|
Content
/ Colormap • Page 5183 • {1/99} (1)Tuesday, 18 July 2000 [Open session] [The witness entered court]
--- Upon commencing at 9.32 a.m.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Good morning, ladies and
gentlemen; good morning to our technicians, our interpreters, legal
assistants, court reporters; good morning, Madam Registrar; good morning,
Mr. Harmon, Mr. McCloskey, Mr. Cayley; good morning, Mr. Petrusic and
(10)Mr. Visnjic; good morning, General Krstic.
We will resume with our work today. Mr. McCloskey will continue
examining the witness. I think that Mr. Petrusic was not nervous
yesterday. We're all doing our job here. We will be working until 3.00
today so that we can finish with the examination-in-chief.
(15)Let me propose a schedule for today. We will have three breaks
during our working day today. We will be working from half past nine
until 11.00. At 11.00 we will have a 20-minute break. Then we will be
working from 11.20 until 12.50, which will be followed by a half-hour
break. Then after that, there will be a working period from 1.00
[as
(20)interpreted] until ten minutes past two, and then we'll have a half-hour
break and work until the end, that is, until 3.00. I will not interrupt
you, but this is a tentative schedule for today.
Good morning, Mr. Butler. You will continue answering questions
that will be put to you by Mr. McCloskey.
(25)Mr. McCloskey, you have the floor.
WITNESS: RICHARD BUTLER [Resumed] • EXAMINED by Mr. McCloskey: [Continued] • Q.: We left off yesterday going over some intercepts from 17 July. (5)I'd like to take us back in time for one document that I inadvertently bypassed yesterday and that's taking us back to 15 July, to Exhibit 596A. It may be in another binder, but Mr. Butler has got it and can get it on the ELMO. Mr. Butler, can you explain to us what this document is, who it's (10)to, what its relevance is to your analysis?
• A.: This is an intelligence report from the intelligence organ of the
Zvornik Infantry Brigade to the command of the Drina Corps, dated 15 July
1995.
What this document is and what it represents is the understanding
(15)of Captain First Class Dusko Vukotic, the Chief of Intelligence of the
Zvornik Brigade, pertaining to the situation with the column that is
penetrating the rear zone of the Zvornik Infantry Brigade.
If you will remember back to the 15 July 1995 interim report
written by Colonel Pandurevic, much of the enemy information that's
(20)described in this report is incorporated in that interim report to the
Corps as well.
If I can direct your attention to the second paragraph, this is
for the first time where the idea is surfaced that the Corps should give
some consideration to the effects and consequences of opening a corridor
(25)for the armed head of the column, letting them through, and then closing
• Q.: So this reflects the actual deal that Colonel Pandurevic did the next day with the Muslim column. • A.: That is correct, sir, yes. (10) • Q.: All right. Let's go on, then, back to where we left off yesterday. It should be Exhibit 662A, an intercept of 17 July, 1244 hours. What can you tell us about this? • A.: This particular intercept between an X subscriber, who's unidentified, and Trbic of the Zvornik Brigade discusses X looking for (15)Pop, or Lieutenant Colonel Popovic, the Assistant Commander for Security of the Zvornik Brigade. Further down it notes that they're to leave right away for here, "for Zlatar 01," he says. Zlatar 01, as we've previously discussed, being the designator for the Commander of the Drina Corps, General (20)Krstic. He notes that -- in this case, Captain Trbic notes that it's difficult for him to get in touch with him. "... it's very hard for me to do that" from where they're located. The rest of the conversation, the reflection of the fact that he'll do what he can and try and get in touch with him. (25)
• Q.: So what task do you think they're talking about that Pop is
• A.: Working under the assumption that Trbic is, in fact, at the Zvornik Brigade headquarters in Karakaj, in Zvornik, the only tasks north on the 17th would be those related to the burial of bodies which occurs at (5)the Branjevo Military Farm on that day. • Q.: Let's go to the next exhibit, 664A, just a few minutes after this conversation that we've just spoke of, at 1249 hours on the 17th. • A.: This particular conversation, again, between an unidentified subscriber and Trbic, the discussion that the guidance has changed. "Let (10)him" continue to "finish that work." Presumably we're talking about that same "him" being Lieutenant Colonel Popovic. And then once he's done, "have him report immediately here at (Golac's?)" The closest that I infer from that is that they're referring to Golic, which in that case would make it Zlatar headquarters, to Major (15)Golic, or where he's located. Trbic is confirming that he will let him continue his work, he won't disturb him, and then he'll tell him when he stops back here at Palma. • Q.: The comment by Trbic, "The preparation is mainly finished," what do you take that for? (20) • A.: I assume that in that particular instance what they're talking about is the work related to burying the bodies. • Q.: Let's go to Exhibit 666A, 17 July, 1622 hours; Popovic on one side of a conversation and Y who is inaudible. What can you tell us about this? (25)
• A.: For the most part, Popovic reporting back to somebody that he sees
• Q.: A little mystery line at the bottom. "French is heard in the background." You don't know anything about that, I take it. • A.: I cannot explain that at all. • Q.: Why they're speaking French in the Zvornik Brigade. All right. (10)Let's go to Exhibit 668A, 17 July, 1850 hours. Could you just tell us about this?
• A.: This is a rather long one. If I could just go through some of the
names. Participants: Mirko and X, X being unidentified. Mirko, I
believe, is Lieutenant Mirko Petrovic who is a Drina Corps officer who's
(15)in charge of intercepting communications from -- I'm sorry, a Zvornik
Brigade officer who intercepts communications from the Muslim radio
operators.
He identifies first Jevtevic, which is Major Jevtevic of the Drina
Corps, the Commander of the 5th Communications Battalion. What the
(20)context of the discussion pertains to is the fact that an individual has
been identified, a Muslim individual, who was the chief radio operator or
signalsman for Naser Oric, and it notes that he is in the custody of the
Zvornik Brigade. They identify the individual of -- they identify him as
Ibraham Becirovic.
(25)He notes that he received that information from a "Colonel
• Q.: Before you go on to the next page, I just want to point out one
sentence in the middle. It says, "Go on, go and look for him and check
with him at home if he is anywhere so we can find him before some mafia
picks him up and kills him there and other things before I finish this
(25)job."
• A.: I believe that is a reference to the understanding that at least X is aware that prisoners are being killed in the zone of the Zvornik Infantry Brigade. (5) • Q.: But by 17 July, most of the of the organised executions, as we know of them, have been finished already by the 16th; is that right? • A.: That is correct, sir. In this instance, we also know from documents that, for the most part, Muslims who were taken prisoner from the column were also executed in small groupings and as we get into (10)additional exhibits further down the line, we will demonstrate that. But again, the awareness of the fact that for the most part, prisoners who are captured from the column by the Zvornik Brigade on the 15th, 16th 17th and 18th, they are being executed shortly after their capture. • Q.: All right. Do you have anything else in that one? (15) • A.: The last line just concludes the conversation. • Q.: All right. Now, let's go on to 671A, a conversation at 1950 hours, the participants: "Krstic - X - Commander (MLADIC)." What do you make of this?
• A.: This, I believe, is related to Zepa. A discussion between the
(20)Corps Commander, General Krstic on the 17th and General Mladic noting that
General Mladic is not accepting the conditions relative to negotiations at
Zepa and that General Krstic is to continue military operations. Further,
he notes that he wants General Krstic to get in touch with Miletic who is
General Major Miletic the Chief of Operations of the Main Staff where
(25)presumably, General Miletic has additional instructions.
