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/ Colormap • Page 8265 • {1/110} (1)Monday, 11 December 2000 [Open session] [The witness entered court] [Accused not present] (5) --- Upon commencing at 9.26 a.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Good morning to the technical booth, the interpreters; good morning counsel for the Prosecution, counsel for the Defence. General Krstic is not here as far as I can see. Mr. Petrusic, can (10)you tell us about the reasons for his absence, please? MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours. On Friday I notified you of the possibility of General Krstic undergoing a medical examination which was supposed to take place last week but was cancelled. So General Krstic is having his medical checkup (15)today, and that is mainly the reason of his absence from the trial, from the hearing today. He has given a written approval, a written waiver, so that the hearing can continue in his absence.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Thank you very much,
Mr. Petrusic.
(20)Good morning General Radinovic. I hope that you have managed to
have some rest and that you have spent a nice weekend here in The Hague.
We're now going to continue with the hearing of your testimony.
Mr. Cayley will continue his cross-examination, and let me remind you once
again of the necessity to be as brief as possible and as concise as
(25)possible in your answers so that we can finish your cross-examination as
MR. CAYLEY: Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours, learned counsel. (5)
WITNESS: RADOVAN RADINOVIC
[Continued] • CROSS-EXAMINED by Mr. Cayley: [Continued] • Q.: Good morning, General. Now, General, just to refresh your memory as to where we were at the end of last week, we were dealing with the (10)movement of the civilian population from Potocari, and we had discussed at some length the involvement of the Drina Corps Command in that operation, and you've made your comments on those particular facts. Now what I'd like to do is move ahead and discuss another assertion that you make in your report. (15) MR. CAYLEY: And Mr. Usher, if this could be placed on the ELMO, page 42. THE REGISTRAR: May we have the exhibit number? MR. CAYLEY: I'm sorry, D160 is the General's report.
• Q.: In your report, General, if you wish to reference it, it is also
(20)on page 42 in your version, and it is the last sentence on page 42.
Now, at the end of paragraph 6.6 you state, and I'll quote, "But
here it is important to note and conclude that what happened was not
forced movement or deportation, but only the fulfilment of necessary
conditions for a movement which that population itself wished."
(25)General, do you stand by that statement?
• Q.: Now, General, the Judges have heard a number of witnesses who were
either Dutch Battalion personnel who were engaged in these events, in the
movement of the population, and they've heard from a number of Muslim
witnesses, and I'm not going to go through all of those witnesses with
(25)you, but one particular witness whose evidence I would like to read you
• A.: That statement is completely contrary to the statement which was
made by General Mladic in his address to the civilian population in
Potocari which was recorded on video footage. He expressly said that they
(25)were free to choose whether to leave or to stay.
• A.: She did have a choice as to whether to stay or to leave. On the (10)basis of all of the documents that I had an opportunity to study, they were given the possibility of choosing whether to stay or to leave. That witness, she probably understood that if she stayed that she would be in some kind of danger. That is how all civilians felt in all of the areas where fighting was going on. That's nothing particularly new. (15)They were all afraid if they should remain under the authority which they did not perceive as theirs. So that is the source of fear and fear is a common consequence of every war. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Visnjic. MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, I didn't wish to (20)interrupt my learned colleague Mr. Cayley. However, I should like to ask him when quoting from the transcript to tell us which page he's talking about so that we could follow. MR. CAYLEY: Yes. My apologies, Mr. Visnjic. It was, in fact, page 1135 of the LiveNote transcript. (25)
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Thank you. Please continue,
MR. CAYLEY: • Q.: General, you mentioned General Mladic giving this television presentation in front of the refugees at Potocari and in essence, as you (5)stated, saying that they could choose to stay or leave. What I would like to address with you is what General Mladic actually thought about the situation and what he was actually stating to other VRS officers. MR. CAYLEY: Could the witness please be given Prosecutor's Exhibit 445. (10) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Sorry to interrupt you, but I should like to ask a question of General Radinovic while we're waiting for the document. General, you said that the moving out of the population was a common feature of the war in Bosnia. Am I correct? (15) • A.: That's an understatement, Mr. President. I don't know what would be the equivalent term. A "common feature," a "common phenomenon" is a rather mild word. I just said that it was something very common, that it was a rule in every such situation, in every civil war. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes. Thank you. I should like (20)to know whether the displacement was a cause of the war or a consequence of the war, that is to say whether the displacement was an objective of the war or a consequence of the war. What is your opinion about that? • A.: My opinion is that it was a consequence of the war.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] That is your position. Thank
(25)you, General Radinovic.
MR. CAYLEY: • Q.: General, in order to save your voice, I will read this intercept. It is an intercepted communication between General Mladic and an (5)unidentified person dated the 12th of July, and the conversation proceeded as follows: (X.:) Go ahead, General. (M.:) Have these buses and trucks left? (X.:) They have. (10) (M.:) When? (X.:) Ten minutes ago. (M.:) Good, excellent. Continue to monitor the situation. Don't let small groups of them sneak in. They've all capitulated and surrendered and we'll evacuate them all - (15)those who want to and those who don't want to. (X.:) I understand General. (M.:) Don't issue any statements and don't interrupt them over the radio station. We'll open a corridor towards Kladanj. (20) (X.:) ....... (M.:) Indeed, let it pass there. Take a patrol of ours to wait on the road and remove the mines and obstacles. Leave the territory.
(X.:) Yes, General.
(25)Now, you would agree with me here, General, that General Mladic is
• A.: My findings are based not on intercepts but on reliable sources, (5)that is, operational documents which constitute primary sources in my studies, and I am quite certain that they give a relatively reliable picture on the situation on the ground. Second, my testimony and my conclusions are also based on doctrinary principles which are not subject to revision. I am using the (10)information, the knowledge of the military science, and I am using the relevant methodology. Intercepts are unreliable sources in several senses, and I couldn't use them as the basis for my conclusions because we have only the transcript and not -- (15)
• Q.: I'm sorry to interrupt you, and I'm -- I can read it out to you if
you want, but on page 11 of your report you state that you relied on
primary sources, and you included intercepted conversations within that
list of primary sources. So in your report you have indicated that you
have relied on them, so I will repeat the question to you again. You can
(20)deal with the reliability or unreliability of them in the re-examination
with Mr. Visnjic. I want you to answer this simple question: If, if
General Mladic said this statement recorded in this intercept, does it not
indicate that he was giving no choice to the population, to the Muslim
population of Srebrenica? He was basically stating everybody has got to
(25)go, wasn't he, General?
• Q.: General, on page 11 of your report, and you don't need to make
(25)reference to it, you state, "This expert testimony was written using
• A.: Sir, as any serious expert, I am duty-bound to inform the user of my report the types of sources that I was using. Intercepts are by all (10)means primary sources, but only those intercepts that can be authenticated and identified. I am sure that you studied my report most seriously, but you can see that in my report I did not rely on any of the intercepts. And I have studied all of the intercepts that had been made available to the Defence, (15)but I did not rely on them because I do not deem them to be reliable. • Q.: Your report speaks for itself, General. If we can move on, please, to Prosecutor's Exhibit 47. JUDGE RIAD: Will you just excuse me? General Radinovic, as a historic witness, you, do you think that (20)the public statements are a reliable source in this conflict?
• A.: I fully agree with you, Your Honour, that not all public
statements can be considered as 100 per cent reliable. Of course, one has
to bear in mind a certain kind of public image, but I divide them in two
groups. In one group I can place the statements which are publicly
(25)addressed and which -- whose authenticity can be ascertained and those
(5) JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much. MR. CAYLEY: • Q.: General, this is the statement that you referred to in your evidence in-chief, and it is the statement that was signed by Major Franken, Mr. Mandzic from the Muslim community, and Miroslav Deronjic who, (10)as you already stated, was appointed by Mr. Karadzic to the civilian commissioner in Srebrenica. Now, I wish to address some of the paragraphs with you. MR. CAYLEY: And if it could be placed on the ELMO. If you could please move it up a little, Mr. Usher. Yes, that's fine. (15)
• Q.: Now, General, you will see in the version you have, and this is
about halfway down the page, "At the end of the negotiations between the
two sides the following was agreed: that our civilian population could
stay in the enclave or move out, depending on the wish of each
individual."
(20)Now, General, Major Franken, a signatory to this document has
given evidence before the Judges about the meaning of that particular
phrase and this is what he states, and he refers to the public statement
made by General Mladic about giving the population a free choice, and this
is what he says: "I understand that General Mladic made that statement,
(25)but hardly any realistic statement because the fate of those who wanted to
• A.: As an honourable professional who signed this record and allowed that in the first paragraph, "We find this position that our civilian (10)population could stay in the enclave or move out depending on the wish of each individual," how can that be explained then? How could the Major, as an honourable officer with ethics, sign a document while thinking what he's stated, as you quoted him. • Q.: Let me tell you why, General. (15) • A.: That speaks of something.
• Q.: Let me tell you immediately why, and we'll come back to my
question on that. The reason, General, why he signed this statement, and
he gave evidence to this Court to that effect, is that the lives of
59 individuals depended on him signing this statement. That is the
(20)evidence that he gave to this Court. It was intimated to him by the
Bosnian Serb authorities that if he did not sign this document those
people's lives would be at risk. Wounded Muslims in a hospital in
Bratunac.
Now I'll ask you again, General. You would agree with me that
(25)Major Franken would have a better idea than you as to whether or not the
• A.: In answer to that question of yours, sir, the best answer is what the Major has signed. He signed a statement claiming that the Muslim (5)population had the choice of staying in Srebrenica or moving out. I cannot answer your question on the basis of anything other than the document I have here in front of me which you have given me as an exhibit. • Q.: Did you consider Major Franken's evidence to this Court when you (10)came to your opinion about this document?
• A.: I studied all the testimony, everything that the Defence had at
its disposal. I cannot, of course, remember each and every detail. I
would have to refresh my memory and look through the statement. But of
course I do remember the testimony you are referring to.
(15)The testimony of all professional officers who were in Srebrenica
make me very angry as a soldier, as a professional. I cannot understand
that they could have done one thing and stated another. They should have
behaved with far greater responsibility, in a far more professional
manner, with greater determination, with greater courage, of course with
(20)risks because the military profession is a high-risk profession, and it
was particularly risky in Srebrenica in a civil war. And this was a risk
that they should have taken upon themselves, and they should have signed
only what they were quite confident of rather than signing documents that
allegedly they were coerced into doing. And I cannot believe that that
(25)was the case, because this document is here with us until time
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] General, excuse me for interrupting you. You remember seeing pictures of General Mladic distributing sweets to the children in Potocari? • A.: Yes. (10) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Do you know why he did that? • A.: I personally think that General Mladic, like any other human being, has emotions and that the situation in which the population found itself as a result of combat operations was such that this had to move him as it would any person, and, personally, I think that he did this (15)exclusively out of emotional reasons. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, but we have many witnesses who have told us that these sweets were later taken away. For a moment while the cameras were on these sweets were distributed. When the cameras were removed these sweets were taken away again. Do you have anything to (20)make regarding the authenticity of these pictures for history, the camera pictures or the other pictures that the camera did not record from the standpoint of authenticity for history?
• A.: I really cannot absolutely imagine that General Mladic could
distribute sweets while on camera and then to take them away again. This
(25)is simply something that I cannot accept.
• A.: No. No. I did not mean the testimony is not worth anything. But comparing the probative value, for me as a person making conclusions -- I (15)am not talking as a jurist, of course. If I have to make conclusions as to what happened over there, then for me there is no doubt that a certain individual did give candy to a certain population, as this was recorded by camera. So this is a document that cannot be denied.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Yes, but the question is "Why?"
(20)What was the objective of that? What was the aim? Why did General Mladic
say, "You can stay or leave. It's up to you to choose"? Also, what was
the objective he had in mind distributing the sweets and then taking them
away again?
When one is interpreting a source such as a document, one needs to
(25)interpret it in terms of the objective behind that document.
