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• Page 7005 - ZELJKO BOROVCANIN


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• Page 7004 • {1/96}

(1)Monday, 6 November 2000
[Open session]

--- Upon commencing at 9.21 a.m.
[The accused entered court]

(5) JUDGE RIAD: Good morning. I would like to greet the parties and all the members of our staff. Mr. Cayley, you have the floor.

MR. CAYLEY: Good morning, Judge Riad, Judge Wald. Good morning learned counsel for the Defence. We're continuing today, Your Honour, (10)with the cross-examination of Mr. Zeljko Borovcanin.

JUDGE RIAD: Shall we introduce him?

MR. CAYLEY: I think, Your Honour, the usher is just at this moment getting him from the witness room.

JUDGE RIAD: Thank you. Do you have other witnesses today, (15)Mr. Cayley?

MR. CAYLEY: I think the Defence have their third witness, but Mr. Petrusic may be able to be helpful.
[The witness entered court]

JUDGE RIAD: Good morning, Mr. Petrusic.

(20) MR. CAYLEY: Judge Riad, I think actually the wrong witness has been brought in. It's the gentleman with the moustache.

JUDGE RIAD: So we have another witness.

MR. CAYLEY: We're moving through them very rapidly, Your Honour, yes.

(25) JUDGE RIAD: I would like just to announce that we'll have to

• Page 7005 • {2/96}

(1)finish at a quarter to three because we have other functions. So I would hope we'll be through with the witnesses by then.

MR. CAYLEY: I think Mr. Petrusic may have a few words.

MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Good morning, Your Honours. After (5)Mr. Borovcanin, the Defence has another witness, and we expect to finish his examination-in-chief by the end of the working day, that is, by a quarter to three.

JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much. We can call the right witness now.
(10) [The witness entered court]

WITNESS: ZELJKO BOROVCANIN [Resumed]
[Witness answered through interpreter]

JUDGE RIAD: Good morning, Mr. Borovcanin. Mr. Cayley will continue --

(15) THE WITNESS: [Int.] Good morning.

JUDGE RIAD: [Realtime transcript read in errorJUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.]"]
-- asking questions now. Please proceed.

• CROSS-EXAMINED by Mr. Cayley: [Continued]

• Q.: Good morning, Mr. Borovcanin.

(20) • A.: Good morning.

• Q.: Now, if you recall, on Friday, I think we concluded where you confirmed to me that in July of 1995 Colonel Mirko Trivic was the commander of the 2nd Romanija Brigade. Do you recall that?

• A.: The commander of the 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade in 1995 was (25)Mirko Trivic.

• Page 7006 • {3/96}

(1) • Q.: Do you recall who the Chief of Staff of the Romanija Brigade was in July of 1995? Do you remember his name?

• A.: No.

JUDGE RIAD: Mr. Cayley, there is just a small confusion in the (5)transcript before, that Judge Rodrigues is here. I want just to say that he is not here. "Judge Rodrigues," and even with "interpretation." He must have sent a message. Thank you.

MR. CAYLEY: I see, Your Honour. Thank you.

• Q.: Now, I'm right in saying that you were a member of the (10)reconnaissance platoon of the 2nd Romanija Brigade; is that right?

• A.: In 1994 I joined the reconnaissance platoon and I remained a member of it until the end of the war.

• Q.: And so in July of 1995 you were a member of the reconnaissance platoon?

(15) • A.: Yes.

• Q.: Now, you said in your evidence that a man by the name of Bojovic was the commander of the reconnaissance platoon; is that correct?

• A.: The commander of the -- or leader of the reconnaissance platoon, yes.

(20) • Q.: Now, you referred to him by two different first names. On one occasion you called him Milenko Bojovic and on another occasion you referred to him as Branko Bojovic. Do you remember what his first name was? Was it Milenko or Branko?

• A.: Milenko Bojovic. I don't think I mentioned the name Branko.

(25) • Q.: Now, do you recall who the name of your battalion commander was?

• Page 7007 • {4/96}

(1) • A.: The battalion commander was Ljubo Eric.

• Q.: And Ljubo Eric was a major; is that right?

• A.: I don't know whether he was a captain or a major. I'm not quite sure now.

(5) • Q.: And what rank was Mr. Bojovic? Do you recall the commander of the reconnaissance platoon?

• A.: He had the rank of corporal.

• Q.: Do you recall now -- I know it's a long time ago -- the names of any of the other battalion commanders within the Romanija Brigade, apart (10)from Mr. Eric?

• A.: No.

• Q.: Now I want you to think about the 9th of July again. And just to refresh your memory, you testified on Friday that by the evening of the 9th of July of 1995, you had reached the Alibegovac feature and the UN (15)soldiers who were at the checkpoint nearby had actually surrendered to you and they had gone to Bratunac. Do you recall that?

• A.: Yes.

MR. CAYLEY: Now, if the witness could be shown a map, which is Exhibit 829.

(20) • Q.: Now, Mr. Borovcanin, I've produced a map of the area and highlighted a number of the places that you spoke about. If you could take a look at the map.

MR. CAYLEY: Judge Riad, would you mind and would Defence counsel mind if for just a moment I approached the witness, because this map is (25)quite difficult to sort of come to terms with immediately and I wanted to

• Page 7008 • {5/96}

(1)help him where I've marked places on the map.

JUDGE RIAD: Please do.

MR. CAYLEY: Do the Defence have any objection to that?

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] I beg your pardon, I wasn't really (5)listening, so could you repeat your question, Mr. Cayley?

MR. CAYLEY: Mr. Petrusic, I have a map which, in fact, you gave to us and I've marked on it some of the locations that the witness spoke about and I just wanted to show him the places that I've marked so that he can become familiar with the map before I start asking him further (10)questions, just to make his life a little bit easier. You can join me, if you want, at the ELMO.

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] If necessary, and if the witness manages to find his way on the map, I'll join you.

MR. CAYLEY:

(15) • Q.: Now, do you see Kiprovo?

• A.: Yes.

• Q.: Alibegovac?

• A.: Yes.

• Q.: Brdo, Slapovici, do you see that?

(20) • A.: I do, yes.

• Q.: Suceska?

• A.: Yes.

• Q.: Jahorina?

• A.: Yes.

(25) • Q.: And Bojna?

• Page 7009 • {6/96}

(1) • A.: Yes.

• Q.: And Jasenovo, do you see that? Now, these two areas here marked in yellow are two UN checkpoints. Now, this one was called Kilo and this one was called Sierra?

(5) • A.: Yes.

• Q.: I'll return to the podium now. If I place this here on the ELMO, will you be all right to look at it? Can you see it clearly enough?

• A.: Yes.

MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Your Honour. Now, unfortunately, Your (10)Honours, it doesn't come out very clearly. Do Your Honours have a copy of this map in front of you? You do; excellent.

• Q.: Now, Witness, could you point to the Alibegovac feature on this map.

• A.: [Indicates]

(15) • Q.: Now, to the best of your recollection, you can see where Kiprovo is where I pointed it out to you. Which was the UN checkpoint which surrendered to your unit, was it Kilo or Sierra, K or S?

• A.: This one here, next to Alibegovac.

MR. CAYLEY: So for the sake of the record, the witness has (20)indicated that it was, in fact, checkpoint Kilo which was the checkpoint that his unit reached by the evening of the 9th of July.

• Q.: Now, you stated in your evidence on Friday that you had been given strict orders not to shoot at the UN, not to seize sidearms or their equipment, and I think the agreement was that the troops be escorted to (25)Bratunac. Are those three things correct?

• Page 7010 • {7/96}

(1) • A.: Well, my unit was there and, as far as I know, nothing was seized from them nor was any fire opened against the UN forces and they were escorted away.

• Q.: Now, Witness, the Judges have, in fact, heard from one of the (5)soldiers who was present at that particular checkpoint and he, indeed, confirms, as you stated, that not a shot was fired. Now, after the Dutch soldiers had surrendered, I think you moved forward to the old lines of the Bosnian army, you went to their trenches; is that right?

• A.: We only took over the trenches which earlier had been used by the (10)Muslim army.

• Q.: And how far were they from the UN checkpoint?

• A.: I think it wasn't very far. A little hill up there. I can't remember exactly, maybe one kilometre, not more.

• Q.: So you didn't actually see the UN soldiers taken away?

(15) • A.: We took up these positions and there were other people who escorted them away.

• Q.: So you wouldn't know anything about whether or not these soldiers did, in fact, have their weapons taken away from them, their flak jackets, their blue helmets. You wouldn't know anything about that if that (20)happened because you, in fact, were in the Bosnian army trenches?

• A.: There were no troops there. We all took up these positions. Surely five or six men couldn't have seized weapons and things.

• Q.: But I'm right in saying that you, yourself, took no part in transferring the Dutch soldiers from the checkpoint to Bratunac?

(25) • A.: Correct.

• Page 7011 • {8/96}

(1) • Q.: So you wouldn't be able to make any comment on the fact that the witness that the Judges heard stated that his weapon was taken away from him and that, in fact, all of the Dutch soldiers had their flak jackets removed and their blue helmets removed. You wouldn't know anything about (5)that because you weren't, in fact, in Bratunac, were you?

• A.: I don't know what happened afterwards.

MR. CAYLEY: And Your Honours, I just refer the Court to the testimony of Mr. Andere Stoelinga and the position at the transcript is 2275 where he speaks about these events. He was a soldier who testified (10)before you who was, in fact, one of the soldiers at OP Kilo.

• Q.: Now, if we can move on in time, Mr. Borovcanin, and I want to now talk a little bit further about the 9th of July and the 11th of July. Now, you said in your evidence that, as far as you recall, there was no shelling when you reached the Alibegovac feature. You hadn't heard any (15)shelling up until that point by the Bosnian Serb army.

• A.: I just said that along our route that we were moving, there was no need for shelling nor was there any shelling.

• Q.: And the reasons for that, I think you said, was because the Muslim army had withdrawn, it had retreated?

(20) • A.: Yes.

• Q.: Now, briefly, I want you to think about the 11th of July, and you said in your evidence that, on that particular day, you recall that there were air strikes by NATO aircraft against Bosnian Serb forces?

• A.: Yes.

(25) • Q.: And I'm correct in saying that I think you heard the explosions

• Page 7012 • {9/96}

(1)very clearly?

• A.: Yes.

• Q.: Now, I think the reason that you probably heard those explosions very clearly because, one, they were very loud and, two, the bombs were (5)falling in a valley so the noise travelled right down the valley, didn't it?

• A.: They weren't falling in the valley. We were in the valley. They were above us, near the place where we had spent the night on the 10th in the evening. That is where the shells fell on that hill.

(10) • Q.: Now, the Judges have heard evidence in this case, and Your Honours, I would refer to the UN report on Srebrenica which is Prosecutor's Exhibit 30, that two bombs were dropped by NATO forces, by NATO aircraft at 2.40 in the afternoon on the 11th of July. Do you recall hearing two explosions?

(15) • A.: I really don't know now how many there were.

• Q.: But nevertheless, it was very loud and you heard it. You heard a number of explosions.

• A.: I heard several explosions but I can't remember now how many.

• Q.: Now, I want you to think of the time period between the 6th of (20)July and the 11th of July. What shelling did you hear during that period by your army, by the Bosnian Serb army?

• A.: There were a couple of explosions but, as I said, along our route, there was no shelling, but a couple of explosions could be heard from other directions.

(25) • Q.: But you are aware, are you not, that there was very heavy shelling

• Page 7013 • {10/96}

(1)during that period, into Srebrenica.

• A.: Srebrenica was not shelled, as far as I am aware.

• Q.: Let me refresh your memory about this. Now, you may or may not be aware that present within the enclave during this period were not only (5)Dutch UN forces but also a group of United Nations military observers whose task was to specifically monitor Bosnian Serb forces and shelling into the enclave. Were you aware of their presence?

• A.: I did not.

• Q.: Well, they were there and they produced a number of written (10)reports, which the Judges have seen, over this period of time. And I will not show you all of the reports, they are in English, and I will read you small extracts and just ask for your comments on what they observed and/or heard over this period of time.

MR. CAYLEY: So if I can have Exhibit 77/1. (15)Judge Riad, I'm not going to go through -- these reports are voluminous; I'm just going to take extracts. I think Defence counsel have them if they wish to re-examine on them. If you could put the first page, paragraph 3, onto the ELMO. And this is a report from the 6th of July, Mr. Borovcanin, at 1735 hours. I'll read it to you. And this is a report (20)from the period 3.30 in the morning on the 6th of July until 6.00 in the evening on that day. And this is what the UN military observers say: "Team Srebrenica reported a Bosnian Serb army offence launched and ongoing within the enclave as reported under separate cover. The Bosnian Serb army used tanks, artillery, mortars, rockets, and heavy machine-gun (25)and have targeted the DutchBat headquarters and Bandera triangle, DutchBat

• Page 7014 • {11/96}

(1)observation posts Uniform and Sierra --"

THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Cayley, could you read more slowly, please.