(5) • A.: Again, not being deeply versed in the activities relative to the political situation in Zepa, what I believe that we're discussing here is the issue pertaining to how Mladic was looking for the unconditional surrender of the forces there, and how the BiH government did not want to give up the enclave and was specifically ordering the military forces in (10)Zepa not to surrender to the army of the Republika Srpska. • Q.: And up a little further in the conversation, General Mladic appears to be referring to General Krstic as "Krle". Is that the same Krle we heard on the videotape when Mladic and General Krstic came into Srebrenica? (15) • A.: Yes, sir, that's a nickname for General Krstic. • Q.: I also noted that General Mladic wants Krstic to get in touch with Miletic on the secure line. Now, we've had a lot intercepts where we see people speaking in open and sometimes in vague terms. Can you tell us what you know, if anything, about their -- General Krstic's and the (20)brigade's ability to communicate in a secure means at this time?
• A.: Understanding the communications network that the VRS possessed at
the time, the standard open telephone network, the radio telephone network
that they had that was designed to operate in secure voice mode, and in
many cases was unable to do so because there were technical problems. So
(25)primarily while it was designed to operate in a secure voice mode, it did
JUDGE RIAD: Just in passing, what value, then, would you give to the unsecure communications if they had the secure means? (20)
• A.: The one disadvantage that you have with the secure means of
communications, and as we've noted in previous testimony, the penalty that
is paid is the penalty of time. It takes time to write out the message,
and in some cases, it takes several hours from when the message is
actually written to when the message is actually transmitted. So in many
(25)cases, with very time-sensitive information, commanders opted to use the
JUDGE RIAD: So it is a must sometimes? (5) • A.: Yes, sir. JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much. MR. McCLOSKEY: • Q.: You mentioned that we had some communications like that. Were you meaning we had BiH communications or VRS communications? What did you (10)mean by that when you are referring to "we had examples of secure communications"? • A.: An example of the secure communications would be the daily and interim combat reports from the brigades to the Corps. Those are formalised written reports. They are sent over the secure radio teletype (15)network, sent to the Corps headquarters. Those are the types of reports that I'm referring to that are sent over the secure communications means. • Q.: But we received those combat reports through the search warrant at the various brigades and not by -- not by the BiH actually capturing them over the airwaves; is that right? (20) • A.: That is correct, sir. All of the reports of that nature we obtained through seizures. No information pertaining to those reports could have been collected by the BiH government over the airwaves.
• Q.: Okay. Let's go to Exhibit 673A, later in the day, 2026 hours.
This appears to be a reference to Pop and that he has gone home at this
(25)point and is in no mood for some reason. So let's go on to Exhibit 675A
• A.: This report, again, an interim combat report discussing the (5)significant situation in the Zvornik Brigade. For the most part, it's noting that the brigade is active in operations rounding up the remaining formations from the column that are in the territory. Paragraph two, the Brigade Commander rolls up or notes what his forces are at that time, noting that his forces include a company from the Krajina 16th Brigade, a (10)company of the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade, two platoons of the Bijeljina Military Police, and one platoon from the Vlasenica Light Infantry Brigade. So in that respect, he's reflecting that all of those forces are, in fact, under his command. (15) • Q.: How does that work?
• A.: The forces in question as they come into his zone and are put
under his command are essentially for the period of time resubordinated to
him. In the case of the forces that come from the Drina Corps, for
example, the company from the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade, the
(20)Vlasenica Light Infantry Brigade forces, those would have been directed
into a zone by the Corps Command and then placed under his command for the
duration that they are there.
You'll note there are formations from well outside of the Corps
zone. A company from the Krajina Corps, the 1st Krajina Corps and from
(25)the Bijeljina Military Police, those from the East Bosnia Corps. In those
• Q.: It also notes that he has no reserves despite this additional help. So that is a difficult situation still. • A.: That is correct, sir. (10) • Q.: And I note just below that the R, or perhaps, Reserve Battalion has been mobilised and is involved in sealing off and searching. Wasn't the person that was driving the truck to the Pilica cultural centre on the day before, on the 17th from the R Battalion? • A.: That is correct, sir. (15) • Q.: So the R Battalion, the day before was doing something else. • A.: Yes, sir. • Q.: All right. And I would also draw your attention to the last line of point two where it says, "The brigade will continue to inspect the territory of Zone 1," listing various names (20)including "Petkovci-Baljkovica-Memici front line." Those three words will become relevant in an intercept. Can you explain why that will be so we don't have to come back to this report?
• A.: Essentially, as one would expect, this report going up to the
Drina Corps Command, they are getting their information, the Drina Corps
(25)Command is receiving their information from this report. And in the form
• Q.: Then we have a list of casualties up to that point for the Srebrenica and Zepa operations. • A.: What this listing does is it encompasses three lists: The casualties recently incurred, the casualties from March of 1995 through (10)the beginning of Krivaja 95, and then a composite roll-up of the all of the casualties pertaining to the first six months of 1995, noting that out of an end strength of approximately 4.000 or so troops, 479 total casualties were taken by the brigade in six months, almost ten per cent. And this casualty roll-up sets the stage for a series of very critical (15)observations that come down in paragraph four pertaining to what the brigade is being used for and why. • Q.: And on that second page, just below the numbers, the writer of this report is directing the attention to the Corps -- "I would direct the Corps Command's attention to these alarming figures," so the author is (20)speaking to the Corps Command not the Main Staff. • A.: That is correct. • Q.: How does that fit in with the theory that the Main Staff is the one that is in charge of the Zvornik Brigade and is running the show in that regard? (25)
• A.: It doesn't fit into that theory at all.
(5) • A.: Given the size and intensity of the combat and just the sheer size of the column, it's possible that they would have been reduced by a little bit. It would have meant an additional, perhaps, 50 to 100 combatants that could have been involved in the combat operations. That part I can say with some certainty, that it would have brought more to the battle, (10)but I'm not sure that I could speculate as to whether or not another 100 combatants would have affected the casualty rates. • Q.: All right. You referred to paragraph 4 earlier. What do you get from paragraph 4?
• A.: Paragraph 4 represents for the first time a number that the VRS
(15)itself establishes for the number of military-aged Muslim men that were at
one time stored in schools in the zone of the Zvornik municipality.
Again, the writer of the report -- I believe the writer of the report is,
in fact, Colonel Pandurevic in this case -- is noting that over the last
ten days, the municipality has been swamped with Srebrenica Turks, and to
(20)him it is inconceivable that somebody brought 3.000 Turks of military age
and placed them in schools in the municipality, in addition to the 7.000
or so who fled into the forests. So very specifically here, Colonel
Pandurevic is differentiating between the Muslims who were part of the
column and the Muslim military-aged men who were in the schools at the
(25)time.
JUDGE WALD: Mr. Butler, can I just ask you one question about that figure that bothered me. Most of the information that we've gotten so far has suggested (5)that the number of military-aged men who came up from Potocari, didn't come up through the column but came up through Potocari, was much smaller than this. I never heard this big a figure as opposed to what we heard, the 7.000 or 8.000 or more in the column. I'm just wandering if that scores with -- that's much larger than the figure I remember of (10)military-aged men who were bused out of Potocari. • A.: In looking at this number, and this is their hard number -- JUDGE WALD: Sure. • A.: -- the only way to really go back and look at that number is trying to generate a series of numbers from those that were killed at the (15)execution sites and how many were being held at the schools. I believe that the rough figures that the investigation has generated is somewhere at approximately 1.000 at Orahovac, perhaps 800 to 1.000 at Petkovci, and several thousand up in the Pilica area between the Dom Kulture, the school, and a completely unknown number who may have been held at the (20)school at Rocevic.