• A.: I was going to say that to Your Honour but was interrupted. There is no doubt that General Mladic did distribute sweets before the cameras. (5)Perhaps I would equally value testimony if General Mladic was to collect the sweets. But if some irresponsible individual did it, then that kind of behaviour cannot be attributed to General Mladic. If this were to be done to General Mladic, then perhaps one could ask what the intention was when he gave those sweets. But if somebody (10)else did that, then it is not General Mladic's intention that is in question but the intention of the person who did it. So I think that General Mladic had no other objective but to distribute those sweets. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Excuse me. Judge Wald. (15)
JUDGE WALD: I have just one question. In your conclusion that
this movement of the civilian population was a voluntary one, do you
include the men in that? In other words, the women and children, as you
know - I think there is no dispute - were put on buses and moved on toward
Kladanj. The men were not, at least the men who were in the normal ages,
(20)not elderly, were not allowed on the buses and they were taken off. We
won't talk about what happened to them, but they were taken off to one
side and something happened to them. But is it your position that they
had a choice? They could have stayed in Srebrenica?
I mean the testimony is uniform, uniform, that they are taken off
(25)and something was done to them in -- both in Potocari and later on. But
• A.: I would not. (5) JUDGE WALD: Thank you. MR. CAYLEY: • Q.: General, Prosecutor's Exhibit 47. Put yourself for one moment in the position of Major Franken. It's the 17th of July. The entire civilian population, 30.000 people, are, to the best of his knowledge, (10)safely out of the enclave. Fifty-nine wounded Muslim men remain in the hospital. The Bosnian Serb army is in control. He is informed their welfare depends on your signature on this document. To save those people, you have to sign this document. What would a military officer of honour and integrity have done (15)in that situation? Would he have refused to sign and put those people at risk?
• A.: It's a dilemma. I was not in that dilemma at the time, so I don't
know what my decision would have been. The question has been put out of
context. One could answer that question only if one found one's self in
(20)that situation.
I'm a person who would -- I'm not saying that is the pattern of
behaviour that others would have to follow, including the Major. I'm a
person who would not sell his honour and integrity for anything in the
world, even his own life or the life of his own family. I would not sign
(25)anything dishonourable. There is no force in the world that could make me
JUDGE RIAD: General, you wouldn't consider signing it under the circumstances, and at the first opportunity denounce it as being under (10)great pressure? Wouldn't you consider that as an attitude, as a honest approach to reconcile saving lives and being honest? Just for the sake of your statement.
• A.: Your Honour, I would have done many things prior to this to avoid
getting into this situation. I would have been in control of the whole
(15)process with much greater responsibility and with much greater risk than
they were ready to expose themselves to.
I know that this activity of escorting this process of
displacement and adjusting it to the rules that could have been
implemented at the time, I know that that was very difficult and highly
(20)risky, but that was the primordial role that they had, that it was their
duty, and that is what they should have done; and then it would have been
known immediately if there were irregularities, and there were apparently,
then it would have been known there and then had these gentlemen carried
out their duty. And there is no other way I can react to this act of
(25)theirs.
MR. CAYLEY: • Q.: General, let me just read another portion from the statement. It's on the ELMO. "It was arranged that the evacuation would be carried (5)out by the army and police of Republika Srpska, and that UNPROFOR would supervise and provide an escort for the evacuation." Let's examine for a moment, General, what actually happened on the ground, and let me read you first of all the testimony of Witness G who was a Dutch soldier tasked with escorting the convoys, and he was asked a (10)question by my learned friend Mr. Harmon. "Witness G, did it appear to you that the theft of your vehicles, your two vehicles, and the theft of the other escort vehicles was organised?" The witness here is discussing how when he went to escort a convoy, vehicles were stolen. The vehicles were stolen from the escort at gunpoint. He goes on to say: (15)"Yes, it seemed to me that that was the case." • Q.: Can you give the Judges your opinion as to why you think the escort vehicles were being taken?
• A.: Those escort vehicles were used by us to follow the buses,
to escort the buses, and it seemed to me that the Bosnian
(20)Serbs just didn't want to see, didn't want to see what
happened to the buses and the content of the buses. That is
why, usually with violence, they took away our vehicles.
Now, General, it's a fact, isn't it, that the Dutch couldn't
escort the refugees because they were prevented from doing so at gunpoint
(25)by the VRS.
• A.: No. No, that is not correct. That is not true. That is not how a convoy is escorted. That is not how that job is organised. A person -- the person, who wanted to provide effective escort and to control the (5)whole process effectively, and that was the obligation of the Dutch Battalion, that person should have made sure that in every vehicle there should have been a Dutch soldier, rather than one vehicle in the whole column. And then, because of poor communications, the convoy's drawn out, a vehicle breaks down or intentionally something happens -- (10) • Q.: General, General -- • A.: -- situations which can be foreseen in similar circumstances. • Q.: You're not answering the question. Were you aware, were you aware, General, from reading the evidence in this case, that Dutch soldiers, travelling in pairs, armed, in an escort vehicle, were prevented (15)from carrying out their duty by the VRS at gunpoint? Were you aware of that? • A.: I read the testimony to that effect, and if that really happened in the way they testified, of course I do not accept such behaviour, but I'm saying that there was a way to prevent that if the Dutch Battalion had (20)carried out the operation as it should have been done. Therefore, they, too, contributed to the irregularity of the whole process.
• Q.: Let me read to you, General, Major Franken, his evidence, the
Deputy Commander of the Dutch Battalion, what he said about the escorts.
When he's referring to "activity" in his evidence, he's referring to the
(25)escort duty.
• A.: In total, we lost about 33 vehicles, but I think concerning the convoys it would be about 15 or 16 jeeps. But (5)the figures are somewhere in the documents, the exact figures, but that's what I recall now. • Q.: Why do you think that they were taking the jeeps? Why were they stopping the Dutch escorts from accompanying the buses? (10) • A.: Because they didn't want anybody to be around; that's obvious. Otherwise, they can't think of any reason to stop them because we were not a threat. We were not a military potential. One jeep with two guys in it is nonsense, and so obviously they didn't want us to witness whatever would (15)happen. • Q.: Now, when you'd lost 16 jeeps, did you think that there was any kind of significance or planning that somebody had actually decided that this was to happen? • A.: It was obvious that the word was out to frustrate the (20)convoy escort and the regular forces as far as we could judge. MR. CAYLEY: And that's on page 2031.
• Q.: Now, General, it's a fact that the Bosnian Serb army had already
decided to frustrate the Dutch escorts as soon as the convoys moved out,
(25)hadn't it? That was part of the plan.
(25)
JUDGE RIAD: General, just to cut a long story short, I'm not
• A.: Your Honour, that activity of escort is an activity that is studied in military schools. And if it is not studied, it is part of (10)common sense. It is the obligation of the escort to escort the column out in the most effective way, and one of those ways is by an escort being in the vehicle to check who is getting in and coming out. And even if he was not in a position to prevent, he at least could have seen who did it. I am quite certain that if that activity had been done in the way (15)I'm saying is it should have been done, then there would certainly have been at least fewer such crimes. I can't say that there wouldn't have been any. And as an individual, I am very sorry that it was not done, but I'm not giving an excuse to anyone. JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much, General. (20) MR. CAYLEY: Judge Riad and Your Honours, there is actually-- we won't go into it now. There is actually evidence to that effect, that there was insufficient personnel, but I think we can probably deal with that in closing.
• Q.: General, in your report - and I won't refer to it because time is
(25)marching on - you essentially state that the UN was a party to this
MR. CAYLEY: And if Prosecutor's Exhibit 113/3 could be placed on (5)the ELMO, please. If you could move it up, please, Mr. Usher. • Q.: Now, General, this is a press release by the Security Council of the United Nations on the 14th of July of 1995. I won't read all of it, but what I will read, the fourth paragraph down. "'The Council is deeply concerned about ongoing forced (10)relocation of tens of thousands of civilians from the Srebrenica safe areas to the Tuzla region by the Bosnian Serb party,' said a presidential statement of the Security Council. "'Such a forced relocation is a clear violation of the human rights of the civilian population,' the statement added. (15)"The Council reaffirmed that those who had committed or had ordered the commission of `ethnic cleansing' would be held individually responsible." General, are you aware that Security Council of the United Nations, the day after the deportation was complete, issued a public (20)statement to the world criminalising that conduct? Are you aware of that?
• A.: I cannot remember at this point, but I'm sure I follow that and I
know that such statements were made. However, I can tell you now that the
movement of the population from Srebrenica was not -- it did not
(25)constitute ethnic cleansing or plan. It was a consequence of war
• Q.: General, let me read for you Prosecutor's Exhibit 113/1. MR. CAYLEY: If that could be placed on the ELMO, please, (10)Mr. Usher. • Q.: I'm only going to read the fourth paragraph of this. This is a statement made on the day that the movement of the population was complete, and it's a statement by Sadako Ogata, then the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. (15)"In Geneva, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, called the wholesale removal of Srebrenica residents one of the most blatant examples of ethnically motivated forced displacement we have seen yet in war. 'It is inconceivable to me that the Bosnian Serbs can inflict such hardship on the people of Srebrenica, people who have (20)already endured years of war and suffering,' said Ogata in a statement." General, based on your report in which you say that the UN was a party to this movement of the population, are you stating that the High Commissioner for Refugees and the Security Council were criminalising conduct to which the UN itself was a party? (25)
• A.: Is Mr. Akashi considered to be a member of that mechanism? I
• Q.: General, I'm sorry, but we must move on. There were crimes committed against the Serbian people. Nobody denies that. But that is (5)not relevant to these proceedings. Let us move on. Now, General, you stated both in your evidence and in your report that it is a legitimate military operation to check the identities of male Muslims who are passing through the hands of the VRS, and I think you stated in your evidence that the Bratunac Brigade had indeed provided a (10)list of suspected war criminals to the Drina Corps headquarters. Do you recall that evidence? • A.: Yes, I do. • Q.: Now, General, as Her Honour Judge Wald has already stated, there has been a great deal of evidence in this case that men and boys were (15)separated by the Bosnian army in Potocari and that, it appears, was in the form of an organised military operation. The Prosecutor does not dispute the legitimacy of checking Muslim males for war crimes, but I want to deal with another aspect of this operation. First of all, I want to read to you a description given by (20)Captain van Duijn, then a young platoon commander with the Dutch army who describes the state of the men and boys who had been separated in Potocari, and this is what he said:
• Q.: Can you describe to the Judges the appearance of those men
that you saw at the White House?" And the White House is the
(25)location where these individuals were separated.
• A.: When I came up to the White House, and as you can see in front of the White House there is a large lawn, it was covered totally with personal belongings, with pictures, holiday (10)snaps, as well as passports and other identity papers. The witness then goes on, General, to say that he had a conversation with a VRS officer called Mane about why all of these belongings particularly -- THE INTERPRETER: Could counsel slow down, please. (15) MR. CAYLEY: I'm sorry. • A.: And particularly identification papers had been separated from these individuals and placed in a big pile in front of the White House. And this is the answer that that VRS officer gave about why those (20)individuals, why those Muslims had been separated from their personal belongings and from their identification papers:
• A.: He said, "Well, they don't need the stuff that's there. They
don't need it any more." And I asked him how he could explain
the fact that if they wanted to know who was a war criminal
(25)and who was not they could do that without identity papers,
MR. CAYLEY: If Prosecutor's Exhibit 62 could be made ready. • Q.: General, can you explain to the Judges why, if it was a requirement of the Security and Intelligence Service to identify these people for the purposes of alleged war crimes, that the Bosnian Serb army (10)was systematically removing all forms of identification from these Muslim men and boys? • A.: In my report, I stated that the identity checkups of males was a legitimate activity. There were lists of war crimes suspects in Srebrenica. That list was there. Of course one still has to find out (15)whether it was only a suspicion or whether those people were really war criminals. However, one can justify the procedure of checking up the identity of males who had arrived in Potocari, namely, whether their names can be found on the list of suspects of war crimes against the Serbian population. Moreover, whether any of them was a member of the (20)28th Division, that is, whether they had been engaged in fighting.
