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/ Colormap • Page 5434 • {1/104} (1)Friday, 21 July 2000 [Open session] [The witness entered court]
--- Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Good morning, ladies and gentlemen; good morning, to the technical booth, the interpreters; good morning, legal officers, the registrar, Mr. Harmon, Mr. Cayley, Mr. McCloskey; good morning, Mr. Petrusic, Mr. Visnjic, and (10)General Krstic. Good morning, Mr. Butler. We're going to continue with your testimony, and it is Mr. Petrusic's turn to continue. Your witness, Mr. Petrusic. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Good morning, Your Honours; good (15)morning, my learned friends from the Prosecution; good morning, Mr. Butler. The Defence wishes a good morning to all others present here in the courtroom. WITNESS: RICHARD BUTLER [Resumed] • CROSS-EXAMINED by Mr. Petrusic: [Continued] (20) • Q.: Mr. Butler, do you have any evidence that the forward command post of the Drina Corps was located in the headquarters of the Bratunac Brigade on the 12th, 13th, and 14th of July, 1995?
• A.: I believe there is one specific reference in one of the previous
exhibits tendered, and again the specific exhibit number escapes me, where
(25)the specific identification "IKM Drina Corps" and "Bratunac" are used in
• Q.: Was Pribicevac a forward command post during the operation? • A.: As established, the location of Pribicevac was first a command post for the 3rd Battalion of the Bratunac Infantry Brigade, Light (5)Infantry Brigade. It was also a command post for a group or Tactical Group that oversaw or monitored the operations of Srebrenica for two years prior. It later became the forward command post of the entire Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade as part of the operations for Krivaja-95, and into that same command post function, a good number of Drina Corps officers (10)fell in, so it became a forward command post for the Drina Corps as well. • Q.: The command post or the forward command post? • A.: In this regard, we would be talking about the forward command post at Pribicevac, sir. • Q.: Do you have any evidence to show who represented the Corps (15)Commander at the command post in Vlasenica on the 14th of July, 1995?
• A.: Working under the premise that General Major Krstic was the Corps
Commander on that day and that he may well have been in Zepa, with the
understanding that at that time Colonel Svetozar Andric, who was assuming
the position as Chief of Staff at the time, was also reportedly in Zepa,
(20)the next logical individual who would have assumed that function would
have been the Chief of Operations for the Drina Corps.
Now, my understanding in this regard is that the Chief of
Operations of the Drina Corps was also in and around the Zepa area as
well. So specifically, while I can't give you the name of an individual,
(25)the other individuals in question would have been other officers of the
(5) • Q.: Regarding the change of the Corps Commander, were the brigade commanders or the brigades informed of that change? Because as you say, this change took place on the 13th. Were they informed on that same day of this change? • A.: As the previous -- as at least one previous exhibit has (10)demonstrated, the response by the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade to a Drina Corps order that we do not possess, in reading that response, I conclude that that case specifically, the Bratunac Brigade, was informed of a change of command, and my presumption is that based on that document, that the other brigades would have been informed as well. However, that (15)again -- that information would have been available to them by the late evening of the 13th or the early morning of the 14th hours, so I can't specifically say the brigade commanders would have been aware of that change of command on 13 July. • Q.: In the written documents of the other brigades, the Zvornik, the (20)Milici, the Vlasenica, and Birca Brigades, as well as the Rogatica Brigade, among those documents is there any evidence to show that the Commanders were informed of the change at the head of the corps?
• A.: As I previously indicated, of the units that you've listed, the
written documents that I have reflect only Bratunac Brigade and Zvornik
(25)Brigade. I do not possess the material documents for the other units that
• Q.: In that piece of information from the Bratunac Brigade, is a date (5)indicated when the change took place? • A.: No, sir. The specific phrase, and again it comes out rather awkward in English, is "hitherto," which, being American and not English, I had to ask -- do some research on what exactly that meant, "hitherto" reflecting from that point and prior. So my conclusion is that that (10)change of command or that date is reflective of their notification on the 14th. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] I should like to ask the usher for his assistance to find Exhibit 556, please. • Q.: In its questions, the Defence will proceed from the assumption (15)that this piece of information is an authentic document, although that has been disputed because this is an intercepted telephone conversation conducted on the 14th of July, 1995, at 20.38 between Major Jokic and Major General Zivanovic who is at Zlatar. In the third line of this conversation, General Zivanovic says to Major Jokic, "Take this as an (20)order." Mr. Butler, somebody who has been replaced and relieved of his duty as commander, can he issue orders to an immediate subordinate?
• A.: In reviewing the intercepts within the context and with
specifically this intercept, because this issue and this specific
(25)intercept flies counter to the theory that we've examined, one of the
• Q.: In this same conversation a few lines down, General Zivanovic
(20)indicates in tactical terms, I would say, what Major Jokic needs to do --
or rather, the unit of the Zvornik Brigade, when he says, "Then it means
good weapons, good reconnaissance and taking good action against all of
that." And then towards the very end of the conversation he says again,
"Therefore blockade, blockade. The units will be there by dawn."
(25)Mr. Butler, is he, that is General Zivanovic, indicating how units
• A.: In this specific intercept, what I believe he's doing -- he's not specifically indicating how units would be deployed as a command. What he's doing is indicating in broad terms the type of broad actions that he (5)wants the duty officer to pass to Obrenovic what he should be doing during the course of the evening, for the first part; and for the second part, indicating that block it, do the best that you can, and be aware that reinforcement and other units will be there by dawn, dawn in this case being the morning of the 15th. And as we know from the further (10)information, the units of the Zvornik Brigade withdrawing from Zepa arrive the morning of the 15th back in the zone of the Zvornik Brigade. • Q.: The time of this conversation is the 14th of July, 1995, at 2020 hours. That is what the Defence wishes to note. The next exhibit is 558. The date is the 14th of July, 1995, and (15)the conversation at 2056 hours between a major and General Zivanovic - X. Mr. Butler, in the seventh line of this intercept, the Major addresses the General and says, "How can I find out --" he's addressing "X" and asking him, "How can I find out where General Zivanovic is as I've been waiting here for him on his orders since 1700 hours." (20)Does that mean that someone is continuing to act on General Zivanovic's orders and to carry out his orders, or rather, that Major General Zivanovic is still issuing orders to his -- to subordinate officers?
• A.: Well, clearly your first explanation is probably the most
(25)technically accurate one considering the identification of "M," the major,
• Q.: So in this case too, we have an order which was passed on to (5)somebody from General Zivanovic. • A.: I'm not sure it qualifies as an order. It's a statement that a Major has been waiting for General Zivanovic at a location on his order. I don't know if that qualifies as a passing on of an order in a formal sense. (10) • Q.: But in this intercept, in this case, reference is made to an order among the participants. • A.: The reference made to the order is the individual Major was told by General Zivanovic to be here waiting for him. In the scheme of orders and instructions in commands, in my mind, looking at that, it's less a (15)formalised, "I'm giving you a series of formal instructions," rather than a general is a superior officer telling a major, unidentified, "Be there at this time and wait for me." It's tough to tell what the context is, but I wouldn't read too much into it on one line, sir. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Mr. President, may the Defence be (20)allowed to read the entire intercept? It is not long. So: (X.:) Just a moment, to Colonel Vukovic. (M.:) How it's going? (X.:) We're fine, how about you? (25)
(M.:) How can I find out where General Zivanovic is? I've been
(X.:) He's here. (M.:) What? (X.:) He's here. (5) (M.:) There? (X.:) Yes. (M.:) Put me through to him. (X.:) I'll try to now. (Z.:) Good evening, Vuko. (10) (M.:) Things are all right, good, here. I did everything in the spirit of what I received last night. And this morning /?he/ called me Natasku? /word unknown/ and I came here this morning at around 10 o'cock and I /as written/. (Z.:) Major! (15) (M.:) Yes, yes, I understand you. (Z.:) I have just come from the checkpoint ... (M.:) Could you repeat that, please? (Z.:) I said that paper which was sent - there is one - from Blagojevic, about me. (20) (M.:) Okay. (Z.:) Read my conclusions. (M.:) I understand. (Z.:) Because (from here on drowned out by previously recorded conversation) (25)
(M.:) Yes, sir. I understand, completely, and then we'll focus on
(M.:) I understand. I'm going to my post up there. (Z.:) Listen. Where are your boys there? (5) (M.:) Well, my boys are now in the western part, working there as of today. Everything's in place. Sweet as a nut. (Z.:) Excellent. (M.:) I did that today. (Z.:) ... (mumbles something briefly) (10) (M.:) Yes, sir. (Z.:) Take care. (M.:) Take care." • Q.: From this entire conversation, Mr. Butler, it is clear that the Major, as a participant, and Zivanovic as the other participant, are (15)discussing a certain military situation, and in a part of that conversation, Ivanovic is cautioning the Major and telling him to read the conclusions. Is that correct? • A.: That's a correct phrase, sir, read my conclusions, yes. • Q.: Is it also correct that the Major is telling General Zivanovic (20)where his forces are distributed? • A.: That is correct, sir. • Q.: And does General Zivanovic express his approval of that distribution of forces when he says "excellent"? • A.: That is correct, sir. (25)
MR. PETRUSIC:
[Int.] Could I ask the usher for his
• Q.: This is an order of the Main Staff of the army of Republika Srpska issued by Lieutenant-Colonel Milan Gvero. The date is unclear, illegible, but it is July 1995. (5)In view of the format of this order and the units to which it is addressed, the question is: The units to whom this order was issued, are obliged to inform the Main Staff on the execution of this order? • A.: With this specific order and coupling that with the follow-on order for the Drina Corps, which essentially repeats this and (10)redistributes it to the brigades, I would not interpret it as the brigades are responsible for informing the Main Staff specifically. The order, as written, indicates -- I believe the phrase that they use is -- okay. In this case they do not use the phrase, so let me -- in this specific one they talk about the Republika Srpska Main Staff. So in this case, I don't (15)believe they use the generic phrase "superior command." Again looking at this, I read there along the lines of the Drina Corps, as the primary command, having to inform the Main Staff through interim reports. I do not read this, and I do not believe it is intended that the subordinate brigades are to inform the Main Staff directly (20)through the use of interim reports. • Q.: It is undisputed that the Main Staff has issued an order to lower-level units, in this case, brigades, is it not? • A.: In this case the Main Staff has issued an order to the Drina Corps commands, the IKMs, and several of the Drina Corps brigades. (25)
MR. PETRUSIC:
[Int.] With the assistance of the usher,
• Q.: An order of the Main Staff of the army of Republika Srpska, dated the 17th of July, 1995, signed by the Commander, Colonel-General Ratko Mladic. (5)The appointment of commanders of the mentioned orders, and that is Lieutenant-Colonel Kesarevic, does that imply that Lieutenant-Colonel Kesarevic is obliged, after carrying out activities envisaged by this order, to inform the Main Staff through regular and interim reports to the Main Staff of the army of Republika Srpska or to -- that is, to its (10)Commander? • A.: In this particular instance, the document specifies that the deadline for the completion of the task by a designated date and an order for further engagement towards Cerska shall be imposed, meaning that Colonel Kesarevic -- I hope I pronounced that correctly -- should propose (15)a future operations plan to me, again in this case it would be General Mladic, by July 19, 1995. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Exhibit number 364/2, please, Mr. Usher. The tab 17th of July, tab 14/2.
