (10) MR. CAYLEY: Mr. Usher, if you could prepare Prosecutor's Exhibit 428. • Q.: Now, General, you stated in your evidence that it was obvious to you that the corps artillery did not take part in these activities in operation Krivaja 95. Do you recall that evidence? (15) • A.: Yes. To be quite precise, the corps artillery group and not the corps artillery. There was corps artillery. It was the corps artillery group. Although in the order for the corps artillery group there is that position, but as far as I know, it was not active. • Q.: Let's -- (20)
MR. CAYLEY: If we could turn, Mr. Usher, to page 3.
I'll summarise the document, Mr. President, because I have a lot
to refer to.
But it's at the bottom of page 5, Mr. Usher. The bottom of
page 5, the page that you have. Page 3. I'm sorry. Page 3, going on to
(25)page 4.
MR. CAYLEY: This, Your Honours, is the Krivaja 95 document, the order of General Zivanovic. (5)
• Q.: "5. Tasks of the units for separating and reducing the enclaves in
size." It then gives a task to the 1st Battalion and it states that the
1st Battalion, on the next page - if you go to the next page, Mr. Usher,
at the top - is to be supported by the corps artillery group.
If we then go down to the 2nd Battalion and its tasks, we see --
(10)and, Mr. Usher, if you could move that up.
Again we see to be supported by KAG, the corps artillery group, as
per plan and request.
If we then turn the page and we go to the next section which deals
with the Bratunac Light -- the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade forces, at
(15)the top, again, we see, at the top of the TV screen, to be supported by
KAG corps artillery group, as per plan and request.
If we go to the 1st Milici Light Infantry Brigade, we see to be
supported by corps artillery group, as per plan and request.
Then - if you can move that page up, please, Mr. Usher - in the
(20)launching of the attack -- and this is the general instruction just above
the artillery support section. In the launching of the attack, the forces
in direct contact to be supported by the artillery and by the corps
artillery group as per plan and request command post in the area of
Pribicevac.
(25)Then to summarise, in paragraph 6, it talks about the composition
• A.: Sir, no, for the simple reason - you don't have to know this, it's
(10)not your profession to - but when orders are issued, they are issued to
units. The corps artillery group is formed by its artillery platoon,
mixed -- regiment, I'm sorry, regiment, the 5th Mixed Artillery Regiment.
Had that Mixed Artillery Regiment had to be active, it would have been
stipulated here explicitly. The Commander of the regiment would have
(15)stated that he was forming a corps artillery group, and a corps artillery
group is formed from the Mixed Artillery Regiment, and parts of the Mixed
Artillery Regiment are attached to brigades where the activity is greatest
for them to be able to form their brigade artillery groups.
There was no need whatsoever for the corps artillery group to go
(20)into action because it was not an attack operation by the corps but,
rather, it was an operation for active combat activities of a tactical
level, and in that type of endeavour, the corps artillery does not make
part.
In part 4 which you read out -- I'm sorry, point 6 on page 4 of
(25)the document, point 6 that you read out, it says fire support and then --
• Q.: General, can you -- (10)
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Mr. Cayley, just one moment,
please. Perhaps this would be an opportune moment to take a break,
because I see that General Radinovic has been speaking for eight minutes
continuously, and I think he will need to rest his throat, his voice.
Also, General Radinovic, I should like to profit from the occasion
(15)to ask you to be more direct in your answers to questions. I do
understand that you know many things and that you have a need to express
them here, but if you try to go straight to the heart of the question,
answering the question directly, you will benefit and so will your
throat. So I think that you could perhaps try to do this. You said that
(20)you were having a throat problem, a problem with your voice.
So let's take a 20-minute break. And for everybody to be able to
plan ahead, we will be resuming at five minutes past twelve and go on
until ten minutes past one. At ten minutes past one, we will have our
40-minute break for lunch. So that is how we shall proceed. But let's
(25)take a 20-minute break now, General.
--- On resuming at 12.08 p.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Cayley. Please proceed. (5)General, have you had a rest? THE WITNESS: [Int.] Yes, thank you, Your Honour. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well. Let's proceed. MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President. Could Prosecutor's Exhibit 425 be placed on the ELMO, and I think (10)the General already has that document in front of him. And do we already have 428 on the ELMO? Yes. Keep that one to hand, 425; 428, if you leave on the ELMO. I'm sorry, 428 on the ELMO, and keep 425 in your hand. • Q.: General, do you have the first page of Prosecutor's Exhibit 425 in front of you? (15) • A.: Yes -- no. 425, yes, 425 I have. MR. CAYLEY: And again, Your Honours, this is the Krivaja 95 order from Zivanovic, the one that we've just been referring to before the break which contained all the references to the corps artillery group.
• Q.: General, I'm going to read, in order to save your voice, and I'm
(20)just going to read out where the order expresses, "To the commands of,"
and then it refers to all of the infantry brigades involved in the
operation, and then lastly it refers to the 5th Mixed Artillery Regiment,
the very unit that you stated would have had to have received this order
in order for a corps artillery group to be put together for this.
(25)Now, General, you would agree with me that General Zivanovic would
• A.: I can agree with you only in part. Had he had the intention to form it, he would have formed it and gave it, assigned it, fire positions, (5)reserve fire positions, and follow-up fire positions. And he would have stated its composition, that is to say, he would have ordered directly to the commander of the 5th Mixed Artillery Regiment to form a corps artillery group of the following composition, with the divisions and artillery pieces and everything else that the group would require; and on (10)the basis of that, the chief of artillery would have devised and drew up a plan for its action for preparation and for support. As I did not come across those documents, and they are the sole documents on the basis of which artillery fire can be opened as a planned action, so as I did not come across that in the documents that were made (15)available to me, I concluded that that plan of action was never compiled; and on the basis of that, I concluded that the corps artillery group was, in fact, not engaged at all. • Q.: General, General -- • A.: And in the order, orders are -- also include things that are not (20)realised, not implemented.
• Q.: General, you're going to have to trim down your answers because
otherwise we're going to be here for a very, very long time during this
cross-examination. So what I would like you to do is to answer my
questions directly when I put a direct question to you. I don't expect
(25)you to answer yes or no, you can give an explanation, but you don't need
MR. CAYLEY: It's on page 5, Mr. Usher. • Q.: And you can see at the bottom of the TV screen, General, it says, "During preparatory fire to neutralise the enemy targets as per plan for preparatory fire." Now, General, you would agree with me that when (15)General Zivanovic signed this order, he anticipated that there would be a plan for preparatory fire, even if you haven't seen it? • A.: Could I ask you to read point 7, the following point immediately after point 6? Could you read that point out, please, point 7. • Q.: "Anti-tank combat." (20) • A.: Yes.