• Q.: General, the Prosecutor doesn't dispute anything of what you've
just said, as I informed you just a moment ago. The question I have for
you: Why was the Bosnian Serb army removing forms of identification from
these Muslim men and boys who had been separated in Potocari? Why, if
(25)they needed to identify these people they were removing their passports
• A.: Of course, before I can answer your question, one has to see who it was who did it, whether it was done by the members of the army or someone else. I didn't -- I wasn't able to reach a full answer to that (5)question, whether it was done by members of the army or members of the police. For me as a military expert, that is not the same. Second, as regards the question whether individuals were engaged in such conduct without any authorisation or whether it was based on a preconceived plan, I do not have any information. I do not have any (10)evidence to that effect. You say members of the VRS. If indeed we are talking about the members of the VRS, we are talking about individuals, and individual members of the overall system of the VRS. We do not -- I do not have a single piece of evidence which would enable me to conclude that it was done on the basis of a preconceived plan issued by the command (15)system, that is, that the Muslim population should be destroyed in that way. I cannot confirm your allegation that it was done in a systematic way by the army. If that indeed was done, it was done by individuals. And of course, I do not consider it to be legitimate. I consider it to be (20)a crime, and I, of course, cannot justify it.
JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me, General. I according to your assessment,
was the situation under control, or was everything running wild and
everything was doing what -- everybody could do anything. If there was a
control, then there would be discipline and, as you say, a systematic
(25)attitude; or was it anarchy, according to your assessment?
JUDGE RIAD: Whenever there is army and the police, don't they have the same command? Would it be to the most senior officer or command? (20)
• A.: That principle is in force only in the areas where combat
operations are taking place. Since the operation for Srebrenica had come
to an end, that system was no longer in force strictly speaking. Police
forces of the Ministry of Interior of Republika Srpska were not under the
control of the Drina Corps Command, and there wasn't a single document on
(25)the basis of which the Drina Corps would have -- the Drina Corps Command
JUDGE RIAD: Thank you, General. MR. CAYLEY: (15) • Q.: General, if you could look at the photograph that you can see on the screen in front of you, and this is a photograph that was taken by a DutchBat member sometime after the 13th of July. And these are all of the belongings of the Muslim men and boys who had been separated, their belongings, their identification cards; and as you can see, there is a (20)fire. It's being burnt. He gave evidence that it was burned by the Bosnian Serbs. Now, General, you would agree with me that if you wanted to leave no trace of somebody's existence, a very effective way of doing that is to remove all forms of identification that that person had ever possessed. (25)
• A.: Yes, but Bosnian Serbs include civilians, policemen, and
• Q.: General, answer the question. Do you or do you not agree with me that if you wanted to leave no trace of somebody's existence, a very (5)effective way of doing that would be to remove their identification and then destroy it? • A.: On this photograph, I can only see that the area is on fire, but I don't know who did it, why they did it, when they did it. I cannot answer your question on the basis of this photograph. (10) • Q.: General, you've considered all of the evidence in this case. You're the expert. The Judges have heard evidence that these men and boys' identification papers were systematically removed and destroyed. That evidence has been heard in this courtroom. Do you or do you not agree with me that the reason why that was (15)done was to leave no trace of these people's existence; that is the reason why these identity cards were destroyed? • A.: The very fact of seizing such documents cannot in itself constitute a criminal act. • Q.: That is not the question, General. That is not the question. And (20)I'm going to insist on an answer. You can decline to answer.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Mr. Cayley, you can try perhaps
once again, and we will see what the General's answer will be.
General, I think that you fully understand the question. We will
give you one more opportunity to answer it.
(25)Mr. Cayley, just once more, last time.
• Q.: These people's passports and identification papers were destroyed as a step in essentially leaving no trace of their life or existence; isn't that right, General? (5) • A.: Those who did it committed a criminal act; however, the whole process is not only that. The seizure of documents does not necessarily constitute a prohibited act. Those who did it, those who burned it, must be held responsible; and the issue is to know the identity of that person and the reasons for that. There are several aspects to this problem which (10)can be mutually exclusive. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Cayley, would this be a convenient time for a break? MR. CAYLEY: Yes, thank you, Mr. President. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] We will have a 20-minute break (15)now. --- Recess taken at 10.40 a.m. --- On resuming at 11.02 a.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Cayley, you may continue. MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President. (20)
• Q.: General, I want to leave deportation fairly swiftly or, as in your
words, the movement of the population, but first of all and finally on
this area, I would like to read to you what General Krstic told us in a
police interview with the Office of the Prosecutor regarding the movement
of the population.
(25)General, prior to your evidence did you speak with General Krstic
• A.: No. • Q.: Was General Krstic provided with a copy of your report, do you know? (5) • A.: I don't know. I gave a copy to the Defence. I don't know whether they gave it to him. MR. CAYLEY: If the General could be given Prosecutor's Exhibit 399/B bis. • Q.: It is, in fact, on page 19, General, of the B/C/S, of the Serbian (10)version. MR. CAYLEY: And it is page 32, Mr. Usher of the English transcript. • Q.: For you, General, it's page 19, so you can follow, but I will read portions of this. (15) MR. CAYLEY: This, Mr. President, is the public transcript of General Krstic's interview with Mr. Ruez. • Q.: Let me read out to you, General, what General Krstic stated about the movement of the population. "Now, what is their guilt and their responsibility? General (20)Mladic was in charge of all activity. His guilt also consists of his orders that he gave to the units of the Drina Corps to continue the attack towards Srebrenica, which caused the civilians to flee the town and the villages --" • A.: I apologise, but I don't have that. (25)
MR. CAYLEY: Mr. Usher, if you give it to me I can find the
• Q.: Do you see where I've placed a blue mark, General? • A.: Yes.
• Q.: "Now, what is their guilt and their responsibility?" This is
(5)General Krstic speaking.
"General Mladic was in charge of all activity. His guilt
also consists of his orders that he gave to the units of the
Drina Corps to continue the attack towards Srebrenica, which
caused the civilians to flee the town and the villages south
(10)and west of Srebrenica. When the Drina Corps units entered
Srebrenica, there was nobody, it was completely empty. There
were no civilians; there were no soldiers. This also can be
seen from a videotape, from a film that has been shown on
Dutch TV and English and American TV and so on. As I said
(15)before, it was General Mladic who ordered the units of Drina
Corps to continue the attack towards Bratunac through
Potocari. Fortunately, as I explained before, after a lot of
arguing we managed to prevent the carrying out of this order
so that it would not happen.
(20)"As far as the deportation is concerned, since that is
the first activity on the list, and this is what I have
information on, this is what happened. The deportation took
place on the 12th and 13th of July. This was organised, led,
and managed by the Commander of the Main Staff, through the
(25)senior officers that I have listed. General Mladic was the
• A.: Yes, that follows from this interview. This is the view of (15)General Krstic. • Q.: Now, before you gave your evidence, had you read this interview?
• A.: I read the interview, but only after I had written my report. I
mean, I didn't know about the existence of this interview for quite some
time. And when I completed my report, I had the opportunity of reading
(20)the interview, so I know what it contains and I know about this position
that he took in respect of that.
But again, it's General Krstic's view. He's entitled to have a
view of his own. I consider it from a certain distance, but it is very
difficult to have a distance in respect of that because we are talking
(25)about the events which are very hard, and even for me who tried to analyse
• Q.: So, General, your position is such that whereas the accused himself acknowledges the criminality of this conduct, albeit excluding himself from responsibility, you maintain the position as an expert on his (5)behalf that the movement of the population was an entirely voluntary one, that the population decided to move itself? • A.: I'm not Krstic's expert witness; I'm the Court's expert witness, and in view of my knowledge and expertise, I'm trying to understand what happened. And on the basis of that, I compiled my report, and it is on (10)the basis of that that I'm giving my testimony here before this Tribunal. • Q.: Would you agree with me, General, that since Mr. Krstic is the one actually accused of this crime, and since he was actually there at the time, he would know better than you the nature of the movement of the population in July of 1995? (15)
• A.: As far as an objective assessment of the situation is concerned, I
don't see any reason why General Krstic should be any more objective than
myself. He may have more personal knowledge; however, the analysis of the
documents and the overall situation and events does not necessarily
constitute an advantage for him. It can also operate to his disadvantage
(20)because he's the one who is accused of it. So in view of that, it can
operate as some kind of limitation as far as his understanding of the
situation is concerned.
I don't have a problem of that kind. I am not restricted in my
views in my way, and I think that I'm competent enough to have reached the
(25)conclusion that I stated in my report and that I'm stating here again
• Q.: Are you thus suggesting to the Court that when General Krstic told the Office of the Prosecutor that this activity was deportation, that he was either incorrect or was lying to the Office of the Prosecutor? (5)
• A.: It is, of course, your right to put to me anything you want, but I
kindly ask you not to do that. I'm not saying that he lied. I'm just
saying that he maybe doesn't fully understand the meaning of the word
"deportation." I'm not a jurist either, so I may have problems
understanding it as well. The way I interpreted the movement of the
(10)population from Srebrenica was that it was a consequence of war
activities, the war being a civil one in nature.
Second, I also interpret it as their wish to move out, out of fear
of consequences that might ensue. Nobody wants to leave their home unless
they are frightened of staying.
(15)I didn't claim that it was an expression of the free will on the
part of that population because the life would be better for them in
Tuzla, but because they were fearful of the consequences of the war, they
expressed their wish to leave Srebrenica.
There is not a single trace of justification in my testimony. I'm
(20)just trying to understand the consequences and the causes in an objective
way.
Whether we should call it a deportation or a movement of the
population, I don't know. I'm not an expert to reach such conclusions.
All I'm trying to explain here is how such things arrive in any war, and
(25)indeed, many such phenomenon took place throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina,
• Q.: General, you've made the point about the Serbs. It's accepted that the Serbs were also victims in this war, but let's move on. (5)Now, General, I stated to you from the interview of General Krstic that he holds General Mladic responsible for what happened, General Mladic and his officers. You yourself in your report state that the Drina Corps Command was relieved of all responsibility in this operation. Do you agree with General Krstic that General Mladic was (10)responsible for the movement of the population from Srebrenica to Tuzla? • A.: Yes, I agree with that. Not that it was General Mladic but that that part of the activity was not under the control of the Drina Corps, that it was within the competence of the Main Staff. • Q.: General, that's not the question I asked you. I asked you whether (15)or not General Mladic was responsible for the movement of the civilian population from Srebrenica to Tuzla. • A.: In my report, I didn't discuss the responsibility, the culpability of General Mladic but the responsibility of General Krstic, and I was explicit enough in my report when I stated that General Krstic was not (20)responsible for the operation nor did he conduct it in any way. I did not examine the responsibility of General Mladic or his subordinate officers. I discussed the responsibility of General Krstic, and I discussed it in view of his responsibilities and competencies, the competencies of General Krstic. (25)
• Q.: General, you're the military expert. Consider it now. Consider
(5) • A.: Sir, I'm going to repeat what I said. In order to fulfil the task that was given to me by this institution, I dealt with the responsibility of General Krstic. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Cayley, I think you should move on to your next question. You have heard the answer of the witness. (10)The witness is probably going to repeat once again what he has already stated. So please continue. MR. CAYLEY: • Q.: Now, General Krstic, in his interview, in essence said that there were a group of officers around General Mladic who had an equal level of (15)responsibility for what happened. He named General Tolimir from the Main Staff as also being responsible for what happened in Srebrenica. Do you agree with General Krstic that General Tolimir was also responsible for the movement of the population from Srebrenica to Tuzla?