• Q.: Mr. Butler, the Defence will once again ask the following
(20)questions under the presumption of authenticity of this document. This is
an intercepted conversation. It was -- it took place on the 17th of July
at 2030 hours. Participants are Krstic and "X."
In this conversation, Krstic asks "X," "With whose approval did
you send soldiers down there?" and "X" answers, "On orders from the Main
(25)Staff." Does that mean that the Main Staff having issued the order, in
• A.: I just want to make sure I read the whole thing before I give you my answer. I don't want to answer it out of context, here. (5)My answer to that, and I just wanted to confirm this because I've gone over this one before as part of my analysis, is that it only -- your conclusion makes sense if you're willing to assume that "X" and the unit of "X" are under the command of the Drina Corps. That presumption is not indicative in the order, for example. "X" could be the commander of a (10)Main Staff unit or another unit which General Krstic may have thought he had some right to command or had some string on their resources. So without knowing again who "X" is and what the function and purpose of "X" is prior, I can't presume that "X" is in fact a subordinate of General Krstic. (15) • Q.: Mr. Butler, "X" mentions Potocari, and that's the area of responsibility of the Drina Corps. • A.: "X" says he was up in Potocari; he had to check it out. All "X" is doing is giving a physical location on the ground where he was at a point in time. (20) • Q.: Mr. Butler, "X" says, "I have just come recently from my area of responsibility just to make your acquaintance," and he talks about Potocari. So is Potocari in the area of responsibility of the Drina Corps? Just yes or no, please. • A.: The answer is yes, Potocari is in the zone of the Drina Corps. (25)
• Q.: Mr. Butler, are there cases and is it possible for a superior
• A.: If I understand what you're asking, sir, what you're asking is, is (5)a series of two theoreticals. Theoretical number one, is it possible for a Superior Command to take over, and if I read the transcript correctly, over the command over subordinate units, the whole area of responsibility in one sense; and then the next one is the theoretical, is it possible for them to take over command of a limited small unit. (10)Going back to the 7 [sic] July 1995 order, the previous exhibit, 649, I believe that's an excellent example of how the Main Staff can take over limited command of select assets, some including the Drina Corps, for a specific period. Going back to your first one, whether or not it's possible for them to come in and essentially take over whole commands, (15)brigade-size formations, if you will, I don't see practical applications of that, and I don't see evidence that supports that in my research, unless we're physically talking about the resubordination of brigades from one command to another command for battlefield reasons on the ground. One would think that with the work load of the Main Staff over -- having to (20)oversee the activities of six corps, that that would be a bit much for them.
MR. PETRUSIC:
[Int.] Mr. President, there seems to be a
mistake in the transcript. Instead of the 7th of July, it should read
17th of July since Mr. Butler in his response referred to document -- to
(25)Exhibit 649.
• A.: General Mladic is clearly the Commander of the Main Staff and, in effect, the senior ranking and Commander of the army who answers only to (10)the President of the republic. Understanding the context of this meeting, the fact that General Mladic, whether he wanted to designate or not delegate the details of it to his Chief of Staff or to a Corps Commander or to anyone else, is his decision. And clearly when one looks at the style of General Mladic, (15)certainly as envisioned by -- or certainly as demonstrated by the video evidence that has been seen to date relative to Srebrenica, he very much is hands-on and involved with certainly the public aspects of these events, and these meetings certainly qualify as public aspects. • Q.: Can we count these meetings that fall under the heading of (20)"command of subordinate officers"?
• A.: Could you be more specific, sir? I'm not sure what regard
"command of subordinate officers." I mean, clearly he's giving
instructions to his officers, he's giving instructions to the Dutch UN
representatives that are present, and he's giving instructions to the
(25)Muslim civilian representatives who are present. So it's an exercise of
• Q.: Thank you, Mr. Butler. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Mr. President, in the last part of our cross-examinations, we would like to go over into closed session. (5)
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] So let's go into private
session, please, for a few minutes.
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] So we are in open session now. Thank you very much. You may proceed, Mr. McCloskey. • RE-EXAMINED by Mr. McCloskey: MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President. (25)
• Q.: Since we left at the meetings, let me just briefly ask you, the
• A.: It's -- my understanding is that there would be other meetings, yes, sir. • Q.: From a military sense, when could you expect the VRS command structure that was present in the area of Potocari and Bratunac on the (10)10th, 11th, and 12th, when could you expect for them to have knowledge that there were a fair number of Muslim men gathered and a large group of individuals in Potocari?
• A.: If we look back at the military situation and where the units were
laid out, and as previously noted, the VRS positions were in the hills,
(15)not only along the route and -- or along surrounding Srebrenica town and
later on the 11th in the town but certainly in a position to overlook the
road from Srebrenica to Potocari and then Potocari itself, the presumption
is that they would have been able to observe the movement of the civilian
population from Srebrenica to Potocari on the late afternoon, early
(20)evening hours of the 11th. And certainly either during the evening hours
of the 11th or certainly by first light on the 12th, been in a position to
physically observe the composition of the large number of people at
Potocari. Certainly they may not have been able to pull out numbers and
everything else, but as the witness statements and Dutch testimony
(25)indicates, the sheer number of people around that area, it should not have
• Q.: Now, given that the transcripts of those meetings, what we know of them, obviously they're not complete transcripts, show that on the 11th, General Mladic is interested in the Muslim soldiers. When is the first time that we see from the transcripts that General Mladic actually makes (10)reference to males between the ages of 16 and 60, if you recall? • A.: If I recall correctly, at the third meeting that occurs at 1000 hours on 12 July 1995, General Mladic makes that statement. • Q.: And again, if you can recall, when approximately did Muslim people in Potocari start to get put on buses? (15) • A.: In reading and in reviewing the testimony of the Dutch and other survivors, by the mid-afternoon, almost -- and I can't really qualify it in a period of time when the first buses leave for Kladanj, there are also a series of buses that depart that are filled with men that are going to Bratunac. So again, that process occurred in the mid-afternoon hours of (20)12 July, and we see the men being put on buses and taken to Bratunac at approximately the same time.
• Q.: So given that time frame that you've discussed, from the evening
of July 11th when the VRS could have first found out about men in Potocari
and the afternoon of July 12th when men had their IDs taken and were put
(25)on buses, who was the Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps at that time and
• A.: That would have been General Major Krstic, sir. • Q.: And as the Chief of Staff, as you've described earlier, would one of his principal responsibilities be the planning and organising of (5)military operations? • A.: That is his primary job function. • Q.: When did the VRS first become aware of large numbers of Muslim men from the column and that they would have the opportunity to -- sorry. Let me start over and phrase that a little better. (10)When was it -- did it become clear to the VRS that they were able to capture or they would be able to capture large numbers of Muslim men from the column? • A.: The intercepts, as we have them, indicate that by approximately 0300 hours on the morning of 12 July, the Muslim [sic] lower commanders on (15)the ground or along the road were becoming aware of the existence of a column. That column formed during the day and continued to move through 12 July. The presumption would be that sometime certainly by the afternoon of 12 July or early evening hours at the latest, they would have been capturing Muslim men from the column. As to when an exact awareness (20)of when that would have been, I can't answer that specifically, sir. JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me, Mr. Butler. You said at the beginning of your answer "the Muslim lower commanders on the ground." • A.: I apologise, sir. That should be the VRS lower commanders. JUDGE RIAD: Thank you. (25)
MR. McCLOSKEY:
(5) • A.: Yes, sir. That is correct. • Q.: And again at that time period, General Krstic was the Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps and would have been involved primarily in planning -- well, excuse me, not primarily but certainly would have been involved in planning operations if he was doing his job as defined by the (10)VRS? • A.: That is correct, sir. • Q.: Now, counsel brought up, in the cross-examination, a conclusion you made in your report regarding the leadership role of General Krstic in the attack of Srebrenica. Now, I've asked you to assemble some of the (15)documents that are actually in support of that theory of yours. Could you just take us through them very briefly. I know you've already spoken of them, so I don't think we need to spend much time, but I do -- I would like it if you would remind the Court of what -- the real meaning of that paragraph. What backed up that paragraph in your report? (20)
• A.: In that regard, that series of documents which are now exhibits
which demonstrate the situation that certainly General Zivanovic, the
Corps Commander, is not physically present and that General Krstic, the
Chief of Staff, is present at the forward command post and running that
operation.
(25)I would refer to Exhibit 431, and again, I won't discuss it in
• Q.: Could you note the times as you're going through these so we can see the time, how they're related in time sequence? (20)
• A.: My apologies. This one is 1305, and I believe the date inclusive
that we've been discussing is all 12 July, sir.