JUDGE WALD: My understanding was those were composite groups;
that a lot of the people taken off who surrendered from the column or were
captured from the column were then marched off into these schools, or at
least that's the kind of testimony that we've been getting. So that the
(25)school number represented a combination of some from Potocari, but
• A.: Where I believe he is differentiating here is, the column breakup, as he understands it, in the zone, we know that the people who were taken (10)from the column in the zone of Bratunac got incorporated in there. JUDGE WALD: Right. • A.: The Zvornik Brigade was not incorporating or not taking anyone out of the column as it went into the zone of the Zvornik Brigade. JUDGE WALD: I see. (15) • A.: So Colonel Pandurevic has only two frames of reference: those prisoners that he received from Bratunac, which encompasses those including the column down there, and the column, which is a separate one. JUDGE WALD: Okay. That makes sense. Thank you. MR. McCLOSKEY: (20)
• Q.: Mr. Butler, let me ask you a bit again about this 3.000 number
that Colonel Pandurevic uses as military men placed in his schools.
Now, I want to go back to the 15 July conversation where Beara
says he has 3.500 parcels to distribute, and we know at the time of that
conversation, the people at Orahovac and the people at Petkovci have all
(25)been murdered or killed.
(5) • A.: In that particular case, it's hard to reconcile the two numbers. I can only speculate that perhaps Colonel Pandurevic didn't count the numbers from the schools at Orahovac and Petkovci, those who were already dead when he returned back into the zone. But that's only speculation on my part. I really can't explain the low figure that Colonel Pandurevic (10)gives and the higher figure that Colonel Beara gives; there is a difference. MR. McCLOSKEY: Again, for the Court's information, the exhumation figures, the various figures, we will provide in argument for you to help deal with these various numbers and the situations there. (15) • Q.: All right. Anything else on this particular interim combat report?
• A.: The final series is, again looking at paragraph 7, a very pointed
request to the Corps to examine and review how their brigade is used, and
for future assignments, that they want to be very involved in the
(20)process.
Again, in its entirety, this is a rather critical report leading
me to believe that the only person in the Zvornik Brigade who would author
such a report, both in content and in tone, to the Corps Command would be
the Brigade Commander personally. I couldn't ascribe this report as being
(25)done by either a deputy or a duty officer in that regard.
(5) • A.: No, sir. Just the based premise that, again, this report is going to the command of the Drina Corps. • Q.: All right. Then let's get on to the intercepts of 18 July, starting with Exhibit 677A, 0712 hours. Can you tell us briefly how this fits into your analysis? (10) • A.: This intercept is a specific conversation between General Major Krstic and Colonel Veletic. As we discussed earlier, Colonel Veletic, normally the Chief of Artillery of the Drina Corps, is in this regard the Commander of the temporary formation which was established, the 4th Drinski Brigade, operating in the zone of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. (15)What I infer or what I get from this message is just, again, a notification or an instance where General Krstic is communicating with other individuals pertaining to issues, in this case, outside the Corps zone. • Q.: Let's go to Exhibit 680A, 0716 hours, the 18th. Tell us about (20)this.
• A.: The primary correspondents are General Krstic and Colonel Cerovic,
who previously was identified as the Assistant Commander for Moral, Legal,
and Religious Affairs of the Drina Corps. Discussing -- first of all,
making sure that he's put through to extension 385, and as we've noted
(25)earlier on several occasions, the 385 extension drop leads directly to
(20) • Q.: Are these the normal actions of a commander in this situation?
• A.: These represent the normal actions of a corps commander,
absolutely. He's keeping -- not only is he keeping fully advised of the
situation within his own corps zone, he's going the additional step and
designating -- because he perceives a problem with a specific unit or a
(25)specific situation, he's designated one of his own assistant commanders to
• Q.: And that's not Zepa. • A.: I don't believe we're talking about Zepa here, no, sir. (5) • Q.: All right. Let's go briefly to Exhibit 681A, a 0729 hours conversation. What can you tell us, if anything, about this? • A.: The one conversation is X, the other one is identified as Cero, which may be a nickname for Colonel Cerovic. It notes, "Miljanovic was supposed to go down there too." There are several people who fall into (10)that -- who that name could be so I don't want to speculate. But the reference down towards the end under X, "Well, somewhere in that part. Pop and I were in charge over here in this part," a reference, again, to the slang of Popovic. • Q.: All right. Let's go on to the next exhibit, 684A, 18 July, a (15)conversation at 1245 hours between B and X, which is -- do you know who these people are, and can you tell us what they're talking about?
• A.: In this context, I'm not able to identify B and X, other than to
be able to say that whoever they are, at this particular time, they were
rather informed individuals.
(20)What I use this particular intercept for is what I call an
awareness piece, to show that a lot of individuals have a general
awareness of what has been happening in East Bosnia over the past several
days.
In this context, they're certainly talking about the issue of men
(25)from Srebrenica. They identify the situation in Zepa. They note Savcic,
(5) • Q.: I'm going to interrupt you, Mr. Butler. I think we may need to correct the transcript. It says: "... the 65th Protection Regiment who were deployed in Savcic," but that's not correct, is it? • A.: No, sir. They were deployed near Zepa. • Q.: I'm sorry. Go ahead. (10) • A.: They note further down in the conversation a fierce attack in the zone of the 2nd Romanija -- the 2nd Romanija Brigade of the Drina Corps and their zone at Olovo. • Q.: What's the significance of that? • A.: Again, just primarily the fact that the subscribers are aware or (15)very knowledgable about what's happening in the zone of the entire Drina Corps headquarters or the entire Drina Corps zone. Olovo is, in fact, part of the Drina Corps zone under the control of the 2nd Romanija Brigade.
• Q.: Okay. Before you go on, let me take you back to the first page.
(20)X says they had close to 10.000 men of military age in Srebrenica. The
next question is: "Have they reduced them by half?" and the next says,
"Well, it must be close to half. 4,000 to 5,000 have certainly kicked
the bucket."