MR. CAYLEY: I'm sorry. "-- south of OP Hotel, Potocari township, Srebrenica township, and --" and then it gives a grid reference, 651849. (5)"At least 250 artillery and mortar rounds have been recorded so far. The UNMO team have confirmed two fatalities and six casualties so far being taken to hospital. Further details re: casualties and shell investigations are not possible at this stage. DutchBat reported six 120-millimetre rockets landed close to their compound with only two (10)exploding at about 3.30 hours Bravo on the 6th of July, 1995. The shelling of the surrounding area (Potocari) however continued until 1600 hours Bravo 6 July 1995, with two civilian casualties so far recorded." Now, Mr. Borovcanin, I'm not going to read any more of that. Did you hear any of that shelling and tank fire and rocket fire and heavy (15)machine-gun fire on the 6th of July?

• A.: On the 6 of July I think we were between Jasenova and Kiprovo. I said that along our axis there was no shelling. I said that some explosions were heard.

• Q.: Could you just put the map that you have in front of you and show (20)the Judges where Kiprovo is.

MR. CAYLEY: If the camera could come out, please.

• Q.: Could you point to Kiprovo, Mr. Borovcanin? And now point to Srebrenica. Now, each of those big squares on that map is a thousand metres, so during that period you were about 3.000 metres away from where (25)these shells were falling and your evidence is that you heard very little

• Page 7015 • {12/96}

(1)in the way of explosions, heavy machine-gun fire, tank rounds exploding; you heard very little?

• A.: There was shooting from machine-guns and automatic weapons, but shelling was rare.

(5) MR. CAYLEY: Let's now move to the 7th of July. And if Prosecutor's Exhibit 77/3 could be placed on the ELMO, paragraph 3. This is a report, Your Honours, made at 1742 hours on the 7th of July. You can see the CapSat notation at the top of this exhibit when it was actually sent, I think, by satellite phone. And I'll read out what (10)the UN military observers observed and heard on that day: "Team Srebrenica reported that the Bosnian Serb army continued their offensive on the enclave with heavy weapons since early this morning. DutchBat reported heavy shelling around their compound in Potocari, and as a result, three men were injured and brought by MSF, (15)Medecins Sans Frontieres, to the hospital. UNMOs confirm this. At 1000 hours, unconfirmed reports indicated that the Bosnian Serb army are regrouping around former OP Echo, Company Hill, and Bratunac. At 1000 hours, two shells landed in Srebrenica village, but no one was wounded. At 1100 hours, four shells landed in Potocari, no injuries. At 1500 (20)hours, three shells landed in Srebrenica and injured two men. One was picked up by our patrol and the other one by Medecins Sans Frontieres, but he died on arrival at the hospital. More shells have been landing in the same spot or around and we suspect they are at a tank positioned at Company Hill. A lot of damage at buildings has been caused in that area (25)despite the low casualty figures. At 1700 hours, 21 detonations were

• Page 7016 • {13/96}

(1)heard by UNMOs in Potocari. We suspect they are from a multiple rocket launcher located at --" and there's a location marked, "but NCBU," which I think is "cannot be confirmed." "We cannot analyse the craters at the moment due to the continuous shelling, but we assess that the Bosnian Serb (5)army are still using mortars, rockets, artillery and tanks." Now, on the 7th of July, I think there was bad weather, so the infantry wasn't moving on that day. Do you recall hearing all of the shell fire on that day from your position about 3.000 metres away from the centre of town?

(10) • A.: As I said, I did hear detonations occasionally.

• Q.: So on the 7th of July you did, in fact, hear shelling go into the enclave?

• A.: I cannot say with certainty now whether it was the 6th, the 7th or the 8th. We didn't move until the 9th. We only engaged in (15)reconnaissance.

• Q.: Let's move to the 8th of July, and if you can think about that particular date.

MR. CAYLEY: And if we can have Prosecutor's Exhibit 77/8. And it's actually the fourth page of this. It's page 127. And it's just the (20)very last paragraph, where it says, "Updates to." Your Honours, this is a report from the 8th of July, and the time indicated is 1758 hours, so it's the early evening hours of the 8th of July. "Update to: At 1354 hours DutchBat liaison officer called UNMOs (25)and informed them of their intention to withdraw their observation post

• Page 7017 • {14/96}

(1) Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and English transcripts.

• Page 7018 • {15/96}

(1)Foxtrot due to the heavy shelling on their positions. They said that their APC will move to a safer place as soon as shelling reduces. UNMOs had counted 60 explosions from 1335 hours to 1406 hours in Srebrenica and Potocari, and shelling is still going on. More info to come as we get (5)it," it says in writing at the bottom of that report. Now, on that date, on the 8th of July, and I know your recollection is not that good at this time period, do you recall hearing shelling on that day? You would have heard 60 shells exploding, wouldn't you, in Srebrenica, from the position where you were located?

(10) • A.: As I said, until the 9th, my unit did not move from its starting position. Every day we heard occasional detonations, but these were occasional; they were not numerous.

• Q.: Now let's move to the 10th of July. And I think on the 10th of July, in the evening hours, you found yourself on the road between Zeleni (15)Jadar and Srebrenica; is that correct?

• A.: Correct.

• Q.: If you could just indicate to the Judges on the map. If you could put the map on the ELMO, and the usher can help you here.

• A.: I think that we were, on the 10th in the evening, on this hill (20)here, Bojna, above Srebrenica.

MR. CAYLEY: So let the record show that the witness has pointed to a location which is marked "Bojna." It's highlighted and it's essentially in the same grid square as the large indication of Srebrenica.

(25) • Q.: Now, I'm right in saying that at this point in time, Witness, you

• Page 7019 • {16/96}

(1)were in fact very close indeed to the town of Srebrenica, weren't you? You were, looking at this map, perhaps a matter of five hundred to a thousand metres away from the town itself?

JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me. Can he point on it again more closely?

(5) MR. CAYLEY: Of course, Judge Riad.

• Q.: Can you point the location again? If you point to Srebrenica.

JUDGE RIAD: I would like to know how far it is exactly, please.

MR. CAYLEY: Could you answer the Judge's question how far Bojna was from Srebrenica?

(10) • A.: I don't know exactly, but about 1.000 metres, one kilometre, or more.

MR. CAYLEY: Your Honour, the squares on this, I believe, Mr. McCloskey, are a kilometre, a thousand metres? I'm sorry. I put my colleague on the spot.

(15) JUDGE RIAD: He gave us the indication. Thank you.

MR. CAYLEY: I believe the scale of this map, it's a thousand metres.

JUDGE RIAD: Because it looks far on the map.

MR. CAYLEY: It's a kilometre.

(20) JUDGE RIAD: Thank you.

MR. CAYLEY:

• Q.: Now, Witness, I'm going to read an extract from the 10th of July, and this is a report -- if you could place that on the ELMO. This is page 109. And again, I'm not going to read all of this. In the -- no. I (25)think you've got the wrong page there, actually. At the bottom of the

• Page 7020 • {17/96}

(1)page, it's marked 109. Yes, that's the page.

MR. CAYLEY: If the camera could come out a bit.

• Q.: Starting from the top: "Srebrenica situation update, 10 July, 1230 Bravo, July 1995. Shelling is still going on in Srebrenica. Up till (5)now we UNMOs confirm from the morning over a hundred detonations. At 10 July 0930 hours about eight rockets were fired from grid --" and then it gives a grid reference -- "in the direction of Srebrenica." And then down to the next paragraph, which is an update on the 10th of July at 1255 hours, "Two heavy shells, probably 155-millimetre (10)artillery shells, hit the direct surroundings of the hospital at 1100 hours. All the windows are smashed and shrapnel has showered the walls and rooms of the hospital." And the next paragraph, if the interpreters can see that, it's an update at 1346 hours on the 10th of July: (15)"Srebrenica township is still undergoing a very heavy shelling. So far we have recorded figures 49 shells since 1250 hours to 1353 hours this afternoon with figure 9 rockets launched into the town and exchanges of occasional heavy machine-gun and small arms firing." And then the last paragraph, 1645 hours on July of 1995, and I'll (20)just read the first two paragraphs: "Information received from one of our yellow cards who is in Srebrenica at the moment and with whom we are in contact with by radio indicates that as at 1552 hours Srebrenica town came under another heavy shelling, resulting in nine serious injuries. The western end of the town (25)is said to be the most heavily hit, with 12 shells. It is also reported

• Page 7021 • {18/96}

(1)that our former location, the PTT building, is presently under a barrage of shelling, having been hit ten times in the last hour." Now, Witness, you'll agree with me that from your position at Bojna, be it 1,000 metres or 2.000 metres, you would have heard that (5)shelling on that day?

• A.: At the position of Bojna, we reached that position in the evening hours.

• Q.: Did you hear any shelling on that day?

• A.: As I said --

(10) JUDGE RIAD: Mr. Cayley?

• A.: There were occasion.

JUDGE RIAD: Mr. Visnjic.

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Your Honour, Mr. Cayley gave us the piece of information that in one of the squares that the distance in the (15)squares is approximately one kilometre. I have just consulted my colleague, Mr. Petrusic. We think that this is in the ratio 1 to 50.000, which would mean that one square would be equivalent to two kilometres and not one kilometre, just by way of information and for the record, to gain a better insight of distance and impression of distance, although I am not (20)quite certain of that. If it is -- the map is in the ratio of 1 to 50.000, that would make one square the equivalent of 2 kilometres.

JUDGE RIAD: Thank you, Mr. Visnjic. I believe Mr. Borovcanin -- it was Mr. Borovcanin who said it was 1.000 metres. Thank you. Would you like to ask him, Mr. Cayley?

(25) MR. CAYLEY: We'll check the scale of the map but, frankly, 1.000

• Page 7022 • {19/96}

(1)or 2.000 metres, we'll see what the witness says.

JUDGE RIAD: Thank you.

MR. CAYLEY:

• Q.: So on that particular day, Witness, on the 10th of July, you don't (5)recall hearing much in the way of shelling at your position at Bojna which was 1.000 to 2.000 metres from the centre of Srebrenica?

• A.: We arrived at Bojna in the evening and that's why I say that on the 10th we were not at Bojna. We arrived in the evening of the 10th.

• Q.: Let's move on in time, certainly in terms of events, but it's the (10)same day that we're talking about, which is the 10th of July, and I think you testified in your examination-in-chief that you arrived at the village of Slapovici in the morning; do you recall that?

• A.: On the 10th above Slapovici.

• Q.: If you could take the map and place it on the projector and just (15)indicate to the Judges.

• A.: [Indicates]

• Q.: Could you indicate to the Judges where Slapovici is?

• A.: [Indicates]

MR. CAYLEY: So for the sake of the record, the witness is (20)indicating to the village marked Slapovici, just above the yellow sticky dot marked K, marked Kilo.

• Q.: Do you recall, if you can, and I know it's five years ago, approximately what time you got to Slapovici on the 10th of July?

• A.: I know that it was before noon.

(25) • Q.: Now, you have said in your evidence that, in fact, nobody was in

• Page 7023 • {20/96}

(1)the village when you got there.

• A.: That's right.

• Q.: Do you know where everybody was?

• A.: I don't know.

(5) MR. CAYLEY: If for a moment, Judge Riad, we could go into closed session.

JUDGE RIAD: Closed or private?

MR. CAYLEY: Closed.

JUDGE RIAD: It's supposed to be public anyhow even if there is no (10)one.

MR. CAYLEY: I want to read some closed session testimony.

JUDGE RIAD: Can we have private?

MR. CAYLEY: Private would be sufficient.

JUDGE RIAD: Private session, madam registrar.
(15) [Private session]
[redacted]
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(20) [redacted]
[redacted]
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(25) [redacted]

• Page 7024 • {21/96}

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(25) [Open session]

• Page 7025 • {22/96}

(1) MR. CAYLEY:

• Q.: Now, Witness, I'm just going to read you one more piece of evidence that the Judges have heard, and this is from the commander of the Dutch forces that were in the enclave, and this is what he says occurred (5)on the 9th of July.

MR. CAYLEY: This is, Your Honours, Colonel Karremans, whose evidence you heard.

• Q.: "In the southern part of the enclave, there was the so-called Swedish shelter project, a lot of housing built under Swedish (10)authorities. In that Swedish shelter project there used to live about 3.000 refugees. As soon as the attack started in the southern part, all those refugees fled in the northern direction towards the city of Srebrenica. You can imagine there was panic, chaos in those days, what I explained before, no food. And there was no way to give them houses in (15)Srebrenica itself. Panic I must say." Now, Witness, are you aware that the advance of the Bosnian Serb army in this area caused 3.000 to 4.000 Muslim refugees, women and children, to flee into Srebrenica? Are you aware of that?

• A.: No.

(20) • Q.: Did anybody ever speak to you about it afterwards, did anybody ever discuss that matter with you afterwards?

• A.: In Slapovici?

• Q.: No, I'm saying after the operation on Srebrenica, did you discuss amongst your comrades the fact that Slapovici had been empty when you (25)arrived there?

• Page 7026 • {23/96}

(1) • A.: Well, we didn't talk about it but when we got to Slapovici, Slapovici was empty.