1345 hours, and this is Exhibit 509, and the back end of the
conversation, again, an acknowledgment, "I can put you up there to General
Krstic. He's in charge of this attack." Again, an awareness on the part
(25)of the subscriber "O," a duty officer, and as we've discussed earlier in
• Q.: And that's signed as Chief of Staff, General Krstic as Chief of Staff on the 13th; is that correct? • A.: That is correct, sir. That is signed by General Krstic as the Chief of Staff. (25)
• Q.: All right. And then I think the last two exhibits are just
• A.: That is correct. Exhibit 99, as we've discussed previously, and Exhibit 482, also discussed previously. (5) • Q.: General Mladic's statements were very specific regarding the Srebrenica and Zepa attacks. He describes the leadership of General Krstic as Chief of Staff or Corps Commander; is that right? • A.: That is correct, sir. • Q.: All right, thank you. And just to clarify the record, one -- I (10)think Mr. Butler identified an Exhibit as 539, and Ms. Keith tells me it should be 359. At this point we may be getting a little dyslexic, all of us, so we'll ... Now, Mr. Butler, 14 July, that was the day the records indicate the attack on Zepa? (15) • A.: That is -- according to the operations plan and the other information we have, the beginning of the attack on Zepa occurred early morning hours of 14 July, yes, sir. • Q.: And do you have any intercepts that have General Krstic on them on 14 July? (20) • A.: As previously noted, we have no intercepts of General Krstic on 14 July 1995 that reflect that. • Q.: However, there are indications in the investigation and in the records that Major Obrenovic had discussions with General Krstic on the 14th of July regarding the situation up in Zvornik; is that right? (25)
• A.: That is correct, sir.
• A.: There are I believe at least one, perhaps two on the 15th, and numerous ones on the 16th and 17th, sir. (5) • Q.: And are those generally consistent with a Corps Commander checking in or monitoring the situation in his zone of responsibility? • A.: Yes, they are, sir. • Q.: Now, I want to briefly go back to an exhibit the Defence discussed, the Main Staff order signed by General Gvero on 13 July, (10)Exhibit 532/A, and there was a suggestion that or a question to you whether or not this order would have required the brigades to report back to the Main Staff. You made reference to a Drina Corps order that was directly related to that Main Staff order, and I have that now, and if I could ask you to take a look at it. It's Exhibit 462/A, and is that (15)specific as to the reporting responsibilities of the brigades? • A.: This order, and as I've discussed previously, is almost a verbatim copy of the General Gvero order. If you go to the final paragraph 8 on page 3 of the English translation, it notes, "Through interim reports, ensure all units are kept informed of the current situation in areas of (20)responsibility so that the Command of the Drina Corps may be able to take measures in good time." I believe this very clearly articulates that the reports are to go to the Command of the Drina Corps so they can take measures in good time.
• Q.: Now, if we could get the exhibit that shows the quote from the 15
(25)July interim combat report, I think it may be 29 right there.
• A.: I would say that that's a, that's a fair assumption. If you did not understand the context of what was going on, this would be pretty (20)meaningless to you. • Q.: And when was this sent to the Corps Command of the Drina Corps? • A.: The actual report, the outgoing time stamp reflects, I believe, either 18 or 2000 hours on 15 July 1995.
• Q.: Is there any information in the record that would indicate whether
(25)or not the Corps Commander, General Krstic, did in fact have knowledge of
• A.: I would in that event refer back to the series of exhibits which reflect the conversation which occurred between General-Major Krstic and (5)Colonel Beara with regards to the "packages" and having no effective way to deal with them. As I've noted as that conversation as well, certainly from reading that conversation, because it's noted by one of the subscribers, and I don't know whether it's Colonel Beara or General Krstic off the top of my (10)head, that the "line is open and we shouldn't discuss it in that manner," they're clearly attempting to talk around the meat of the subject. Again, another clear indication that in trying to talk around what the real part of the subject is, both correspondents are fully aware of what the context of the conversation is about. (15) MR. McCLOSKEY: And for one or two last questions, Your Honour, could we go into closed session?
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Yes, let us go into private
session, please.
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] We are in open session now. I think this is a good time to have a break. Yes, Madam Registrar. (20) THE REGISTRAR: I see on the transcript it says "private session," but Mr. McCloskey said "closed session." Just for clarification for the court reporters, because they always ask me, do you want it private, closed?
MR. McCLOSKEY: I'm not sure of the difference, but I want it as
(25)closed as we can get it.
MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes. THE REGISTRAR: Okay. Thank you. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well. We're going to have (5)a half-hour break now, and after that, we'll come back for the questions of the Judges. --- Recess taken at 10.55 a.m. --- On resuming at 11.27 a.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Petrusic, I think you have (10)something to communicate to the Chamber. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Yes, Mr. President. In the break that we just had, General Krstic had certain health problems linked to his amputated leg, and as soon as that was noted, the doctor on duty found that an urgent medical treatment was required to deal with the injury, so (15)that General Krstic is now being treated. However, we have conferred with him, and he agrees that we continue with the proceedings in his absence, and he has given a written statement to that effect, which has been provided to the registrar. The statement is in the Serbian language, but if I may translate (20)it, it says that General Krstic agrees that we continue the hearings in his absence. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Harmon.
MR. HARMON: Mr. President, Your Honours, we have no objection to
proceeding in the absence of General Krstic, in light of the fact that he
(25)has filed a written waiver.
(5) THE REGISTRAR: 714. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] So the General's statement will be marked and admitted into evidence as 714, Exhibit 714. Fine. So we can resume our proceedings, and it is now the turn of us Judges to put questions to the witness, Mr. Richard Butler, and I give (10)the floor, therefore, to Judge Fouad Riad. Excuse me. I beg your pardon. Mr. Harmon. MR. HARMON: I'm sorry to interrupt, Your Honours, but I see that Exhibit 714 is in the series of the Prosecutor's exhibits, and I don't think this should be a Prosecutor's exhibit. I draw that to the Court's (15)attention. THE REGISTRAR: Sorry. My mistake. I'll get the proper number. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Thank you very much, Mr. Harmon, for drawing our attention to this. I myself was surprised that the Defence had produced all those documents prior to this one, 713, (20)therefore. So what will be the number now, Madam Registrar? Or we can deal with the matter at the end of the session. So let me give the floor now to Judge Fouad Riad. • QUESTIONED by the Court: (25)
JUDGE RIAD: Thank you, Mr. President.
• A.: Good morning. JUDGE RIAD: I've been listening carefully to your very comprehensive testimony. I've learned a lot from it. I would invite you (5)to shed some more light, to help me understand as somebody who is not military. Some of my questions I don't think need closed session, but if there is any suspicion, we can immediately close the session. You mentioned a statement -- I think you mentioned a statement by President Karadzic at the time, stating that General Krstic -- he was not (10)a General perhaps at that time -- "Krstic planned the operation in front of me and I approved that task for Srebrenica, which he did exceptionally well." I quoted you as much as I can. Then you said, "I corroborate that statement." Now, what do you corroborate in that statement? In other words, (15)what is the planning of the operation? What does this entail or include, military or civilian, the fighting, or the execution? Could you tell it to me without being too sophisticated militarily?
• A.: In doing my analysis and looking at the outside material, the
open-source press, in which case this would fall under, what I indicate
(20)when I corroborate it is that it in fact is a corroboration by
President Karadzic of, at a minimum, the military planning aspects of the
operation.
Now, as to whether he physically planned it in front of him or an
awareness of the president of the planning process, I don't know, but --
(25)and again, keeping with the more limited or more conservative views that I
JUDGE RIAD: Would the military aspect include the transportation of the men to the camps, for instance, and keeping them in the camps as one step? • A.: A military -- certainly that is a military function, sir. Where (10)the problem that I would have is trying to, again, get in the head of President Karadzic and try to determine whether or not he is only referring to the Krivaja-95 operations plan, which it would be a natural assumption to make that as the president of the Supreme Command, he would see that plan and certainly be briefed on it; or whether it's taking it to (15)the next step, which is the planning and execution process of moving the men up to execution sites and things of that nature. So I'm unable to make a determination based on that individual piece of information as to what part of the planning process President Karadzic is referring to. JUDGE RIAD: So the Krivaja plan did not include transportation or (20)anything except fighting? • A.: The Krivaja plan as written does -- only indicates that prisoners will be assembled and dealt with as part of the normal function of a corps military operation. The Krivaja plan as written does not go into the next series of steps as part of criminal act, sir. (25)
JUDGE RIAD: As written, but who is supposed to execute it?
JUDGE RIAD: Now, there was also a mention that Mr. Karadzic would -- considered General Krstic a very prominent general, and even he could compete with Mladic. (10)Do you think that still General Mladic would be able to pass over Krstic and, let us say, dominate the situation and do the whole thing, or would this be contrary to your findings?
• A.: One of the things that needs to be understood about that
particular excerpt is, and one of the reasons why I don't put that much
(15)validity in except a very limited manner, is the fact that that excerpt
was part of a larger speech by General -- or by President Karadzic on 4
August 1995 where he, in effect, removed General Mladic from the chief --
as the Chief and Commander of the army, the Commander of the Main Staff,
and tried to move him sideways, so to speak, and appoint himself the
(20)Commander of the army and move General Mladic into a position as his
advisor, in effect, taking him out of a position of codified command and
removing him to an advisory position.
Understanding that that's the context of the entire thrust of the
conversation, it's not unreasonable to assume that he's going to certainly
(25)try and downplay the role of General Mladic and up-play the role of
JUDGE RIAD: Now, would this -- where would the, what can I say, the withdrawal of General Zivanovic fit in this case? Why did Zivanovic, why was he removed in that period, if you know about it, and replaced by Krstic? (15)
• A.: That, sir, is the million-dollar question, and I really don't have
a solid answer. We understand from both public statements, and we also
understand from the interview that he gave to a correspondent a year after
the events occurred, that he was suffering health problems. And if you
would refer back to the video exhibit where it shows the walk-through on
(20)11 July 1995 in company with General Mladic and General Krstic, one of the
statements attributed to General Zivanovic, and if I believe the quote is
correct, he says, "My blood pressure must now be 600 over 300." Again, I
don't have a background in medicine, but clearly the implication is that,
you know, perhaps high blood pressure.