Now, of course, this term in English "kick the bucket" is a slang
(25)term for having died. It's not a literal translation of the B/C/S, but
• A.: That is correct, sir. (5) • Q.: And does that number, 4.000 to 5.000 having died, connect at all to the investigation in your analysis as you've reviewed the investigation? • A.: I can certainly note that in the case of 4.000 to 5.000, that those numbers would be high if they were only discussing the combat (10)involving the column going through the zone of the Zvornik Brigade because certainly there were nowhere near 4.000 to 5.000 killed in that column in the combat between the 14th and the 17th or 18th of July. I can only speculate that that 4.000 to 5.000 has to include the Muslim men who were taken up and executed in the zone of the Zvornik Brigade. (15) • Q.: Okay. And then on page two, in the middle of the page, X says, "Yeah, Pandurevic had to let them pass because he couldn't kill them all. They surged at them. He lost men. He was afraid that they would break through his line from the other side, you know, because they are close to the line and they attacked from over there." (20)Now, how close does this description match what you know from the daily combat reports and from the other information about Pandurevic opening up the corridor temporarily? • A.: That is, in fact, an accurate description. • Q.: Okay. Then why don't you continue on with your analysis. (25)
• A.: A series of names that come out talking about who was injured, one
• Q.: That is that a roughly correct figure, three to four brigades? (10) • A.: In the case of the enclave at Srebrenica, it tied down the entire Bratunac Brigade, the Milici Brigade, elements of the Skelani Separate Battalion. In the case of Zepa, it tied down the Visegrad Brigade and the Rogatica Brigade. In the case of the enclave at Zepa, that tied down additional Drina Corps assets. So that actually may be a low figure. (15) • Q.: Anything else to say about this? • A.: No, sir. • Q.: So the participants in the last line perceived the International Community as interfering with them. All right. Let's go to the next exhibit, 685A, and I would just direct the Court down to line five where (20)it says, Petkovci, Baljkovica and Memici. Mr. Butler, can you explain how that fits in with the previous combat report that we looked at?
• A.: In the micro sense, the reflection that they are going back and
trying to get the exact line and the exact map line of where that report
(25)reflects, and we've discussed this previously. In the larger sense, a
• Q.: For the record, it's Exhibit 675A. The interim combat report at (5)the end of line two specifically refers to Petkovci, Baljkovica and Memici and that was also a report sent to the Drina Corps. Mr. Butler, how credible do you find these intercepts?
• A.: Overall, I find the intercepts relative to the information that's
contained in them to be very credible. In a very large number of cases,
(10)we've been able to go back off of material from the intercepts, and by
virtue of examining the documents that we've seized from the Zvornik
Brigade or the Bratunac Brigade, we've been able to go back and validate
that what the BiH 2 Corps operators were intercepting, the conversations
that they were intercepting were, in many cases, very or directly linked
(15)to actions that were happening on the ground and are reflected in other
documents. This is one example of that.
Clearly, from an analytical perspective of my own view, we
received these documents from the BiH government and very candidly, I have
to note that one of the first things that I, as an analyst, looked for was
(20)to determine whether or not the information that we had received from them
was information that was being fed to us for a purpose. So initially, I
was very skeptical about this material and I examined it extremely
critically with an eye towards finding information that nobody within the
BiH government or military could have possibly known or had access to to
(25)validate this information.
JUDGE WALD: Let me ask you though, do you get any sense, from looking at all of these and putting them in the context of other material, of the completeness of it? In other words, we know we certainly don't have all intercepts and some must have been done on secure lines and maybe (20)we didn't get some. But do you get any sense that there might be a whole parallel group of communications that we don't have access to that might change the way in which we construe the ones that we have access to? Or do you get some impression that probably we got all the main lines of communication that were going through? (25)
• A.: With regards to the telephonic intercepts, these documents, we
(25)
JUDGE WALD: Do you think from looking at all that --
JUDGE WALD: I'm sorry. Do you think that it is possible or likely that there could be a lot of orders or commands coming from the top down, from the Drina Corps (5)down that we don't have, to the people in the field? • A.: That is a possibility, ma'am. I don't see that much of a reflection of it in cases where we have the brigade orders. In many cases, they reference Drina Corps orders that, even though we don't have, we have identification, reference numbers to them. So in that regard, I (10)think I know what I don't know with respect to the orders that were issued. But with respect to other orders that may have come down, that's -- I can only speculate that some certainly did and I'm not aware of them. JUDGE WALD: Thank you. (15) JUDGE RIAD: Mr. Butler, did you detect, in your analysis, that some intercepted communications were being used to mislead the enemy?
• A.: Certainly the VRS was fully aware that the voice communications
were susceptible to intercept and we know that from previous directives in
March and April that there was, in fact, a concerted effort to try to
(20)attempt to do that. I looked at that from that perspective and, as an
analyst, when one looks at a deception or a potential deception operation,
the question becomes what are we trying, we as the people who are
launching the deception operation, what are we trying to draw away an
enemy's attention from and to?
(25)Clearly, in this case, the military objective would have been to
JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much. • A.: Yes, sir.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Mr. Butler, in that light, how
(25)do you see the fact that there is frequent mention in the communications
• A.: That is correct, sir. And under normal conditions, one would
(5)expect that those sensitive communications would be passed only via secure
means. And when you examine the bulk of the intercepts for the period of,
say, an example, July, what you will see is a low level of voice
intercepts up to the period of 11 July. You'll see a very high period of
intercepts between the period of 12 July to 18 July and then as the
(10)situation calms down again, or becomes less dramatic or critical, the
information tapers off.
What we see is the bulk of the intercepts occurring between the
period of 11 July and 18 July, reflective of the significant changing
situation in the Corps zone where. Because of the combat activities,
(15)because of the continual changing of the plan based on the combat
activities and the rapidly changing situations faced by the commanders to
have to make decisions, the overriding theme appears to be that because of
the speed and because of the necessity to get the information out to the
subordinate commanders, that they are willing to sacrifice or set aside
(20)their own operational security posture in order to effect a more rapid
exchange of information with subordinate or lateral commands.
Again, a reflection of the approaching crisis situation that
occurs in the zone of the Zvornik Brigade and as that period diminishes,
in many cases, you see more of a reflection of less traffic and less
(25)sensitive traffic being passed over the open network.
• Q.: Mr. Butler, you mentioned that reports coming into the brigades were destroyed. I just want to clarify. Can you tell us about that, what reports are destroyed and where -- are they completely destroyed or do (5)these reports exist somewhere else, ideally?
• A.: In one of the very first searches that the Office of the
Prosecutor did, which I was a member of, when we searched the headquarters
of the Krajina Corps, during that search we had an opportunity to sit down
with the Krajina Corps archivist, the person responsible for maintaining
(10)the records, and we requested from her an explanation on how the VRS
maintains its records. And one of the -- the explanation that we were
given was that it is the responsibility of each unit to permanently
archive the material that it originates.
So in a sense when I say "destroy," it's not a deliberate
(15)destruction attempt in order to deceive anybody. What it reflects is that
at the end of a year or a two-year period, the units in question, these,
the brigades, will go through all of their records, they will bundle up
the records and documents that they originated and they will destroy the
orders and documents that they did not originate with the knowledge that
(20)those will be maintained by the headquarters that originated them.