• Q.: Did it look to you as if people had left in a hurry?

• A.: I didn't notice anything like that.

(5) • Q.: Did you look into any of the houses with your comrades?

• A.: No.

• Q.: Was there any livestock in the village at all?

• A.: No.

• Q.: Was there any sign of life at all in the village?

(10) • A.: Well, we didn't notice. We just passed through. I didn't notice anything.

• Q.: How long did you spend in the village?

• A.: Only as long as it took us to pass through.

• Q.: How long was that?

(15) • A.: Well, quite a number of hour -- half an hour, half an hour to get to the other side.

• Q.: So you were in the village for half an hour?

• A.: Not in the village, for as long as it took us to pass through the village, through Slapovici, and to get up on to the hill up there. About (20)half an hour, I'd say.

• Q.: So it took you half an hour to pass through the village of Slapovici to Brdo?

• A.: That's right.

• Q.: Did any of the soldiers that were with you go into any of the (25)houses?

• Page 7027 • {24/96}

(1) Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and English transcripts.

• Page 7028 • {25/96}

(1) • A.: As I was in a group of 10 to 15, I don't know exactly how many of us there were. We were the reconnaissance group that moved ahead. We got to the hill and gave the sign that the army could pass through and tie up the line and, while I was there, nobody entered.

(5) • Q.: Now, you were in the reconnaissance unit that was ahead of the main unit. Do you have any idea what the main unit of the Romanija Brigade actually did in Slapovici after you had left for Bojna?

• A.: No. When we got to the hill, we waited for the majority of forces and linked up the line and continued on.

(10) • Q.: So you can make no comment on what happened in the village of Slapovici after you had left with the reconnaissance unit and the main force had arrived?

• A.: Well, I do know because we waited for them up above Slapovici, some 500 metres above Slapovici, they came right behind us and we linked (15)up the line. There was no staying behind in the village at all.

• Q.: Now, let's move to the 11th of July which we've already referred to briefly when we were talking about shelling and I think in answer to some of Mr. Petrusic's questions, you said that there was artillery firing from Bojna and I think you referred to a weapon called a Browning?

(20) • A.: Yes.

• Q.: Whose artillery was that? Was that Bosnian Serb artillery or was that Muslim artillery?

• A.: Muslim artillery.

• Q.: And where was that firing, that artillery piece, who was it firing (25)towards?

• Page 7029 • {26/96}

(1) • A.: When we were at Bojna, in front of us, some -- I don't know how far away, 200, 300 metres away, they had their fortification in a trench of some kind.

• Q.: And they were firing at you?

(5) • A.: Yes. Towards my unit along our axis.

• Q.: And on that occasion with this firing, how many of your unit at Bojna were killed as a result of that firing?

• A.: Not a single man.

• Q.: Now, let's move to the 12th of July, and let me just refresh your (10)memory. I think in the morning you were given orders to search the terrain in the direction of Jahorina, Viogor, and Suceska; do you recall that?

• A.: I said I remember that searching of the terrain and our assembly, but I can't remember whether it was exactly on the 12th. I can't remember (15)that and the feature and where we passed through, but we did search the terrain because our unit got the inaccessible area to search. It was a deciduous area of the forest. Now, in the 12th of the morning, we started out where Viogor, Jahorina or wherever, I don't know where we met up but the unit did assemble somewhere there. I know there was the Zvornik, the (20)Birac and our own unit that assembled there, but I don't remember the exact spot --

• Q.: Could you just indicate to the judges the areas where you searched where I was marked. So if you could just indicate Suceska, Jahorina and Viogora.

(25) • A.: Jahorina is there, Suceska and Viogora. But we did not go into

• Page 7030 • {27/96}

(1)Suceska, we were up there in the inaccessible areas.

• Q.: So in the central area that's bordered by these three places, would that be right, this very mountainous area in the middle?

• A.: Yes, that's right.

(5) MR. CAYLEY: So the witness has indicated that the area that his unit was searching is the area where you can see with the very close contour lines bordered by Suceska, Jahorina and Viogora essentially in the centre of the map.

• Q.: Now, what exactly were you searching for up in this mountainous (10)area?

• A.: Well, we had received the orders to move along one route axis and to come up, whether at Viogora, I'm not quite sure now, but we were following this direction and did not hit any civilians, and we moved around there. Whether there was any assembly or not, the leader was at (15)the head.

THE INTERPRETER: We did not come across any civilians, the witness said, or army.

MR. CAYLEY: Now, Witness, you specifically said -- I'm sorry, Mr. Visnjic. Judge Riad, Mr. Visnjic wants to speak.

(20) MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, the Witness said, "We did not come across civilians or the army." In line 18, it just says civilians and it doesn't say the army so I just wanted to correct that. "We did not come across any civilians or members of the army." I just wanted to put that straight for the record.

(25) JUDGE RIAD: The translation is, "We did not come across any

• Page 7031 • {28/96}

(1)civilians," the witness said, "or army." That's what -- that was said by Mr. Cayley or by the answer. I'm looking at the transcript because it's put under "A," which is the answer. So ask witness again.

MR. CAYLEY:

(5) • Q.: Witness, there's a little bit of confusion about what is actually in the transcript, not about what you said. Am I right in saying that you stated that, in your search, you did not come across any civilians or members of the army?

• A.: No, we didn't come across any civilians or members of the Muslim (10)army.

• Q.: And am I right in saying that that is what you had been tasked to look for? You had been tasked to look for Muslim civilians and members of the army?

• A.: It was not our task to look, to search, just to pass through that (15)axis, because I think that the units were to assemble at these three features that I mentioned. I'm not quite sure which particular feature, I can't remember that now, but we were to assemble somewhere there.

• Q.: What instructions were you given by your commander in the event that you did find any civilians or members of the Muslim army?

(20) • A.: It was our duty, if a situation of that kind occurred, to hand them over. I don't know where that centre for assembly was, but we were to escort them to that particular centre.

• Q.: So you would have handed any member of the army who surrendered and, indeed, any civilian over to your commander who would have had them (25)transferred to this centre?

• Page 7032 • {29/96}

(1) • A.: That's right, yes.

• Q.: Let's move to the 12th and 13th of July when I think you stated that your unit went to its assembly point at Viogor. Do you remember saying that; are you uncertain about the date?

(5) • A.: Correct.

• Q.: Could you just point on the map, for the benefit of the Judges, the location of Viogora?

• A.: [Indicates]

MR. CAYLEY: And the witness is indicating the location Viogor, (10)which is written almost vertically down the map and it's about two squares to the left of the place marked as Srebrenica.

• Q.: Now, it was at this place on either the morning of the 12th or 13th of July that you were addressed by General Mladic; is that right?

• A.: Yes.

(15) • Q.: Now, General Krstic has already told the Judges in his evidence that he was present during this address by General Mladic. Do you recall seeing General Krstic when Mladic was addressing the soldiers?

• A.: No.

• Q.: Do you recall seeing anybody at all with General Mladic, any other (20)senior officers?

• A.: No, I cannot claim that I did or not. I'm not quite sure. I just know that as he addressed us. That was the first time that I saw General Mladic personally, in person.

• Q.: What did he say to you?

(25) • A.: Well, he said that we should be prepared to collect our things up

• Page 7033 • {30/96}

(1)and move towards Zepa.

• Q.: Did he say anything about the success of the operation in Srebrenica?

• A.: I don't think he did.

(5) • Q.: Did he congratulate you on winning back Srebrenica for the Serbian people?

• A.: I don't remember.

• Q.: Do you recall if anybody, apart from General Mladic, made any kind of speech?

(10) • A.: No.

• Q.: Did Colonel Mirko Trivic speak to you at all?

• A.: Nobody -- well I say I don't remember. I just remember that General Mladic addressed us and he told us to be prepared to move to Zepa.

• Q.: How long did General Mladic speak for; do you recall?

(15) • A.: Not long. He just addressed us in a few words because the army was tired. The men were tired. And the doctor -- that is to say, there are a lot of tired fighters. We had not taken off our boots for about a month, and we got some skin disease because of that, so we -- the men thought they would be going home.

(20) • Q.: Now, I think on this same day, either the 12th or the 13th, after you had speech from General Mladic, you returned to Jasenovo?

• A.: Yes.

• Q.: Could you point to Jasenovo on the map? I think you'll find it's near the bottom of the map and I've marked it for you. So the witness is (25)indicating the area marked Jasenovo directly beneath the yellow circle

• Page 7034 • {31/96}

(1)marked S for Sierra. Now, Witness, am I right in saying that this was the forward command post of the Romanija Brigade during the operation in Srebrenica?

• A.: Our tents were there. There were set up first of all in Zeleni (5)Jadar when we got there, and then they were transferred to Jasenova, and that's where the army has assembled. Now, whether the command was there, well, I say again, we were given orders by our superior officer of the reconnaissance group.

• Q.: Do you remember seeing Colonel Mirko Trivic at all in Jasenova, (10)the brigade commander?

• A.: I don't remember.

MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could be shown Prosecutor's Exhibit 817, which is a photograph.

• Q.: While we're waiting for the photograph, in your reconnaissance (15)unit, do you recall what communications you used, what equipment you used for communications purposes?

• A.: Motorolas.

• Q.: Did you -- did each of you have a Motorola or was there one man who was the signaller in the unit?

(20) • A.: The leader had a Motorola with him.

• Q.: And that's how he received orders from his commander?

• A.: Yes, quite certainly.

THE REGISTRAR: Excuse me, Mr. Cayley. I was not given Exhibit 817.

(25) MR. CAYLEY: We can use this. It's not a very good copy, but ...

• Page 7035 • {32/96}

(1)If Mr. Usher could give it to the witness first. It's not a -- it's a photographic copy of a colour copy.

• Q.: Do you recognise on that photograph General Mladic?

• A.: Yes.

(5) • Q.: So you're pointing to the man on the left of the photograph in the foreground, with a pair of binoculars. Do you recognise Colonel Mirko Trivic on that photograph?

MR. CAYLEY: And now the witness is pointing to the gentleman on the right of the photograph, not the extreme right, who again has a set of (10)binoculars around his neck.

• Q.: Now, you've already indicated to the Judges that, in your particular unit, your commander had a Motorola and that's how he kept in contact with his superiors. Do you recall whether you saw any communications equipment in Jasenova?

(15) • A.: No.

• Q.: So there wasn't a tent or anything at Jasenova in which you saw radio equipment?

• A.: No.

• Q.: Can you look at the photograph again -- you can take it off the (20)ELMO if you wish -- and study carefully the image of Colonel Trivic. What is he holding in his left hand?

• A.: Well, it's not very clear, but ...

• Q.: It's a Motorola, isn't it?

• A.: Well, we can assume that it is.

(25) • Q.: Does it look like a Motorola to you?

• Page 7036 • {33/96}

(1) • A.: Well, you can't see that clearly on the photograph.

• Q.: Could you place the photograph on the ELMO?

JUDGE WALD: Mr. Cayley, for my benefit, could you -- we don't have the exhibit directly in front of us. Could you identify where the (5)photo was taken?

MR. CAYLEY: This photograph, Your Honour, was taken in Srebrenica. This is the walk-through that was made through Srebrenica. My apologies for not -- and this is a still taken from the video that you --

(10) JUDGE WALD: As of which date?

MR. CAYLEY: This would be on the 11th of July.

JUDGE WALD: Thank you.

MR. CAYLEY: We'll get copies, Your Honour, of this photograph after the break.

(15) JUDGE WALD: I was just trying to put it in time and place.

MR. CAYLEY:

• Q.: So as best you can make out, it could be a Motorola in Trivic's hand, in his left hand?

• A.: Yes.

(20) MR. CAYLEY: Thank you. Now, I'm nearly finished. Judge Riad, do you wish to take a break at this point? We've been going --

JUDGE RIAD: How long do you have still?

MR. CAYLEY: Probably, at the most, about half an hour.

JUDGE RIAD: I'll just consult Judge Wald.
(25) [Trial Chamber confers]

• Page 7037 • {34/96}

(1) JUDGE RIAD: I think we'll continue. Thank you.

MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Judge Riad.

• Q.: Now, do you recall that after you went back to Jasenova, you then deployed with the rest of the Romanija Brigade to Zepa? Do you remember (5)saying that on Friday?

• A.: Yes.

• Q.: And you were unfamiliar with the route that you took from Srebrenica, from Jasenova, to Zepa?

• A.: That is right.

(10) • Q.: Do you recall that the route may have been via Derventa, Milici, Vlasenica, Han Pijesak and Krivaca? Do you think that's the route you may have taken?

• A.: When we set off from Jasenova, I know well that the first thing I could recognise was Vlasenica, Han Pijesak, and then Plane, when we got (15)there.

• Q.: So you do recall going through Vlasenica and Han Pijesak?

• A.: Yes.

• Q.: Do you recall going through Milici?

• A.: I don't know now. All I know is Vlasenica, Han Pijesak and Plane, (20)as the ultimate point.

• Q.: Do you remember that you went past the bauxite mine?

• A.: No, I don't remember.