• Q.: "In all units of company and battalion size, form an anti-tank
group and have it in readiness for combat against the enemy armoured
forces."
Now, General, answer my question first of all, and I'll repeat it,
(25)General. I'll repeat it to you, General. Would you agree with me that
• A.: In point 7, he stipulates the anti-tank combat although he knew (5)the Muslim forces in Srebrenica no possibility whatsoever to -- MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, please, I'm going to start insisting because now I'm getting far behind in my cross-examination. The witness is going to be here a very long time. I insist that he answers the question or declines to answer. (10) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Cayley. And we too are going to be lagging behind. General, could you please go directly to the question. If you don't agree, say you don't agree; or if you don't know, say you don't know, but please give us a direct answer, otherwise, we'll be going round (15)and round in circles. • A.: Mr. President, I am answering in the best way possible, as I deem fit for the question, and I have tried to indicate to Mr. Cayley, the distinguished Prosecutor, that the orders contain many things which are written down but never implemented in practice, and if we wish to get to (20)the end of the proceedings, we have to go back to basics.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] No, General. The question that
you were asked was at the level of not realisation but what was provided
for forecast, and what the Prosecutor asked you was that he -- actually,
he wanted to know whether this was forecast, envisaged, not if it was
(25)actually implemented and existed.
MR. CAYLEY: (5) • Q.: General, I will repeat the question for you. Would you agree with me that when General Zivanovic signed this order, he anticipated that there would be a plan for preparatory fire, even if you have not seen that plan, by the language in paragraph 6? • A.: No, he does not anticipate a plan. He approves a plan once a plan (10)has been compiled, but artillery fire was not planned nor the corps artillery went into effect. So my only conclusion, and that is the sole one I insist upon, is that the corps artillery group at Srebrenica was not active. We can spend a whole day discussing that, but it is my belief that the corps artillery (15)group was not active and I have sufficient arguments to bear that out. No plan of activity was found and a corps artillery group does not step into action without a plan. MR. CAYLEY: If we could move, please, to Prosecutor's Exhibit 77/1. (20) • Q.: Now, General --
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Just a moment, please,
Mr. Cayley.
I am going to insist upon this point. Now, at least in paragraph
6 was General Zivanovic mentioning -- did he make mention of a plan in
(25)para 6? Does General Zivanovic mention a plan?
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well. Please continue, Mr. Cayley. MR. CAYLEY: (5) • Q.: General, I'm going to go through -- I didn't intend doing this, but because of the progress that we're making, I have a whole series of UN military observers' reports. MR. CAYLEY: This is Prosecutor's Exhibit 77/1. The General won't be able to read them because they're in English and I don't intend reading (10)all of them, I just intend reading some extracts. If 77/1 could be placed on the ELMO, please. Yes. That's perfect. Mr. Usher, if you could move that document up. That's perfect.
• Q.: General, you're aware that there were a team of UN military
observers within the Srebrenica enclave and indeed you have referred to
(15)these UNMO reports in your evidence-in-chief to the Defence, and I think
you stated in your evidence-in-chief that these reports were unreliable
because they relied on Muslim information. What I will state to you from
the outset is that, in fact, these reports flag up whenever information
was received from the Muslims, and the UNMOs always stated in these
(20)reports that where the information had been received from Muslim forces it
was not confirmed because of the concern that they had about reliability,
and we'll see that in these reports as we go through them.
Let me read to you what happened or what they stated happened on
the 6th of July of 1995.
(25)"Team Srebrenica reported a Bosnian Serb army offensive launched
• A.: I did not claim that the artillery did not act. In my testimony, if I remember correctly, I said that I had information from reports from UN military observers and reports of the Dutch Battalion. Those reports (15)differ with respect to the number of assessed artillery action and their reliability as well. And if I recall, I said that the degree of -- as to the degree of reliability, I consider the reports of the Dutch Battalion to be more relevant because they did this work -- better quality work. Now, when I say that, what do I mean? They recorded explosions. They (20)recorded the explosions and informed of the number of explosions, detonations, and this can be -- • Q.: General, who is firing this artillery? Who is firing the guns into Srebrenica? How did these shells end up in Srebrenica that the UN military observers are recording? (25)
• A.: Shells did not only end up in Srebrenica, in the urban part, but
• Q.: Excuse me, sir. You're not answering the question. Who was firing the guns? (5) • A.: Those who had those guns. • Q.: And who was that, General? It was the Drina Corps, wasn't it, General? • A.: And the Drina Corps and the 28th Division, both. They had guns, too, and mortars. And in the number of identified explosions, there is no (10)data as to the structure of the explosions. They were -- incorporate all the explosions, the 82 millimetre, 120 millimetre, artillery, and gun mortars and shells. • Q.: So what you're saying is the 28th Division was firing from outside of the Srebrenica enclave into the enclave; is that what you're saying? (15)They were actually firing into Srebrenica township and into Potocari, is that -- they had artillery that was firing into the enclave? • A.: The data were not the craters themselves, but just the registered recorded explosions, detonations, not the craters. • Q.: General, you're not answering my question, and I'm going to keep (20)on interrupting you, until the President stops me, until you answer my question. Are you stating that the 28th Division was firing from outside of the enclave onto their own people? Is that what you're suggesting to the Court? (25)
• A.: No, no. I'm not saying that.
• A.: The Drina Corps fired fire positions and defence positions of the 28th Division in order to perform the assignments set by the order for (5)active combat in order to establish military control over the enclave. • Q.: And that was the corps artillery group, wasn't it, General? • A.: No, that was not the corps artillery group. They were, for the most part, for the most part -- I cannot assess here exactly. For us to know that, we would have to do an on-the-spot examination to examine the (10)craters and the shrapnel. • Q.: Who was running this artillery; which brigades of the Drina Corps?
• A.: I personally feel that, in the most number of cases, it was the
fire groups of the battalions who were within the composition of the
forces engaged in active combat, which means fire groups of the battalions
(15)mostly.
And as testified to by one of the UN observers, he said that they
were two shells, 155 millimetres, on the 10th of July. I personally think
that they were tank shells and not the 155 millimetre shells because the
corps artillery group did not go into action, and a similar impression is
(20)left by cannon shells or tank shells. So they registered the detonations,
the explosions. They didn't do an on-the-spot examination to ascertain
what shell and the type of projectile that was in fact used.
So I think that the testimony by the Dutch Battalion is more
reliable, although the figures for the shells fired, from the Dutch
(25)reports, is greater than this.