That, of course, is reflected by the documents that we seized, for
the most part, from the Bratunac and Zvornik Brigades where we have
thousands and thousands of records from those particular brigades but only
a few documents from the Drina Corps. Presumably, the Drina Corps would
(25)have maintained all of their own documents themselves. So again, not part
• Q.: You discussed briefly some of the written orders you've analysed, what kind of oral orders, if any, can we expect, not the kind of orders, (5)but could we expect oral orders to play a role in any kind of a operation, be it a military operation or even a criminal operation? Just briefly, where do oral orders fit into the scheme of the VRS? • A.: Certainly oral orders fit into the scheme of not only the VRS but of any army. And as we've noted in the previous intercept, General Krstic (10)giving an oral order to his assistant commander to go up to a specific location and to take command and to accomplish a function. How those orders are accounted for is a more formalised process within the VRS. Each command maintains an orders log or journal out of the duty officer's shop, in many cases, and it is his responsibility to notate in that (15)written log, oral orders, who they are received from, the context of those orders. So while certainly the provision is made in the VRS that oral orders are going to be a part of operations and certainly in the context of these operations, the rapidly changing combat, one would expect a lot (20)of orders being given orally as reflected by the intercepts. But they do not remain oral. It's the responsibility of the receiver to note those down in the brigade or in whatever echelon's documents that they have received these oral orders from these individuals and how they are reacting to them. (25)
• Q.: Okay. Let's go back to our intercepts of 18 July. The next one
• A.: The first series of lines, essentially General Krstic asking somebody, was he supposed "to come, up here or there?" Based on the date, presumably we're either talking about does somebody want Krstic to wait in or around Zepa or does he want him to come up to Vlasenica. In this case, (10)it's said: "... the boss said that you should wait for him there in Vlasenica," a reference being that at this point in time, General Krstic is physically located at the Drina Corps headquarters in Vlasenica. • Q.: And "the boss," whom might that be? • A.: In this regard, one would think it would be General Mladic. (15) • Q.: Now, then, shortly after that there's a line that says, "Fuck it ... we pushed them, but it's hard, let me tell you, we didn't have a break." Could that be a discussion about Zepa? • A.: That's how I read it, sir, yes. • Q.: And then X says: "OK chief, OK." Now, have you looked into the (20)translation of "chief," as we discussed yesterday? What word are we talking about here in the B/C/S language?
• A.: In this regard, we're talking not the word "chief" as in "naccel,"
normally referred to as Chief of Staff, but we're referring to the more
slang version of that, "Dobro, sefe, dobro." "Okay, boss, okay." "Okay,
(25)chief, okay." The slang variant, not a specific reference to "chief" as
• Q.: I would note that the reference to chief yesterday in another exhibit, that was actually the Chief of Staff word and "Chief" was capitalised by the translation unit. (5)Also, at the bottom of that translation, there's a reference to the "KZ, man" and a problem there. What's that problem that they're having? • A.: A reflection of one of the observations that I noted earlier, that they were having problems in ciphering/securing their communications (10)network, and that as a result of that, you know, they will be able to talk in the secure. • Q.: All right. Let's go on to Exhibit 691A. This appears to be a conversation in the evening, the 18th, 2341. Krstic is giving orders to fire at the centre and other things. How does this fit into your (15)analysis, if at all? • A.: In this regard, this is General Krstic giving instructions which I would believe pertain to an artillery fire mission related to Zepa. • Q.: Now, that's going over the open airwaves, but I take it that the artillery round should hit its target before the Muslims have time to (20)transmit this down to Tuzla to get out of the way? • A.: Well, presumably, the theory is that before they can do anything about the information the impact is already made.
• Q.: Okay. Let's go now to July 19th intercepts, Exhibit 694, a
conversation at 0812 hours. Again, what, if anything, do you make of
(25)this?
MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, it's 11.00. It's a good time to (15)stop.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Yes, it is a good time for a
break.
I don't think the transcript was quite correct regarding what I
said regarding the timetable for today. The last break will be a
(20)ten-minute break, not a 30-minute break, as the interpreters understood me
to say. We can't have such long breaks.
So we're now going to have a 20-minute break. Then we're going to
work from 11.20 on. After, 1.20 until 2.10, a ten-minute break, and then
2.20 until 3.00. I think that is correct now. Yes.
(25)A 20-minute break now.
--- On resuming at 11.25 a.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. McCloskey, you can continue. (5)We will [as interpreted] have a 25-minute break in the end and not a 20-minute break as I previously indicated. You may now continue, Mr. McCloskey. MR. McCLOSKEY: Just to clarify, Mr. President, what time is the next break? (10) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] 12.50, more or less. MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you. • Q.: All right. Mr. Butler, let's now go on to the 19th, Exhibit 693A. It's the regular combat report from the Zvornik Brigade. Prior to -- (15)
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Mr. McCloskey, sorry to
interrupt you but there seems to be a misunderstanding here.
I didn't say that we would have a 25-minute break, I said that we
had a 25-minute break although I had indicated that there would only be a
20-minute break. Because I can read on the transcript, "We will have a
(20)25-minute break in the end and not a 20-minute break." So that was the
reason for your question, and I understand it quite well. It seems that
there are some problems with the schedule. I had said that there would be
a 20-minute break and not a 25-minute break, which means that we have to
be ready after 20 minutes and not 25 minutes.
(25)Sorry for this interruption, Mr. McCloskey. Please continue.
• Q.: Mr. Butler, before getting into the substance of the 19 July Zvornik Brigade combat report, can you briefly summarise for the Court your recollection of who we call the Nezuk survivor, his testimony, (5)because now we're going back into one of our last known crime scenes. • A.: The Nezuk survivor, as identified, is an individual who is a member of a small group of Muslims who, on about the 18th or 19th of July, were captured by the VRS. A group of those survivors were then subsequently executed by the people who captured them. I believe, if the (10)survivor's accounting is correct, two individuals from the group were held by the VRS and the remaining individuals were shot. The Nezuk survivor in this case was one of the individuals who was shot, in fact survived the summary execution, and later made his way to BiH territory. • Q.: So now going to the 19 July combat report, how does the (15)information in that combat report tie in to the factual recitation of the testimony of who we refer to as the Nezuk survivor?
• A.: In this regard, looking at paragraph 2, it discusses during
operations that day a story of two Muslim soldiers being captured and 13
being eliminated. Further along the line, it discusses the fact, the
(20)presence of the company of the 16th Krajina Brigade. One of the features
that the Nezuk -- or one of the instances that the Nezuk survivor recounts
is the fact that the soldiers who shot him in the area identified
themselves. I believe one of them had a shoulder brassard that said
"Krajina."
(25)So at a macro level, you could look at this incident they're
• Q.: Geographically, my recollection is Nezuk may not have been extremely precise, but is this roughly the same geographic area noted in (5)this report as -- is it the same as that recounted by the Nezuk survivor? • A.: Yes, sir, it is. • Q.: What else, if anything, do you get from this report? • A.: At the broader level, a recognition that the Zvornik Infantry Brigade is still coming across prisoners -- or, I'm sorry, Muslim men in (10)zone and is conducting combat operations in relation to them. • Q.: I note at the bottom of the page that one Serb soldier, Nenad Asentic, was wounded and Milenko Milosevic was killed. So what does that tell you? • A.: Again, a reflection of armed combat occurring. (15) • Q.: All right. Let's go to intercept 696A. What, if anything, do you get out of this? • A.: For the most part, a conversation between General Krstic and an individual named Milankovic whom I do not know. Broadly, all I really get out of this conversation is the fact that General Krstic is still (20)discussing things, issues over the telephone network and is aware of what's going on in a broad sense. • Q.: All right. Let's go on to Exhibit 698A, 19 July conversation, 2157 hours between Krstic and Jevdevic.