MR. CAYLEY: Excuse me one moment.

• Q.: How long did it take for you to get from Jasenova to Zepa?

(25) • A.: I can't remember exactly now. You can imagine what it is like to

• Page 7038 • {35/96}

(1) Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and English transcripts.

• Page 7039 • {36/96}

(1)transport troops. The vehicles sometimes go out of order, there are delays. I know we got to Plane sometime in the evening.

• Q.: About what time during the day did you leave Jasenova? Now, if you think carefully, Mladic speaks to you in the morning, you return to (5)Jasenova, you arrive at Zepa in the evening.

• A.: In the afternoon, I think it was. I don't know exactly when it was that we left. All I remember well is that when we arrived at Plane, it was -- darkness was just falling, and we slept there.

• Q.: So if it was July and summer months, it was probably 9.00 or 10.00 (10)in the evening when you arrived?

• A.: I think 8.00 or 9.00.

• Q.: Now, did you hear Mladic's speech on the same day that you travelled from Jasenova to Zepa?

• A.: I don't know. I can't remember. I said it was the 12th or the (15)13th. I just can't remember that, what date it was.

• Q.: Now, I think it was the 14th of July, in the morning, that you received orders to place yourself as the reserve to the Zvornik Brigade in a shop or a school in the village of Podzeplje.

• A.: Yes.

(20) • Q.: And I think it's true that on the 15th of July you did actually replace the Zvornik Brigade, which was returning to Zvornik.

• A.: Yes.

• Q.: Now, I think, in answer to Mr. Petrusic's questions, you heard in the normal course that the reason why the Zvornik Brigade was returning to (25)Zvornik was to deal with the Muslim fighters who were breaking out towards

• Page 7040 • {37/96}

(1)Tuzla.

• A.: I learned that later. All I know is that they were pulled out and that they had to report to the command of the Zvornik Brigade. And later I learnt that the Muslims were -- the Muslims from Srebrenica were (5)attacking the lines under the control of the Zvornik Brigade.

• Q.: Did you ever hear later what happened to the Muslim fighters who had been captured during that operation?

• A.: I heard from the media, later, later.

• Q.: We'll come back to that subject. Now, I think you stated that (10)when you were at Putici you heard General Krstic on a Motorola issuing orders, I think it was to let a Muslim delegation pass. Was that your Motorola or was that your commander's Motorola?

• A.: No, because in my unit only the commander had a Motorola, and I was close by, next to the commander.

(15) • Q.: How did you know that it was, in fact, General Krstic on a Motorola?

• A.: I recognised his voice.

• Q.: How far away were you from this Motorola?

• A.: I was right next to the commander.

(20) • Q.: Did General Krstic introduce himself on the Motorola?

• A.: No.

• Q.: How many times prior to that had you heard General Krstic speak, prior to hearing him on the Motorola?

• A.: I had heard him. He was my brigade commander from 1992 until (25)1994, and he spent most of his time together with us fighters on the front

• Page 7041 • {38/96}

(1)line.

MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could be shown Prosecutor's Exhibit 818. It's a new exhibit. And again, Your Honours, this is a still photograph from the video of the entrance to Srebrenica on the 11th of (5)July. Mr. Usher, the witness can have a look at the photograph, because I think he'll be able to see it better if he studies it carefully.

• Q.: Now, Witness, do you see on that photograph General Krstic?

• A.: Yes.

(10) • Q.: General Krstic has a Motorola in his left hand?

• A.: Yes.

• Q.: Can you point to that Motorola? You'll need to -- I see. So could you put the pointer on there and leave it on the hand which you see holding the Motorola.

(15) • A.: I think this is the Motorola, in his left hand.

MR. CAYLEY: So the witness is indicating on Prosecutor's Exhibit 818 General Krstic holding a Motorola in his left hand.

• Q.: Thank you, Witness. Now, Witness, you --

MR. CAYLEY: Just one moment, Your Honours. If I could just (20)confer for a moment.
[Prosecution counsel confer]

MR. CAYLEY:

• Q.: Witness, have you heard of a unit called the 10th Sabotage Detachment?

(25) • A.: I've heard of it, but I don't know anything about it. I had no

• Page 7042 • {39/96}

(1)occasion to meet them, nor do I know who they were.

JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me, Mr. Visnjic. I owe you an apology, because I have to look at them, and I don't have eyes in my back. So I apologise. Go ahead.

(5) MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, just a point of clarification regarding exhibit -- the last exhibit. Could the Prosecutor explain to us from this which exhibit was this still taken? From which video was this still taken? Has that video been shown here as an exhibit?

(10) MR. CAYLEY: This is -- I don't know the exhibit number off the top of my head, but this is the video of the entrance of General Mladic and General Krstic and their entourage into Srebrenica on the 11th of July of 1995, and we've taken a still from that particular video. I'm told it should be Exhibit number 2. I'm sorry. No, that's wrong. It's not (15)Exhibit number 2, but I will find that in the break, the correct exhibit number, and I'll let Mr. Visnjic know.

JUDGE RIAD: Thank you, Mr. Cayley.

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Could you be kind enough to provide us with that number, because we might need it for our re-examination of (20)this witness. Thank you.

MR. CAYLEY: Yes. I will do that in the break, Your Honour.

JUDGE RIAD: Thank you. Please proceed.

MR. CAYLEY:

• Q.: Now, Witness, you said that you learned at the beginning of August (25)that General Krstic was the new commander of the Drina Corps. From whom

• Page 7043 • {40/96}

(1)did you hear that?

• A.: Well, you know what it's like in the army. Soldiers talk.

• Q.: But you soldiers had not seen the official appointment of General Krstic, had you? You hadn't seen the documentation which made his (5)appointment?

• A.: No.

• Q.: So you wouldn't have any knowledge of the exact date of his appointment, you and your comrades; you simply weren't familiar with that information, were you?

(10) • A.: That's right. When we returned from Zepa, we learnt that he had been appointed commander of the Drina Corps.

• Q.: Now, you said in answer to a question put by Mr. Petrusic that Borovcanin, your last name, is a very familiar -- it's a very usual name to find in the Romanija area.

(15) • A.: Yes. Yes.

• Q.: Did you know or had you heard of Ljubisa Borovcanin, who was the deputy commander of the Special MUP Brigade?

• A.: Yes.

• Q.: He is a fairly senior officer, isn't he, within the MUP?

(20) • A.: I know he worked in MUP. Whether he was a senior officer or not, I don't know.

• Q.: Is he related to you?

• A.: Yes.

• Q.: What is your relationship with him?

(25) • A.: We're relatives. We have the same patron saint. How shall I put

• Page 7044 • {41/96}

(1)it?

• Q.: I think I understand it. You're cousins, essentially?

• A.: Yes.

• Q.: Have you ever met him?

(5) • A.: Before the war, yes, but during the war and after it, no.

• Q.: Did you ever hear him referred to as "Borovcanin of the Specials," "the Specials" being the Special MUP Brigade?

• A.: No.

• Q.: Now, moving towards the end of my questions for you: When did you (10)hear of the killings of Serbs by Bosniak forces in Kravica in January of 1993?

• A.: I heard later. I can't remember now all this. I learned from the media, so I can't remember exactly.

• Q.: Now, the Judges have heard in this case that upwards of 7.500 (15)Muslim men were killed during and after the fall of Srebrenica, were killed by Bosnian Serb forces. When did you hear about that?

• A.: I heard that later too from the media, whether it was on the radio or otherwise. You know, there were different figures. The Muslims were using one figure, these others another, the foreigners something else, so (20)I heard all this from the media.

• Q.: As your memory serves you now, how long after July of 1995 did you learn about these killings? A week, a month?

• A.: I don't know.

• Q.: Did you ever discuss these killings with your comrades in the (25)Romanija Brigade?

• Page 7045 • {42/96}

(1) • A.: As we didn't know, our unit went along different axes and went to carry out a different task. Some people believe it, others don't believe it. I don't know.

• Q.: And those people who do believe it, who spoke to you or you spoke (5)with them, what did they tell you about what happened?

• A.: The story was that this had happened but we never knew what the figure was. We just couldn't understand that it could have been possible that such a thing could have happened. I don't know. I wasn't there.

• Q.: Witness, do you believe that it took place? Do you believe that (10)upwards of 7.500 people were murdered after the fall of Srebrenica?

• A.: As a man, I can't believe it because that is -- I don't know. I can't believe that.

MR. CAYLEY: Judge Riad, I don't have any further questions for the witness so I think my learned friend may have some re-examination.

(15) JUDGE RIAD: Thank you, Mr. Cayley. Mr. Petrusic, would you like to ask any questions?

MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Yes, Mr. President but the Defence would like to receive from the Prosecutor the exhibit from which this photograph was taken first and then, after that, we might have a couple of (20)questions.

JUDGE RIAD: Yes. I was planning to keep it for after the break, but you have some questions?

MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Yes. Yes.

JUDGE RIAD: How much time do you think you will need?

(25) MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Two or three questions, not many.

• Page 7046 • {43/96}

(1) JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much. I think we will resume after half an hour, at 20 past 11.00.

--- Recess taken at 10.50 a.m.

--- On resuming at 11.20 a.m.

(5) JUDGE RIAD: You can proceed, Mr. Cayley, but before that, we would like to make one announcement. [In French] You have the floor, Mr. Fourmy.

MR. FOURMY: [Int.] Thank you, Your Honour. Simply to inform all those present that, thanks to the efforts of the registrar, it (10)will be possible for the Chamber to sit, as from tomorrow and until the end of the week, in courtroom number three. Thank you, Your Honour.

JUDGE RIAD: Thank you. I think that we can have another break at 1.00 for 45 minutes. That will be the lunch break, if you think that's all right. If somebody feels any emergency, especially for General (15)Krstic, if we need to stop before that, you can please tell me. Otherwise, we will continue until 1.00. Please proceed.

MR. CAYLEY: Yes, Your Honour. I think now the Defence have some questions to ask in re-examination. Thank you.

• RE-EXAMINED by Mr. Petrusic:

(20) • Q.: [Int.] Mr. Borovcanin, during your service in the army, did you personally use communications devices of the Motorola type?

• A.: Yes.

• Q.: Can you assert with certainty -- I'm sorry, could Exhibit 818 be placed on the ELMO first, please. (25)Are you claiming with certainty that this is a Motorola that

• Page 7047 • {44/96}

(1)General Krstic is holding in his hand?

• A.: No, I cannot claim that with certainty because you can't see it well.

MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] I have no further questions, Your (5)Honour, for this witness.

JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much. Judge Wald.

JUDGE WALD: No questions.

JUDGE RIAD: Nor do I have questions. I only have to thank you, Mr. Borovcanin, for coming and for testifying and wish you a safe trip (10)back home.

MR. CAYLEY: Your Honour, just before the witness is taken out, there are three exhibits which I'd apply for admission, and if the witness could remain just while we do that in case there are any problems. The first exhibit is 829, which is the map of the Srebrenica enclave with the (15)various locations identified by the accused.

JUDGE RIAD: Yes.

MR. CAYLEY: 817 is the photograph of Colonel Trivic which the witness identified, and Prosecutor's Exhibit 818 is the photograph of General Krstic that we've just been looking at a moment ago.

(20) JUDGE RIAD: Yes.

MR. CAYLEY: So I would like to apply for admission into evidence those three exhibits.

JUDGE RIAD: Mr. Petrusic, do you have any comment?

MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] With respect to Exhibits 818 and (25)817, the Defence has no objection. But regarding Exhibit 829, the Defence

• Page 7048 • {45/96}

(1)objects, saying that on this map which is drawn -- on which the borders are drawn in red, that those borders are not the borders of the enclave. That is our map and the red line does not indicate the borders of the enclave.

(5) JUDGE RIAD: Mr. Cayley.

MR. CAYLEY: Well, the first point that I would make, Your Honour, is it was a map that we received from the Defence so it's not a map that we produced. And in any event, the witness made absolutely no comment nor did I ask him about the boundaries of the enclave. He neither confirmed (10)nor denied, nor do I suspect he probably knows. The purpose of the map was to indicate for your use and for greater clarity the locations that he was referring to together with the Observation Post Kilo and Sierra, so I think it can be admitted into evidence with the reservation of my learned friend, Mr. Petrusic, that indeed the red line does not accurately (15)represent the borders of the enclave.

JUDGE RIAD: Would that be satisfactory for you?

MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Yes, Mr. President.

JUDGE RIAD: Mr. Cayley, we'll admit it into evidence with this reservation.

(20) MR. CAYLEY: And the others.

JUDGE RIAD: Yes.

MR. CAYLEY: And the other ones 817 and 818.

JUDGE RIAD: Yes. There was no objection about that.

MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Your Honour.

(25) JUDGE RIAD: Mr. Usher, you can accompany the witness.

• Page 7049 • {46/96}

(1) [The witness withdrew]

JUDGE RIAD: Yes, Mr. Petrusic.

MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Mr. President, before the next witness enters the courtroom, I should like to move into private session (5)for a few moments to explain the protective measures that the Defence is requesting for the witness that is due to testify.