• A.: I am saying that the largest number, and don't keep repeating -- (5)repeat the answers; I have said it. Most of -- when, when the structure of the detonations, the explosions, from the Dutch Battalion report, and I deduced that there were 1.323 over a period of six days. And if we look at the relationship between action and reaction, 1:3, then this means that they were about 1.223 detonations. (10) • Q.: If you can't answer the question, we'll move on to the next report. We're now looking at the 7th of July, "Team Srebrenica reported --" MR. CAYLEY: This is Exhibit 77/3, Mr. Usher. (15)
• Q.: "Team Srebrenica reported that the Bosnian Serb army continued
their offensive on the enclave with heavy weapons since early this
morning. DutchBat reported heavy shelling around their compound in
Potocari and, as a result, three men were injured and brought by Medicins
Sans Frontieres to the hospital. UNMOs confirm this. At 1000 hours,
(20)unconfirmed reports indicated that the Bosnian Serb army are regrouping
around former OP Echo, Company Hill in Bratunac. At 1000 hours, two
shells landed in Srebrenica village, but no one was wounded. At 1100
hours, four shells landed in Potocari, no injuries. At 1500 hours, three
shells landed in Srebrenica and injured two men. One was picked up by our
(25)patrol and another one by Medicins Sans Frontieres, but he died on arrival
• A.: I did not claim, and I repeat that, I did not claim that there was (15)no artillery action. I said that it was not action by the corps artillery group. That is my assertion; that is what I claim. That there was artillery activity, I agree, studying the documents, and artillery activities could have been expected with active combat. How can you have it without fire preparation, preparatory fire? (20)And that was reduced to the battalion fire groups and perhaps some artillery pieces from the artillery of the brigade, but not from the corps.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Mr. Cayley, just a moment,
please.
(25)General, in the analysis -- in your analyses of the documents,
• A.: In answer to your question, what I can say is the following: I (10)can give you an answer of principle but not of practice because I was not on the spot for me to be able to know. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, I'm asking in general terms. • A.: I personally think that they were, yes. According to military (15)doctrine, if inhabited areas were prepared for defence and that military action came from them, then they are legitimate military targets, and I think personally that Mr. Butler confirmed that in his testimony and report as well. He did not contest the legitimacy of the military actions once a decision had been made for that action to be launched. (20) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] My question was perhaps a little too general. For example, the fact that you didn't see an artillery plan, does that necessarily mean that one -- that the artillery did not exist or not?
• A.: No, I did not say that the artillery did exist but the corps
(25)artillery did not step into action. There was no activity of corps
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well. So it did not intervene, but you accept that there was artillery. To whom did that artillery belong, the artillery that did intervene? To whom did it (5)belong? • A.: The battalions in contact and the brigades in whose zones of responsibility it occurred. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Those battalions and those brigades, to which army did they belong? (10) • A.: The army of Republika Srpska. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Okay. I'm not going to insist further on, but I hope I will have another opportunity to develop a little bit this question, to know whether the rules were indeed respected in practice. (15)You have told us that not all of the procedures were always applied and respected, but I think we can remain at that for the time being, and I will raise the issue perhaps once again at some other opportunity. Mr. Cayley, please continue. (20) MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President. • Q.: We'll move on to the 8th of July, General. There are many, many of these reports. I'm not going to go through all of them. I'm going to go through perhaps half a dozen. "8th of July. Shelling started in Srebrenica this morning" -- (25)
MR. CAYLEY: I'm sorry, Mr. Usher. It's 77/6.
• Q.: General, the Alibegovac feature was the principal first target of the Romanija Brigade, of the 1st Echelon Forces? • A.: Yes. (5) • Q.: And that, General, was in the south of the enclave, wasn't it? • A.: Yes. • Q.: And this report, General, indicates that on the 8th of July, all of the highly-populated areas, Potocari in the centre of the enclave, were being shelled. You'd agree with me, General, that the Potocari township (10)and Srebrenica itself are not on the Alibegovac feature, are they?
• A.: Yes, sir, but you will also have to agree with me when I say that
military action is not conducted in the way you think it is conducted.
You have to put up a certain show of force in order to avoid intervention
from the forces from that direction towards the main line of advance, the
(15)main line of attack. You have to provide a fire support on certain other
lines.
Had the forces appeared from the direction of Potocari towards
Alibegovac, then the number of losses and the destruction in that area
would be far greater.
(20)It is now debatable as to what is better, but that is the part of
the military doctrine. A commander undertakes tactical activities,
tactical steps which are intended to prevent action from the enemy. Those
are activities for the purposes of show of force which are put up in order
to avoid the enemy forces to appear on the main line of attack, and that
(25)is how military action is conducted. That is how warfare is being
• Q.: If we can move now, General, to the 9th of July. JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me, General. Even if it's full of civilians? (5)You say it's a principle of warfare, even if there is no military activity, to avoid attack of the enemy. Even if civilians are there? • A.: No, Your Honour, that is not what I said. I said that what we commonly refer to as collateral damage is something that is, unfortunately, unavoidable in any war. So when targeting a military (10)target, or an assumed military target, an erroneous assessment can be made. There are unfortunate incidents of targeting hospitals. NATO probably didn't wish to target hospitals in Belgrade, but it did hit them. But that's war. That's how things happen. Or perhaps the settlement in Aleksinac or that train which happened to be on the bridge (15)which was targeted. I'm perfectly sure it was not the intention of the NATO to shell those targets and that intention cannot be imputed to them, but that is a kind of risk is understood, which is implied in any war. JUDGE RIAD: Thank you. MR. CAYLEY: (20) • Q.: General, I think you said in your evidence to Mr. Visnjic that the operation to take the Srebrenica enclave essentially was completed on the night of the 9th of July, morning of the 10th of July; is that right? The Alibegovac feature was taken at that point in time, from your assessment?
• A.: There may have been an error in interpretation. I didn't say that
(25)the operation of the takeover of Srebrenica was completed but that the
(5) • Q.: And that was completed by the night of the 9th of July? • A.: Well, on the 9th or -- I don't have a precise piece of information, but my estimate is that it took place sometime in the evening hours of the 9th, but that perhaps is a date -- is information that could be contested, but I will take that risk. My assessment is that it took (10)place in the evening of the 9th. • Q.: Let me read to you the report --
MR. CAYLEY: This is 77/12, Mr. Usher. We can put that on the
ELMO. This is the UNMO report from that day, from the 10th of July.