• A.: In this case, we're certainly discussing the tactical situation
(25)as it's occurring in the zone of the Corps. Jevdevic, then Major Jevdevic
• Q.: Has the investigation revealed anything about the person Srna, this person identified as Srna? • A.: I believe that they have developed some information but it escapes my memory at this point what Srna is. (15) • Q.: Anything aside from this conversation that you've mentioned? • A.: Again, a reflection that General Krstic is in communication with members of the Drina Corps pertaining to military activity. • Q.: Again, I would note that that is -- closes one main chapter of the case and we'll go on to some other documents that are related which is (20)Exhibit 701. But before we get to those documents, Mr. Butler, those are documents that were recovered from, I believe, the Bratunac Brigade. Can you tell us, briefly, about some of these documents that were recovered from the Bratunac Brigade and just briefly what they reflect. I don't think we'll need to go through them each individually. (25)
• A.: When the OTP conducted a search of the Bratunac Brigade, one of
• Q.: And I would briefly call Your Honours' attention to the testimony of Helge Brunborg where he referred to that many names in Bosnia are similar and the key identifier is, many times, the father's name of the (5)individual as well, of course, the date of birth. Mr. Butler, do most of these documents, and let's start with Exhibit 701, actually provide enough information to get a good identification from the ICRC missing list? • A.: Certainly in this case: Last name, first name, father's name, (10)date of birth. • Q.: And what in these notes ties it to the -- to our situation? • A.: The last line in the notation, "a number of people wish to break through to the Drina to surrender to Serbia." • Q.: Now, we haven't heard much about people making it over to Serbia (15)and I don't intend to go into that in great length, but did some people actually -- some of the Muslim refugees make it over to Serbia? • A.: My understanding is that some did but I'm not familiar with the numbers or circumstances behind that. • Q.: Okay. All right. Let's go to the next exhibit, 702A. Just (20)again, lists of individuals with identifying information noting that they crossed over to Cerska with the first group, the mention of a column. Going over to Exhibit 703A, this exhibit also indicates from the notes information that is relevant to the analysis, things that we'd known about or heard about related to this case. (25)
• A.: Yes, sir, it does.
• A.: This particular exhibit, which is an extract from the narrative, (5)reflects the names of the individuals listed and where they were cross-checked against the International Committee for the Red Cross missing list registration number, and where they were last seen alive. • Q.: All right. And before we get to the next chapter, there's something I wanted to go back to; this morning's discussion of intercepts, (10)very briefly. In terms of the numbers of -- or the intercepts that the Court has been provided, are you aware of the process that there were other intercepts on the same dates involving conversations that were not brought forward to the Court? • A.: Yes, sir, there were some. (15) • Q.: And roughly why was that?
• A.: Those conversations represent low-level -- we call them tactical
radio communications between various elements of the Zvornik Brigade
related to the combat functions. One of the other aspects of intercepts
that the Bosnian Muslims were doing was not only with the intercepting the
(20)large radio telephone networks, the radio telephone communication one, but
also the tactical radio intercepts, in some cases, the small portable
radios, in some cases the low-level VHF radios between companies and
battalion commands.
This communication which we have, at this level, they were very
(25)strict about following communication security. They used a lot of code
• Q.: Okay. Well, you have talked about notations of prisoners in the (10)Bratunac Brigade for our time period and the next series of exhibits, beginning with Exhibit 706, involves prisoners captured in the Zvornik Brigade area of responsibility during this time period. Can you brief the Court on what your analysis has done in regard to those prisoners and how you've tied it into the testimony of the older Branjevo Farm survivor? (15)
• A.: With regards to the prisoners in the area of the Zvornik Brigade,
there are two distinct groupings. The first grouping, as we have alluded
to with the Nezuk survivor, were those prisoners who were taken as part of
a column. And in many cases, where a few of them were kept and a number
of them were subsummarily
[sic] executed.
(20)Another set of prisoners and in one particular case, a
well-documented one, is a group of Muslims who, on analysis, appear to be
survivors from a mass execution up at the Branjevo Military Farm who
escaped from that execution and who, several days later, came back into
the custody of the VRS and then were subsequently executed.
(25)So in that regard with the Zvornik Brigade prisoners, those are
• Q.: When you say the Zvornik Brigade prisoners were executed, they were, in fact, on the -- found to be missing from the ICRC list; is that right? (5) • A.: That is correct, sir. • Q.: I presume that they didn't have an accidental death or some other. All right. Let's -- can you tell the Court the -- about the documents, what do the documents tell about the story of those particular prisoners, how many of them were there and what happened to them? (10)
• A.: In this particular case, the situation in question arises from two
soldiers of the 1st Battalion of the Zvornik Infantry Brigade who are
charged by the brigade command, specifically the Assistant Commander for
Security, Lieutenant Drago Nikolic for charges relating to aiding and
abetting the enemy.
(15)They are accused of providing aid in comfort, for lack of a better
word, to four Muslim prisoners who were trying to escape the custody of
the VRS. What we have in a series of documents that reflects the legal
proceedings that were initiated against these two Zvornik Brigade
soldiers. Part of those proceedings include signed witness statements
(20)from the four Muslim prisoners who they were accused of helping. These
four Muslim prisoners are now on the ICRC missing list.
Further, when you take that series of events and compare it to one
of the survivor accounts of the Branjevo Military Farm survivors, he notes
that there were a group of four individuals who also had escaped, and he
(25)recognises one of them or he remembers one from a specific village that he
• Q.: Do you remember the village? • A.: I would have to look in the actual exhibit. I don't remember it (5)offhand. • Q.: Something like Jagonje? • A.: I believe that is correct, sir. • Q.: Can you tell the story that is told by the statements in the exhibits? (10) • A.: What this story tells is that these four individuals departing from the area of Srebrenica essentially tried to escape through the Nezuk area, did not escape through the Nezuk area and, if I may go to the map here for a second, took a route from the Nezuk area laterally across the entire front area of the Zvornik Brigade with the intention of breaking (15)out in this area to the north towards a Muslim military facility known as roughly Teoack. T-e-o-a-c-k, I believe it's spelled. As we've been able to indicate through the records and documents, the overwhelming majority of the column went out in this broad area here, yet these four individuals, according to their statements, made a trek (20)throughout the entire zone of the Zvornik Brigade to try and get out in this area. • Q.: Could we just for one second go to another exhibit that I think will illustrate this.
MR. McCLOSKEY: It should be Exhibit 610. I'm sorry. No, it's --
(25)perhaps it's 29.
MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes. • A.: As we've previously noted in our discussion of the route of the column, in many instances the route of the column, that they followed, was (5)dictated by the terrain and where the hills were. Yet when you look at this particular set of stories, essentially while the major terrain features run in ridges along this way, the statements would have you believe that these four individuals essentially crossed a long series of ridges and hills in order to try and reach friendly lines from way up (10)here. Further, when you look at the four witness statements and compare them with each other, in almost all respects, it's obvious that the witness statements themselves are identical, to a point where the author got very lazy and essentially copied the route and path and circumstances (15)of all four individuals. If you lay them up against each other, the series of circumstances are almost identical, which would further lead me to believe that the recounting didn't happen the way it did. It's almost too perfect. • Q.: So what is the story that they recount after getting up into the (20)area where they were captured? • A.: The story, as it is recounted in those statements, is that they got up into this area, and where their actual trek took them was in this direction here, somewhere in this region right here. • Q.: Can you describe the area. (25)
• A.: The very mountainous area in the 1st Battalion sector, I believe
• Q.: You can have a seat. (10)Let's discuss briefly the exhibits where you get this story. The first one, I believe, is Exhibit 706. Can you tell us what that is? • A.: This document is from the Assistant Commander for Security for the Zvornik Infantry Brigade, discussing that as a result of his initial investigation, the two individuals in question, one Nesko Dzokic and one (15)Slobodan Dzokic, are to be held in detention for three days until the Military Prosecutor's Office in Bijeljina can determine what they want to do with these individuals. And the explanation discusses the broad series of events. • Q.: So Dzokics are the Serb soldiers that were apparently arrested for (20)providing food to the Muslims. • A.: That is correct. • Q.: Aside from this mention of up to three days' detention, were there any records to indicate what eventually happened to these two Serb soldiers? (25)
• A.: No, sir, I don't have any information on that.