(25)We have in the statements of Drazan Erdemovic, he makes a specific
JUDGE RIAD: You added yourself that, I don't find the quotation exactly, but it was a very -- it was not the most propitious period for a transition of command. (10)
• A.: If one looks at the operations in a strictly military sense, that
Krivaja-95 as an operation militarily alone ends at a fixed point in time
and then subsequent to that Stupcanica-95, the operation for the takedown
of the Zepa enclave occurs in sequence afterwards, you could make the
argument that it would be a logical time to replace the Commander,
(15)particularly if it was understood that the Commander is going to be
replaced by the Chief of Staff, and you would have absolutely no loss in
the knowledge base and the visions of what the operations were supposed to
be.
Overlaying the context of the military events as they occurred,
(20)which shows that it wasn't a clean break and, in fact, the unexpected
breakthrough by the 28th Infantry Division or the unexpected movement of
the column out clouds that issue. You don't get a clean break. And when
you look at it from that aspect, it wouldn't seem to be a good time to do
that.
(25)The only other inference that I can make that adds another fact to
JUDGE RIAD: But the bottom line would be that in the eyes of the (10)president, the Supreme Commander, Krstic was the man fit for the job. • A.: Presumably he may not have appointed him unless he felt that he did, sir, yes. JUDGE RIAD: And with the support of the president? • A.: Again, as the president is the only person who can formally (15)appoint him as the commander, yes, sir. JUDGE RIAD: Now, in the light of this, how much do you think he could be unrelated to the events? For instance, you mentioned the civilian authorities of Srebrenica. Could there be some kind of distribution of roles and Krstic would be just the military man and the (20)civilian authorities would be handling, let us say, the rest, the transfer of prisoners, the executions, and so on? Is that, militarily speaking, a very logical plan, division of roles and power?
• A.: While in the abstract it might appear to be a logical break-up of
responsibilities, the fact basis completely supports the fact that the
(25)military was the primary agency responsible for doing all of this, to
JUDGE RIAD: Now, when you speak about the military function, does it -- do you speak in the light or bearing in mind the chain of command as (15)the regular army or just the military people with weapons, doing what they like?
• A.: Certainly in this context and what I hope I've demonstrated
through the fact base that has been presented, is that one of the
fundamental tenets of this entire series of events is the underlying
(20)organisation and structure involved. Certainly in isolation, one can make
the argument that an individual Muslim civilian in Potocari being killed
or maybe a group of five or ten being killed can be an isolated event or
along the road an isolated event, but when you string them altogether,
particularly tracking the implied organisational process that takes the
(25)civilians from Potocari, the female and the children and the elderly from
JUDGE RIAD: Now, in light of this orderly chain of command, you mentioned that General Krstic gave orders that women and children should not be molested, shall not be hurt, and he was obeyed, except one who was abused. I noted that down. (20)Did he only concentrate on women and children and mention nothing according -- you don't say the people should not be -- the civilians should not be touched or he said women and children? And what do you infer from that?
• A.: He makes two specific comments. The one, the first comment you
(25)refer to was from an intercepted communication where he's discussing the
(10) JUDGE RIAD: The statement concerning the women and children you said was obeyed, except one exception. Was the other one -- had he given the same orders concerning men? Would it have been obeyed? • A.: My understanding is -- I don't have any evidence that he gave the same order concerning men, and to be honest, sir, again you're asking me (15)to get into General Krstic's head on that one. I don't know whether if he gave that order it would be obeyed, sir. It's real speculation on my part, sir. JUDGE RIAD: No, I'm sorry. It's a twofold question. You said first he didn't give the order, I gather from the answer. (20) • A.: That's my understanding. JUDGE RIAD: But the other thing: According to the chain of command, would he have been obeyed?
• A.: If he gave that order according to the chain of command, certainly
all the troops under his command would have obeyed that order or should
(25)have obeyed that order.
• A.: Well, as you've indicated, sir, I don't know that that wasn't the case with General Zivanovic. JUDGE RIAD: What about others? Was there any other who (10)disapproved of what was happening? • A.: Let me answer your question in two parts, sir. The first part is that I do not have any information, throughout the entirety of my analysis of the VRS, that at any given point in time a senior officer, battalion, brigade, certainly a corps commander, was at any point in time ever (15)prevented from or operating under a climate of fear pertaining to what he approved of or did not approve of actions. I would remind the Court that in November 1994, General Galic, for again circumstances not clear, left as the Commander of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. So in that respect, I don't have any evidence (20)base which would suggest that officers who disobeyed or not disobeyed but disapproved of the conduct of the overall course of the war or of the orders they were following felt a compelling need to follow them for individual fear. I mean, this was not the Nazi SS.
JUDGE RIAD: Just as a footnote. You said about Zivanovic, you
(25)said he made it clear that by the 11th of July, midnight, he was not
• A.: Sir, again, I wouldn't want to speculate too far into that. All I know is we have the one fact, the one public statement that he's made to that regards. (5)We certainly are able, through the fact base, to demonstrate that he was in fact there on the 12th, and he was in fact there on the 13th, and he continued to be in the area on the 14th. So that is an inference. But based on those two, I wouldn't go that much further, personally, in trying to theorise the circumstances that General Zivanovic did that (10)under. JUDGE RIAD: You're not putting him in the same category of the other General, Galic, I think? • A.: I was just using General Galic as an example of the fact that corps commanders did change through the war, and I only used General (15)Galic. I know there were other corps commanders as well, but that they did change throughout the war. And while we don't understand the reasons why all of these corps commanders changed, there's nothing in the information or the evidence base that I have that would suggest that these senior VRS officers were operating under a climate of fear. (20) JUDGE RIAD: My last question, you mentioned that Colonel Pandurevic mentioned that he would not consider the -- he would not consider operation Krivaja as finished until it has -- until all the issues are dealt with in the zone of Zvornik Brigade, until all the issues are dealt with? (25)
• A.: That is correct, sir.
• A.: Based on the content of that specific comment and based on the events that were occurring, there were only two issues occurring in the (5)zone of the Zvornik Brigade at that time: one, the combat operations against the column, and the other, the mass executions that were occurring at the previously identified sites. As to which one is he specifically referring to, I don't know that I could take that next step, sir. (10) JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much. I have perhaps a question that requires a closed session, but I'll keep it. Thank you. Thank you very much. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Thank you very much, Judge Fouad Riad. (15)Madam Judge Wald, please. JUDGE WALD: I asked many questions as your testimony, perhaps too many from your point of view, as your testimony has proceeded; but let me tell you in advance I've got about a dozen questions so that you may, if you care to pace your answers -- (20) • A.: I have a blank pad, ma'am.
JUDGE WALD: So that we have lots of time for Judge Rodrigues'
questions as well.
Several of them are, in the beginning, based upon your analysis of
the roles of Chief of Staff in the VRS based, as you explained, partly on
(25)earlier JNA regulations, partly on what you saw as evidence of the way
• A.: The way the system is designed, ma'am, that's exactly what is supposed to happen, the Chief of Staff taking the broader guidance, and (10)then it becomes his function as the head of the staff to take the broad guidance and turn that into executable orders or specified taskings for the subordinate commands and commanders. That's how the system is designed, ma'am. JUDGE WALD: Okay. My next question is, in the specific situation (15)we had here, if an order to the Assistant Corps Commander who was the chief of security, the assistant commander for security for a corps, if that person received an order from the Main Staff head of security that was at conflict with either an order of his own Corps Commander or corps policy, existing corps policy, which one do you believe under the (20)regulations he would be obliged to obey? He might try to accommodate them, I understand that, and go to the Corps Commander and explain his dilemma, but if push came to shove, which one does he owe primary obedience to?
• A.: My readings of the JNA Corps Command Regulations and the JNA
(25)Security Regulations, both being adopted by the VRS, those are -- that's
JUDGE WALD: So if he should receive a proposed order or directive from the Main Staff, chief of security, with whom he does have communication lines, as you explained, that ran counter to his own commander's orders or to what he believed to be command corps policy, then (10)he would have a duty, certainly, as I understand it, to go talk to his corps commander about it and attempt to resolve the dilemma, unless it was an investigation of personal malfeasance as you said. Is that right? • A.: That is correct, ma'am. JUDGE WALD: Now you talked some about the duty of investigating (15)war crimes that a Commander had under the existing regulations here which, as I understand it, would include the duty to make inquiries or investigations, if there were enough evidence or suspect evidence to suggest that these might be being committed. Would a Chief of Staff have that same duty, that same level of duty? Or if a Chief of Staff had some (20)evidence that came before him to suggest that there might be war crimes going or crimes against the international norms of war going on, would his duty be to go talk to the Commander or to initiate some kind of investigation on his own? • A.: Let me answer that in two parts, ma'am. (25)
JUDGE WALD: Sure.
(5) JUDGE WALD: Right. • A.: The Chief of Staff by position within the entire corps structure does not just qualify as any officer. He is, by position, the second senior ranking officer in the entire corps. If he finds out about it, in the sense where he finds out about this, on his own authority as the Chief (10)of Staff and the Deputy Commander, he would certainly have the authority to phone down to the brigade or to whatever level and order the operation to cease. JUDGE WALD: Or to at least find out -- • A.: Yes, ma'am. (15) JUDGE WALD: -- what was going on?
• A.: Even if he were to operate under the presumption that the corps
commander was doing this without the knowledge of the Chief of Staff, as
the Chief of Staff finds out about this, and again in a theoretical sense,
gives the order to stop, the brigade commander is going to accept that
(20)order at face value, operating under the assumption that the Chief of
Staff was authorised to give it anyway.
So even in a theoretical sense where there was a gigantic
conspiracy to cut him out of the loop, once he found out, he certainly had
within his own discretion the powers to at least take some form of action
(25)against it.