• A.: Sir, my answer in response to your question is identical to the
(20)previous one. I did not deal with the responsibility of anyone else but
General Krstic, that is the command system of the Drina Corps, to the
extent that General Krstic, in the period between the 11th and the 13th --
12th and the 13th of July belonged to the chain of command of the Drina
Corps and in view of the role he played within that chain of command.
(25)In order for me to answer your question, I should study the
• Q.: So, General, your report essentially concentrates only on who was not responsible not who was responsible. • A.: No. My report concentrates on an analysis of the activity, and it is focused on the role and responsibility of General Krstic. (10) • Q.: Now, General, in acknowledging that my statement is incorrect, that in fact it's wrong to say that you didn't concentrate on who was responsible, I'll ask you another question based on the same interview that General Krstic gave and that is this: General Krstic also named Colonel Ljubo Beara from the Main Staff, from the Security Administration (15)of the Main Staff, that he was another officer who was responsible for everything that happened after the 11th of July, 1995, in Srebrenica. Do you agree with General Krstic's statement about Colonel Beara? JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Visnjic.
MR. VISNJIC:
[Int.] Mr. President, I must object. This
(20)has been the third time that my learned colleague is asking his question
to General Radinovic. I believe that the subject of this
cross-examination is not a further investigation of the subject. I think
that General Radinovic has given us enough explanation as to the framework
of his analysis in respect of this case. I think that what Mr. Cayley
(25)wants him to answer falls outside that framework, and I think it is the
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Cayley, how do you respond to that objection? (5) MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, ultimately in any criminal case the individual or individuals who are responsible for the crimes alleged is absolutely fundamental. Now, the witness had stated that he has reviewed all of the material that is available in this case. General Krstic makes assertions (10)about individuals on the Main Staff of the VRS who are responsible for what happened. It's absurd to infer to the Court that he has only considered those persons who are not responsible and not the persons who are actually responsible. I'm simply going through the list of individuals who General (15)Krstic states were responsible. I'm asking the witness whether he agrees or disagrees. If he doesn't wish to make a comment, then I will move on. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Is there anything you wish to add, Mr. Visnjic? MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] No, Mr. President. (20)
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] I agree that the issue of who is
responsible is a very important one which permeates the whole case, but,
Mr. Cayley, I think you're running a risk of receiving one and the same
answer to all of your questions. You may now continue, but somehow I
suspect that General Radinovic is going to provide you with the same
(25)answers. Please continue.
THE WITNESS: [Int.] If I may, Mr. President, I should like to state the following: I am not avoiding the answer to any of the (5)questions that have been put to me. However, I think I would be acting irresponsibly if I should attempt to state who is responsible since I didn't study, analyse exactly who did what and where General Mladic and other officers were at a certain point in time, what were their messages or their communication. I really do not feel able to answer the question. (10) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] General Radinovic, we understand your position, but if that is the case, please give us a clear answer. Just tell us that you cannot answer the question, because you're wasting too much time in explaining your inability to answer the question. So you can simply state "Yes or no, I agree or I do not agree" (15)with the statement made by the Prosecutor. If you wish to add a comment, you are free to do so, but first of all give us a clear and direct answer to the question. Answer the question in accordance with your knowledge. If you do not know it, just tell us so.
THE WITNESS:
[Int.] But Mr. President, the question
(20)that is put to me is a leading one, and it requires a yes or no answer,
and I'm not able to give a yes or no answer so I have to explain why. I'm
not trying to avoid answering the question. I should like the Prosecutor
not to ask such questions of me, but to concentrate on the issue of
General Krstic's responsibility; otherwise, my answer will always be the
(25)same, and I will appear to be wasting the time of the Court.
MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President. • Q.: General, you said in your evidence in-chief, and you have done in your cross-examination, that you spoke to a number of individuals within the Bosnian Serb army before giving your testimony. Did you speak to (10)General Mladic or Colonel Beara about what happened in Srebrenica? • A.: No, no. Unfortunately, I was not able to reach them. I don't know where they are. MR. CAYLEY: We can move on to another area, now, Mr. President. • Q.: General, do you recall in your evidence that you stated that on (15)the night of the 11th of July, a meeting took place at which General Mladic appointed General Krstic as the operational group commander, as the Commander of forces for the operation in Zepa? • A.: Yes. MR. CAYLEY: If an exhibit could be prepared, Exhibit 425. (20) • Q.: Now, General, are you quite certain that that meeting took place on the 11th of July of 1995?
• A.: I'm not absolutely certain because I don't have the minutes from
that meeting, nor do I have a document; but General Krstic spoke about
that evening in his testimony -- about that meeting, I'm sorry, and I feel
(25)that his memory is probably reliable. And on the basis of the study I did
(5) • Q.: Now, General, on the 13th of October of last year -- of this year, I'm sorry, an interview was conducted with Colonel Trivic who is the Commander of the Romanija Brigade, as you know. Do you know Colonel Trivic? • A.: Personally I don't know him, but I know that he was the Commander (10)of the Romanija Brigade. • Q.: And General, this is what he stated in his interview with the Office of the Prosecutor about that meeting. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Visnjic?
MR. VISNJIC:
[Int.] Mr. President, I assume that my
(15)learned friend Mr. Cayley will use a part of the interview that Colonel
Trivic gave to the Prosecution; he told me he would do that prior to
today's hearing. So it is an interview that Colonel Trivic had with the
investigators of the Tribunal in Banja Luka on the 13th of October this
year.
(20)We have already on two occasions witnessed the use of this
interview by the Prosecution, mostly to check the credibility or impeach
the witness. I objected, and the Trial Chamber made its ruling. I think
that this time we have a completely different situation. This witness
here will be submitted an exhibit which doesn't speak about something that
(25)the witness could have any personal knowledge about.
(15) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Cayley, your response?
MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, as the Bench knows already, Colonel
Mirko Trivic was on the list of witnesses that the Defence intended to
call. On that basis, I would assume that they had spoken to him if they
were going to call him as a witness, and I would hope that if they have
(20)spoken to him, that what he told them is the same as what he told us.
Secondly, this witness has stated that he spoke to a number of VRS
officers. He had that opportunity in putting together his expert report.
He spoke to a number of VRS officers who were engaged in this operation,
and I would assume that he spoke to them about all of the facts which were
(25)relevant to his report, including the date of this meeting.
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] So in order to do this, you're going to examine this document in detail or are you just going to use the information in general terms as suggested by Mr. Visnjic? MR. CAYLEY: Colonel Trivic makes a single assertion which I wish (10)to put to the witness. It is a three-line assertion within his interview. Colonel Trivic was at the interview. That's what he told us. If that's to be believed, I think I can put that to the witness and see what his response was. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Visnjic. To close the (15)discussion, we have to move on. MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, I will be brief. We did talk to Colonel Trivic, but I'm not able to compare his statement with what the Prosecutor is now claiming just now. That is one point. Secondly, I think the Chamber also should have access to the whole (20)interview so that they may ask questions of the General if the Prosecution is relying on the statement of Colonel Trivic. Thirdly, I still don't know how Colonel Trivic was interviewed, under which circumstances. Bearing all this in mind, we still maintain the objection that we have just made. (25)
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Just a moment, please.
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Cayley, the Chamber is of the opinion and decides that you should ask the witness whether he knows that Colonel Trivic said whatever it is you want to say. Regardless of (5)the response, you're going to ask the question that you have to ask, but the Chamber wishes to inform you that the Chamber will not take as evidence what the statement itself says. MR. CAYLEY: Yes. And -- JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Have you understood? (10) MR. CAYLEY: I understand perfectly. In fact, Mr. Visnjic, I gave the wrong date for the interview. It was held on the 5th of October, 2000, not the 13th, as I stated. • Q.: General, during that interview, it was put -- the following question was put to Colonel Trivic and it's as follows, "JR" standing for (15)Mr. Ruez, the interviewer. JR. It is 1303 hours and we are resuming the interview with Colonel Trivic, so we are still on the meeting of the 12th of July after 10.00. During the interruption at one point, you told us that this meeting was also about giving -- giving, (20)receiving new tasks, and the new task was to receive the new task towards Zepa. Would you please develop on that part of the meeting? GK: After the meeting -- THE INTERPRETER: Would you please read slower. Thank you. (25)
MR. CAYLEY:
(10) • A.: He certainly knows better than me, but why should he know better than Krstic if Krstic said it was on the 11th in the evening. The meeting in the command of the Bratunac Brigade was held on the 11th in the evening. MR. CAYLEY: I don't think my learned friend wishes to make any (15)objection, so I -- JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] I don't know. Did you want to say something, Mr. Visnjic? I saw you getting on your feet. MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] No, Mr. President, as the witness has already given an answer. So we'll withdraw your objection. (20) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well. Thank you. So continue, Mr. Cayley, please. MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could be provided with Prosecutor's Exhibit 426.
• Q.: General, you stated in your evidence that the operation towards
(25)Zepa was not referred to in directive 7/1. Do you recall stating that?
(5) • Q.: But directive 7/1 does refer, does it not, General, to combat operations towards the enclave of Zepa? It was anticipated by the Main Staff and by Mr. Karadzic in March of 1995 that there would be combat operations towards Zepa, wasn't it, General? • A.: There's nothing illogical about that, bearing in mind the fact (10)that these were enclaves from which the Muslim army was active, but my statement referred to the Stupcanica operation, as the coded name for the operation. • Q.: General, when did General Krstic arrive at the forward command post in Krivace? (15)
• A.: In my testimony, I said that from the moment he was given the
assignment to prepare, plan, and execute the operation Stupcanica 95, that
is the Zepa operation, he could have been at various different places.
From the forward command post in Pribicevac, that command post had to be
dismantled, the installations removed, and then a new forward command post
(20)had to be set up at Krivace.
I have no documents nor was I able from those available to me to
ascertain with precision the direction of movement and his positions,
where he was between Pribicevac and Krivace and back again, but I said
that he might have been at Pribicevac, at Krivace, or at Vlasenica at the
(25)command post in order to carry out all the necessary activities required
• Q.: General, are you aware of what General Krstic stated that he did on the afternoon of the 13th of July before he arrived at the command post in Krivace? • A.: To tell you the truth, just as this moment I can't remember (20)exactly what he said he did, but I know what he should have done. • Q.: General -- • A.: He should have focussed on the operation.
• Q.: -- I'm not interested in what he should have done, I'm interested
in what he did. And I can inform you that both General Krstic and a
(25)witness, Witness DA, stated that General Krstic spent the great proportion
• A.: Yes, I remember now. • Q.: Now, General, if General Krstic was making social visits on the (5)day before an operation, you would agree with me that he was in fact taking advantage of a respite or a lull in activity before another major operation took place, wouldn't you? • A.: He issued assignments, and those preparatory activities were ongoing. (10) • Q.: General, General, you're not answering my question, and I'll repeat it to you. If General Krstic, by his own words and by the words of his own witness, was making social visits on the 13th of July of 1995, the day before the Zepa operation was to commence, you would agree with me that he (15)was in fact taking advantage of a respite or a lull in activity before another operation took place, wouldn't you? • A.: Yes, one could put it that way. If you really insist on calling it that, yes. Touring the wounded is also an obligation of a senior officer. It is also officially prescribed. (20) • Q.: General, if you could have available before you paragraph 3.4 of your report, Defence Exhibit 160. MR. CAYLEY: And it's on page 52 of both the English and the B/C/S version. If, Mr. Usher, you could move the document up. That's fine. • Q.: And General, you will find, I think, the relevant passage -- (25)
• A.: It is number, I beg your pardon, which page did you say?
• A.: No, sir. That cannot be put like that because in the decree, the (15)constituent act of the Supreme Commander, it is stated that the appointment is of the 15th of July -- • Q.: General, General -- • A.: -- and no one has the right --
• Q.: -- we'll get to the discussion of that document and what you said
(20)about it. I will allow you to say all you wish to say about that
document. What I want you to concentrate now is the reasoning in your
report. That's all I want you to think about.