• A.: That is one of the statements from one of the Muslims. • Q.: This particular individual, Sakib Kiviric, was from the village of (5)Jagonje, in the municipality of Bratunac. • A.: That is correct, sir. I would just also note, on the original document, the signature of the individual and the signature of the individual who took the statement, who is in fact a member of the Zvornik Military Police Company, Crime Prevention Service. (10) • Q.: Has that got an exhibit -- that's the same exhibit we've referred to before? • A.: That is 707A. • Q.: Do you know roughly how far the Branjevo Military Farm is from this Donji Lokanj, the area of the headquarters of the 1st Battalion? (15) • A.: Roughly four kilometres, five kilometres. • Q.: All right. Now, the exhibit -- let's go to the next exhibit, 708A. What does this illustrate, and how do you fit it in to your overall analysis?
• A.: Leaving that aspect and going back into the aspect of Muslims
(20)being captured as a result of military activity, the first series of
paragraphs notes what they're doing. It also notes the fact that they're
capturing Muslims still. But for the first time, in paragraph 3, is a
request that the Corps Command, or through the Corps Command, that the
exchange submission start work as soon as possible, and requiring
(25)instructions on what to do with prisoners that they're taking, where to
(5) • Q.: What does that mean to you? • A.: It indicates that somewhere along the time frame prior to 22 July there was some form of a directive or some form of guidance change on what the disposition would be of Muslim prisoners captured. JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me. What do you mean, "guidance change"? (10) • A.: An order or directive that indicates that from a certain point in time there will be a change in what happens with the Muslim prisoners. JUDGE RIAD: Thank you. MR. McCLOSKEY: • Q.: All right. Mr. Butler, we'll now get into the time period of (15)September 1995, where, to remind Your Honours, the aerial images show disturbances at the mass grave Branjevo Farm, for example, on the latter part of September -- I believe September 27th, but in the latter part of September -- and all the movement and the secondary graves. Mr. Butler, we have seen over the last several days all kinds of (20)documents, engineering documents, for example, military police documents, related to the crime scenes at Orahovac, at Branjevo Farm, at Kozluk, at Petkovci. The engineering log that you referred to many times, to what date did that log go to?
• A.: I believe, and my memory may be unclear on this one, but I believe
(25)that the log goes out to 10 September 1995.
(5) • A.: For the most part we have the same bodies of information, which obviously the Office of the Prosecutor seized throughout the entire period. But when we look at the material for September/October of 1995, we do not see the same reflections of activity at all. We don't see the expected activities with the engineer equipment for fuel utilisation and (10)vehicle utilisation during those periods; we don't see those types of activities rolled up at all in the daily combat or interim combat reports for those periods. We have very few pieces of information which can possibly be linked to the known reburial activities that took place during the period. (15) • Q.: But there are a couple of documents that you have; is that correct? • A.: There are a few documents which we can associate with the reburial activity. • Q.: All right. Let's go to Exhibit 709A. Tell us what this is, who (20)it's from, and how you evaluate it.
• A.: This particular document is from the Main Staff of the army of
Republika Srpska, 14 September 1995, to the Drina Corps Command, to the
Main Staff Logistics Sector, with a copy to the 1st Zvornik Infantry
Brigade for their information. What it discusses is approval by the Main
(25)Staff, under the signature of General Mladic, for 5 tonnes of diesel fuel
• Q.: Who's the author of this document, based on the document? • A.: Again, it's under the signature of General Mladic, the Commander of the Main Staff of the army of Republika Srpska. (20) • Q.: Would a security officer normally be in charge of fuel for engineering works? • A.: Normally fuel accountability is the responsibility of the Rear Services Branch, the Technical Services Directorate. • Q.: So what's your analysis regarding what this document is about? (25)
• A.: Given the fact that when we look at the engineer vehicle
• Q.: So what do you think this fuel may have been used for? • A.: During the period in question, the overhead images clearly show (10)the reburial activity. We know that, as a fact, happened. During the same period, the Zvornik Brigade reports, notes, road building activity during a good percentage of this period. We don't have information which would confirm the road building theory or the road building activity. Based on that in isolation, I would have to say that this fuel was (15)used for the reburial activity. • Q.: Let's go to Exhibit 710A. It's a related exhibit. What is this? • A.: This essentially is the 35th logistics base instructing the Drina Corps Command and the Zvornik Brigade Command that the diesel fuel is available and that a Drina Corps representative shall collect the fuel and (20)provide the transportation. I'm sorry. It's not from the 35th logistics base, it's from the logistics sector to the logistics base and info the Drina Corps Command and Zvornik Infantry Brigade Command. • Q.: On 14 September 1995, who is the Commander of the Drina Corps?
• A.: During this period, the Commander of the Drina Corps is Major
(25)General Krstic -- General Major Krstic, my apologies.
• A.: Number 33 -- • Q.: Right. (5) • A.: -- on the first page, reflecting him as a member of the Brigade Command Security Branch. • Q.: All right. Now, there's at least one document from the Bratunac Brigade in our exhibit list, Exhibit 712A. Can you tell us what this document is, what kind of book it came out of, and how it fits in to your (10)analysis? • A.: This specific document is a journal that was maintained to record morning or periodic meetings where the Brigade Commander addressed what he refers to as his Corps Command staff, those being his primary assistant commanders and deputies and, in some cases, the subordinate battalion (15)commanders. Depending on the combat situation or the events, these meetings occurred daily; in some cases twice a day; and in some cases, like during the operation at Bratunac with Srebrenica, there were three- or four- or five-day gaps. What this book and several others like it, because this book is (20)very fragmentary in its dates, reflected are the orders and the directives and the issues that were raised at those meetings. • Q.: What part of the information on this exhibit are you referencing as part of your analysis on the secondary grave or the robbing aspect?
• A.: In that particular aspect, there is a notation reflecting the 16
(25)October 1995 meeting and the individuals present. If you look down to the
• Q.: Now, Mr. Butler, that's a fairly vague reference there. Are you aware of an aerial image taken at Glogova on 20 October at the mass grave site there of a loader digging at that time, some four days after this (15)October 16th report? • A.: Yes, sir, I am. • Q.: Now, I also want to call your attention to -- Mr. Nikolic says that this was a task issued by the General Staff or the Main Staff of the VRS. How do you account for this suggestion that the Main Staff has been (20)given a task directly, perhaps, to the Bratunac Brigade?
• A.: Given the scope of how I understand orders are passed down, I
don't interpret it as a direct order from the Main Staff to the Bratunac
Brigade. The presumption that I would make is that the order originated
from the Main Staff, that it came through the Drina Corps to the Bratunac
(25)Brigade. And while it may have come through security channels, Captain
(10) • Q.: In the previous exhibits, we saw that General Mladic of the Main Staff dealing with the Zvornik Brigade Milorad Trbic; however, it was done indirectly, of course by chain of command through the Drina Corps. Is that the normal way this should work? • A.: Yes, sir, that is correct. (15) • Q.: But you don't have the documents that may reflect how this particular job was assigned or what particular job this was? • A.: That is correct. • Q.: Would it be normal for a commander to not know of such activity occurring in his zone that must have taken days to occur, just to briefly (20)summarise, the movement of some 3500 to 5500 bodies from several mass graves both in Zvornik and Bratunac areas, to many areas, secondary graves throughout the entire area. Would it be normal for a commander not to have any idea that was happening in his area at this time period?