JUDGE RIAD: Well, we should stop him from coming, then. Yes, we'll go into private session.
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[Open session]

(20) THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session.

MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.]

• Q.: Witness DB, can you tell us in July 1995 where were you and did you receive any assignments or orders with respect to the Krivaja operation, Krivaja 95 operation?

(25) • A.: At the beginning of July 1995, I was at the command post of the

• Page 7055 • {52/96}

(1)communications battalion at Vlasenica and I received an order to set up a communications centre at the forward command post of the Drina Corps in the Village Pribicevac region.

• Q.: Who gave you that order?

(5) • A.: I cannot remember at this point in time whether the order was issued by the head of communications of the Drina Corps as the professional body who, by authorisation of the command of the Drina Corps, is empowered to issue that order or whether that order was issued personally by the Corps Commander, but I do know that I received the order (10)in oral form.

• Q.: I should like to ask you to make pauses between my questions and your answers to facilitate the work of the interpreters, and also would you kindly slow down in responding to the questions, please. Was that customary, that is to say, that an order of this kind be (15)issued orally or does it have to be given in written form?

• A.: The rules and regulations applied in the army from before and the ones that apply now imply the issuance of that order in written form. However, wartime practice very often deviated from those rules and regulations and I remember that quite certainly I was issued that order (20)orally.

• Q.: Can you tell us the contents of that order, that oral order?

• A.: As I was an officer at that time who had been engaged in similar activities of that kind before, and I'm thinking of the war period, it was enough for me to see that from the person that -- giving me the order, (25)conveying the order, that I was given the facts and figures where the

• Page 7056 • {53/96}

(1)forward command post would be, which units would be taking part in the assignment, and to be told when the communications centre of the forward command post should be completed and ready for use. That was the information I needed.

(5) • Q.: Did you get all that relevant information?

• A.: Yes.

• Q.: What about the units who were to take part in those combat operations?

• A.: Yes. I had information as to the units to be taking part in the (10)forthcoming operation.

• Q.: When establishing communications at the forward command post, were these indispensable to you?

• A.: Yes. For purely technical reasons that's what I needed.

• Q.: Therefore, having received that order, you set out for the (15)Pribicevac forward command post; is that right?

• A.: Yes.

• Q.: Can you tell us the time or, rather, the date when this occurred?

• A.: The new forward command post of the Drina Corps in the village of Pribicevac, that is to say, I arrived there a day before the combat (20)operations took place, that is to say, on the 5th of July, sometime around noon or thereabouts.

• Q.: What did this imply, the establishment of communications or communications centre at the forward command post? Technically speaking, what did you have to do to establish the centre?

(25) • A.: In the technical sense, according to the rules that exist, it was

• Page 7057 • {54/96}

(1)my duty and I was assigned to establish communication between the forward command post and the superior command, that is to say, the command of the Drina Corps in Vlasenica, and to establish communication from the forward command post to the subordinate units which took part in the Krivaja 95 (5)operation.

• Q.: When you say the "subordinate units," does that -- would you explain to that whether you mean subordinate units to the command or subordinate units who were on the terrain itself?

• A.: No, not to the commands of the original units, their commands in (10)the original zones, but towards the commands of the units and the units which actually took part in the Krivaja 95 operation, that is to say, those units who were grouped in the regions expecting to perform the assignments mentioned.

• Q.: So this initial information, that is to say, when the corps (15)commander or head of communications told you that there would be combat operations around Srebrenica, is that the first time you learned about that?

• A.: Yes, those were -- that was the first information I received as to the forthcoming assignment.

(20) • Q.: Did you know who issued the order for preparations for the Krivaja 95 operation?

• A.: No.

• Q.: Were you acquainted with the directives 7 and 7/1 issued by the Main Staff and the supreme commander and the Main Staff of the army of (25)Republika Srpska?

• Page 7058 • {55/96}

(1) • A.: No.

• Q.: To the best of your recollection, when did the forward command post of Pribicevac, when was it technically capacitated and ready for work?

(5) • A.: The forward command post of the Drina Corps in the village of Pribicevac in the technical sense, technically speaking, as far as communications, it being a communications centre, was ready for work in the afternoon hours of the 5th of July.

• Q.: You told us about the establishment of communications with the (10)units that were to participate, that is to say, participating in the combat operations and the establishment of communications with the superior command. Now, was this everything that you, as a professional man, did or are there any additional matters with respect to the general functioning of that centre that you had to see to?

(15) • A.: Do you want me to explain how I organised communications themselves?

• Q.: Yes, quite so.

• A.: The communication towards the superior command, that is to say, with the command of the Drina Corps in Vlasenica, that communication line, (20)I organised by means of, one, a single channel via a radio relay device. And I did so by the fact that at the forward command post of Pribicevac, we brought a telephone switchboard and extension from the command facility of Crna Rijeka, and those same extensions we had in the command, that is to say, at the communications centre of the Drina Corps in Vlasenica. And (25)so by dialing these mutually, we were able to ensure a direct

• Page 7059 • {56/96}

(1)communication. By using that same communication, via it, we were able to send out information, written information which was encrypted, protected. At the communications centre, I also had a device for the protection of oral (5)information. And this oral protection, the protection of oral information, was possible towards the main command of the army of Republika Srpska. We were able to do that along that line. The communication towards the subordinate units I organised in a radio network of command with a protected device, and that was my sole (10)communication towards the subordinate units which were participating in the Krivaja 95 operation.

• Q.: When you spoke about the sending out and reception of written messages, that is what we generally know as a teletype machine; is that right?

(15) • A.: Yes. Yes, that's right. It was a coded teletype communication, with the use of teletype and encryption devices.

• Q.: All that, then, was ready on the 5th of July; is that correct?

• A.: Yes. In the afternoon of the 5th of July, by the afternoon of the 5th of July.

(20) • Q.: And you were there at the forward command post, you yourself?

• A.: Yes.

• Q.: Were you acquainted at the time with the plan, or rather, the -- yes, the plan of operation Krivaja 95?

• A.: At the forward command post, after the arrival of the command to (25)the forward command post, I was informed of the plan for Krivaja 95, in

• Page 7060 • {57/96}

(1)summary.

• Q.: Can you tell us what the plan was, Krivaja 95? What was it?

• A.: As far as I remember, in the military sense, we were to encircle the enclave of Srebrenica by deployment of our units and taking up the (5)dominant features, assuming control of the dominant features in the vicinity of the demarcation line, delineation line, between our own forces and the forces of the 28th Division, and that line was in the vicinity of certain points which were controlled by UNPROFOR.

• Q.: You mentioned dominant features. For the functioning and (10)establishment of your communications, was that important?

• A.: Yes. It was essential for me to have that knowledge and information because, with the subordinate units taking part in the Krivaja 95 operation, I had only one type of communication: radio link. And in view of the mountainous terrain around which the movements had to move, it (15)was very important for me to know the assignment and their axis of attack so as to be able to have feedback information, that is to say, whether communications would always be top quality and continuous. So when I say this, I'm referring to it in the technical sense, technically speaking.

• Q.: So you learnt at the time which those elevation points were or the (20)features that were the object of the activities of the units taking part in the attack?

• A.: Yes.

• Q.: Were those features Kak, Alibegovac, and Zivkovo Brdo?

• A.: Yes.

(25) • Q.: Among the command staff, or rather, senior officers of the Drina

• Page 7061 • {58/96}

(1)Corps, who was present at the Pribicevac forward command post?

• A.: I remember that at the Drina Corps forward command post in the region of the village of Pribicevac, the Chief of Staff, the then Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps, was present, that is, General Krstic, as the (5)commander of the forward command post. There was Colonel Vicic, from the operations department of the Drina Corps, Lieutenant Colonel Svetozar Kosoric from the intelligence department, there was myself, and probably one of the non-commissioned officers from the staff command of the Drina Corps to service the forward command post.

(10) • Q.: Was that the first time for you to go to the Pribicevac forward command post?

• A.: No. In that region and the area around it, I had been on several occasions, ever since the spring of 1993, when units of UNPROFOR entered the town of Srebrenica itself, and in the meantime I had been there on a (15)number of occasions. And immediately prior to the operation Krivaja 95, I was in the region of the forward command post at the village of Pribicevac sometime at the beginning of June 1995, when units of the Drina Corps placed under their control the asphalt road going from Zeleni Jadar to Jasenova, Jelindol, Podravanje. Because this road, for the implementation (20)of peace in the area, could not have been used until then; it was not possible to use it. Rather, our forces were not able to use it, even though it belonged to our territory.

• Q.: Was the command staff at Pribicevac the same at the beginning of June, when you went there then?

(25) • A.: I remember that at the beginning of June the commander of this

• Page 7062 • {59/96}

(1)assignment was General Zivanovic, the commander of the Drina Corps, and I don't know who else, or rather, I don't remember who else among the senior officers of the Drina Corps was present. Probably one of the operations people, but I do not remember that now.

(5) • Q.: Witness DB, do you remember how the combat operations developed during those few days following the 6th of July?

• A.: As far as I can recollect, the combat operations that were part of the Krivaja 95 operation started in the early morning of the 6th of July. The Drina Corps grouped the bulk of its forces along the axis Zeleni (10)Jadar-Zivkovo Brdo, and I think the auxiliary forces had the task of breaking out from the broader region of Podravanje to the features of Kak and Alibegovac. During the first several days, or rather the first two days, combat contact was established with the enemy and surveillance was carried (15)out by force, but there were no significant movement of the forces of either side, ours or the enemy forces. I think that it was on the third day, counting from the beginning of the operation, that our units along the main axis of attack managed to gain control of a feature called Zivkovo Brdo that was part of the defence system of the 28th Division. (20)Along that axis the forces of the 28th Division put up strong resistance. I think that this feature was captured in the afternoon of that day. From the direction of Podravanje, according to my recollection, there was no significant resistance by the forces of the 28th Division, so that our units along that axis made advances without encountering any major (25)difficulties.

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(1) • Q.: So we're talking about the period from the 6th until -- now we're talking about the 9th of July and the afternoon of the 9th. During those days, was General Krstic at the forward command post at Pribicevac?

• A.: Yes.

(5) • Q.: Could you tell us what he was doing at the command post at Pribicevac during those days?

• A.: General Krstic, throughout this time, was in command of the operation Krivaja 95.

• Q.: My question was with reference to the period from the 6th to the (10)9th, so when you say "all the time," do you mean that three-day period? Because we'll be going on to the period after the 9th later on.

• A.: Yes, yes. I'm referring to this period that he was in command of his units and the operation Krivaja 95 during that period. He was in command of his units.

(15) • Q.: Does that mean that using radio transmitters, he conveyed --

MR. HARMON: Objection. I'm going to object to that.

JUDGE RIAD: Yes, Mr. Harmon.

MR. HARMON: I'm going to object to my friend telling the witness what it means. I think the question should not be leading. It should (20)perhaps be more open-ended. So my objection is, and I object to the reference to "Does that mean ..." because it is Mr. Petrusic who is testifying and not the witness.

JUDGE RIAD: Mr. Petrusic.

MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] No, Mr. President, I just wanted to (25)clarify the time that the witness was referring to, the time period,

• Page 7065 • {62/96}

(1)whether he meant the period from the 6th to the 9th of July.

• A.: Yes.

• Q.: Witness DB, in that period from the 6th until the 9th of July, do you have any knowledge as to how General Krstic would forward his orders (5)to the brigade commanders?

• A.: In that time period, General Krstic forwarded his orders to the brigade commanders within the command radio network which I described at the beginning of my testimony.

• Q.: At the forward command post, did you have reports from those (10)communication lines on the situation on the front, or rather, along the lines of attack?

• A.: Yes. General Krstic, by means of those communication lines, issued commands to his subordinate commanders and they reported to him using those same communication lines regarding the achievement of the (15)tasks assigned to them and the situation on the front lines.

• Q.: By means of those communication lines, were you informed about the peace forces that were stationed there?

• A.: I remember that one of the subordinate commanders, directly subordinate commanders, reported to General Krstic that at one of the (20)UNPROFOR posts or checkpoints, an accident had occurred and that in a conflict or during a war conflict, a soldier had been killed. And we had that, the information that this soldier had been killed by members of the 28th Division and that the UNPROFOR soldiers at that post, finding themselves in an unfavorable situation for them at that time, and fearing (25)the possibility of further adverse consequences, they pulled out to our

• Page 7066 • {63/96}

(1)side. What I mean is they crossed into territory that was under our control. I remember this because General Krstic ordered me personally at the time to go in the direction of Zeleni Jadar to find that group of (5)UNPROFOR members and to escort them to safe territory in the region of the village of Pribicevac. That is what I did. I came across them in the vicinity of Zeleni Jadar as they were about to move in the direction of Pribicevac, and I escorted them to the region of the village of Pribicevac.

(10) • Q.: When you said you escorted them, did they have their side weapons and equipment with them? I'm referring to APCs.