(10) • A.: In that regard, the comment that I made, and I did qualify it in my testimony, was that I have no specific evidence -- JUDGE WALD: Right, right. • A.: -- from the VRS and the documents. JUDGE WALD: I understand. (15) • A.: Now, clearly Dutch witnesses have testified that they believe that the civilians were, in fact, being shelled. When I talk about the issue of targeting, and again looking at it from a very narrow military sense -- JUDGE WALD: I understand. (20) • A.: -- what I'm looking for is evidence or information that the shell was aimed at or the round was aimed at a specific location or with that specific intent. Now, I understand that that is a very narrow view.
JUDGE WALD: So in other words, your answer was not ruling out,
that's all I wanted to -- the notion that you might also use shelling as a
(25)strategic way of getting civilian population to move on, as it were?
JUDGE WALD: Right. (5) • A.: -- certainly inferred that to them, that they were being herded in a direction. JUDGE WALD: Tell me if you're able to answer this question based upon the information base that you have: Would you say in the almost complete evacuation of the Muslim population from Srebrenica, that the (10)dominant factors -- or how would you rate the factors of, one, the actions of the VRS in taking over the town militarily; two, the decision by the military and perhaps civilian leaders of the BiH at a certain point that they thought it was best for them to move on to Potocari; and three, just the spontaneous reactions of the population itself? (15)
• A.: With regards to the sequence of events between the military
operation at Srebrenica and the BiH activities, clearly as indicated by
one of the exhibits I believe the Defence raised, by the 9th of July, the
BiH military and civilian leadership in Srebrenica realised that, one, the
UN forces were not going to be able to prevent the VRS from taking the
(20)town; and two, that they militarily themselves could not do that and were
awaiting guidance.
Certainly as Colonel Karremans discusses the next day or that
evening in his discussions, he discusses the issue of the fact that NATO,
to his understanding, will conduct airstrikes sometime on the 11th. That
(25)evening of the 10th, for whatever reason, the BiH military and civilian
(10)
JUDGE WALD: Okay. My next question deals with the column. We
had a couple of discussions about how the VRS was entitled under military
law to treat a mixed military-civilian column as a military target of some
sort. We also had in your report, testimony, that actually the number of
armed men, at least, it seemed to me the greatest estimate, the highest
(15)estimate was about a third of the column, and then there were estimates
that were lower than that, that maybe a thousand of these men out of the
several thousand that were in the column were armed.
Do we know whether or not the armed men were at the head of the
column for the breakthrough primarily. Or whether they were scattered at
(20)random, as it were, throughout the column? Predicate to that, the second
part of the question would be, is it indeed, if they were concentrated at
the beginning, if, of the armed column -- of the column, then is it
legitimate for the enemy to treat the whole column as a military target if
large portions of it are clearly purely civilian? That's kind of a
(25)complicated question; do the best you can.
JUDGE WALD: Was at the front. (10)
• A.: -- was at the front of the column. As that column then transited
through the zone of the Zvornik Brigade the 14th, 15th, and 16th, clearly
intelligence reports that the VRS is receiving from their sources qualify
the column in a series of one, two, or three groups, either an advanced
group, a reconnaissance group, and the main body, and they note that the
(15)bulk of the fighters are in the beginning of the column.
As a matter of record that we've discussed as part of the evidence
base, on the 14th of July, Dusko Vukotic, an intelligence officer assigned
to the Zvornik infantry brigade, makes a report to the command of the
Drina Corps, the intelligence command of the Drina Corps, recommending
(20)that some thought should be given, considering the strength of this part
of the front of the column, that they be allowed through, and then the
remainder of the column can be successfully engaged.
And as you look at the series of events that occur afterwards,
that is what was reflected on the ground, a temporary truce to allow the
(25)bulk of the column that was armed through, a closing of the lines, and
(5) JUDGE WALD: But there was nothing militarily illegitimate about that. Even if you only have a scattering of arms in a predominantly civilian column, it's still okay to treat it as a military target? • A.: The best that I can do on that is to again refer back to the fact that under their reading of that specific portion of the regulation on a (10)mixed civilian military target, that at a broad level, it's acceptable. However, there is a qualification that military commanders, in doing so, are required to take due regard to the military benefits of the military operations and how they would impact either the civilian population or, in this case, whether or not the casualties that the civilians would occur in (15)a pocket of people justifies the military necessity. And in that regard, judgements on that would be legally speculative and probably above my purview, ma'am.
JUDGE WALD: Okay. Let me ask you this: You gave us your
elaboration both in your report and in your oral testimony about why you
(20)think it would be permissible, perhaps even necessary, to infer from the
facts that General Krstic actually became operationally the Commander a
day or two days -- a day before President Karadzic's appointment, and two
days, I think, before it was to be effective, and you made out that case,
which we don't have to go into.
(25)On the other hand, if I understand your answers correctly, and
• A.: There are two parts to that question. I'd like to answer one, and I think I can answer it in open, and the other one I would request going (20)into a closed session on. JUDGE WALD: All right. You can save the closed session maybe till the end and we'll do everything in one closed, so just answer the open-session part.
• A.: Let me just write down the -- with regards to the second part, the
(25)issue pertaining to Mladic and the Main Staff going to handle that aspect
JUDGE WALD: But my question is -- I understand that. That's your
reason why. On the facts it's not likely to have happened, but the fact
is we do have evidence on the public record that General Mladic was
(20)sighted on several of those places where some of these holding actions and
even where some of the executions were taking place.
So we know that he was down there, we know that some of his Main
Staff was down there, and I guess my basic question is: Could he have,
under existing military regulations or military law have said, "I'm going
(25)to take charge of this. I'll use your Drina Corps assets down that. I'll
• A.: In the larger sense, as the Commander of the army of Republika (5)Srpska, he does that anyway. On the other aspects, certainly we have him on the ground on the 12th and the 13th of July. We have him in Belgrade on the evening of the 14th and all day on the 15th, according to General Elliot's affidavit. So at a point in time, his physical presence disappears. Now, that certainly doesn't imply that his ability to command (10)and control disappears. He -- certainly there are Main Staff officers in the zone of the Drina Corps, but it would again come back to the observations of the size and scale and scope of the operation. Certainly it would be at the direction of General Mladic. The question then becomes: How did he (15)choose to execute that? And again, General Mladic, being an experienced commander and staff officer, it would be difficult for me to believe that for the purposes, that he would essentially remove one or two or five of the most critical officers of the corps and isolate them completely, and then of his own violation or volition try to handle it himself. I mean, (20)in essence, to do that, he is degrading his own abilities to successfully conduct that.
JUDGE WALD: Okay. I have just about four, I think, rapid
questions. One, we heard one theory raised in some of the Defence
questions that the references to the word, which I don't -- couldn't
(25)pronounce correctly, for burial, in a couple of the excepts, might have
• A.: In that regard, perhaps the best way to do it is keeping in mind the time sequence of the events as they occurred. The phrase itself obviously refers to the burial of bodies. It doesn't qualify how the (10)bodies got there. What I tried to do as part of my analysis is to go to the effort of quantifying where the combat from the column was physically and where it occurred in time, and then demonstrate that based on the times that we see the engineer equipment operating, that there cannot be a physical linkage between the two. (15)I mean, in the sense of Colonel Pandurevic as a Commander -- JUDGE WALD: Yes, I understand. • A.: -- I would find it very difficult for him to be concerned about the burial of bodies on a battlefield, from a battlefield context, before the battle has really gotten underway. (20)
JUDGE WALD: Okay. I've just got four questions now. If the Main
Staff was running an operation of any sort in the Corps Commander's
territory without there having been a formal recertification or
reallocation of authority, would it be the normal military procedure for
the Commander, for the Corps Commander, to be told about both that
(25)operation and some degree of detail?
• A.: Absolutely, ma'am. The fundamental issue within a military
structure, particularly a ground army, is that everybody has to know what
everybody's doing. I mean, certainly not the individual soldier on the
ground, but the staff, because it is their job to, one, coordinate the
(10)activities, and to further deconflict
[sic] the activities. Because,
again, in a live-fire environment, if everybody is not clear where
soldiers are on the ground, you will end up killing your own people.
We've done that in various wars in the US Army. It's not an exact
science, and a lot of the work of the staff resolves around that.
(15)The second piece is again from a military aspect and as
demonstrated by what occurred in the Zvornik Brigade, at the same time
these events are occurring, you've got significant military activity, and
you have a conflict in the resources required to either fight the column
or to bury the bodies and conduct the executions. And again, with Colonel
(20)Pandurevic noting that there is a conflict here, he needs guidance, he
needs reinforcements, it's an unexpected situation, and the manifestation
of this command and staff activity to get Colonel Pandurevic the tools he
needs to both fight the column and continue on the execution process. I
mean, that's why the system works the way it does, and that's why it's --
(25)particularly within the JNA and former VRS, orders that are issued at one
(5) JUDGE WALD: Okay. Exhibit 619, which I believe is -- the Defence counsel brought up again, which is an order from the Main Staff to the Drina command and the recipients, several of the brigade commanders which you -- brigade commands which you discussed, but I noticed, in looking at the heading on that, when it said, "Drina command, from the Main Staff," (10)it says, "for information," and then it says, "Zvornik Brigade, Bratunac Brigade." Is there any -- I mean, it says "Drina Corps command," then "for information." It's unclear to me, reading the English translation, if the "for information" is for the Drina command, if the "for information" is for the following -- the individual brigade commands. Do (15)you have any impression on that? Or is it completely random? • A.: I tried to discuss this a little in direct. It is a bit confusing because of the language issue. JUDGE WALD: Right. Yes. • A.: Now, in that particular exhibit, unless I'm mistaken, if you go to (20)the B/C/S version, behind it you will see where the comma is. JUDGE WALD: Oh, okay. • A.: Or "for information," and then units listed behind it. JUDGE WALD: From which you would infer what? • A.: That the order was directed to the higher command. (25)
JUDGE WALD: And the information was down below.
JUDGE WALD: Now my last question, but it's a little bit
complicated. At various times, people, and we don't -- I mean, have
suggested that may have been a plan from the very beginning about the
treatment of the prisoners, namely, the women and children would go on
(10)through to Kladanj and the men would not. But the time line, and maybe
you can go over this for me briefly -- and there's also been evidence very
early on, maybe it was even the 12th but it may have been the 13th, you
suggested that people down the line had to be going around finding these
holding stations like these schools and the various places so they would
(15)be ready when the prisoners arrived. On the other hand, we know that
the -- in Potocari, the maximum number of men that anybody has suggested
there were 900 or 1.000, something like that, from the Potocari group,
whereas the bulk of the people that eventually were held in these stations
and executed came out of the column. It's my understanding.