You have agreed with me that the 13th of July of 1995 was a
respite in the fighting. Now, based on your logic, General, based on your
(25)logic where you state that a pause or a respite in fighting was the ideal
• A.: The 13th of July was not a pause in the operation, it was the eve of a new operation, and that time is not suitable for any kind of takeover (5)of new duties. And he was appointed Commander of the Operative Group for Zepa. It was still in the preparatory stages. It had not even begun. But more importantly, it is a date that is not mentioned in the constituent document, and he was not authorised to take over duty on that date, nor was anyone authorised to hand over to him duty on that date. (10) • Q.: General, let us look at Prosecutor's Exhibit 483. Now, General, this, and Your Honours, is the operations order for Stupcanica 95, the operation towards Zepa. Now, General, you have already testified on a number of occasions that General Krstic was appointed to command the Operative Group that was (15)responsible for combat in Zepa. MR. CAYLEY: If the front page -- the front page of that document is present on the ELMO. • Q.: Now, General, General Krstic wrote this order, and he states at the top of this order that it is an order from the Drina Corps Command, (20)Krivace forward command post. Now, General, you would agree with me that any sensible military officer receiving a copy of this order would make the logical assumption that this was an order from the Corps Command and not from any kind of operative group command; isn't that right? (25)
• A.: An operative group is a component part of the Drina Corps.
• A.: I apologise, I didn't hear you. There was an interruption in the (5)interpretation, so could you please repeat. • Q.: General, is it not normal military convention for a commander who is placed in command of an operative group, is placed in command of a subset of a larger unit, to actually identify that fact on the order that he issues? (10)
• A.: Yes, but the problem is that there is no document from whoever
designated General Krstic as Commander of the Operative Group, so no
reference can be made to a document. And the rights that would emanate
from that document of the person who is in command to call him the
Commander of the Operative Group.
(15)You see that General Krstic signed this document as Chief of
Staff, which means that he too acknowledged the fact that there is no
document, no paper of his appointment, no written appointment for him to
be able to use that title in communication. It was probably an oral order
by the Commander of the Main Staff and there is no document that he can
(20)refer to and call himself the Commander of the Operative Group.
So when I'm saying that General Krstic was the Commander of the
Operative Group, what I'm saying is that he was in fact there conducting
the operation following the oral order of the Commander of the Main
Staff. That was his right. He could have issued a written document, but
(25)he need not have. But he appointed him Commander of the Operative Group.
• Q.: General, so what you're saying to the Court is even though General Krstic knew when he wrote this order that in fact he was to be the Commander of an Operative Group going to Zepa, he represented to the entire Drina Corps that the Drina Corps Command was to move to Krivace and (10)that this was to be a Drina Corps operation. Is that what you're saying? • A.: What I am saying is that from the end of the Srebrenica operation a new forward command post is being formed of the Drina Corps from which the operative group conducting the operation for Zepa is being commanded. That is what I'm saying. (15) • Q.: General, let's go to paragraph 10 of this order. That is on page 4 of the English translation and it is on page 4 of your version. Now, General, it states here, this order signed by General Krstic, that the Drina Corps forward command post in Krivace shall start work at 1800 hours on the 13th of July of 1995. (20)Now, General, you would agree with me that General Krstic makes no reference in this order to an operative group forward command post moving to Zepa, does he?
• A.: He mentions the forward command post of the Drina Corps, but he
does not mention the operative group because he doesn't have a document on
(25)the basis of which he can call himself Commander of the Operative Group.
• Q.: Now, General, you yourself, throughout your evidence, have stated - and, Mr. Visnjic, this is at page 7905 a single example of it - (5)that it is a very strict requirement that the commander of the corps be at the forward command post. You have stated that in your evidence, haven't you, General?
• A.: Yes. No. No, it's not a very strict regulation. The Corps
Commander may, on the basis of his own judgement, appear at the forward
(10)command post. It is up to him, to his own judgement, where he should be
at what point in time, where his appearance is most important. If he
considers it to be at the forward command post, that is where he will go.
If not, then he will not go there.
There are twofold implications of this being the fact that the
(15)Commander of the Main Staff of the VRS ordered General Krstic to carry out
the operation on Zepa, thereby in practice and in fact, he relieved the
Corps Commander of the obligation to appear at the forward command post,
whereas Krstic was obliged to be there as the commander of the group
conducting the operation.
(20)So that is the distinction between this situation and the
situation at the forward command post in Pribicevac. There the commander
was obliged to appear even though General Krstic, as Chief of Staff, was
at the forward command post. In this case it is different.
General Krstic has the duty to conduct the operation and General Zivanovic
(25)has no obligation to appear at the forward command post. It would have
(5) MR. CAYLEY: If I could have Prosecutor's Exhibit 762, please. • Q.: Now, General, here you see an order from a Colonel Vladimir Arsic, and you will see at the top that Colonel Arsic particularly refers to being in command of an operative group, of Doboj Operative Group, and he is himself giving commands to a tactical group. (10)Now, bearing in mind, General, that it was in fact a requirement to identify that a commander was in command of an operative group as opposed to an entire corps, don't you think that General Krstic, being an experienced VRS officer, would have actually put that fact in this order had he really believed that he was in command of an operative group rather (15)than the entire corps?
• A.: No, not necessarily, for the simple reason that General Krstic was
Chief of Staff and also Deputy Commander. Even if General Mladic had not
given him orders to carry out that operation, the Corps Commander could
have given him that order. He could have said, "Krstic, from now on you
(20)will plan and carry out the Zepa operation as an operation carried out by
such-and-such a group," and he could designate the forces.
As you can see from the combat order for Zepa, General Krstic
issued that document to all units of the Drina Corps which he wished to
engage for Zepa without any limitations because in the order for Zepa,
(25)nobody had given him the exact units he had to engage. He had the freedom
• Q.: Now, General, at page 7905 of your evidence, you said: "There is a very strict requirement that the commander should be located at the forward command post because that is the very reason why the command is (5)being relocated because it is so that the commander can have a more efficient control over his troops from the forward command post." Now, General, based on your logic and based on the fact that the Zepa operations order identifies Krivace as the forward command post, based on the fact that General Zivanovic was never seen at the forward (10)command post in Krivace, based on the evidence that the Judges have heard, you would agree with me that it is a logical conclusion that General Krstic was the Commander of the Drina Corps from the 13th of July of 1995, wouldn't you, General? • A.: No. I would not agree with you because standing in the way is the (15)decree of the president of the republic and my overall insight into the course of events from the 12th until the 20th. There is not a single document on the basis of which it is possible to conclude that General Zivanovic was replaced, that he was removed from duty, or that he was sick or wounded, that he was unable to perform his duties. (20)I really did not come across any such document, and therefore I have no reason to believe that General Krstic became commander before he took over duty from Zivanovic and before that is done in the regular way in which duty is transferred.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Yes, Mr. Cayley, perhaps it is
(25)now time for a break. We'll now have a 50-minute break.
--- Upon commencing at 1.08 p.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Cayley, please continue. (5) MR. CAYLEY: Good afternoon, Mr. President, Your Honours. • Q.: Good afternoon, General. MR. CAYLEY: If we could have Prosecutor's Exhibit 759, please. JUDGE RIAD: Mr. Cayley, I just want some information from General Radinovic. (10)General, you were mentioning that till the 20th, General Krstic did not take over any duty from Zivanovic. Concerning Zivanovic, was there any real role played by him during this period, basic roles between the 11th and the 20th, or was he a little bit absent from the picture according to your assessment? Just a general question. (15)
• A.: Your Honour, I don't have any information as to whether he was
removed from duty at that time, so I couldn't comment on that aspect of
your question; however, there are documents which he signed on the 13th of
July which indicates that he was still active within the chain of command.
There are certain activities which are being conducted within the area of
(20)responsibility of the Drina Corps which are not directly part of the Zepa
operation, although they do affect the operative situation in the area of
responsibility of the Zvornik Brigade; that is, that situation affects the
issue of the Zepa operation because General Krstic expected certain forces
to be returned to him. So that, to a certain extent, affects the
(25)situation in Zepa.
JUDGE RIAD: Thank you, General. But you say you have no documents to prove -- which prove that he was excluded from the picture, (20)but do you have documents which prove that he was included in the picture? Not passively, actively.
• A.: By definition, he is participating in the command. He's both de
facto and nominally the Commander of the Drina Corps until such a time as
he hands over the duty of command and until a document is issued to that
(25)effect. So he is here de jure and de facto Commander of the Corps, and by
JUDGE RIAD: By definition, that's right, but there is nothing concrete, no orders signed by him and so on. That's just my question. Did you come across orders signed by him in this period, by Zivanovic? (5) • A.: Yes. General Zivanovic signed an order on the 13th as the corps commander, and he is, of course, in the area of responsibility of the corps and he's active. He also signed an order on the 14th, I believe, or maybe even on a later date - I don't remember exactly when - whereby he is requesting his (10)subordinate officers as to when the hand-over of duty can take place in the usual manner, which means that he was still in the area of responsibility. And as long as he was able to command the corps both physically and formally, he was still on duty as a commander. As to how active he was, it's a matter of his assessment. I don't know whether it (15)was necessary to issue specific documents of command. All of the units which were carrying out their missions in the area, particularly Zvornik and Birac Brigade, they were at their positions and they were engaged in combat with the forces of the 28th Division which were attempting a breakthrough from the area. So there was no need for (20)him to make any radical changes with new orders. He was dealing with the current situation, with the situation that was on the ground at that time by inspecting the units that were deployed in the area. JUDGE RIAD: Thank you, General. Thank you. MR. CAYLEY: (25)
• Q.: General, if you could look at Prosecutor's Exhibit 759 in front of
• A.: The Commander of the Drina Corps was General Zivanovic, who was the commander at the time. MR. CAYLEY: Now, if the booth can bring in the focus of that document so we could see both documents alongside each other. If you (10)could move it a little bit. If the booth could focus in. That's fine. • Q.: General, now looking at the document on the right-hand side which is dated the 13th of July, 1995, which you will note is identical in all respects, it says at the top, "Command of the Drina Corps," as per the order of General Zivanovic, and it is signed at the bottom "Commander, (15)Major-General Radislav Krstic." Now, on the basis of the order of the 13th of July, 1995, you would agree with me that General Krstic is here representing himself as the Commander of the Drina Corps, isn't he?
• A.: Only for the purposes of this document. This document concerns
(20)the search of terrain for the Milici and Bratunac Brigades and the Skelani
Battalion. Those are the units which General Krstic included in his group
for Zepa, and the order in question concerns the search of terrain.
As to why we see the word "Commander" here there can be several
interpretations, but it obviously refers to his command function within
(25)the preparation for the Zepa operation.
(5) • A.: Well, it's the same formation. Both Krstic and Zivanovic belonged to the Drina Corps, and they issued their orders on behalf of the Drina Corps Command. MR. CAYLEY: If we go to the signature block on both documents, and, Mr. Usher, if you could move the document to the right slightly. (10)Across a bit further. Perfect. If the focus could come out a little bit, please. • Q.: General, if we look at the signature block of each document, you'd agree with me that General Zivanovic signs as commander and indeed General Krstic signs as commander, does he not? (15) • A.: Well, Krstic is also the commander at that time. He's the Commander of the Zepa Operative Group and he's issuing an order to the units which are part of that operative group. So he's a commander as well. • Q.: General, does this order of the 13th of July of General Krstic (20)make any reference to the Operative Group of Zepa? • A.: No, but you have to bear in mind the done text in which all this is taking place. The document was issued in the context of the preparations for the Zepa operation by General Krstic. If we want to be mindful of the facts, and I hope we do. (25)
• Q.: General, can you examine the top of this document where it states
• A.: It's a convention. It need not necessarily be so. Well, Krstic was the commander, the Commander of the Operative Group, and he has the right to use this mark. And even if he had used number "2", it wouldn't have been a mistake. But since he was appointed by the Commander of the (10)Main Staff to command the forces engaged in Zepa, he has the right to use number "1". • Q.: So your evidence, General, is that even though General Krstic represents himself in this order as the Commander of the Drina Corps, even though convention demands that "01" apply only to the Commander of the (15)Drina Corps, that everybody knew on reading this order that in fact he wasn't the Commander of the Drina Corps at all. Is that your evidence?