• A.: Yes. I think there were three or four personnel carriers. They were marching alongside the APCs in a column, in a combat formation together with all the equipment and weapons they had, and I led them to (15)safe territory in the region of the village of Pribicevac. And I am quite certain that, in that region, nothing could have -- nothing unforeseen could have happened to them. What is more, a number of our soldiers who happened to be there spoke and greeted them in a very friendly manner and they spoke in English. I think that someone offered them water. (20)After that, I returned to the forward command post, that is the communications centre there.

• Q.: Witness DB, you are an officer and you are familiar with the concept and notion of taking captives. Can you describe this situation as taking members of UNPROFOR captive or capturing members of UNPROFOR?

(25) • A.: No, that situation has absolutely nothing in common with that

• Page 7067 • {64/96}

(1)term. Our behaviour towards them in the situation that I have just described was as between colleagues, between military men and officers, and I am quite sure I am not mistaken if I also add that it was, to a degree, a friendly attitude. I am saying this with reference to what I (5)personally saw and the situation in which I participated.

• Q.: Do you know where they went on from there, that is the UNPROFOR troops, that is, where they went from the region of the village of Pribicevac?

• A.: This group of three or four APCs, as far as I can recollect, (10)stayed there for a while, and then I learned from someone that after they had established contact with their own command, they headed towards Bratunac, crossing through our territory, that is, territory controlled by our forces.

• Q.: So you are linking this event to the 9th of July.

(15) • A.: It was the day when they had one fatality, one killed soldier. And reconstructing the whole period, I assume that it could have been the 9th of July.

• Q.: At the forward command post at Pribicevac, in addition to the officers you have mentioned, were there other officers of the Main Staff (20)or the Drina Corps in the period from the 9th of July onwards?

• A.: From the 9th of July until the completion of the operation, that is, until Srebrenica fell in military terms, I remember that at the forward command post, the commanders of the Main Staff did come, that is General Ratko Mladic, and the commander of the Drina Corps, General (25)Zivanovic. I think they came on two or three consecutive days, and I also

• Page 7068 • {65/96}

(1)remember that one day, but I think this was only for a couple of hours, at the Pribicevac forward command post that General Gvero also came.

• Q.: Can you tell us what General Mladic and General Zivanovic did during their visit to the forward command post?

(5) • A.: General Zivanovic was accompanying or escorting General Mladic, or rather, they were always together. When they arrived at the forward command post, General Mladic would briefly inquire into the situation on the front in global terms, in general terms and, according to my recollection, on that occasion and on the occasion of several other (10)operations, it was his custom personally using the radio link to confer with commanders of the directly subordinate units participating in the operation, telling -- to tell them, to congratulate them or to give them additional orders. I remember this because that was the customary behaviour of (15)General Mladic.

• Q.: On the 10th of July, was General Mladic at the forward command post at Pribicevac?

• A.: Yes.

• Q.: On that day, did he get in touch with the subordinate units, the (20)units actually carrying out combat operations?

• A.: Yes.

• Q.: Did you have occasion to hear that?

• A.: Yes.

• Q.: Could you please explain to us, in addition to what you have (25)already said about the operation of the communications system at the

• Page 7069 • {66/96}

(1)Pribicevac forward command post, tell us how it was possible for you to hear his messages that were transmitted through that communication system.

• A.: When he came to the forward command post, and after being briefed (5)about the situation, General Mladic would go to the observation post on the Kula feature, from where there is a very good view of the whole valley of Zeleni Jadar and Srebrenica, in fact, and all the surrounding features and the terrain in general. As a rule, together with him, General Zivanovic and General Krstic would go to the observation post. In order (10)to be able to directly transmit orders from the observation post, I would order a soldier to carry a mobile transmitter to the observation post and to accompany them there with this equipment. The other transmitter would remain with me at the communications centre of the forward command post. So that we were all in one and the same network at the time, same radio (15)network, both the observation post, where General Mladic was, and myself at the communications centre, and all the commanders of the directly subordinate units directly participating in the operation. In this way, I was able to hear the conversations that were being transmitted within that radio network.

(20) • Q.: On that day, the 10th of July, did you hear conversations or orders issued by General Mladic to subordinate units?

• A.: Mostly, yes.

• Q.: Can you remember one of those orders or conversations?

• A.: I remember an incident that occurred very early in the morning, (25)before dawn, in a counterattack by the forces of the 28th Division. Our

• Page 7070 • {67/96}

(1)forces were pushed back from Zivkovo Brdo and there were several killed soldiers on our side belonging to units whose task it had been to take up defensive positions on the lines they had reached. That battle went on until 7.00 or 8.00 in the morning of the 10th of July. At the time, we (5)were taken aback by this new development, and I remember there was hasty regrouping of forces in preparation for an attack, for another counterattack to gain control of Zivkovo Brdo again. At that point in time, or about that time, I think it was about 9.00 or 10.00 in the morning, General Mladic appeared at the forward (10)command post, together with General Zivanovic, and when he learnt about this development that had occurred that morning, he personally spoke to the then Lieutenant Colonel Pandurevic, commander of the Zvornik Brigade, whose unit was attacking along that axis. And I remember that Lieutenant Colonel Pandurevic said then that they would regain the feature, regain (15)control of the feature, by 11.00 that day. I thought this was a brilliant military response at the time. And when he really did manage to recapture it sometime before midday, this made me remember the whole incident. After that event, General Mladic communicated over the radio with a number of commanders who were participating in the operation, and as far (20)as I can recollect, as the overall combat situation at that moment appeared to be extremely favourable for our forces, because the dominant features had been captured, those immediately next to Srebrenica and some further away, I remember that General Mladic, in his communication with some of the commanders, ordered that the attack should resolutely be (25)continued towards Srebrenica.

• Page 7071 • {68/96}

(1) MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Mr. President --

JUDGE RIAD: Yes.

MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] I must say, I have to interrupt the witness and his testimony, but my colleague tells me that General Krstic (5)needs to be excused for a moment.

JUDGE RIAD: I was expecting that, and I gave you this authority. Thank you. So we'll adjourn for 15 minutes, till a quarter to one. Thank you.

--- Recess taken at 12.32 p.m.

(10) --- On resuming at 12.52 p.m.

JUDGE RIAD: Mr. Petrusic, we have been informed that General Krstic is not feeling in good shape. If he wants to waive his right to attend the trial, he is authorised to do so. If he can stay, he can stay with us until 1.30 and then we can adjourn for half an hour for the lunch (15)period and resume until quarter to three. If he prefers not to be in the courtroom, you can ask him. I know the nurse is being fetched.

MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] We'll all remain as we are until the next break. So General Krstic will attend up until the break and, depending how he feels after that, we shall be able to decide, (20)Mr. President. Thank you.

JUDGE RIAD: Thank you, Mr. Petrusic.

MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.]

• Q.: Witness DB, you have Exhibit 829 before you and I should like to ask the usher to place it on the ELMO, please.

(25) MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Yes, thank you, Mr. Usher.

• Page 7072 • {69/96}

(1) • Q.: Witness DB, you said that you had information that the dominant features that were to be taken control of by orders for active combat operations was Kak, Alibegovac, and Zivkovo Brdo; is that right?

• A.: Yes.

(5) • Q.: On the map in front of you, can you find those features for us, please, although we used another map previously, but could you point them out to us, please, on that map?

• A.: Yes.

• Q.: Would you point them out? Let's take Kak first.

(10) • A.: Kak is here. Alibegovac next, Alibegovac is here; and Zivkovo Brdo is here.

• Q.: Witness DB, now between the Kak and Alibegovac features, will you draw a line with your felt tip marker. I think you have a marker in front of you, a red one. Will you draw a line between those two points, (15)please. Join the two features up.

• A.: [Marks]

• Q.: Thank you. Next, from Alibegovac towards Zivkovo Brdo. Will you do the same and draw a line between those two points.

• A.: [Marks]

(20) • Q.: Witness DB, are you acquainted with the Bojna feature?

• A.: Yes.

• Q.: Can you find it for us on the map, please?

• A.: [Indicates]

• Q.: Would you draw a circle around the feature Bojna.

(25) • A.: [Marks]

• Page 7073 • {70/96}

(1) • Q.: According to your knowledge, sir -- just one moment, please. I withdraw that question upon the suggestion of my colleague, Mr. Visnjic. Now, along these lines, the lines that you have linked up, Kak, Alibegovac, and Zivkovo Brdo, those areas that you have linked up, will (5)you please put your initials "DB" for us.

• A.: [Marks]

• Q.: That will be difficult to decipher as being DB because you have written them in Cyrillic but, for the purposes of the record, let us note that the witness has written in his initials DB in the Cyrillic script. (10)Can you do the same for the Bojna feature, please; also place your Cyrillic initials there.

• A.: [Marks]

• Q.: Thank you. After gaining these lines and taking control of those features, the ones that we mentioned, did General Mladic, through radio (15)communication, issue orders to his subordinate commanders?

• A.: I remember that, after our units broke through to these features and assumed control, he congratulated the commanders on having done so through radio link, radio communication and, at the same time, he hurried them up so to speak, to continue and -- in a further attack. Whether he (20)dictated the axis of attack to the units on that occasion or not, I can't remember at this point. But at any rate, each unit had to receive an axis of attack. But I do remember him speeding up the commanders, urging them on. And sometime on the 10th, in the afternoon, perhaps even at about 7.00 or 8.00 p.m., when Colonel Andric, the then Colonel Andric, the (25)commander of the 1st Birac Brigade, informed him that after his order he

• Page 7074 • {71/96}

(1)was still engaged in this assignment and that he had still to take control of the Vagan feature. I remember that very well. I remember it well when, according to his assessment, he energetically ordered him to bypass that particular feature and to continue his attack further so that his men (5)would not become too exhausted by taking control of that particular feature, because I felt at the time that General Mladic thought that there were no forces at that feature belonging to the 28th Division.

• Q.: Can you find that feature on the map, please, because we have mentioned it for the first time, Vagan.

(10) • A.: It's this feature here. It's this feature here.

• Q.: Please put your initials in Cyrillic, please, DB. So those were the activities that you described and which, to the best of your recollection, took place on the 10th of July, 1995?

• A.: Yes.

(15) • Q.: Let us now stay with the 10th of July for a moment. General Zivanovic and General Krstic, were they in command then and did they issue orders to the units at that time?

• A.: I think that General Zivanovic did not appear in the command network, and I also think -- I also do not think that General Krstic (20)appeared either. That is how I remember that period and that particular day.

• Q.: Witness DB, may we move on to the 11th of July now, 1995. You were at the forward command post, were you not?

• A.: Yes, I continued to be at the forward command post.

(25) • Q.: Was the composition of the superior officers the same with respect

• Page 7075 • {72/96}

(1)to the previous day?

• A.: Yes, they were the same.

• Q.: Can you tell us what happened, what was taking place at the command post that day and what the commanding officers' activities were, (5)depending on developments on the front?

• A.: That particular day, the attack by our units was continued on the basis of the order given the previous day. I think that at one point General Mladic, together with Generals Zivanovic and Krstic, transferred to an observation post in the region of the Kvarac feature. Whether that (10)was immediately before the NATO airstrikes -- I think it was, yes, which would make it sometime around midday. And I know that it is from that observation post at Kvarac that communication continued and commanding of the operation continued from there.

• Q.: Would you show us that area, please, on the map, the Kvarac (15)feature. Where is it? For purposes of the record, we have your initials in Cyrillic there again. The aviation, that is to say, the NATO airstrikes, took place?

• A.: Yes. That day, there were NATO airstrikes attacking our forces located -- that is to say, in combat with the forces of the 28th Division, (20)and I think that those strikes, that bombing, took place in the Bojna region, and they attacked the forces of the 1st Zvornik Infantry Brigade. I think that there was machine-gun fire around the broader region of Pribicevac sometime around 1.00 p.m. or 2.00 p.m., after midday.

• Q.: You said that, according to your recollections, Mladic, Zivanovic (25)and Krstic went to the Kvarac area. Did they return to the Pribicevac

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(1)forward command post?

• A.: I can't be quite sure now whether they returned or not during the afternoon. I think they did come back from the Kvarac area to Pribicevac. I think they returned sometime in the afternoon, that is to (5)say, after the NATO airstrikes.

• Q.: And finally, did you -- via your communications centre and the subordinate units, did information reach you that either parts of the units or their commanders had entered the town?

• A.: Yes. At the communications centre, following developments via our (10)radio devices, we learnt that all the defences of the 28th Division of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina had ceased and that parts of our own units had entered the town itself.

• Q.: These three commanding officers, Mladic, Zivanovic and Krstic, the generals, did they go into town?

(15) • A.: Yes. Sometime during the afternoon, at about 1700 or 1800 hours or thereabouts, with their heavy vehicles, terrain vehicles, they went off towards the town itself.

• Q.: So after their departure, who stayed on at the Pribicevac forward command post?

(20) • A.: After their departure from the forward command post, of the officers at that forward command post, only I myself remained and probably some of the subordinate officers from the staff command.

• Q.: You said earlier on that, in the course of those days and in the establishment of the former command post, that Colonel Vicic and Colonel (25)or Lieutenant Colonel Kosoric arrived there. Now on that day, the 11th of

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• Page 7078 • {75/96}

(1)July, were they at the forward command post?