"Shelling is still going on in Srebrenica. Up till now, we UNMOs
(15)confirm from the morning over 100 detonations. 0930 about eight rockets
were fired from," and then it gives a grid reference, "in the direction of
Srebrenica. Then at 1255 on the 10th of July, two heavy shells, probably
155-millimetre shells, hit the direct surroundings of the hospital at
1100 hours. All the windows are smashed and shrapnel has showered the
(20)rooms and walls of the hospital. The surgery is very difficult to
proceed. The number of casualties and wounded we don't know yet, but we
will inform you as soon as possible. It looks as if the Bosnian Serb army
are now targeting the hospital and the surroundings."
And then a further report, and this is 77/14, Mr. Usher.
(25)Mr. Usher, don't worry, we'll leave that one. Don't worry about 77/14,
• Q.: General, based on your theory of events that by the evening of the 9th of July the enclave had been deactivated and neutralised, militarily speaking, why would the Drina Corps shell the hospital if by that time, by (5)the 10th of July, in your evidence, the enclave had been deactivated? • A.: Well, I really couldn't answer your question because I'm not familiar with the context in which it took place. It is possible that the target was something else and that it was missed, whoever was operating the artillery piece. It is possible for a very precise projectile to miss (10)the target, let alone an artillery piece. • Q.: General -- • A.: It is very highly probable for such a thing to occur in any war. • Q.: General, in your own words, you stated that by the evening of the 9th of July, the enclave had been neutralised; it had been deactivated (15)from a military point of view. Why did the Bosnian Serb army shell the hospital in Srebrenica on the 10th if there was no longer a military threat?
• A.: There was probably some kind of counter-attack from Srebrenica
because, as you know, the 28th Division gathered in the area of Susnjari
(20)and Jaglici on the 11th. Up until then, its brigades and parts of its
brigades were still probably somewhere in the area. Their movement was
observed, and I'm sure that there was need to continue action towards
certain resistance points which were still active at the time.
I didn't say that the enclave was captured; I said that conditions
(25)were created for its deactivation and for the takeover of the dominant
MR. CAYLEY: Mr. Usher, if you could -- Prosecutor's Exhibit 30, paragraph 283 of that report. • Q.: And this is the Secretary-General's report, General, 10th of (5)July. "The Bosnian Serb army continued to shell the town throughout the day. B Company also reported a number of fire fights between the Bosnian army and the Bosnian Serb army at various locations. UNHCR reported that an estimated 2.000 civilians had begun to gather around the hospital, hoping that its special status might protect them from Serb fire. UNHCR (10)also reported that by approximately 1300 hours, six civilians had been killed and 23 wounded as a result of the shelling. Between around 1100 hours and 1800 hours, however, the Bosnian Serb army did not fire directly at UNPROFOR blocking positions." General, there were 2.000 civilians gathered around the hospital, (15)and the Bosnian Serb army opened fire with heavy artillery on that hospital. Do you think that was an accident? • A.: Yes, I think it was an accident. Were there any fatalities in that action? I don't think so. • Q.: Six civilians killed, General. (20) • A.: What I was saying to you all the time, and after all, that is the subject of this report, was that the activities were still ongoing and that it could only be expected for such activities to take place until -- up until such a time as the enemy forces are still active.
• Q.: General, on the 11th of July, 5.000 civilians were gathered in the
(25)town of Srebrenica around Bravo Company, around the UN compound. 5.000
• A.: I read this in the Secretary-General's report, and I do not have any reasons not to believe that. However, those are consequences of war activities which take place everywhere, which took place everywhere in Bosnia and Herzegovina, anywhere in the world. In Yugoslavia, we had (10)2.500 killed civilians and 400 killed soldiers, so many more civilians than soldiers, and civilians were not the target of the military action. That's what happens in any war. This is not something that I can justify, but you have to understand that it is a perfectly normal consequence of a war. War is also a misfortune, and it is always the (15)greatest misfortune for the civilians who always suffer most. • Q.: General, the reason that the Bosnian Serb army went on shelling is because they wanted to frighten the population, didn't they? • A.: Well, you're not asking me questions, you're putting things to me. I cannot agree with you, no, because that was not the objective of the (20)operation. • Q.: General, do you recall in your evidence that you said that none of the UN protection force positions were the object of attack? Do you recall that in your evidence?
• A.: Yes, I was speaking in principle. I said that the UN was not the
(25)target, was not the objective of the attack; and that was indeed contained
JUDGE RIAD: But to your knowledge, was the UN compound which was shelled, was it close to any military target, any military which -- where (10)the Muslim army was, 28th Division was, to your knowledge? Was it close by? Or usually the official UN compound was rather isolated. • A.: I cannot give you a specific answer for specific checkpoints, but the Muslim positions were immediately behind the lines which were held by the Dutch Battalion. As to specific checkpoints, I don't know, but I know (15)that a certain amount of military cunningness is necessary. It would have been perfectly normal for the 28th Division to have parts of its force deployed around UNPROFOR positions because those were the most protected points, and it was only to be expected that those would be the places of the lowest intensity. (20)As far as I know, UNPROFOR checkpoints were not the target. As to whether they were exposed to a certain amount of danger during the activities that were being conducted against the Muslim forces, that, to me, again, constitutes a very likeable consequence of -- a very likely consequence of the tactics. (25)
JUDGE RIAD: Is there any indication that the UN, the UN compound
• A.: For example, I have a piece of information, and I consider it to be reliable, that in the post office building, in the basement, was the centre of communications of the 28th Division; and so towards that feature (5)there was probably action on the part of the VRS. It probably did. But now, whether it was a post -- in a post office or in another feature, that is negligible for a general assessment, but I just quote it as information, as an example. In an inhabited area, military targets cannot be completely (10)outside and divorced from civilian facilities. And of course, the civilian features and facilities also are in jeopardy, and this -- and there I include the UN, as well, forces. And the worst thing is the unprotected civilians. That is the worst consequence of wars of this type waged on a small area where the parties are mixed; the fronts are mixed, (15)they are taken control over by one side and then another, and that is the whole unfortunate characteristic of small wars and wars of this kind. MR. CAYLEY:
• Q.: General, let's go straight back to what His Honour Judge Riad was
speaking about. The Judges have heard evidence from many of the Dutch
(20)personnel who were in the enclave at the time, and Major Franken, who was
the Deputy Commander, was asked questions by myself about the shelling
that took place on the 10th and 11th of July, and he said the following.