• A.: "01" refers to the commander as such, not the Commander of the
Drina Corps. Every commander marks, designates his documents with 01, the
Commander of the Main Staff, the Brigade Commander, Corps Commander. This
(20)is a convention concerning this type of designation so that the documents
can be easily traced.
General Krstic used his right here in this document. He was
indeed appointed as the commander and he functioned as the commander of
that part of the corps which was involved in the preparations for the Zepa
(25)operation, and it was in that capacity that he issued this document.
• Q.: So are you suggesting to the Court that General Krstic essentially misrepresented himself in this order; by using this designation of the commander, 01, he was in fact misrepresenting himself to the Drina Corps? • A.: No. What I stated, sir, was that within the same command, to use (15)one and the same designation for two individuals and for two positions is not a very good idea for the overall system of command, that this is not something I would have done. However, he did not commit any serious infringement of the system of command. He was indeed the Commander of the Zepa forces, and he was able to use this designation, but I wouldn't have (20)used it myself, for example. He signed the Zepa order as the chief of staff. I could have signed this document as a chief of staff.
• Q.: General, are you aware that the last order signed by General
Zivanovic was at 1720 on the 13th of July of 1995, and the first order
signed by General Krstic was at 2000 hours as commander on the 13th of
(25)July, 1995? Are you aware of that fact?
(15) JUDGE RIAD: General, but if the order has been implemented without any protest, wouldn't that be an admission that he is the Corps Commander?
• A.: He is both Chief of Staff and Deputy Corps Commander. So as
regards the continuity of command, it is not necessary for him to
(20)attribute to himself those functions for which he was not authorised. He
has the right to replace the commander and to assume the command when the
commander is unavailable. It was not necessary for him to attribute to
himself the function of the Corps Commander when that was -- when it was
not necessary for him to do that.
(25)So he could only sign this document as the Commander for the Zepa
JUDGE RIAD: Thank you. MR. CAYLEY: • Q.: General, if you could please turn to page 51 of your report. MR. CAYLEY: It's Defence Exhibit 160. (10) • A.: Fifty, what did you say, I'm sorry, what page? • Q.: Page 51, General. Now, General, my understanding from your report, you give two principle reasons why General Krstic signed Prosecutor's Exhibit 463 in the manner in which he did, that of commander, and I will read to you the (15)first reason that you give. "The fact that there are some documents signed by Krstic before July 15th can be interpreted in two ways. First, that Krstic issued and signed these documents in the role of deputy commander, having simply overlooked the fact that the place for the signature is marked 'Commander,' instead of 'Deputy Commander'." (20)Now, General, you agree with me, you would agree with me, that had General Krstic intended to represent himself as the deputy commander, he would have said so, wouldn't he? • A.: Yes, but you omitted to read what follows and which provides the explanation for this. (25)
• Q.: General, we'll move on to the explanation in a moment. If you
• A.: He would have if he had looked. Maybe he didn't look closely. (5)And he considered himself a commander, and it wouldn't make any difference because in terms of competencies, nothing substantial changes. • Q.: But General, General Krstic was a professional, intelligent officer. He would not have signed a document, would he, as commander, if he had meant to sign it as deputy commander, would he? (10) MR. CAYLEY: And if we could have Prosecutor's Exhibit 760 ready. • A.: As you see, he did, even though he was not the commander. • Q.: Here, General, is an order of the 11th of December, 1994, in which General Krstic signs off as the Deputy Commander. Do you see that at the bottom of the order? (15) • A.: Yes, I do. • Q.: Now, you'd agree with me based on this order, Prosecutor's Exhibit 760 where General Krstic signs as deputy commander and on the basis of the order that we're discussing at the moment, 463, where General Krstic signs as the commander, he knew the distinction between (20)those two roles and he indeed ensured in his orders that he properly represented himself, didn't he, General?
• A.: He knew that he was Commander of the forces for Zepa and that is
why he signed in that way. But I agree with you that he knew the
difference. So in answer to your question, the answer is yes. But he
(25)knew that he was Commander of the Operative Group for Zepa and it is in
• Q.: Now, General, the second reason that you gave in your report, and I will read the section that you wanted me to read, "Second" -- it is the (5)second plausible reason that you give for Krstic signing that document as commander: "Second that Krstic signed documents as "commander" and not as "deputy commander" or "chief of staff" without authorisation." Now, General, you would agree with me that had General Krstic been signing an order as commander on behalf of General Zivanovic, he would (10)have said so, wouldn't he, in the order? • A.: Yes, but he signed this order in his own name as commander of the group for Zepa. MR. CAYLEY: And if Prosecutor's Exhibit 76 could be placed on the ELMO. I'm sorry, Defence Exhibit 76. My apologies. (15) THE REGISTRAR: 76/A bis? MR. CAYLEY: Yes, please. Thank you. • Q.: Now, General, here is an order which you will agree was signed by General Krstic on behalf of General Zivanovic. And before you question the document, that is the signature of General Krstic. Here we see (20)General Krstic expressly stating in an order that he was signing on behalf of General Zivanovic. So you'd agree with me, General, that from this document, General Krstic knew when he was signing on behalf of the Corps Commander because he would say so in the order, wouldn't he? (25)
• A.: Yes. He knew that he was signing in the -- when he was signing in
• Q.: Now, General, if we accept that General Krstic knew when he was (5)signing as deputy commander, if he knew when he was signing on behalf of somebody else, and there is absolutely no reference to the operational group for Zepa obtained in Prosecutor's Exhibit Exhibit 463, you'd agree with me that on the basis of those three facts General Krstic was signing as the Commander of the Drina Corps, wasn't he, on this occasion? (10) • A.: I have told you several times that I do not agree with your conclusion and my answer is no. • Q.: Now, General, you stated earlier that had General Krstic indeed misrepresented himself as the Commander of the Drina Corps then that order would have been null and void. Do you recall that evidence? In fact, I (15)think His Honour Judge Riad asked you about that particular point.
• A.: No. No, no. I said that the order would have consequences.
Every time Krstic, in any capacity, signs an act, a document, that
document produces consequences because he is by function Chief of Staff
and deputy commander. So every document he signs produces consequences,
(20)but only within the framework and within the context of the document he
has issued. But in legal terms, if he signs as a commander and an expert
establishes that he was not the commander, then in legal terms it would be
null and void. That is the distinction I wanted to make.
What I want to say is that General Krstic had no need to attach to
(25)his name titles that don't belong to him because being the deputy
• Q.: General, you state that General Krstic signed this order in the capacity as Commander of the Zepa operation, and you also referred to the (5)fact that the order, Prosecutor's Exhibit 463, gave orders to the Bratunac Brigade, the Milici Brigade, and the Skelani Battalion. Are you aware, General, that the Skelani Battalion was never engaged in the operation towards Zepa? It was not part of those forces that were engaged towards Zepa. On that basis, General, if General Krstic (10)was giving orders to those units that did not comprise the Operative Group Zepa, he was giving orders to the rest of the corps and on that basis, General, he was the commander of the corps, wasn't he? • A.: He issued an order here to the Milici Brigade, the Bratunac Brigade, and the Skelani Battalion. Only a part of those forces was (15)included in the operative group for Zepa. Not all those forces. But within the preparations and the regrouping of forces for the Zepa operation, it was necessary to search the terrain in order to secure the rear. And in this part of the assignment, the preparatory work for the Zepa operation, the Skelani Battalion did participate on the left side. (20) • Q.: General, if General Krstic only had authority for those forces engaged in the Zepa operation, how did he have authority to issue orders to the Skelani Battalion? How did he have authority until he was the Commander of the Drina Corps, General?
• A.: There seems to be a basic misunderstanding between us. By
(25)General Krstic's appointment by General Mladic as commander of the group
• Q.: And you just stated in your evidence, General, that the only thing that General Krstic didn't have to participate in were those activities which were outside the area of responsibility of Zepa, but you would agree with me if he was issuing orders to the Skelani Battalion, the Bratunac (20)Brigade, and the Milici Brigade, who were all involved in operations in Srebrenica, he was giving orders, wasn't he, to activities outside Zepa?
• A.: This area we are referring to is an area that was directly
included in the operations area of Zepa. When an operation is being
prepared, then the area or zone of deployment of units is not marked by
(25)lines. It is an area that has its depth, and the depth of the brigade on
• Q.: General, is Ravni Buljin in the Srebrenica enclave? • A.: That is the border of the Srebrenica enclave. If you're talking about Buljim, Ravni Buljim. • Q.: Is Zeleni Jadar just south of the Srebrenica enclave? (10) • A.: That also is the border. It is along the border. That is the border area. • Q.: General, do you know whether or not this order was actually complied with, Prosecutor's Exhibit 463? • A.: You mean search of the terrain? Is that what you mean? (15) • Q.: Yes, yes. • A.: Units of the Bratunac and Milici Brigades and the Skelani Battalion certainly did carry out their assignment regarding searching the terrain. MR. CAYLEY: If Prosecutor's Exhibit 464 could be placed in front (20)of the General. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] General, I have a question for you. Generally speaking, if General Krstic was to replace Zivanovic as Corps Commander, how would he sign an order?
• A.: He could sign the order in several -- he had several options. He
(25)could put his signature under a title called "Corps Commander," and all
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Out of these four possibilities, which would be more in line with the rules? Are they all equal, or is (10)there one that is preferred? • A.: If we exclude this particular document, if we're talking in principle? JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, yes. I'm now excluding this particular document, but we're talking in general terms. In a normal (15)situation, he's Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander, and he needs to sign an order of the command in the absence of General Zivanovic. It is this situation that I should like you to address. You have mentioned four options, and my question is, is there one out of the four that is more in conformity with the rules, or are they all equal? (20) • A.: As far as the consequences are concerned and the authority, they are identical, but the normal thing would be for him to refer to the function that he has in the structure of the command of the Drina Corps, and that is Chief of Staff. Everyone knows automatically that he is also Deputy Commander, so it would be sufficient for him to say Chief of Staff. (25)
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Thank you.
JUDGE RIAD: Just a question on the practical level. How did he always sign, with the exception of this order where he signed (5)"commander"? Did he ever sign -- as you said, he could sign "commander" and everybody knew his signature. Did he do it, or was it also "deputy commander" with the exception of this one? According to your analysis and what you saw. • A.: According to what I saw, he signed in all three variants. There (10)are documents signed as chief of staff; there are documents he signed as deputy commander; and there are also documents he signed under the heading "commander," and he added the word "for" the little word "for," which means he's acting on behalf of somebody, that he has the authority to do that. So he signed in all three ways. (15)The most natural, the most normal way for him to sign would be as Chief of Staff because everyone knows that that is what he was, everyone knows his signature, and there's absolutely no obstacle to carry out those command documents that he signed as Chief of Staff because it is known that he has the authority to do so. (20) JUDGE RIAD: So at best, if he's commander, he would sign "for," he would put "for" before it, "for" the commander? And he never signed "commander" except in this document without putting "for"?