• A.: Yes. They were at the forward command post on that day too, but following an assignment, they left the region. Whether before the group of generals or immediately after the generals, I can't say. I can't (5)remember. But what I do know is that I was the sole remaining officer.

• Q.: The officers that we mentioned and -- that is to say, Generals Mladic, Zivanovic, and Krstic, did they return to the forward command post of Pribicevac at all?

• A.: While I was at the command post that day, the forward command (10)post, they did not return.

• Q.: And how long did you stay at the forward command post?

• A.: I stayed at the forward command post until 1900 hours or thereabouts.

• Q.: And did you leave the forward command post?

(15) • A.: I took stock of the situation and the new developments, and as I was able to control the lines and developments via radio relay, I thought that the communications centre was no longer needed at Pribicevac, that there was no need for it anymore and so I packed it up. When I say "packed up," that is a term we use. And at around 1900 hours or a little (20)after that, a little later, I went off towards the command of the Bratunac Brigade, the Bratunac Brigade headquarters.

• Q.: You say "packed up the communications centre"; can you explain what that actually implies, the term to "pack up," what does that imply?

• A.: Well, according to our regulations, we have that term to install (25)and to pack up the communications centre, both to install and establish

• Page 7079 • {76/96}

(1)means to establish all the communications that have been planned; and to pack up the communications centre quite simply means what it says, to discontinue those communications and to place the devices and vehicles -- to put them on the march, and to prepare to establish communication (5)centres elsewhere where they are needed.

• Q.: So does that mean that, up until the 11th of July, as you say, at around 1900 hours, that is to say, on the 11th of July when you left Pribicevac, the communications centre at that particular command post no longer existed? Is that what you're saying?

(10) • A.: Yes.

• Q.: At that forward command post, that particular feature, was there some other form of communication, telephone communication, apart from the one you yourself helped establish?

• A.: No. At that feature, what remained was part of the units. I (15)think it was the independent Skelani Battalion, part of the battalion stayed on, and they had their own internal communication. That is to say, between the trenches or the defence lines in the defence system that had previously been established before the Krivaja 95 operation was launched.

• Q.: With that type of communication that you say existed within the (20)defence lines of the Skelani Battalion, were they able to communicate in the way in which had previously been done by the communications centre that you, yourself, established on the 5th of July; was that possible?

• A.: No.

• Q.: That is to say, there were no communications with the -- no (25)communications were possible with what was left of the Skelani Battalion

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(1)with the Corps Command, for example?

• A.: No, because there were no technical facilities for doing so after the communications centre that I had established and installed had been packed up.

(5) • Q.: You said, sir, that you left for the command of the -- the headquarters of the Bratunac Brigade?

• A.: Yes.

• Q.: Which route did you take?

• A.: I took the route going from Pribicevac to Bojna, to Srebrenica, (10)Potocari, Zuti Most, Bratunac.

• Q.: When you passed through Srebrenica, you encountered the army there.

• A.: I passed through that town for the first time on that occasion. I noticed some soldiers belonging to the army of Republika Srpska in the (15)town itself along the streets, but not more than ten of them, about ten.

• Q.: And in the town itself -- I suppose you went down the main street -- did you happen to notice the traces of fighting, shelling?

• A.: I don't know what Srebrenica looked like before that. I noticed on the facades of the houses that there were holes from infantry weapons. (20)There were no more visible traces of any major combat activities compared to some other places that I had passed through during the war. I remember that the town itself looked fairly dirty and in disarray, and it is situated in a valley, in a depression, so the impression was not a nice one. But there weren't any major traces of combat activity in the town (25)itself, I can't say that in the sense of any major destruction or anything

• Page 7081 • {78/96}

(1)of that kind. I didn't notice anything like that.

• Q.: Did you notice any civilians or any members of the 28th Division, perhaps?

• A.: On the road from Srebrenica to Potocari, at several points along (5)the road, along that route, I noticed towards Potocari the -- I noticed two or three civilians moving that way. They were elderly persons, for the most part, and they were carrying some bags and things like that with them. But there weren't too many of them. I did notice several of them moving towards Potocari along the road.

(10) • Q.: Did you pass through Potocari?

• A.: Yes.

• Q.: Was -- what about the members of UNPROFOR; did they prohibit passage through Potocari at all?

• A.: I did not encounter any checkpoints or anything like that.

(15) • Q.: And in Potocari itself, did you see any civilians yourself there?

• A.: Yes, in Potocari itself, in the place itself, both on the left and right-hand side of the road, I did see a large number of civilians.

• Q.: I think we'll agree that they were Muslims, were they not?

• A.: Yes, they were Muslims. And for me, that was a new and surprising (20)image in the war, a large number of civilians. And it was already getting dark, dusk was falling, but I didn't stop my vehicle. I moved slowly onwards to make it safe for the civilians. So I moved as slowly as I could, moving in the presence of such a large number of civilians. I took care to move slowly. And I noticed (25)that these civilians seemed to be mixed up with the UNPROFOR soldiers. At

• Page 7082 • {79/96}

(1)several points amongst the civilians I noticed members of UNPROFOR. I also noticed a number of soldiers belonging to the army of Republika Srpska and they were all there together mixed up, and they were discussing something. (5)The soldiers had their rifles on their shoulders, not in the combat position. Quite simply, there seemed to be some curiosity going on, some inquisitiveness, and they were communicating about something of this large number of civilians all together, members of UNPROFOR together with the civilians and some Republika Srpska soldiers. But the (10)communication that was going on amongst all these people, as far as I was able to notice, was not a war situation. I thought that perhaps those soldiers, the army of Republika Srpska soldiers were perhaps from the town itself, from the town of Srebrenica who had been holding positions up until then around the enclave (15)or that they were some other soldiers who happened to know some of the civilians. That was the impression I gained. I was surprised to see this -- to see that only a few hours before that, there had been fighting and war going on whereas at that particular moment, everybody was talking to everybody else in a sort of inquisitive way.

(20) • Q.: Now, this image that you gained, this impression that you gained as you were passing the presence of the soldiers from Republika Srpska and so on, their presence, it did not give the impression that there was any hostility going on, is that right, or any mistreatment of those civilians or any -- or that they were behaving towards the civilians in a way that (25)would not be customary and which would represent a violation of the laws

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(1)and customs of --

MR. HARMON: This is a leading question. I object to the form of the question. I think the witness can be asked his impression, but again, my learned friend is leading the witness by providing the answer to him in (5)his question, and I object.

JUDGE RIAD: This time, Mr. Petrusic, I agree. Thank you. Please proceed.

MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] I agree too, Mr. President.

• Q.: Let's put it again. Was there any hostility in the impression (10)that you had of this conduct on the part of the army of Republika Srpska towards the civilians?

• A.: No.

• Q.: As you passed through Potocari, following on from that, you went along the road towards Bratunac; is that right?

(15) • A.: Yes.

• Q.: Let me go back for a moment. How many Serb soldiers were there in this crowd of refugees and UNPROFOR soldiers?

• A.: I cannot now tell you with certainty, but I am quite sure that what I saw were small groups of soldiers, two or three, or individuals, (20)talking to certain groups. So all in all, as I was passing, I didn't see more than 10 to 20 Serb soldiers along the road that I passed along, to my left and right, as far as I was able to see, because it was already getting dark by then.

• Q.: So you were heading towards Bratunac. Along that road from (25)Potocari to Bratunac, did you see groups of Serb soldiers?

• Page 7084 • {81/96}

(1) • A.: No. On the road from Potocari to Zuti Most, or Yellow Bridge, I think I did not come across anyone.

• Q.: So you reached Bratunac, the headquarters of the Bratunac Brigade?

• A.: Yes. I arrived in Bratunac around 2130 hours, or 2100 hours. (5)Anyway, it was already quite dark, so my estimate is that it could have been that time.

• Q.: Who did you find, or where were any -- were your soldiers, your soldiers who were with you at the communications centre?

• A.: When leaving the communications centre and the forward command (10)post, as a rule, together with General Krstic and a mobile receiver, a signalsman would go with him. Whether this always happened, I cannot say, but that would be the rule, so that General Krstic could communicate, while being on the move, with units taking part in an operation from some other location, as far as the technical possibilities allowed, that is, (15)within the range of those devices. The other soldiers from the communications centre went with me, and a vehicle, a large vehicle with -- the communication system vehicle, where we always had a mobile centre assembled, passed through Srebrenica with me, Potocari, and we arrived at the Bratunac Brigade headquarters sometime after 2100 hours.

(20) JUDGE RIAD: Would it be suitable for you now to break?

MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Yes, Mr. President.

JUDGE RIAD: Thank you, Mr. Petrusic. We'll resume at 2.00.

--- Luncheon recess taken at 1.32 p.m.

• Page 7085 • {82/96}

(1) --- On resuming at 2.04 p.m.

JUDGE RIAD: I hope General Krstic is feeling better.

MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Yes, Mr. President. We'll continue in General Krstic's presence.

(5) JUDGE RIAD: Thank you. Please resume.

MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.]

• Q.: Witness DB, before we pick up where we left off, that is your arrival at Bratunac, my question is: Are you aware that, according to establishment, there was in the army of Republika Srpska a 10th Sabotage (10)Detachment?

• A.: Yes.

• Q.: Do you know under whose command, direct command was that unit?

• A.: The 10th Sabotage Detachment was a unit directly subordinated to the Main Staff.

(15) • Q.: The Main Staff of the army of Republika Srpska?

• A.: Yes.

• Q.: In the period from the 5th of July when you set up the communications centre at Pribicevac until the 11th of July in the afternoon or early evening when this centre was packed up or dismantled, (20)was the unit of the 10th Sabotage Detachment linked by communications to your system?

• A.: No.

• Q.: In that time period, therefore, could anyone from the forward command post at Pribicevac, through the system of communication lines that (25)was operative there, establish contact with them?

• Page 7086 • {83/96}

(1) • A.: Through the system of communications that I organised for the operation Krivaja 95, it was not possible to command that unit.

• Q.: Do you have any knowledge about their presence, the presence of the 10th Sabotage Detachment in the area of combat operations at the time?

(5) • A.: I think that they arrived in the area only a day or two before Srebrenica fell militarily, which means a day or two prior to the 11th of July.

• Q.: So you do know that they were there?

• A.: Yes. I personally saw their signalsman so we exchanged a couple (10)of words related to communications because I was wondering whether they would have any assignment or not. However, they were not covered by our communications system so I don't know exactly who gave them assignments. But in any event, their signalsman told me that they would not enter our communication system, that is the communication system used to command (15)that operation.

• Q.: According to your knowledge, they were not in the communication system in the period from the 5th to the 11th?

• A.: No. They were not in the system at all in that period.

• Q.: When you arrived in Bratunac and you said it was 9.00 in the (20)evening or half past 9.00, who did you find there?

• A.: In the compound of the Bratunac Brigade headquarters, I remember seeing a vehicle which had brought General Krstic there, because I found there my soldier, a signalsman who was carrying with him this mobile device for the needs of General Krstic that afternoon of the 11th. So I (25)asked him whether there were any news, whether I had been called by anyone

• Page 7087 • {84/96}

(1)because, according to my own assessment, I left the forward command post in the evening and I asked whether General Krstic had arrived there. He told me that General Krstic had arrived and that he had come with him along a different route, that they had not passed through Potocari, that (5)he had tried to reach me over the mobile device to convey to me a couple of messages but I had already left the forward command post. I then felt it necessary for me to report to General Krstic, to inform him that I had left, and that I had packed up the communications centre at the forward command post and that that communications centre no (10)longer existed at Pribicevac. I think that my signalsman or someone else told me that there would be a meeting shortly in the Bratunac Brigade headquarters and that General Krstic would be there, so I headed in that direction to report to him and to tell him, let him know that I was in the brigade headquarters too now.

(15) • Q.: You mean in the command of the Bratunac Brigade?

• A.: Yes, the Bratunac Brigade.

• Q.: Did your signalsman tell you what route General Krstic had taken upon leaving Srebrenica?

• A.: They didn't come through Potocari and Zuti Most along that route. (20)In fact, he found it strange that when I told him that I had passed through that area of Potocari. I think he told me that they took another route via Pribicevac and Sase because in passing, he mentioned that already around 2000 hours, just before dark, they had caught up with a couple of soldiers probably from the Bratunac Brigade who had, until then, (25)held defensive positions in the area, that they were pushing in front of

• Page 7088 • {85/96}

(1)them a small herd of sheep, probably from a Muslim village. And I remember this because he told me how he had to get into a jeep in the back seat where it was crowded because -- it was cramped, because General Krstic was furious with these two soldiers, that he (5)apparently criticised them very hard and, in fact, he ordered the signalsman of mine that should any one of them utter a word, that he should hit him with his rifle butt, and he personally drove those two soldiers in his vehicle to the military prison at the Bratunac Brigade headquarters.

(10) • Q.: As far as I am able to understand, those two soldiers that you assume were from the Bratunac Brigade had in fact stolen that livestock?