This is my question:
"Q. You said at the beginning of the answer to my question
(25)that you heard reports of pretty massive shelling of the city,
• A.: That's correct. • Q.: Why was there --" (5) THE INTERPRETER: Would you please slow down for the translation. Thank you. MR. CAYLEY: I'm sorry. • Q.: "Q. Why was there shelling of the city taking place? • A.: It's strange you ask me that question, but there was not (10)any military objective other than the so-called telegraph post and telegraph building where a part of the headquarters of the 28th Division was. But that was not in the city, that was in the northern part of the city. The city itself did not give any military objective in that stage, other than, of course, (15)the UN forces. But then again, it was at random shooting at the city. • Q.: From your recollection, what was the calibre of the artillery and mortars? And if you can remember to pause between my question and answer, I'll try to go more slowly (20)myself. • A.: Mainly it was bigger calibres of around --" And then the transcript is not clear. "I did deduce from that the explosions we heard and we saw, so it was heavy artillery. (25)
• Q.: Any other weapons being used, Major Franken, apart from
• A.: Tanks were used, not only on the positions of our own forces, but also used to shoot into area of the city." The witness then states, and I won't read all of it, that B Company (5)counted 200 shells. I finally asked him: "Q. Now, you stated in an earlier response that there was no military objective by this stage that would require this level of firing, and I'll ask you the question again. In your opinion, what was the reason for this very heavy shelling? (10) • A.: There could have been two reasons, but it was the same effect: killing people, or trying to raise a panic by killing people. And I mean by `people' civilians, women and children." Now, General, you have already stated that you regard the Dutch (15)evidence as reliable information, and you would agree with me, wouldn't you, that a man, a professional army officer of 30 years' experience on the ground in the enclave at the time, would have a better idea than you about the reason for the continuous artillery shelling on the 10th and 11th of July? (20)
• A.: About the reason -- that it was more jeopardised and that he was
on the spot, yes; but as to the reason, I cannot support you in your
opinion there that he knew that better than me. I can know better what
the reason was. Whether the VRS -- or rather, those who opened fire,
whether they knew where the 28th Division was located on the 10th and
(25)11th, they did not know. And up until the time that all contact was --
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] General, I apologise for (10)interrupting, I would like to ask something now. Why do you say that no officer would have ordered that? Why do you say that? What is the basis for your assertion? Because it's the rule, is that all? Because it's the rule or do you have any special information in that regard? (15) • A.: Well, first of all, it is the rule, yes. And everybody is trained to apply that rule. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes. You spoke of ethics, General. So for military rules, for military honour, to say that no officer would have ordered that? (20) • A.: Yes. And apart from that, I also had numerous interviews with people who took part in the operation, and I asked them precisely about that problem. In asking them about that, my answer was that nobody had done that.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Very well, General. You said
(25)the officers of the VRS. Now, having seen everything that you have seen
• A.: That there were executions. Not on the part of the leaders and commanders of army of Republika Srpska, officers that command the battalions, brigades, and corps. Unfortunately, I do know that there were (5)executions, but that was not done by the system of command of the Drina Corps. They were not responsible for that. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] You said that no officer of the VRS did so. Now I'm asking you the question why, if you admit that there were executions, why is that principle valid for the questions of (10)executions, that is, that no officer could have done anything like that? You say that on the other hand. • A.: Well, I don't know who did it. I can't answer that question. I consider that the officers of the army of Republika Srpska were not allowed to do so and did not do so, but who did do so, I do not know. (15) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well. That means that in your opinion, the executions were implemented by somebody who was -- who could never have belonged to the VRS. Is that what you're telling us? Is that what you're saying? • A.: Perhaps they did belong to the VRS. Perhaps they did or perhaps (20)there were some other forces which were not in the composition and under the control of the Drina Corps. We're talking about the responsibility of the Drina Corps, the accountability of the Drina Corps.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Shall we -- we're not going to
continue. It is ten minutes past one, and I think the time has come to
(25)take a lunch break.
(10) --- Recess taken at 1.10 p.m. --- On resuming at 2.05 p.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Cayley, please proceed. MR. CAYLEY: Good afternoon, Mr. President, Your Honours. • Q.: Good afternoon, General. (15) • A.: Good afternoon. • Q.: General, prior to the break we were just addressing, as you can recall, the VRS artillery campaign into the enclave, and you said in your evidence in response to Mr. Visnjic's question that UNPROFOR positions were not directly attacked by Bosnian Serb forces. Do you recall that? (20) • A.: Yes. As far as my knowledge goes. • Q.: Now, General, you have in fact used as part of your reference material the Dutch debriefing report, haven't you? • A.: Yes.
MR. CAYLEY: And if, for the purposes of the ELMO because it's in
(25)English, Prosecutor 404, tab 20, Madam Registrar.
• Q.: Now, General, I'll read this paragraph to you, 3.11: "In the early afternoon at around 1300 hours, two artillery shells exploded near (5)to OP Foxtrot. Shortly afterwards, the OP came under direct fire from two Bosnian Serb army tanks. The tower of the observation post upon which the TOW anti-tank weapon was mounted was damaged. Through a liaison, the battalion requested an explanation from the Bosnian Serb army. However, the Bosnian Serb army required a written report of the incident probably (10)as a stalling tactic." MR. CAYLEY: And then, Mr. Usher, if we could have 3.14, which is page 23, placed on the ELMO. 3.14, that's page 23. I think you have 3.17. It would be the page before. Perfect.
• Q.: "On the morning of Saturday 8 July, the weather conditions were
(15)misty. There was only sporadic firing. At around 12.30 hours, the crew
of OP Foxtrot reported that they were under fire. Shells were exploding
at a short distance from the observation post. At 1345 hours, the
observation post received a direct hit from a tank, and the right front
side of the protective wall collapsed. A few minutes later, the wall
(20)received two more direct hits."
Now, General, there are a number of other references in that
report to direct attacks on UN observation posts which I won't refer you
to, but you would agree with me that, based on this material, in fact the
UN protection forces within the enclave did come under direct attack from
(25)the Bosnian Serb army, didn't they?
• Q.: General, you're a military man. If something is directly hit, such as a tower from an observation post, wouldn't you agree with me that (10)somebody would have to actually target that tower in order to hit it? • A.: Well, I could agree with you there. Of course, it can be hit by mistake or it can be targeted and hit as a result of the targeting. • Q.: Let's move on, General, to -- MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could be given Prosecutor's (15)Exhibit 425. Page 14 of the English version, and for the General it would be page 11, the final page. Mr. Usher, if you could move the exhibit upwards.
• Q.: Now, General, this you will recall is the directive 7 signed by
Radovan Karadzic, and in paragraph 6 of that document, he states support
(20)for combat operations, and the portion is highlighted on the ELMO.