• A.: No, Your Honour. In official correspondence in the JNA or the
army of Republika Srpska when before the heading "commander" you put the
(25)word "for," it signified that somebody is signing the document who is
JUDGE RIAD: That's what I mean, thank you. (5) MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could be provided with Prosecutor's Exhibit 465. It is a map. If you don't have it to hand, Madam Registrar, I can .... If you could move that map up a little bit please, Mr. Usher. A bit further. (10) • Q.: Now, General, Prosecutor's Exhibit 463, General Krstic's order to the Bratunac Brigade, Milici Brigade, and the Skelani Independent Battalion, identifies certain locations from which the search was to be carried out. Could you please point on that map, General, to Ravni Buljim? And this is the orders in respect of the Bratunac Brigade. (15) • A.: [Indicates] • Q.: So Ravni Buljim is in the northwestern corner of the enclave. The next location is down towards Zvijezda which I think you'll find in the centre, General, of the enclave. If you could point to that, please. • A.: Zvijezda? (20) • Q.: I'm sorry. So Zvijezda is in the middle of the enclave? Siljato Brdo, could you point to that? • A.: Siljato Brdo. • Q.: Slapovici and Zeleni Jadar. • A.: [Indicates] (25)
• Q.: Now, those were the lines up to which the 1st Bratunac Light
• A.: But Krstic was not broadening the area, it was the brigade (5)commander who was. Krstic, in his order, ordered which part of the area should be searched, and in military terms, the cleaning of the terrain. I don't see what the dispute is about. MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, as we're talking (10)about these geographic names, perhaps it would be simpler to give the witness the document, the document Mr. Cayley is referring to. I'm referring to Exhibit 463. I think that's what we're discussing. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Cayley, I don't quite get the question. Do you have a response? (15) MR. CAYLEY: I'm sorry. I thought the witness already had that document. If Mr. Visnjic is indicating that he doesn't, then we should give it to him. It doesn't need to be placed on the ELMO. It's better that the witness has the document. He has it already. I thought he did. • Q.: Now, General, in essence you'd agree with me that General Krstic (20)was giving an order for the search of the area enclosed by the Srebrenica enclave, wasn't he, in this order?
• A.: But, sir, the area for the search of the terrain does not,
strictly speaking, coincide with the borders of the enclave. The area of
the enclave is approximately defined so that the brigades should know what
(25)is being referred to. The area of the Srebrenica enclave was mentioned so
• Q.: General, is General Krstic issuing an order for the search of the enclave? Yes or no. It's very simple. You can see the locations on the (5)map. Was he issuing an order for the search of the enclave or was he not? • A.: When an order is being issued, then the most precise designations are lines and axes. A brigade cannot be limited to an area which it cannot fit into. You indicate the axes of the search. That is how a (10)document like this is drafted. And I agree with you that in this order signed by Krstic it is stated that it is the enclave, that the duty to search the terrain does relate to the enclave area, to the area of the enclave. • Q.: General, do you have Prosecutor's Exhibit 534 at hand, please? (15)Now, General, the order issued by General Krstic, the order that we're having this lengthy discussion about, the number of that order was 01/4-157-5. MR. CAYLEY: Your Honours, that's the order which General Krstic signs as commander. (20)
• Q.: Now, this General, is a document from the command of the
1st Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade, dated the 14th of July, and I will
just read three lines of paragraph 2: "Our forces are searching and
clearing the terrain in accordance with order, strictly confidential
number 01/4-157/5, and part of our forces is participating from our side
(25)in the encirclement of enemy forces at point 1."
• A.: No, I would not agree with you because I still abide by the arguments that I have presented and that is that General Krstic, on the 14th, was not the Corps Commander. (10) • Q.: But, General, you would agree with me that if Colonel Blagojevic believed that General Krstic was misrepresenting himself as the Commander of the Drina Corps, he would not have followed the order, would he? • A.: If General Krstic was misrepresenting himself, he knows very well who General Krstic is, and there is no need for Krstic to introduce (15)himself to him. He knows him. And he got an order from General Krstic, and he's carrying out that order. The only thing is that he expanded the area of responsibility beyond what he was ordered to do by General Krstic. MR. CAYLEY: If the General could be shown Prosecutor's (20)Exhibit 467, please. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] What was the rank of General Krstic at the time? • A.: At that time when he received this?
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] For example, on the 13th of
(25)July, yes.
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] No, the rank, the military rank. (5) • A.: He was Major-General. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] And on the 11th of December, 1994? • A.: On the 11th of December, 1994. Let me try and recollect. I think he was Colonel. I think he was Colonel. (10) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well. Thank you. Mr. Cayley. MR. CAYLEY: • Q.: General, do you have Prosecutor's Exhibit 467 in front of you? MR. CAYLEY: And if the translation could be placed on the ELMO. (15)Your Honours, this is a document that you may recall was written by hand by Colonel Blagojevic, and he put the date of the 14th of July on this document in his own hand. When the document was processed and sent by the army telegrapher, the date 17th of July was placed on that document, although, in fact, the document is signed as sent on the 14th of (20)July at the end. So that is why there is a discrepancy in the dates on the document you see on the screen and the document the General has, which is dated the 14th of July.
• Q.: Now, General, this is a document that you can see is have Colonel
Vidoje Blagojevic to the Command of the Drina Corps, and I will read it
(25)out: "We wish to inform you that we shall be able to secure the presence
• A.: No, I would not agree with you. • Q.: General, would you agree with me that when a colonel in the (10)Bosnian Serb army refers to General Zivanovic as the "hitherto," "the hitherto Commander of the Drina Corps," that he believes in his mind that General Zivanovic is no longer the Commander of the Drina Corps? • A.: That is not the -- up to the Brigade Commander to judge of his own free will who is the Corps Commander and who is not. (15) • Q.: General, I'm not asking you that question. The question is a very simple one. Based on this document, based on this document, does Colonel Blagojevic represent his view as being that General Zivanovic is no longer the Commander of the Drina Corps? If you wish to decline to answer, then simply say, "I do not wish (20)to answer," and I will move on.
• A.: I have given you my answer that I disagree with you, because in
the next sentence of this same document it says that Colonel Blagojevic
has informed that members of his command will be able to attend the
official farewell, and it is an official farewell where the former
(25)commander hands over duty and the new commander takes over. Until that
• Q.: So your position is, General, that essentially General Krstic was (5)basically misrepresenting himself as the Corps Commander on the 13th of July and Colonel Blagojevic, one of his immediate subordinate commanders, was completely confused as to the situation and was referring erroneously to Zivanovic being the hitherto Commander of the Drina Corps. Is that your position? (10) • A.: He is the hitherto commander. Until then he was the commander. He was always the commander, and he didn't leave. He will leave only once that official farewell has taken place. That is how it is called according to the terminology of the transfer of duty. Corps Commanders and members of the senior commands transfer duty at an official meeting, (15)at a working meeting which has an official and ceremonious character. And commanders of tactical units do the takeover and hand-over duty in front of lined-up units. JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me, Mr. Cayley. Just a question since you mentioned it. In English it is "hitherto," and in the French (20)it's "jusqu'a present." I listened to it. It's "jusqu'a present." It means that he was still in command. "Jusqu'a present," it does not mean it is the final point. Is it in English or in French?
MR. CAYLEY: In the English language, it's a very old fashioned
word, "hitherto," but it essentially means the previous commander, the
(25)person who was in the position and no longer is in the position.
(5) MR. CAYLEY: The English translation of this document from the Serbian -- JUDGE RIAD: Let's check it first. MR. CAYLEY: We will, but there has been, to be honest with you, Judge Riad, there has been a lot of discussion about this particular word, (10)so it's not something that we've just sort of pulled out of a hat. It's been interpreted as the word "hitherto," and I've just explained, I think it's clear what that word means. JUDGE RIAD: So the French is not correct, in my opinion. "Jusqu'a present," the present is included. So if we rely -- just I (15)wanted to understand. Otherwise, the President is listening in French, I'm listening in English; we will not have the same opinion. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Visnjic, are you going to suggest a break?
MR. VISNJIC:
[Int.] Mr. President, I think perhaps it
(20)would be most opportune to ask the interpreters for an official commentary
because we also have a dilemma, together with our learned friends from the
Prosecution, which would be the best word in English, and I am not sure
that this is the best solution for the Prosecution or the Defence. So
perhaps the translation service could give us an additional explanation as
(25)to the various meanings that can be given to this word.
(5)
MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, as far as the English-B/C/S version is
concerned, and I believe my learned friend is already aware of this, there
has been a report produced on that - in fact, copied to my learned friend
Mr. Harmon - and I can read that into the record if you wish, or I can
give you this to read.
(10)It simply says, "On the 31 October 2000 in the trial session of
the case of The Prosecutor v. Krstic, General Krstic read OTP Exhibit
467/b in Serbian for the record.
"The English booth interpreted the words of General Krstic as
follows: `We wish to inform you that we are able to ensure the presence
(15)of members of the command and representatives of the municipal authorities
for the official farewell for General Zivanovic, the outgoing commander of
the Drina Corps, on 23rd of June 1995 at 1300 hours."
And then this is the commentary by Maya Drazenovic-Carrieri, the
chief of the interpretation service, she says the following: "At the
(20)request of the Prosecutor, I have reviewed the English transcript of the
proceedings together with Exhibit 467/a. I wish to state for the record
that the official translation of the Serbian term," which I shall probably
mispronounce, "'dosadasnji' is `hitherto' as can be seen in the revised
English translation (OTP Exhibit 467/a)."
(25)So we do for the purposes of the proceedings have the
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Can we have any comment from the translation service for the French as well, please? (5) MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, we'll seek that commentary. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well. Let us now have a very brief break so that we can work until three. We'll have a 10-minute break. --- Recess taken at 2.13 p.m. (10) --- On resuming at 2.25 p.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Cayley, you may continue. MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President. • Q.: General, I now want to move on to general principles of appointment of senior officers. Now, I want to read to you some evidence (15)of a Defence witness, Witness DB, who is a serving senior VRS officer who testified before the Court, and my learned friend Mr. Harmon was asking him a number of questions about presidential decrees and appointments of officers, and the question went like this, General.
• Q.: I understand that there was a presidential decree and the
(20)presidential decree was required for a number of positions,
officer positions, but can you allow for the possibility that
de facto someone assumes command prior to the issuance of a
piece of paper signed by the president which formally
designates the individual to a command post?
(25)And the answer to that question was, "I accept that possibility."
• Q.: Now, you would agree with me, General, wouldn't you, that if a senior VRS officer stated in this courtroom that individuals could be appointed to de facto positions without the issuance of official (5)paperwork, then that is a real possibility, isn't it, General? • A.: I think I'm more familiar with the matters than the officer who testified here, and I know that that cannot happen. MR. CAYLEY: If we could have Prosecutor's Exhibit 468. • Q.: Now, General, you yourself said in evidence, and this is at -- (10)actually, I don't have the page reference for this at the moment, but I will give it to you when I can locate it. These are your words, "It is perfectly customary for those individuals," and here you were referring to senior officers, "to be discussed and assessed during high level meetings, and it is quite possible that the appointment in question was a kind of (15)assessment of the personnel situation, human resources situation, and then the service in charge of drafting such documents then prepare the relevant documents on the 14th of July, 1995." Now, General, you yourself have stated in evidence that appointments could be made prior to the paperwork being issued. That is (20)what you were saying then, wasn't it, General?
• A.: No, no, I'm sure I didn't state that. It is the process of
assessing the personnel matters which takes place before the actual
appointment. Human resources need to be managed and certain plans have to
be made in respect of that. So before the actual appointment takes place
(25)the nominees, the candidates, are being assessed and they are being
• Q.: Did you serve in the Bosnian Serb army during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina? • A.: No. • Q.: Did you have any contact with the Bosnian Serb documentary (10)processes, how they processed appointments? Did you have anything to do with that at all, General, during the war in Bosnia? • A.: Me personally you mean? • Q.: Yes. • A.: No. No. No. (15) • Q.: So you would agree with me on that basis that Witness DB, who was a senior officer in the VRS serving in Bosnia throughout the war, would have a much better idea than you as to whether or not de facto appointments were made without the paperwork being completed immediately? • A.: As regards the appointment of generals, I'm a hundred per cent (20)sure he doesn't have any better knowledge than me of the issue, despite the fact that he was a member of the VRS and I was not. MR. CAYLEY: If I could have Prosecutor's Exhibit 536.