• A.: Particularly with respect to this time period, and under a
(25)declared state of war that now exists, and the fact that most of the areas
• Q.: And who, Mr. Butler, is in the best position to know the lay of (10)the land, to know the geography, to know the places to hide bodies, to be able to get the equipment and the manpower to do it, to secure the routes, to secure the roads, to do all the things that must be necessary for such an operation? Who is in the best position to do that?
• A.: In the case of the burial and reburial activity in the Zvornik
(15)Brigade, the logical conclusion is the Commander of the Zvornik Infantry
Brigade. He is responsible for the land. He is responsible for the
security of that land. He has the manpower to accomplish the mission. He
has the engineer equipment assigned to him to accomplish the mission.
He's in the position to do those activities as well as continue
(20)combat-related activities as they should occur. It's all within the
functions of and within the purview of the Brigade Commander of the
Zvornik Brigade.
In the case of those that occurred in the Bratunac Light Infantry
Brigade zone, the same rationale would apply with the possible exception
(25)of the engineer equipment which the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade did
• Q.: Now, in order to dig up thousands of bodies, you have to know where to look if they're all under the ground by mid-September 1995; is that right? (10) • A.: That is an implied, yes. • Q.: And without going through the evidence again, it -- it's clear that the elements of the Zvornik Brigade know where the bodies are buried in their area; is that correct? • A.: Considering that they put them there, yes. (15) MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, this brings to a close this portion of the direct testimony. We have other testimony and according to our original plan, it would be appropriate at this time to go into closed session. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] We are going into closed (20)session. We do not have conditions here for the public to be present, I think.
MR. McCLOSKEY: Mr. President, I'm sorry, there is one more little
video Mr. Harmon reminded me of that should be in open session. It won't
take long. If we could play that in open session then we'll be ready to
(25)go into closed session.
MR. McCLOSKEY: And we -- (5) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] I don't see any indication that we are in open session on the monitor. Is that all right now? THE REGISTRAR: The technical both has informed me that we are in open session. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] We are in open session, fine (10)thank you very much. You may continue, Mr. McCloskey. MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you Mr. President. • Q.: Mr. Butler, we have a video, it's Exhibit 367. It starts out with a parade. It's a military get together of some sort. Can you tell the Court what this is and what's going on and the approximate date of it? (15)
• A.: This video is the video coverage by the army of Republika Srpska
and the Serbian radio and television network of a military ceremony that
occurs in Vlasnica on I believe 2 or 5 December 1995. It relates to two
things primarily. The first one being a speech by General Mladic about
the recently-approved Dayton agreement, and the second part is to
(20)commemorate the establishment of a new formation within the army of the
Republika Srpska. The mobile brigade, if you will, of the Drinski Corps.
Essentially, in short, what they did is take the Drina Wolves
formation with some other units and added some strength to it and created
a separate formation that could be used anywhere across the territory of
(25)the Republika Srpska. What this ceremony depicts is the public
• Q.: And before we get to the video, we have an Exhibit 482A which is a Srpska Vojska article related to that ceremony. • A.: I don't that exhibit in front of me. (5) • Q.: 482A, I've got a copy of that if that will save us some time. First of all, can you tell us what the Srpska Vojska is? You may have discussed that briefly in the past because I believe we had another article, but just again, could you remind us? • A.: Srpska Vojska is the magazine of the army of Republika Srpska. (10)Just like the Drina Corps had Drinski Magazin, this was the magazine of the entire army where events of general interest to the army were discussed in open form. This particular one, the magazine's article is dated 28 December, reflects the magazine's coverage, if you will, of the ceremony that we are discussing. (15)For the purposes of the investigation, we didn't deal with obviously General Mladic's feelings towards Dayton, but at the back of his speech, he makes specific reference to the Drina Corps and the operations pertaining to Srebrenica and Zepa. • Q.: How about General Krstic, does he make any reference, in your (20)view, to General Krstic?
• A.: In this case, certainly not by name but by position. "You," and
again to keep in mind, he's addressing the soldiers of the Drina Corps
during this ceremony, "who fought under the leadership of your Chief of
Staff or Corps Commander who although severely wounded made a tremendous
(25)contribution to the victory of the Serbian army."
• Q.: Now, there's a notation there, "... you who fought under as your (5)Chief or your Commander," does that correspond with your analysis? • A.: As my analysis is reflected during the period, during the actual capture of Srebrenica, General Major Krstic was the Chief of Staff of the Corps. During the actual operation to take over Zepa, he was the Corps Commander. (10) • Q.: Now, you -- the video portion that we are going to see does not have this section of the speech. Was that in possession or is that in possession, this section of the speech in the possession of the OTP? • A.: I do not believe that we have the audio portion of that speech. MR. McCLOSKEY: And Your Honours, we do have a portion of this (15)ceremony, just a brief segment to give you a feel for who was there and General Mladic was at the podium. • Q.: Mr. Butler, who was there besides General Mladic and General Krstic that may relate to our case? • A.: There will be video coverage of two other individuals directly. (20)One of them will be Captain First Class Milan Jolovic, who was the Commander of the Drina Wolves and was the designated Commander of this mobile brigade. And the second individual that will be seen in the video will be Colonel Beara the Chief of the Main Security Administration of the Main Staff. (25)
MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. If we could play Exhibit 367, and it
• A.: The individual now in the centre of the picture, that white-haired individual, was Colonel Beara. MR. McCLOSKEY: Could we go back and play that again, booth? (5) THE REGISTRAR: Excuse me, the technical both has informed me that they do not have lighting capabilities. MR. McCLOSKEY: That's fine. Is it possible just to go back to the very beginning? Okay. • Q.: And Mr. Butler, if you could just narrate this. (10) • A.: As you will see, General Mladic walking in. The man behind him is Colonel Beara, and General Krstic. The man he is saluting now is Captain First Class Milan Jolovic. You see General Krstic come into the picture you see Colonel Beara come into the picture. In the military sense this is General Mladic taking the salute of his troops accompanied by General (15)Krstic and Captain First Class Jolovic. • Q.: And we have another exhibit, a still shot of that video that shows Colonel Beara, General Krstic, Captain Jolovic and General Mladic all in one frozen frame, that's Exhibit 65. And that was recently provided so it -- the Court should get copies, but I don't think we need to comment (20)any further on that photo. And now after one false start, I believe we are ready to go into closed session and it may be helpful and productive to take a break now, Your Honours, so we can set up for the closed session.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Very well. We can have a break
(25)now. So we'll have a 30-minute break. I said 30 minutes.
--- On resuming at 1.13 p.m.
THE REGISTRAR: We are in public session now.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Thank you very much. I think
that we will be here tomorrow morning again for the cross-examination.
(25)Mr. Petrusic, are you ready?
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Thank you. So we will adjourn for today and come back again tomorrow morning at 9.30. --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned (5)at 2.55 p.m., to be reconvened on Wednesday the 19th day of July, 2000, at 9.30 a.m. |