"The relevant state and military organs responsible for work with
UNPROFOR and humanitarian organisations shall, through the planned and
unobtrusively restrictive issuing of permits, reduce and limit the
logistics support of UNPROFOR to the enclaves and the supply of material
(25)resources to the Muslim population, making them dependent on our goodwill
• A.: The Drina Corps did not deal with those issues. It did not come under the competence of the Drina Corps, the permission or lack of it or reducing the entrance, restricting this. That was something that the Main (10)Staff did. • Q.: That is not the question that I asked you. So I will repeat the question. I won't repeat the material. Would you agree with me, General, that that particular directive from the Supreme Commander of the VRS is a directive to strangle the resources available to UN Protection Forces (15)within the enclave of Srebrenica? • A.: This refers rather to the superior support of UNPROFOR to the forces of the 28th Division because from the resources that were brought into the enclave, part of that was siphoned off to the funds of the 28th Division. (20) THE REGISTRAR: There seems to be a problem with the speakers and I have someone coming to look at that. MR. CAYLEY: I'll carry on, Mr. President. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes. Let's continue now. MR. CAYLEY: (25)
• Q.: But, General, specifically this language actually refers to
• A.: But in wars of the type carried on in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in (5)and around Srebrenica, the army quite simply was in direct contact and closely integrated with the population with respect to the bases and supplies. And, unfortunately, and I say unfortunately, that too is a consequence of wars of this type which must be incorporated into our calculations when we consider the consequences of war and combat action. (10)Unfortunately, that is something which naturally attends wars of this kind. It is not a specific feature of Srebrenica. It was something that was -- that happened on the whole -- the entire battlefield of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Where the army is, there you will find the population too. And if you wish to restrict the material resources of the army in (15)the sense of combat resources, then you're also, by implication, restricting civilians, and this cannot be avoided. All that falls within the domain of what we refer to colloquially as collateral damage. Unfortunately, that is so.
• Q.: Now, General, you stated in your evidence-in-chief, and indeed I
(20)think within your report, that the UN Protection Forces did have
sufficient material at its disposal to prevent the Krivaja 95 operation
and compel the belligerents to respect the safe area.
Now, you would agree with me that if the Bosnian Serbs were
systematically strangling the resources that were available to the
(25)UN Protection Forces, the UN Protection Forces would be unable to defend
• A.: You didn't understand me properly. That's not what I thought, even if I said it. What I said was that UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina had the possibility of preventing operation Krivaja 95. Within the (5)frameworks of the overall responsibility of UNPROFOR, the Dutch Battalion had to have prevented the actions of the 28th Division which triggered off the operation Krivaja 95. I did not mean to say that the Dutch Battalion should have opposed the VRS by fighting, by engaging in combat and to keep them within the enclave. What I thought was that it should have secured a (10)strict respect for the May 1993 agreements with respect to demilitarisation and the absence of all forms of military activities from the enclave geared towards the VRS and then -- and it would have no reasons or arguments to launch a counter-offensive. As things stood, it gained the legitimate right of preventing (15)military activities which were not prevented by the Dutch Battalion. And the Dutch Battalion for that mission, for its motion mission, did not only rely upon its own resources, but they had at their disposal the entire mechanism of the United Nations. So it was in that sense that I was addressing the portion of responsibility for that battalion, not that it (20)did not engage in combat and stand up to the VRS in that way. • Q.: Did the Dutch Battalion themselves within the enclave have sufficient resources to resist the Bosnian Serb advance into Srebrenica?
• A.: No, nor should they have resisted the Bosnian Serb army. They
should have prevented the operation from taking place, and the best
(25)prevention would have been not to allow the 28th Division to violate the
• Q.: And you agree with me that the Bosnian Serb army essentially prevented military materiel from getting to UNPROFOR within the enclave by (5)preventing convoys from entering the enclave? • A.: I don't know if it prevented this, if it did prevent it. I think that the convoys -- that the supply system of UNPROFOR was a highly elaborate one, and whether this happened at that period of time, I don't know. I have the testimony, I read it myself, but I do allow for the fact (10)that there were restrictions in that respect. But as far as the Drina Corps was concerned, that wasn't its competency. • Q.: Now, General, Colonel Karremans, who was the commanding officer of the Dutch Battalion, testified in video-recorded testimony in this courtroom, and I won't read all of his evidence, but that in essence, the (15)Bosnian Serb army prevented from entering the enclave replacement military personnel, military equipment, ammunition, food, spare parts for equipment. Now, you'd agree with me that the commanding officer of the Dutch Battalion would know better than you whether or not the Bosnian Serb army (20)was preventing military materiel from getting into the enclave. • A.: Yes, but I would ask -- I would put the question in a different way, Mr. Cayley. Why did the battalion of the commander of the Dutch Battalion, why did he not, by the UN mechanism --
• Q.: General, answer my question, and I'll repeat it for you. If you
(25)don't want to answer it, just say, "I do not wish to answer."
MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, I see in the (5)transcript that the General has answered that question. That was his first word, and this was an addition, as I understood it. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Visnjic, you are saying that the General has already answered? MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, line 24, page 63, the (10)answer -- first word is the answer to the question, and after that we have the General's comment. Now, if Mr. Cayley isn't satisfied with the length of the answer, then that's another problem entirely; but if we're talking about whether he answered or not, I think he did answer. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] If you are talking about line (15)24, are you talking about page 63, line 24? Is that it, "yes"? MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Yes, that's it, Your Honour. MR. CAYLEY: Your Honour, we can move on, really. The General wanted me to formulate the question in a different way. I'll move on. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well, please proceed. (20) MR. CAYLEY:
• Q.: General, are you aware that a threat was made to the Dutch
Battalion that if there were further air strikes, that the Bosnian Serb
army around Srebrenica would shell the Potocari compound and the
surrounding area where there were located 25 to 30.000 civilians? Are you
(25)aware of that, General?
MR. CAYLEY: If I could have Prosecutor's Exhibit 77/18. • Q.: Now, General, you stated a moment ago that NATO, UNPROFOR forces, had at its disposal the necessary force to prevent further action, and in (10)that one could refer to the air strikes. Now, the air strikes were made as a warning to the Bosnian Serbs. And in response - and I'll read this report, 77/18; this is an UNMO report - "The town is in the hands of the Bosnian Serb army by now and the latest ultimatum given by the Bosnian Serb army is that if the air (15)strikes continue, everything inside the enclave will be bombed, also UNPROFOR and the other UN organisations." General, do you regard that as a lawful threat by the Bosnian Serb army? • A.: I consider it a threat, but not a lawful one, and luckily that threat was never acted upon, although NATO did act. (20) • Q.: How could the Dutch Battalion defend all those people with that kind of threat hanging over them?