(20)So I'm trying to get it straight as to whether or not you think,
based on the evidence you have, when they were going around finding these
holdings stations and that sort of thing, they were doing it just on the
basis of the Potocari, because you point out it was the day or so before
they caught on what was happening to the column and the capturing began,
(25)all of which comes to my final question.
• A.: The best way that -- or possibly the way that I use, I won't say "best," to try and come to grips with that on a time line of looking back (10)at what a plan might have been, and again keeping in mind that it takes them a few days for the column to -- JUDGE WALD: Right. • A.: -- get established in their mind where it's going and what it's doing, is again when an awareness of -- that there would have been men in (15)Potocari evening of the 11th, the morning of the 12th. Certainly the evening of the 11th the decision was made to start busing them out. JUDGE WALD: Right.
• A.: The presumption is that sometime during the evening, the early
morning hours of the 12th, somebody in Bratunac started designating and
(20)identifying sites to hold individuals who would start arriving by the
12th, by the afternoon of the 12th, the earliest ones. Excuse me.
General Mladic makes the statement pertaining to a formal vetting
process in his mind for war criminals. The separation at Potocari there,
the fact that there's a list, the fact that Dutch witnesses say that in
(25)the white house there were photographs out where some people were vetting
JUDGE WALD: Thank you. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Thank you very much, Judge Wald. I see that it is 20 to 1. I, too, have a large number of (10)questions for you, so if we begin with my questions, we will be under pressure because we will need a closed session, so perhaps it would be better to have a break, at least for me to prepare my questions. I have asked the registrar to prepare the exhibits which I intend to use, and to facilitate your answers. My questions will be very simple, but maybe your (15)answers will not, so I'm going to ask Madam Registrar to put before Mr. Butler the exhibits. So we're going to have a break. I think 20 minutes will suffice because after that we don't have much more to do. 20-minute break. --- Recess taken at 12.43 p.m. (20) --- On resuming at 1.05 p.m.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Mr. Butler, I am going to ask
you a certain number of questions, 14 in all; some have subquestions to
them. I proceed from the principle that all my questions require answers
from you after you have reviewed and read all these documents. Some are
(25)hypothetical, but they are always based on the information you acquired
• A.: There may very well -- depending on the order, there may be instances where that is theoretically possible. A very simplistic order may be an individual type of an order. But within the realistic scheme of (10)how a military command and staff works, trying to do that on a broader scale and trying to keep the Chief of Staff specifically out of the loop very quickly runs the risk of military confusion, particularly if it's an order that would require the work of subordinates on the staff to have to accomplish, and yet somehow not be able to do that, deal with the Chief of (15)Staff and then deal directly through the Commander. I mean, one of the last issues on the command is the fact that the one resource a Commander can't fix on the battlefield and can't somehow modify or alter is time. He's got a lot of missions and a lot of jobs and a lot of hard decisions, and he has "X" amount of time. And one of the (20)reasons why he has the Chief of Staff and the staff is so he can give a simple order or broad guidance and not himself have to spend the hours necessary taking that broader guidance and turning it into specific executable tasks.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Do you have any indications of
(25)the presence of Arkan's Tigers in Potocari?
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] But if we take into consideration Exhibits 423 and 424, those exhibits refer to regular units, if I can call them that; and in connection with that you said that at a given moment, paramilitary units were integrated into the regular (10)structure or were disbanded. How can we interpret their presence in the context of military principles?
• A.: With that regard, I believe I qualified that "that moment in time"
was in mid to late 1992. The physical presence of a single individual is
not something that in isolation, that I would say qualifies the presence
(15)of that individual to the fact that a paramilitary unit is fully there.
What I'm looking for as part of my analysis to come to grips with
that issue is information or evidence which would suggest that either
multiple sightings which we could use or which I would use to refer
multiple individuals, or some evidence within the documents or within
(20)other statements that I could use as an additional piece of evidence
coming from another source to confirm or deny that. And at the end of the
day, what I've come up with is I have this specific statement, and I just
have no other information which would allow me to confirm or deny their
physical presence. I can't say that they were there; I cannot say that
(25)they weren't there. I cannot confirm it, though.
• A.: With respect to Srebrenica in 1995 in that regards, certainly the
army, as well as the civilian leadership of the country Republika Srpska,
was very aware and had to take those into consideration. The
(10)manifestation of that in my mind, of how they took those considerations
into effect, first would be the Krivaja-95 OP plan itself which does not
specify the taking of the town of Srebrenica as an objective; the 5 July
1995 air defence order published by the Drina Corps, a reflection that
because of the upcoming operations, NATO aircraft would potentially be
(15)involved, understanding that they would expect some reaction out of the UN
as a result of the increased military operations; the fact that when you
look at the scope of the operations, and I have to give them very good
credit on this, it was very much done, at least from my view, not in a way
that would immediately cause a trigger to be tripped in the International
(20)Community or with the UN. It was a very slow, cautious approach, moving
forward, taking an OP, moving forward again, taking an OP, working very
hard not to cause UN casualties as reflected in some cases by the way they
did this. In other cases, you know, firing at the UN, always a pattern or
a lack of pattern that the UN and the International Community could grasp
(25)onto as the ultimate intent. And clearly, the lack of response or the
(5) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Exhibit 428 refers to the separation and reduction of the enclaves as the objectives of the military operations as a first step, at the same time, the creation of conditions for the elimination of those enclaves. Would you agree with that? • A.: That is correct, sir. (10) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Those objectives, were they separate or were they simultaneous in time? • A.: They were -- well, from a military sequence, separated by time one after the other. In a planning sequence, they were certainly looked at as a unified plan, and we see the manifestation of that in some of the 9 and (15)10 July -- matter of fact, I believe there's 10 July Drina Corps order that is either an exhibit or part of my supporting material which reflects the fact that as a result of what is occurring at Srebrenica, we're now in a position to start taking advantage of that and start setting the conditions for the military operation at Zepa. (20)So while the military events fall in sequence because you need the same forces and they can't be in two places at once, the planning intent was certainly together.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] If one assesses the results, do
the results coincide with the objectives, or is there a discrepancy
(25)between the two, and if so, what is the discrepancy between the objectives
• A.: I believe from a military sense, the results exceeded the planned
objectives but met the modified objective insomuch as the fact that the
initial intent and goals was, first, the physical reduction of the
(5)enclave, and to create the conditions where presumably the United Nations
and the International Community would evacuate the enclave. In effect,
try to replay what happened in 1993 prior to the establishment of the
enclave.
In that regard where I think they were surprised was from a
(10)military sense, they were surprised by their success, and a lot of the
events that you see relative to the frenzy of activity trying to get the
buses and the resources to move the population is a reflection of the fact
that it didn't occur to them until almost the 11th, the evening of the
11th, that they would need to do that.
(15)I mean, looking at a corps staff and any military staff, part of
that process is to be able to anticipate events so you can plan for them
before you need whatever you need. And in this regard, you don't see
that. There was no prior planning for that aspect. So from a military
sense, they did achieve that at the low end. At the larger end, they
(20)achieved the goals of what they wanted, which was the elimination of
Srebrenica and Zepa as enclaves, and in a larger sense, now they did not
have those two enclaves to deal with in the area of the wider area of the
Predendija
[phoen] Valley.
Now, going to the next step of whether that included Gorazde and
(25)whether they thought they could get away with that as well is a bit
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Is it true that in the original plan, the evacuation of the population was included, was envisaged? • A.: Are we referring to the original OP plan Krivaja-95? I don't read (5)it as such. The specific line that I believe you're referring to would be part of the procedures that would be relative -- and, again, I don't want to put words in your mouth, sir, but I believe this is the passage that you would be referring to, the issue of dealing with prisoners in a war in a civilian population behaving in every way. (10)When I look at that, I don't take that to mean that they are already thinking through the process of removing thousands of numbers of individuals. I believe we're referring here to something of a much smaller scale. The fact that they can anticipate that they're going to take a number of prisoners, certainly at the beginning of the operation in (15)maybe ones and maybe tens, that they're going to come across members of the civilian population, and as previous testimony has indicated, there was, in fact, a rather large civilian project out there, I believe it's called the Swedish Shelter Project, in that area, so it would not be unreasonable at all to expect that their combat troops would be dealing (20)with prisoners of war and civilians in that aspect of the combat. But I wouldn't take this any further than that, sir.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] But if we come to the 11th or
the 12th of July, specifically to the meetings held in the Fontana Hotel,
I don't know whether it would be naive to say that there was an intention
(25)on the part of those responsible to evacuate the population. But what we
(5)
• A.: I would say, based on the events and probably the best trigger of
the event in my mind that would illustrate that intent would be at the
first meeting and then further at the second meeting. At the first
meeting, General Mladic articulates he wants to see the Muslim military
commanders; second meeting, the same.
(10)He doesn't know that the 28th Division is trying to escape.
Again, their understanding is that that division is in the Bandera
Triangle to the south-west of Srebrenica and may be preparing to fight or
may be preparing to make an escape towards Zepa. He doesn't know that
they're going out as a column or that there is an intent.
(15)It's almost clear, at least in my mind, that on the evening of
11th July, General Mladic, by that first meeting, second meeting, he's
looking to set the conditions for a set peace surrender of the
28th Division to him.
Somewhere after that second meeting and through the events that
(20)are occurring late in the evening of the 11th and the morning of the 12th,
as his tactical units on the ground along those roads start indicating
that there's a column moving, there is an awareness that, one, the
28th Infantry Division is not where the VRS thought it was; and, two, that
the 28th Infantry Division is not going to surrender but is, in effect,
(25)trying to organise a mass escape and return to the lines of the BiH.