• A.: Yes. These were some petty thieves. When the front line was moved, they probably took advantage of the opportunity to pick up that herd for their own needs.

(15) • Q.: Among the officers, who did you find in the Bratunac Brigade headquarters?

• A.: I entered the hall where the meeting was held. Just then it hadn't started yet, and I think it started around 2200 hours. I know that present at the meeting were General Mladic, General Zivanovic, General (20)Krstic, I think. Logically, all the commanders of the directly subordinated units that had taken part in Krivaja 95 were also present, and also some other officers, but I do not recollect now who.

• Q.: Do you have any recollection as to the contents of the meeting that you are referring to that was held on the 11th in the evening?

(25) • A.: It seemed to me that the meeting did not have a strictly military

• Page 7089 • {86/96}

(1)content that was precise and clear, as was customary, because there was a feeling of victory, a celebratory atmosphere, probably because of the outcome of the combat operations. And the meeting was chaired, or rather the main say was held by the commander of the Main Staff of the army of (5)Republika Srpska, General Ratko Mladic.

• Q.: And what was the topic of the meeting?

• A.: I remember that General Mladic praised the units for their success; he underlined their successes in the operation. And I remember also that just then he conveyed his idea or gave orders that immediately (10)all the units which had participated in the operation Krivaja 95 had to be transferred to new areas in order to prepare for the attack on Zepa. It seems to me that he said that a plan had to be done immediately and that General Krstic should prepare the plan and that, with all the units that had participated in Srebrenica, should immediately be transferred for the (15)offensive operation against Zepa. General Mladic, while saying this, and as he noticed me sitting there in the hall, he ordered me that I should immediately, that same evening, immediately head for a new forward command post in the region of the village of Krivace [Realtime transcript read in error "Pribicevac"] to establish a communications centre there.

(20) MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, I think we have an error in the transcript. The witness said "in the region of the village of Krivace," and in the transcript we see "the village of Pribicevac."

JUDGE RIAD: Thank you.

MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.]

(25) • Q.: So let us correct this through a question. Did you get an order

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• Page 7091 • {88/96}

(1)to set up a forward command post in the village of Krivace, near Zepa?

• A.: Yes.

• Q.: That concept or order, as you put it, at the meeting, did anyone oppose that or did you all accept it as such?

(5) • A.: I remember after this concept had been presented, or order, that the then Lieutenant Colonel Pandurevic addressed General Mladic. He was the commander of the 1st Zvornik Infantry Brigade. And he pointed out that the situation in the broader region of Srebrenica was, in military terms, rather unclear, that forces of the army of Republika Srpska who (10)were in pursuit of the enemy had not managed to establish combat contact with them anywhere and that again we had no information that the units which had held defensive positions earlier on in other parts of the enclave, that there were reports that soldiers of the 28th Division were endeavouring to break through. For this reason, Lieutenant Colonel (15)Pandurevic suggested that the situation should first be cleared up in the military sense around Srebrenica so that this should not provoke any fresh problems. However, I cannot now quote or even paraphrase the answer General Mladic gave, but in general terms it could be interpreted as the following: Regardless of that, all for Zepa.

(20) • Q.: Did you draw any conclusions from that, if it is possible at all to talk about conclusions?

• A.: At the time, I was the youngest at the meeting, but the suggestion and the thoughts conveyed by Lieutenant Colonel Pandurevic seemed to me to be quite logical and justified, because I had up to then already had (25)appreciation for his military capabilities and the fact that he was

• Page 7092 • {89/96}

(1)capable of presenting his own views and positions to General Mladic, who in those days was considered to be an unquestionable military authority among soldiers and officers alike. I think that General Mladic had his own assessment on the basis of which he had made this idea and decision, (5)he had taken this decision.

• Q.: Did you have any knowledge about the officer cadres, if I can call them that, that had gathered at that meeting? What was your opinion? Why was it that Lieutenant Colonel Pandurevic addressed General Mladic; do you have any explanation for that?

(10) • A.: I think it was because our forces were in pursuit of the enemy from the south-east towards the north or north-west. And it was expected that the forces of the 28th Division would try to make a breakthrough towards the north or northwestern part of the enclave and their advances towards the territory of the 2nd Corps of the BH army through the area of (15)responsibility of the Zvornik Brigade. And I think because he was the commander of that brigade, he thought that there was a danger for his own area of responsibility and that is why he made that suggestion. Secondly, Lieutenant Colonel Pandurevic, in that particular situation, felt that it was logical for the situation to be cleared up (20)militarily. At the time, he was the commander of a brigade which numbered between 5.000 and 6.000 men. And with his unit, he was a pillar of support for the Drina Corps in many battles even in other theatres of war outside that area. He was considered an authority among other commanders. And as I said, he had a say of his own and he didn't hesitate (25)to convey his opinion.

• Page 7093 • {90/96}

(1) • Q.: When you were given the order orally on the 11th in the evening at that meeting to go and set up a communications centre at Krivace, was that sufficient for you to set up technically that future centre, or rather, the future forward command post?

(5) • A.: Yes. For me, that was quite sufficient. I knew the location of the new forward command post. I heard the order that all the units that had been at Srebrenica should march forward and prepare for an offensive operation on Zepa so that I know who the participants were. I knew where the forward command post would be, and that was quite sufficient for me. (10)So I sat there for a very short while, waiting, whether perhaps in the course of these consultations, there might be some additional information or any change which would affect my organisation of communications. And when I saw that there were no additional information, that same evening, with the communication centre already packed, and with (15)my soldiers, I went from Bratunac in the direction of the command of the Drina Corps in Vlasenica.

• Q.: What route did you take for Vlasenica?

• A.: I arrived at Vlasenica from Bratunac via Krivace, Konjevic Polje, and Milici.

(20) • Q.: On that road from Bratunac to Vlasenica, did you come across members of the army of Republika Srpska?

• A.: No. No. I think it was only in the region of Krivace and Konjevic Polje along the road that there was some ambushes being prepared and I think that I saw members of the MUP, Ministry of Interior Affairs.

(25) • Q.: Are you sure that they -- that it was them or is that a

• Page 7094 • {91/96}

(1)supposition on your part?

• A.: I think it was them because they had the characteristic uniform predominantly blue. Had it been the army, I should have known that in view of the units which took part in the operation Krivaja 95, and as I (5)monitored the situation, I know that in that region, there would not have been any, so to speak, reserve units of the army there.

• Q.: When did you arrive in Vlasenica at the command headquarters of the corps?

• A.: I arrived at the Corps Command at around 2400 hours or thereabouts (10)on the 11th of July.

• Q.: From there, did you carry on towards Krivace because you had an order to set up a command centre?

• A.: Moving towards Vlasenica, I had something wrong with my vehicle, something had gone wrong with the vehicle, and there was some knocking (15)noise in the wheels. And when we reached Vlasenica, after the driver had looked at the vehicle and told me that a whole spare part had to be replaced and taken from another vehicle, he informed me of that. But that vehicle was very important because we had installed all the devices necessary for a mobile communications centre on it. (20)I can't now remember whether, at the corps headquarters, I asked permission from anybody because, at that time, I don't think that there was anybody in the Drina Corps command headquarters who had the authority to give me permission to spend the night in Vlasenica or perhaps I assessed the situation myself and decided to spend the night there. But (25)anyway, I stayed there that night in Vlasenica and didn't go on to Krivace

• Page 7095 • {92/96}

(1)to repair the car, the vehicle, and that's where we spent the night.

• Q.: In Vlasenica at the headquarters of the corps, is that what you mean?

• A.: Yes.

(5) • Q.: Do you remember who you came across there of the officers in the Corps Command?

• A.: It was late. Perhaps the duty operations officer was there but I don't remember who it was.

• Q.: And the next day, on the 12th of July, in the morning, what were (10)your activities then?

• A.: The next day, early in the morning we worked fast to repair the vehicle and to prepare everything else necessary for our new assignment. They were technical preparations, all the material that we needed for the communications centre and I think that the new forward command post (15)towards Krivace we started at sometime around midday, at around 12.00 noon.

• Q.: From the 11th in the evening when you left the meeting in Bratunac, up to your departure for Krivace at about 12.00 the next day on July 12th, did you have any communication with General Krstic, or rather, (20)anyone from the Corps Command?

• A.: No. I think General Krstic stayed in Bratunac on the 11th, and I did not see him until my departure for Krivace.

• Q.: Did you come across anybody in Krivace on the 12th of July, upon your arrival?

(25) • A.: In the immediate vicinity, that is to say some 50 to 100 metres

• Page 7096 • {93/96}

(1)away from the place, we set up the communications centre on the 12th of July. There was a unit there from the 65th Protection Motorised Regiment and they had a defence position there that they held from earlier on, and it was 285th Zepa Brigade, that is to say, they were close by. So I found (5)them there, and some two or three kilometres away, there was the command of a battalion in the village of Plane, a battalion belonging to the 65th Motorised Protective Division, but I didn't go to them on that day.

• Q.: As you mentioned the 65th Protection Regiment, do you know which unit held that resistance point, defence point?

(10) • A.: I don't know. I think it might have been a platoon. They had one or two combat vehicles perhaps, so it was perhaps a platoon of one of the companies from that battalion in Plane.

• Q.: And the battalion in Plane, do you know anything about that? Was it an infantry battalion, or what?

(15) • A.: I think it was an infantry battalion, although in that particular region, whether before or afterwards, there were some armoured units as well, but I think that, at that time, it was an infantry battalion. At least, those were the kinds of weapons they had. That is what I would say. That is how it appeared to me.

(20) • Q.: On the 12th of July, in the course of the day and the evening, while you were there at Krivace, did anybody appear of the command staff at that forward command post? Did anybody come?

• A.: No. On that day, we had a lot of work to do to install the communications centre, to camouflage the devices and set up the defence. (25)And I remember that, on that particular day, which was the 12th of July,

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(1)the day that I arrived at the new command post in the village of Krivace, nobody from the command of the Drina Corps turned up. I didn't see anybody.

• Q.: That communications centre, had it been installed for use on the (5)12th of July? Was it ready to function, technically speaking?

• A.: Technically speaking, it could have been used. It was operative and operational and all the communications were ready to go.

• Q.: On the 13th of July, that is to say, the 13th of July, did any of the commanding officers come to the forward command post of Krivace at (10)all?

• A.: On the 13th of July, I think somebody did appear at the forward command post, but conditionally speaking, it was a whole team from the Drina Corps in the Krivaja 95 operation, which means General Krstic, Colonel Vicic, and Lieutenant Colonel Kosoric. Now, whether that was (15)before noon, in the afternoon, or in the evening, I really can't say. I don't remember.

• Q.: So on that 13th of July, the communications centre was operational; it could function unimpeded and serve its purpose, the purpose for which it had been set up?

(20) • A.: Yes. Sometimes we had some minor problems with the power supply, and we had a generator with us, but those problems were not so frequent. And I know that the -- they did not have any vital effect on command, so these problems did not affect command. There were no serious interruptions, so we could go ahead with those communications without any (25)great problems. There were certain interruptions, but it was possible to

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(1)command.

• Q.: Before we end for the day, Witness DB, could you explain to us the functioning of the communications centre, that is to say, from Krivace towards the subordinate and superior commands.

(5) • A.: It functioned on the basis of exactly the same principle and with all the same details as it did in the Krivaja 95 operation. The terrain was different, that was all. But otherwise, all the principles were the same as they were for the communications centre in the village of Pribicevac.

(10) • Q.: So from that communications centre, if I understand you correctly, there was no direct communication with the commands of the original units who were taking part in the operation towards Zepa; is that right?

• A.: Technically speaking, we did not have the possibility from the command posts [Realtime transcript read in error "forward command post"], (15)both Pribicevac and Krivace, to receive -- to reach the commands of the original units directly in the locations where they were. But if that was indispensable, if we had to communicate with them, then we would do so through the mediation of the communications centre at the command headquarters of the Drina Corps in Vlasenica. So we would ring them up, (20)and that communications centre had all the original matrix, commands and connections, and then the switchboard operator would connect us further on. So we didn't have direct communication, but technically we were able to connect via the communications centre in Vlasenica.

MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, we have an objection (25)to make with respect to the transcript. On line 23, which is on the

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(1)screen, page 86, it was the forward command post, and the witness said, "We had no possibility from both forward command posts, Pribicevac and Krivace." The forward command post [as interpreted], not just "the command post," as it says in the transcript. The forward command post [as (5)interpreted]

JUDGE RIAD: It stands corrected.

THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

JUDGE RIAD: It stands corrected now after the intervention. Yes, Mr. Petrusic.

(10) MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Mr. President, the Defence would end there for today with respect to the examination of this witness.

JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much, Mr. Petrusic. We resume tomorrow at 9.20, and I believe it will be in Courtroom 3. [Int.] Is that right?

(15) MR. FOURMY: [Int.] That is correct, Mr. President.

JUDGE RIAD: Thank you. Tomorrow at 9.20.

--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.46 p.m., to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 7th day of November, 2000, at 9.20 a.m.