• A.: Sir, in response to your question, I have answered several times:
It is not -- it was not a threat when the operation was concluded. But
they should have prevented the operation from taking place at all, and the
(25)Dutch Battalion, within the composition of the overall mechanism of the
MR. CAYLEY: If we could have Defence Exhibit 160, please. • Q.: General, are you also aware - and in fact Colonel Karremans (10)testified to this - that the Bosnian Serb army at the same time threatened to execute 32 Dutch UNPROFOR soldiers if the airstrikes continued? Are you aware of that? • A.: No, I'm not aware of that. I don't know about that threat. • Q.: Do you have your report in front of you? (15) • A.: Yes. • Q.: Page 32. Now, General, I'll paraphrase paragraph 4.9 of your report, but in essence you say in that section of your report that "One undermanned battalion could not cushion the hatred of the Muslims towards the Serbs and vice versa," and then you state to the Secretary-General's (20)report where it was acknowledged that the Dutch forces sent into Srebrenica were insufficient to do the job. So you yourself, in your report, accept the fact that the Dutch forces were woefully inadequate in order to meet the threat from outside, from the Bosnian Serbs? (25)
• A.: No. No. You didn't interpret the context of my assertion
• Q.: Thank you so much, General. Let's move on to page 40 of your report in English, page 41 in the B/C/S. Could you read paragraph 6.3 of your report, please. (20) • A.: Mr. Cayley, I asked you if you could read portions of the text instead of me. I mean, if you want me to read this one I will do that for you, but I kindly asked you if it would be possible for you to read it out for me.
• Q.: You need to save your voice, General. I can see that. I'll read
(25)it.
• A.: Yes; otherwise, I wouldn't have written it.
• Q.: Now, General, I'm going to quote very briefly from General
Dannatt -- Major-General Dannatt's testimony who you studied, the British
divisional commander who testified before Their Honours, and he said the
(10)following in respect of a group of civilians who gathers in a small
location which is occupied by a military force. This was his
understanding as a divisional commander. He said: "Well, under the
Geneva Conventions, the military are obliged to assume certain
responsibilities for civilians when those civilians can no longer look
(15)after themselves. When their own civilian, municipal, or government
structure can no longer look after them, then it falls to the military to
carry out that function, and the minimum requirements of that function
should be to provide food, water, shelter, and medical support."
He then stated: "The status of those civilians under the Geneva
(20)Conventions becomes one of protected persons because, by definition, they
can no longer protect themselves. They can no longer look after
themselves. Therefore, from a military point of view, like it or not,
then you have this duty of care which by the Geneva Convention is invested
upon you and you must do the things I have just described; food, shelter,
(25)water, and medical care and freedom from harassment and the basic
(5) • A.: In principle, of course I do. However, the context is completely different and the situation in point is completely different from the one which was analysed by General Dannatt quite legitimately. It is, of course, something that has to be applied if you have appropriate conditions to carry it out. But if you take an army such as was the VRS, (10)which had one-half of a small pate as a daily ration for a soldier, that is the army which didn't have enough resources, didn't have enough logistics, but an army which was based on donations, which is quite ridiculous for an army that is engaged in warfare. Municipal authorities had an obligation to supply their soldiers, (15)and they completely -- they were completely dependent on the goodwill of such authorities. I do not justify any ill-treatment towards civilians, whatever side they may be on, but unfortunately, once again, this is this most unfortunate consequence of any war. The civilians are the most (20)vulnerable, the most exposed ones, despite the lofty formulations contained in relevant conventions. And such was the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina in general, and in particular, in Srebrenica. • Q.: And because they were vulnerable, General, is the very reason why armies have to take special care of civilians, isn't it? (25)
• A.: Yes, of course. If they can; if they're able to do so. But one
(15) • Q.: General, can you turn to paragraph 6.6 of your report on page -- I'm sorry, it is page 59 of your report and page 60 in the B/C/S version. MR. CAYLEY: It's paragraph 3.22. That's fine, Mr. Usher. • Q.: Do you have that, General? It's the final sentence of paragraph 3.22. It's page 60. Do you have that in front of you, General? (20) • A.: Yes.
• Q.: And I will read it: "All facts indicate that the commander of the
Bosnian Serb Main Staff relieved the Drina Corps headquarters of the
obligation to plan and carry out the operation of the movement of
population from Srebrenica."
(25)That is your opinion, is it, in respect of the movement of the
• A.: It's not only my opinion, it's a conclusion that I reached on the basis of everything that I had studied in that respect, including my personal contact with the people who were involved in the process, in the (5)procedure. • Q.: General, would you agree with me that in order to move 25 to 30.000 people a distance, I think, of about 60 or 70 kilometres is quite a formidable task? • A.: Yes, yes, indeed. (10) • Q.: And you would agree with me that it actually does require some kind of organisation, doesn't it? It doesn't just happen. • A.: Yes, but here we're talking about an ad hoc kind of organisation, not a planned one. It would have been planned in a different way. • Q.: Would you agree with me that in order for an army to do it (15)properly, it would need the involvement of the operation staff, of the transportation staff? They would at least have to be involved in some manner in order to organise this transport for 25.000 to 30.000 people. • A.: It wasn't only the army that took part in that. You have the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of the Interior, the government, the (20)United Nations mechanism, including Mr. Akashi, the Dutch Battalion. Everybody was involved in the execution of that task because it appeared suddenly, and it was a rather complex task. MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could be shown Prosecutor's Exhibit 436, please. (25)
• Q.: Now, General, I'm not going to read this order out, but it is an
• A.: It wasn't signed by anyone, but I assume that it was signed in the original, and that is the commander of the Drina Corps. • Q.: So General Zivanovic is ordering the buses for the movement of the population? (10) • A.: Yes, but only the buses that were the property of his brigades. But there is also a request for buses issued by the Main Staff of the VRS, the Ministry of Defence, and the government of Republika Srpska. It was a general problem, not only the problem of the Drina Corps. And the first ones who were able to react were those who had the vehicles, that is, the (15)brigades of the Drina Corps. So that was mobilised by the Corps Commander because he headed there immediately. That is the first -- • Q.: General -- • A.: -- time that we see documents mentioning this particular issue. • Q.: General, if the Drina Corps Commander is ordering buses for the (20)evacuation of the population, it's completely incorrect, isn't it, to say that the VRS Main Staff relieved the Drina Corps headquarters of all obligations to carry out the operation for the movement of the population? That would be completely incorrect, wouldn't it, that assertion, based on this order? (25)
• A.: No, you're not right. The Drina Corps had an obligation to
• Q.: General, evidence has been given by a Dutch officer before this courtroom that not only was General Zivanovic engaged in this operation, (10)but also Lieutenant Colonel Kosoric, who was the chief of intelligence of the Drina Corps. Are you aware that Lieutenant Colonel Kosoric led the first convoy of civilians out of Potocari on the 12th of July, 1995? • A.: In response to your previous question, I stated, and I'm going to repeat that, the operation of the moving out of the civilian population (15)from Srebrenica -- • Q.: General, General -- • A.: -- was not the responsibility of the Drina Corps. • Q.: Are you aware that Lieutenant Colonel Kosoric led out the first convoy of civilians? (20) MR. CAYLEY: And, Your Honours, and this is the evidence of Witness B, a Dutch officer who was present at the two meetings in Bratunac on the 11th and 12th of July of 1995.