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Exhibits 437 and 445 speak about the mobilisation of buses and also of drivers. You may have already answered this question, but I would like to insist upon it. This mobilisation, was it part of the initial plan or of the modified or (10)adjusted plan, following what you have just said?
• A.: Again, given the fact that the VRS, in general, and certainly the
corps tried to be as organised as possible and predict major events like
this, certainly where large numbers of resources are going to be used, all
of the activity pertaining to buses and pertaining to the resources to
(15)move the population appear, in my view, to be reactive to the situation
that's occurring. They're not in anticipation of an event. We don't see,
prior to the early morning hours of 12 July, any thought process
whatsoever on the side of the army or even the side of the civilian
government that they would have to do this.
(20)When you look at that and other statements that are taken in the
context of the events, it almost appears that until the late evening hours
of the 11th, the early morning hours of the 12th, they had always
perceived that the UN would do this and not them, and that it would be the
UN that would gather the assets, it would be the UN that would actually
(25)use all the resources, particularly the large number of buses and the
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] So we come to Exhibit 459. The treatment given to civilians mentioned in the postscript, is it possible (5)to make a distinction between the envisaged treatment and the other treatment that was, in fact, given? • A.: I think the key qualifier in this specific paragraph is the recognition of how it will be necessary to present the operation in Srebrenica to the media. They're qualifying the public face and the (10)private face. I don't think, at this point in time -- I mean, again, they're qualifying it. We have to advance the perception that here's the treatment of the civilians and even here's the treatment of surrendered soldiers. This is the public scene. So this is, in my mind, not an (15)awareness of a duality of how they're going to treat the individuals but an awareness of the fact that "what we do and what we sell publicly has to be different." JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Could it be said that they were playing with public opinion in a sense, that in a way they were lying? (20)
• A.: Sir, I believe that the fact basis supports that they were
manipulating the public opinion or attempting to. The fact that we have
the 12 July order that specifies that access to foreign media, foreign
information sources is going to be restricted along those closed highways
and that only media under the accompaniment of the army -- and again, the
(25)media coverage by Zoran Petrovic, typical of that -- would be allowed to
(10) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] To go back to the Zoran Petrovic interview, has this question something to do with the statement, that is Exhibit 499, according to which, and I'm going to quote it in English [In English] [Previous translation continues] ... "peripheral phenomenon in war." (15)Is there a relationship between the two? This statement is found on page 2, paragraph 5, "Refugees are a peripheral phenomenon in war."
• A.: I think, and again not reflecting the views of the author on this
one, I think he's accurately recounting the fact that military combat,
military conflict, does not occur in isolation with the civilian
(20)population. I mean, in fact, with regret, most of the combat seems to
occur there. Very rarely do you get the situation where you have the
luxury of a wide open desert with very little civilian population issues
to deal with.
Civilians or noncombatants always attempt to flee. I mean, it's a
(25)phenomenon, it's a known one, it's a rational choice, and military forces
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Exhibit 433 refers, among other things, to the presence of General Mladic. I think we have already discussed this at some length, but maybe this is from a slightly different angle. (10)Is it normal for the Major General, the chief of the command, to be present in these conditions? And if not, what are the reasons that you would give for his presence there?
• A.: Certainly given the perception that we're on the eve of a major
Serbian VRS victory, I would certainly expect General Mladic to be there.
(15)As I've noted in my previous testimony, particularly with relation to the
video footage of the walkthrough of Srebrenica with General Krstic and
General Zivanovic, one of the fundamental tenets of leadership and command
is to be seen doing that.
General Mladic is the commander of the army of Republika Srpska.
(20)That's not an esoteric position that is done in isolation. As a commander
at any level -- and I believe this is a pretty universal military
concept -- the commander has to be out with the troops and to be seen
being with the troops, sharing the hardships, sharing the rewards. He has
to be seen commanding and being seen leading.
(25)If you look at the video footage of General Mladic through the
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Have you come across any pieces of information which could lead you to have some views regarding the (5)relationship, even personal relationship, between General Mladic and the Drina Corps, and more specifically, with General Zivanovic?
• A.: The professional association with General Mladic and
General Zivanovic, and where I believe it crosses over to a personal
level, goes back as far as I can track it with the material I have before
(10)the war, at least the war in Bosnia, where General Mladic was the
commander of the JNA 9th Corps in Knin, and where General Zivanovic was
one of his brigade commanders, the Commander of the 180th Motorised
Brigade, I believe.
When the war begins, General Mladic, of course, becomes the
(15)Commander of the Main Staff of the newly-formed army of Republika Srpska.
And one of his deputies -- and if my information is correct, the Main
Staff Chief of Artillery during the early period of 1992 was then
Colonel Zivanovic. Again, a continued professional relationship.
The fact that in November 1992, when the Drina Corps is formed,
(20)General Zivanovic is appointed to be the Commander of that corps. One
would presume that while it would be President Karadzic who appoints the
Corps Commander because it's a general position, that he would have done
so with the endorsement and on the recommendation of General Mladic.
Their continued professional association over the three years of the
(25)course of conflict, and because of the evidence base, I can't really
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] I now come to a subject which was already addressed by my distinguished colleague Judge Riad. (10)It has to do with the question why General Zivanovic was replaced by General Krstic. You have already touched upon that question, but I would like to come back to it with this question: Is it possible to think that General Zivanovic was perhaps not in agreement with the plan or the attitude of General Mladic in that operation? (15) • A.: Sir, that is a definite possibility and one of the two or three theories that we hold. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Exhibit 446, I think that in the analysis that you have made of this exhibit I'm talking about Exhibit number 446 -- (20) • A.: I do not have that in front of me, sir. I have 464 not 446. Oh, here it is on the bottom, sir. I've got it. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Thank you. So this exhibit, according to your analysis, refers to the first convoy of women and children that left Potocari. Would you agree with that? (25)
• A.: The time frame of 1305 and 12 July supports that, yes, sir.
(5) • A.: If we -- or in my case, if I make the assumption that that plan occurred sometime between the second meeting on 11 July and the third meeting on 12 July, the physical presence of General Krstic at both those meetings and in the Bratunac area during the period leads me to believe if there was a plan of that nature, he would have known about that. (10)Now, looking at this specific intercept pertaining to the buses, one would make the inference that part of that would be the knowledge that the women, the women -- and maybe the best way to do it would be to say those people who didn't qualify as military combatants or potential military combatants were not part of that plan. One of the unique things (15)that I can use that helps me to support that theory is witness testimony that was brought before the Court earlier where on 13 July in the Sandici meadow, there was an awareness that they were looking to exclude out of the groups of people individuals who were not between the ages of 16 and 60. And that was an awareness by the soldiers at the lowest level. (20)So in that regards, the intent that there's a plan, that there's the intent that there was some form of thought process who will be excluded from that group manifests itself in both this intercept and in that other piece of information.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] But Mr. Butler, if Mladic knew
(25)about this -- and we have information, but now I ask you the questions. I
• A.: Yes, sir. (5) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] The first question, did Mladic know? • A.: The physical presence, as noted by a lot of the witnesses, and the physical -- and the descriptions and the statements by them, as well as the footage of him in Potocari on 12 July, and certainly his presence on (10)13 July on the Bratunac road up to Konjevic Polje to Nova Kasaba, and the bodies that are on the road during that period, and in one specific instance, that there was one individual killed at Sandici that I believe is closely associated with his presence, strongly infers that; but I can't based on that alone say that from those events, that Mladic knew. I mean, (15)that's a mental state judgement that I can't make, sir.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Exhibit 459, please. I will
quote in English,
[In English] "... has stayed in the hospital of Bratunac
at the request of the hospital staff to make sure that the patients are
properly treated. I intend to send him away tomorrow under the pretext
(20)that his help is not necessary."
• A.: It's easier to answer the second question first. My understanding
from the investigation and dealing with them particularly with regards to
(5)this issue, is that they have in fact looked at this closely, and all of
the information that we have to date from both the VRS documents as well
as from the International Community, the Red Cross and those agencies that
actually did monitor the transfer, indicates that for the most part that
this group of individuals was in fact properly treated, was in fact
(10)evacuated under proper medical supervision, and many of those were in fact
taken to the detention centre at Bajkovici; to include, if you look at a
related document to this, the fact that Captain 1st Class Nikolic
indicates that 23 were transferred on this date under Drina Corps military
police guidance, and one person was given to the municipal police as a
(15)confessed war criminal. And even he comes out after the war from the camp
at Bajkovici. So with this regard, my understanding is that the
investigation, while certainly continuing in this regard, has not yet
determined anything to date that would warrant further action.
In answer to your second question, again, you've reflected on the
(20)fact that Colonel Radislav Jankovic, the intelligence officer or
unintelligence
[sic] officer of the Main Staff, is making an intention or
informing both the Drina Corps and the Main Staff of his intention to send
the doctor away under the pretence that he's no longer needed, again, part
of that larger campaign to remove international eyes from the area.
(25)Now, certainly in this specific case, either by design or just
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] But one could think that this (5)person that -- had intention to get rid of the doctor or to no longer use his services, that he asked the hospital staff whether they needed the doctor, that they would have said that they still needed him? • A.: The interesting parallel, and again if you note it, is that the doctor's -- he stayed on at the hospital at the request of the hospital (10)staff, so presumably some medical authority wants him to stay for whatever reason; and yet, yes, Colonel Jankovic as the intelligence officer is making a pretext to send him away, overriding that medical advice or that medical desire, yes, sir. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Exhibits 463 and 464. In your (15)opinion, these two exhibits are co-related; they need each other. Between the two terms, one that's used in 463 which is "search," and 464, which is "search" -- there seems to be a problem with translation and terminology. Do we need to look up this word in the dictionary. There seems to be the same term used in both documents and the original. (20)
• A.: I believe that in this case, I mean, the phrase "search and sweep
operation" are used interchangeably. And looking at particularly when you
break down the Bratunac Brigade order, what the actual order is directing
is a rather coordinated sweep operation, the goal being to, as the
military unit passes over the terrain in a somewhat linear fashion, that
(25)everything behind that unit is in fact secured. It has no -- they do not
(5)
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Exhibit 556, we have already
visited this exhibit today,
[In English] "Take this as an order," 14
July. • A.: Sir, that is in fact how I do interpret it, and if -- when at a (15)point in time we go into closed session, I will provide additional information which in fact supports why I interpret it that way.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Exhibit 564. We have here the
dialogue, and I'm referring to page 2, between Malinic who says,
[In
English] "We should do something to eliminate it," "it" meaning a group.