• Q.: General, as you can see, this is a daily combat report of the
Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade, and in paragraph 2 of this order, it
(25)states: "Our forces are still searching the terrain in accordance with
• A.: He was carrying out the order which General Krstic signed as the Commander of the Zepa forces on the 13th of July. • Q.: General, do you see that the order is addressed to the Command of (10)the Drina Corps, forward command post of the Drina Corps? Do you see that on this document? • A.: I see it on the document, but it only supports my position and not yours, that it was sent to the Drina Corps Command and the forward command post of the Drina Corps. There was no -- if there had been no need to (15)send it to the forward command post, then no such mention would be made on the document. So this is sent to the person -- to the organ who is supposed to carry out the order, and it is sent to the Commander of the Drina Corps who is at the forward command post of the Drina Corps as the Commander of (20)the Zepa operation. • Q.: General, where did Colonel Vidoje Blagojevic believe the forward command post of the Drina Corps was located, based on this order?
• A.: He knows exactly where the forward command post is because in his
order of the 13th of July regarding Zepa, General Krstic notified him of
(25)the location of the forward command post which was at Krivace.
• A.: I don't know, sir, whether my words are being misinterpreted by (10)the interpretation service or by yourself. What I said was that the Commander of the Bratunac Brigade sent this report to the Command of the Drina Corps, to the location of the command, that is, at Vlasenica, and also to the forward command post of the Drina Corps at Krivace, namely, to General Krstic who had ordered him to do so explicitly. (15)So he sent it both to the Drina Corps Command at Vlasenica and the Command of the Zepa Operative Group at the forward command post of the corps. That is how it is being done in this system of command, which may be complicated but that's how it is. • Q.: General, if Colonel Blagojevic realised that he was sending this (20)document to the Command of the operative group in Zepa, why did he not say that in the order? Why did he not address it to the forward command post of the Operative Group Zepa?
• A.: Because it was the forward command post of the Drina Corps which
conducted the operation, and the forward command post was established as
(25)the point from which the commander involved in the Zepa operation would
• Q.: Now, you yourself have said, and I've reminded you on a number of occasions, you've said that the forward command post is the place from (5)which the commander of the corps fights the battle. Now, if that principle holds true, General, Colonel Blagojevic was sending this to General Krstic at the forward command post of the Drina Corps because he believed that General Krstic was the Commander of the Drina Corps, didn't he? (10) • A.: No. He knew exactly that General Krstic was not yet the Commander of the Drina Corps but that he was the Commander of the group which was conducting the Zepa operation. MR. CAYLEY: If we can have Prosecutor's Exhibit 537, please. • Q.: Now, General, you've stated in your evidence that you have not (15)come across a single document in which the Main Staff authorised the Drina Corps to task or monitor the activities of Main Staff units. Do you recall that evidence? Do you recall that evidence, General? • A.: Yes. I'm sorry. I haven't quite understood you. • Q.: Do you recall stating to this courtroom that you have not come (20)across a single document in which the Main Staff authorised the Drina Corps to task or monitor the activities of Main Staff units? • A.: To issue tasks to the units of the Main Staff, yes. • Q.: Now, General, this is an order which is from Colonel Ignjat Milanovic. It is addressed, as you can see, to the -- (25)
MR. CAYLEY: Actually, in the English version, Your Honours, there
• A.: Colonel Ignjat Milanovic was the Chief of Air Defence with the Staff of the Drina Corps. • Q.: Now, you will see, General, that Colonel Milanovic is addressing this particular report to the corps forward command post. He is making (10)this document for the attention of the commander. He is also copying it to the Drina Corps Command. Now, you would agree with me that if Colonel Milanovic, a staff officer within the Drina Corps, was addressing a document to the commander of the corps forward command post, he believed that General Krstic was the (15)Commander of the Drina Corps, didn't he? • A.: No, I couldn't agree with you. Colonel Milanovic knew exactly who was at the forward command post and who was commanding the forces from that forward command post. That was General Krstic, and it was sent to him, this document. (20)And this document is not an order, it's a proposal. He doesn't have authority to order the commander. He can only submit his proposals to the Commander of the Operative Group who is expecting the forces engaged in the search of the terrain to report to him so they can be deployed for the Zepa operation. (25)
• Q.: Now, General, you'll see that in this document, Colonel Milanovic
• A.: No, I do not agree with you. This is a continuation of the order which was issued for the search of the terrain to the Bratunac and Milici Brigades and the Skelani Battalion. Colonel Milanovic, as per the authorisation of General Krstic, went to the field to check out on what (15)was going on and why those forces were not coming to Zepa because he expected them there. He expected that they would be engaged for the purposes of the Zepa operation. • Q.: Now. General, you will see at the bottom of this document -- MR. CAYLEY: And Mr. Usher, if you could move the document up. (20)
• Q.: -- there is a proposal from Colonel Milanovic, and you will see
that the proposal is to authorise and appoint the commander of the 1st
Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade as commander of all forces are
participating in searching the terrain and sweeping the battlefield.
Now, General, General Krstic in his evidence to this Court in
(25)being questioned by my learned friend Mr. McCloskey was asked the
• A.: Yes. MR. CAYLEY: If we could now have Prosecutor's Exhibit 469. • Q.: Now, General, you've seen this document before, and this is the (10)document in respect of General Zivanovic, and you stated in your evidence in-chief, that being in response to a Judge's question, that you were not aware of Zivanovic taking up any significant posts after the 15th of July. Do you recall stating that? • A.: Yes. (15) • Q.: Now, you will see it says very clearly on this document -- MR. CAYLEY: And Mr. Usher, if you could refer to, I think, the next page of that document. • Q.: You will see it says very clearly that General Zivanovic was placed on disposal. Do you see that? (20) • A.: Yes. • Q.: Now, that means essentially, doesn't it, General, that General Zivanovic was not moving on to any other position after he was removed from the Drina Corps command, doesn't it?
• A.: No, it doesn't mean that, what you're saying. It means that as of
(25)the 15th, that is, from the 15th, which is the earliest date when General
• Q.: General, General -- • A.: And this is in accordance with the document on the appointment of General Krstic for the corps commander. • Q.: To what position was General Zivanovic appointed to by virtue of (15)this document? • A.: I have just answered that, but I will repeat myself. • Q.: General -- • A.: The expression that he's made available. • Q.: Was General Zivanovic appointed to any substantive position as a (20)result of this document? • A.: As a result of this document, no.
• Q.: General, it's correct, isn't it, that General Zivanovic never
occupied any position after this date, any position of which you have
already said you were aware? You are not aware that he occupied any
(25)significant position, are you, General?
MR. CAYLEY: If I could have Prosecutor's Exhibit 539, please. (5) • Q.: General, are you familiar with this particular document? • A.: Yes. • Q.: Now, General, this is a daily combat report from the command of the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade, Colonel Blagojevic, and what I am particularly interested in is the second paragraph of that document where (10)it says about halfway down, "During the day the Brigade commander visited all units which are blocking the enemy retreat (the 1st Milici Light Infantry Brigade, units of the 65th Protection Motorised Regiment, part of the MUP, and the 5th Engineering Battalion) defined their tasks and organised their joint action and communication." (15)Now, General, we have just been considering the previous document in which General Krstic approves of Milanovic's proposal to appoint the commander of the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade in command of all of the forces participating in the search, and you would agree with me that here the Brigade Commander, Colonel Vidoje Blagojevic, is reporting back that (20)he is coordinating the activities of all of the units blocking the retreat, including the 65th Protection Motorised Regiment, parts of the MUP, and the other units referred to. That's what he's doing, isn't he, General?
• A.: He does not say that he is supervising the 65th Protection
(25)Regiment, but he's only reporting that he toured them, and as they are
• Q.: General, I'm going to interrupt you because that is not what the report says. The report says that the Commander of the Bratunac Light (5)Infantry Brigade defined their tasks and organised their joint action and communications. You would agree with me, General, that Colonel Blagojevic is stating that he defined the tasks of the 65th Motorised Protection Regiment and parts of the MUP in accordance with General Krstic's order. (10)That's what he's doing, isn't he, General? • A.: No. Colonel Blagojevic's obligations towards the 65th Protection Regiment are indicated in the next sentence, and they have to do with coordination and not supervision. There's no document that places the 65th Regiment under the authority of the commander. There is no document (15)from the Main Staff or the Drina Corps towards the Bratunac Brigade, and also it is quite contrary to the principles of doctrine. There are two facts against it: There is no document to show it, number one; and number two, it is contrary to doctrine. So this relates only to joint action. He toured them, familiarised himself for what they were doing, and (20)he told the head of the Protection Regiment what they were doing, and beyond that, he has no further authority over the 65th Regiment.
• Q.: Now, General, in Prosecutor's Exhibit 407/a which is "Rules of
Ground Forces," let me just quote you paragraph 63 since you've mentioned
doctrine.
(25)"Command and control. General provisions. Command and control
• A.: Yes, but that does not apply to this order here. You have an order the very next day appointing Keserovic to coordinate activities. (10)The very next day you have another document which says that a provisional command is being formed which will unified activities from the 17th to the 19th in this area. • Q.: We'll get to that document in a moment. When this document states that the Commander of the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade was defining the (15)tasks and organising the joint actions of the MUP and the 65th Motorised Protection Regiment, that means exactly what it says, doesn't it, that those units were placed under his command for the purposes of this operation?
• A.: No. No, sir. When a superior wants to place a unit under a
(20)certain command, then he explicitly says so in a command document, saying,
"We're placing at your disposal the 65th Protection Regiment for the
execution of tasks along such-and-such axis in such-and-such an area until
such-and-such a date," and only then can the brigade commander have
control of that unit. In this way, his obligation was simply to organise
(25)the joint action of his units toward them. He has no authority over the
• Q.: Are you stating to the Judges that in essence Colonel Blagojevic is reporting back to the Drina Corps that he was defining tasks and organising joint action knowing full well that he had absolutely no (5)authority over those units at all? Is that your evidence? • A.: My evidence is exactly what is stated there, to organise -- • Q.: General -- • A.: -- joint action and to issue orders to his units, his own units. • Q.: General, isn't this document stating that Colonel Blagojevic (10)believed that he had the capacity to define the tasks of the MUP and the 65th Protection Regiment? Isn't this what this document says? • A.: No. He specifies the tasks of his own units and organises joint action with other units which are not under his command, because if they were under his command, then he would not be saying that he had organised (15)joint action with them but he would be in command of them.
• Q.: Now, General, Colonel Milanovic proposes, in Prosecutor's
Exhibit 537, to General Krstic, he makes this proposal: "To authorise and
appoint the Commander of the 1st Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade as
commander of all forces which are participating in the searching of the
(20)terrain and sweeping the battlefield."
Now, General, that is the order which General Krstic told this
Court that he approved of that proposal. So you would agree with me, on
the basis of that, General Krstic believed that he was appointing the
Commander of the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade as the commander of all
(25)of these forces including the MUP and the 65th Motorised Protection
• A.: I cannot answer the question as to what Krstic had in mind when he said that, but what I can tell you is that Krstic could not have authorised the Command of the Bratunac Brigade to have command over the (5)65th Protection Regiment because he never received any authority to do so. MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, I think perhaps now would be a good time to finish for the day. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Cayley. Mr. Cayley, (10)are you aware of the time that you still have left? Do you know that? According to our calculations, we need to finish or, rather, you need to finish tomorrow before the big break, that is, around noon, something like that. MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, you have my word that I will be (15)finished by then. I'm as desperate as anybody else to get finished, but I need to get through my material. I have that obligation.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Very well then. We should like
to do everything we can to complete the testimony of General Radinovic
tomorrow, which means that we must be ready to work a little longer,
(20)perhaps half an hour longer tomorrow. I don't see there is any
resistance, but I assure you that we're about to leave on holiday. I see
a smile at least. I don't know whether the smile was provoked by the
mention of "holiday" or by prolongation.
Anyway, but Madam Registrar, bear in mind that if necessary, we
(25)must be ready to work half an hour longer.
(5) --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.03 p.m., to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 12th day of December, 2000 at 9.20 a.m. |