• Q.: That witness identified Lieutenant Colonel Kosoric, a Drina Corps
staff officer, as the man who led out the first convoy of civilians out of
(25)Potocari. Are you aware of that fact, General? That is the question that
• A.: I don't know. I'm not familiar with that particular fact. But even if I did know that, it wouldn't affect the basic sense of my conclusion in any way. It was possible for any officer of the VRS to have (5)led the first convoy out of the enclave, but the operation itself was the responsibility of the Main Staff. • Q.: So at this point in time, General, we have two officers of the Drina Corps, the Commander and the Chief of Intelligence, one of whom who is proven by an order to have ordered buses, the other one led out the (10)first convoy. Do you still maintain that the Drina Corps headquarters had been relieved of all obligations in respect of carrying out the movement of the population from Srebrenica? • A.: Yes, absolutely. I still maintain that the Drina Corps headquarters were not involved in the operation. The staff of the Drina (15)Corps at the time of that operation was involved in something completely different, that is, the preparation for the Zepa operation. MR. CAYLEY: If I could have Prosecutor's Exhibit 435, please. If that could be placed on the ELMO. • Q.: General, this is an intercepted radio communication dated the (20)12th of July between somebody called Krstic and Lieutenant Colonel Krsmanovic, and the conversation I will read goes as follows: (K.:) Hello, that Krsmanovic? (X.:) Yes, go ahead. (K.:) Listen! Write this down! (25)
(X.:) Yes.
(X.:) At 1700 hours at the Bratunac stadium. (5) (K.:) Very sure this is done! Is that clear? (X.:) Understood. (K.:) Go ahead." MR. CAYLEY: This exhibit is bis, I'm just told. I'm sorry. So 435 bis. (10) • Q.: General, this is an intercepted radio communication in which General Krstic is requesting the chief of transportation of the Drina Corps to organise 50 buses. Now, you would agree with me, if General Zivanovic, General Krstic, Lieutenant Colonel Kosoric, and Lieutenant Colonel Krsmanovic were all involved in this operation to move (15)30.000 people out of Srebrenica, it is completely incorrect to suggest to this Court that the Drina Corps headquarters had been relieved of all obligations to plan and carry out the operation to remove the population from Srebrenica.
• A.: You cannot tell me what to say. You cannot put my answer to me.
(20)What I'm telling you is that - and this has been testified to on several
occasions before this Chamber - that at the time the operation of the
moving out of the civilian population from Srebrenica was carried out, the
Drina Corps was engaged in the planning, organisation of a new operation,
namely, the Stupcanica 95 operation.
(25)In view of the fact of what is required when preparing and
• Q.: General, you're not answering my question. I'm not going to let
you talk forever.
General, do you accept that if four officers of the Drina
(20)headquarters -- if evidence has been provided to this Court that four
officers of the Drina Corps Command were involved in the organisation of
buses for the movement of the population, then it is completely incorrect
to suggest that the Drina Corps had no involvement in the movement of the
population out of Srebrenica.
(25)If you do not want to answer this question, then simply say, "I
• A.: No, sir. I will give you my answer. If you think that I am particularly willing of talking all the time, then you're wrong because I'm quite tired by now, but I will say once again I have already stated - (5)I have stated now and I will state it tomorrow, until the date I die - that any staff which receives an obligation, a duty to plan and organise a military operation cannot be --
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] General, it's the Presiding
Judge that's interrupting you now.
(10)You're an intelligent person, General. The question was a simple
one. You're an expert witness. You're providing us with expert
testimony. You know what it means. And you're a military expert. So you
are here to comment also on hypotheses.
The question is as follows: Imagine there's evidence according to
(15)which two or three officers of the Drina Corps had taken part in the
organisation and in the provision of buses. Do you still stand by your
claim, the one that you expressed in your report, that the Drina Corps was
entirely relieved of this duty to organise transport?
It's a very simple question. The question is, if this is true, do
(20)you still stand by your statement? So, just tell us, "Yes, I still stand
by my statement," or, "I don't stand by what I said on a previous
occasion." Please, give us a direct answer and be mindful of the strain
for your throat.
Mr. Cayley, could you repeat once again your question. Could you
(25)put it very precisely.
MR. CAYLEY: • Q.: General, the Court has heard evidence that at least four members (5)of the Drina Corps headquarters, including General Krstic, were personally involved in the organisation of transport to remove the civilian population from Srebrenica. On that basis, would you agree with me that it is incorrect, your assertion, that the Drina Corps headquarters had been relieved of all obligations to plan and carry out the operation of (10)the movement of the population from Srebrenica?
• A.: The interpretation I received was to remove. Maybe we do not have
an equivalent in our language. The issue was not that of a removal, but
of the movement of the population out of a certain place. There is a
significant difference between the two expressions. I apologise for this
(15)digression, but let me answer your question now.
The command of the Drina Corps did not plan and it did not execute
this operation. Of course, the operation was conducted in its area of
responsibility, and portions of its resources, as it can be seen from the
order of the Corps commander, did take part in it.
(20)The assistant commander for logistics or the chief of
transportation are not members of the staff, Mr. Prosecutor. They are
members of the rear elements of the Drina Corps command and not the
members of the staff.
Is my answer precise enough, because I really do wish to be
(25)precise.
(10) MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, perhaps not the best time to state this on a Friday afternoon, but I suspect that I may actually be going longer than all day Monday. I may have to go into Tuesday, but I will try to get through it as quickly as possible. It is problematic for the reasons I think that we all understand, but I will try to move as quick as (15)I can, but I don't guarantee that I will finish by the end of Monday. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] I will ask Madam Registrar to make a calculation of the time which was spent on the examination. We have to bear in mind the questions of the Judges as well, so I will ask Madam Registrar to give us information on that, and on Monday I will be in (20)a better position to inform you thereof. Have a nice weekend, all of you. The hearing is adjourned. --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.05 p.m., to be reconvened on Monday, the 11th day of December, 2000, at 9.20 a.m. |