(20)Nastic answers, "yes." And after Malinic, "Can we do that?"
• A.: With regards to the first question, certainly in the case of Major Malinic, the Commander of the Military Police Battalion, 65th Protection Regiment, and Major Nastic, the Commander of the Milici Brigade, as senior (5)officials within the structure, the military structure that existed, one in the Drina Corps and one subordinate to the Main Staff, these would, these would be people who would be aware of what was going on if -- as part of the plan. Their assets would be involved in it. They'd have to be aware. (10)The second piece is, and again as you indicate, sir, there is a lot of ad hoc or very rapidly changing military situations or other situations that are presenting themselves, which they have either not fully anticipated or having to react to on a -- in a rapid basis. So in that regard again, yes, this particular intercept reflects that. (15)Going to the last piece based on this, and again Judge Wald, I believe, brought this issue up earlier, what to infer from it, again defaulting back to my statements where that as a military analyst that unless it was clear in my mind what I would infer from it, I would always default back to a potential military meaning. And since I do understand (20)at the period that there was column activity that could have qualified as legitimate, I can make that. However, I certainly can't deny that there is an entirely different way to read this which would lay out criminal intent or certainly criminal knowledge.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] So that brings me to
(25)Exhibit 712. One can read that:
[In English] "General Krstic, this
(5) • A.: The first part of your question, and in reading this, one has to keep in mind that as the first part notes, "defining task related to coming duties especially at Trnovo," they still were conducting combat operations. Further during this period in time, the Bratunac Brigade or large (10)elements of the Bratunac Brigade were operating under the command of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps in Trnovo, that ability to do that, being the fact that the Srebrenica safe area no longer existed. So again, a reflection of a manifestation of that goal. Now we're able to use this brigade in another corps zone. So in this regard, there are potentially a lot of (15)very difficult military operations that occur which, in fact, General Krstic could be praising. At the same time during the period that this is occurring, as the investigation has revealed, we have the process where primary mass burial sites at Glogova, I believe, are being removed and are being reinstalled (20)or moved to the secondary grave sites along the Zeleni Jadar road. And again the comment by Major Nikolic or Captain First Class Nikolic at the back of that is what I take as indicative of that, but I can't necessarily say that the task that General Krstic is praising is or is not related to the second task. (25)
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] You mentioned an interview given
• A.: If memory serves me correctly, that interview was taken in November of 1996. It in fact shows up as a footnote in Mr. David Rhodes' (5)book pertaining to Srebrenica, which is how I found out about it. The interview is not relatively public knowledge because for whatever reason, it was not published by the editors. However, the author has in fact provided the investigation with the completed notes of that interview. But I believe the time is November 1996. (10)
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Exhibit 609. We have revisited
that exhibit today, and it has to do with a statement by Vinko
Pandurevic.
[In English]
[Previous translation continues] ... "under his
responsibility, we will be forced to let them go."
• A.: Going back to the first part of your question, would I look at
(20)this and is this a potential indication of whether or not Colonel
Pandurevic knew, and again as I've indicated, the fact that the way he's
talking about that is indicative of the fact that he knows there is a
plan, and certainly, as a brigade commander coming into his zone again
from the Zepa area and very quickly becoming briefed on the situation, he
(25)knows how extensive the plan is, he knows what resources are being used,
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] My last question for the (20)moment: If we have this column and the evacuation and all the problems related to the column, do you have any information on the conversations between the VRS and the BiH, and do you have any analyses of those conversations?
• A.: The intercepts that we have, the BiH intercepts of the VRS
(25)communications, reflect the fact that on the ground, that Muslim military
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] It seems to me, Mr. Butler -- I don't know where I came across that -- that the difference in the (10)negotiations was that on the Muslim side, the condition was for the military and civilian to pass through. The position of the VRS, however, was no, the civilians can pass but not the military men. Can you confirm that? Am I right or not? • A.: The evidence as tendered reflects the fact that the Muslim (15)position was that they wanted the entire column out, and the fact that Colonel Pandurevic had indicated that his position was the civilians could go out but that the military would remain in the custody of the VRS. And because of the circumstances that followed, what ended up happening, as reflected by Colonel Pandurevic, was that the compromise, whether it was (20)planned or not, the compromise solution that he reported was that, "I couldn't control it either way, but at least I can say that those Muslim military who went out went out unarmed." So the two positions are reflected and then the end result being as Colonel Pandurevic discusses. (25)
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] So can we conclude that when
• A.: In this regard and because I read this in conjunction with the above paragraph, I would say no, only because I do not believe that at this point in time, in time sequence, that the enormity of the situation (5)that is reflected in the 16 July 1995 interim combat report has occurred on the 15th of July. On the 15th of July, in the morning, we have the Muslim side trying to initiate contact. There is no reflection that contact is returned or that any discussions are made during the day of the 15th. So (10)because of that and because of the way I read this, I wouldn't come to the conclusion that if no one takes responsibility, I will be forced to let them go. I would not take that comment as relating to the column at all, sir.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Madam Registrar, can we now go
(15)into closed session, please?
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] So that Judge Fouad Riad can put (10)his questions, bearing in mind that it is now 2.40.
JUDGE RIAD:
[Int.] Is it all right? (20)
• A.: The first theory is as you've stated, that he did not agree with
the operation and chose to depart. The second theory is that because of
preexisting health conditions, that that was a planned move between
operation Krivaja-95 as planned and operation Stupcanica-95 as planned,
and in fact that was a manifestation of what did occur. So again, I can't
(25)prove either of those two theories.
JUDGE RIAD: And the events could not put more weight on one of (15)the theories? • A.: It would be probably unfair for me to infer that General Zivanovic after the fact should have been expected to publicly stand up and decry what happened if he disagreed with it. He lives in Serbia, as our last knowledge of him is. Those are still his people, and at a point in time (20)particularly in 1995, late 1995, when the Serbian people and the army of the Republika Srpska is under attack from the Croatians, from the Bosnian-Muslims, and from NATO in that regard, and maintaining unity at all costs would be a plausible goal, in that regard it would be unfair for me to expect General Zivanovic to stand up at that time and say things. (25)
JUDGE RIAD: The other answer you gave, also to Judge Rodrigues I
• A.: Essentially, it's a long-term and a short-term argument. Within
the scope of the short-term problem of trying to assemble the buses, it
was reactive. There did not appear to be a plan several days out that
(15)they would need these buses.
Now, again, somebody put together a plan rapidly and did that, but
it doesn't -- again, it doesn't -- to me, looking at the material, it
doesn't infer that somebody thought this out more than two days in
advance. The same way with the identification of sites in Bratunac for
(20)Muslim males and sites in Zvornik for Muslim males, again, reactive in a
sense of the planning didn't look to occur long term. They weren't
looking three or four days out, which is what one would expect from a
corps staff, that they're looking four, five, six days in the future,
reactive insomuch as we have a situation that is occurring now or will be
(25)occurring within a very rapid period of time, and we have to do something
JUDGE RIAD: Would that apply to the executions of such a big, a big number? • A.: If going back to when the first series of executions occurred that (5)could infer being planned, and in this case we'll use the Cerska Valley executions of the early afternoon of 13 July, and -- JUDGE RIAD: That was planned in advance? • A.: The inference that I make is that somewhere between that and the period of 11 and 12 July, the plan must have been hatched. Again, in my (10)mind, that reflects short-term planning. It does not reflect a long-term plan of execution. Not execution in a criminal sense in this one, just one how executes a plan. I wouldn't take the events that are occurring on the 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th of July and beyond and take that back, and to say that on (15)2 July 1995 or 4 July 1995, when Krivaja-1995, the plan, was hatched, that that was in any way part of it. JUDGE RIAD: Putting this in perspective with an answer you gave to Judge Wald, you expressed some kind of a transition mark. You said that there was some kind -- the fact that they had something like 10.000 (20)Muslims in prison was a leverage to the BiH and to the international community, and it seemed rather strange that they would not use this leverage and apparently execute the people, and you wondered if they had a higher plan in that sort. What could be the higher plan which would override the leverage, this very strong leverage? (25)
• A.: In that regard, what I was noting was that one would believe that
(10) JUDGE RIAD: You say "trigger" or "higher purpose" or "plan." • A.: When I use the phrase "trigger," I use some event or some decision that had to have been made by somebody somewhere that, "No. We're not going to hold these individuals as prisoners. We're going to in fact continue or begin a long series of process of executions." (15)So somewhere apparently somebody made a conscientious decision one way or another which way it was going to be, and I don't have the evidence base and I don't have, as a result of my reading it, I can't put my finger on when, where, and under what circumstances that individual decision was made. The best that I can do is offer the windows of when this could have (20)occurred, to the Court, based on the known facts that I have in my possession.
JUDGE RIAD: So just to finish. I'm closing down. Could you
consider this was reactive or as a strategy, a policy of a higher status,
owing to the number of executions and, as you said, the coordination and
(25)so on?
JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much, Mr. Butler. (25)
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] In normal conditions, having
MR. HARMON: Mr. President, I'm prepared to defer until Monday the regulation of these documents. I intend to meet with counsel after today's session. We perhaps can present to the Court a more expedited (15)presentation. Thank you. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Do you need the presence -- maybe I should ask Mr. McCloskey, but it's more or less the same thing. Do you need the witness for the tendering of documents, Mr. McCloskey? (20) MR. McCLOSKEY: I don't believe we need his presence, but he's still working on various investigations. So he's close by if necessary. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] I think there is a Defence document to be tendered, Madam Registrar.
THE REGISTRAR: Yes, it's document D24, and that's
(25)General Krstic's waiver to be presented today.
(15) --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.55 p.m., to be reconvened on Monday, the 24th day of July, 2000, at 9.30 a.m. |
