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/ Colormap • Page 6025 • {1/65} (1)Tuesday, 17 October 2000 [Open session] [The witness takes the stand] --- Upon commencing at 9.35 a.m. (5) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Good morning, ladies and gentlemen; good morning, the technical booth, the interpreters; good morning, legal assistants and the registrar; good morning to the Office of the Prosecutor, to the Defence counsel; good morning, General Krstic. We are here to continue the testimony of General Krstic. I remind (10)you, General, that you are still testifying under oath, and you will continue to answer questions put to you by Mr. Petrusic. Mr. Petrusic, your witness, if you please. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Good morning, Your Honours; good morning, my learned friends from the Prosecution. The Defence also bids (15)good morning to all present in the courtroom.
WITNESS: RADISLAV KRSTIC
[Resumed] • EXAMINED by Mr. Petrusic: [Continued] • Q.: General, we stopped yesterday with the events at the end of (20)December when you were wounded during your regular activities and visits of units. So I would like to ask you, regarding your further activities after that injury -- or rather would you describe to us how the injury occurred and what happened after that?
• A.: Returning from the area of responsibility of the Herzegovina
(25)Corps, and after being briefed on the situation in the Corps and the
• Q.: So this was in mid-May or the second half of May? • A.: I think it was mid-May. Anyway, I resumed my duties in the second half of May. (10) • Q.: During your absence from the 29th of December, 1994 until you returned, did you have a deputy to take your place in the Corps?
• A.: According to the establishment and the structure of the Drina
Corps, the Chief of the Operations and Training unit would naturally be my
deputy, according to the rules. However, he didn't stand in for me all
(15)that time.
Upon the request of the Commander of the Drina Corps, General
Zivanovic, the Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps became the previous Chief
of Staff, the one I had replaced, that is, General Milutin Skocajic, upon
the request of General Zivanovic. So General Skocajic replaced me until
(20)sometime at the beginning of April 1995 when, because of certain disputes
or conflicts with General Zivanovic, he went back home to his family.
After that, until my return, the Chief of the Operations and
Training unit, Colonel Milenko Lazic replaced me, and he was given orders
by the Commander of the Drina Corps, dating back to April of 1995, to
(25)replace me in my position.
• A.: Yes, of course he did. The first matter I was briefed about and given information on were the following: He told me that preparations for (5)a spring offensive by the army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina had almost been completed and that it was to be expected that the operations of the BH army in offensive -- can be expected to undertake offensive activities towards the area of responsibility of the Drina Corps. He also briefed me on the earlier activities of the 28th Division (10)from Srebrenica and Tuzla, and told me that they had engaged in combat continuously, that sabotage groups had been infiltrated into the rear of our forces deep within our territory, and that in the process we had suffered very considerable casualties. Just when I arrived, the intensity with which these groups were (15)being infiltrated was very, very high. He also informed me that units of the 28th Division were continuing to procure arms. • Q.: Let me interrupt you, General, for a moment, because of exhibits the Defence would like to offer.
MR. PETRUSIC:
[Int.] Mr. President, Your Honours, I
(20)should like to ask you for a little more patience during the day, as
Defence will be producing a number of documents which, unfortunately, we
only have in one version and that is the B/C/S version, but after this set
of documents, all the other documents will be provided in English as
well.
(25)I know that this is a problem for both you and my learned friends
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Petrusic, we understand the situation, but I already asked for us to take stock of the situation at the end of the day, because we really must do everything to have the (10)documents translated. But we will discuss this at the end of the day. But there is the risk of us coming to the end of the examination-in-chief of General Krstic and not being able to begin the cross-examination. So we will review the situation at the end of the day to see how we stand, but for the moment, please continue. (15)So the registrar can give us these documents now. THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Petrusic, could you please move the microphone closer. On the ELMO, please. Could Defence counsel move the microphone, please. (20) MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.]
• Q.: This is an order of the 1st Zepa Light Brigade, 08-20-22/95, dated
the 10th of January, 1995, addressed to the Main Staff of the army of
Bosnia-Herzegovina in Kakanj, attention Brigadier-General Enver
Hadzihasanovic, and I quote -- for the record, the number of this document
(25)is 08-20-22/95, and I quote: "In reference to your documents as quoted
• A.: Yes, you are quite right. Flights were not allowed because there was a prohibition, a no-flight rule for helicopters, but they did fly in from the direction of Tuzla. (15)In this document of the 1st Zepa Brigade, the Brigade Commander is suggesting to the leadership of the BH army a new location for the landing of helicopters because the previous location is no longer safe. These flights had been detected over territory under Serb control, so he is saying that UNPROFOR forces are also representing a certain obstacle and (20)he is unable to move them away from there. So he's suggesting a new location, Kupusna, which is an area more to the north-west of the Zepa enclave, in fact, within the Zepa enclave, as a safer place. He also provides the coordinates which a pilot has to have when landing, saying that the brigade command will provide security for the landing area. (25)
MR. PETRUSIC:
[Int.] Could I ask the usher for document
• Q.: This order that we have in front of us bears the number 08-20-48/95, dated the 19th of January, 1995, issued by the 1st Zepa Light (5)Brigade, and I quote: "The cargo which arrived by helicopter on the 18th of January, 1995 has been received in order and stored in a safe place. We have withdrawn the personnel from the location. Give us notice of the rough time when the next cargo is due to arrive so that we can prepare the personnel and the landing strip. We have a lot of problems (10)with UNPROFOR regarding the landing of helicopters at the location used so far. We can safely receive another delivery at the same location whereas all subsequent deliveries would be extremely risky. Signed Commander Colonel Avdo Palic." According to this order or, rather, report or information, the (15)Commander is reporting that he has received the delivery. So my question is: Did you have any knowledge of any UNPROFOR intervention, that is, any intervention by the battalion that was stationed in the area of Zepa, that is, the Ukraine Battalion, on overflights by helicopters and on supplies of weapons for the enclave in this way? (20)
• A.: You corrected yourself. This is not an order. This is
information addressed to the Main Staff of the BH army, specifically to
Enver Hadzihasanovic.
Obviously, the Main Staff of the BH army did not accept the
previous suggestion by the Commander of the Zepa Brigade regarding a new
(25)location in the area of Kupusna, so that helicopters continued to land at
(10) MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Please, can I have the Exhibit 47B.
• Q.: This is an order of the General Staff of the BH army. The number
is 1-1/224-1, dated 7th of February, 1995. In fact, it is a notice about
the distribution of materiel and equipment.
(15)Paragraph 1, I quote: "Carry out the occupation of the heliport
immediately tomorrow and take appropriate action for receipt of the
delivery."
Paragraph 5, item 5, I quote: "As regards the rifles for
Srebrenica, we are preparing a special delivery."
(20)And paragraph 6: "Automatic rifles 7.62: For Zepa, 100 pieces;
for Srebrenica, none; Mortars, 60-millimetre mortars: For Zepa, two
pieces; for Srebrenica, six pieces; Shells, 60-millimetre: For Zepa, 40;
for Srebrenica, 20 --" I apologise, "120; 7.62 calibre rounds: For Zepa,
24.500; for Srebrenica, 66.150." The document is signed by
(25)Brigadier-General Enver Hadzihasanovic.
(5) • A.: Yes, precisely. The previous documents and this one show that the process of supplying the units with weapons and ammunition, when it comes to the 28th Division, was controlled by Enver Hadzihasanovic from the Main Staff of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This document is again composed as a report, but it can be, in fact, considered as an order, (10)because he allocates the weapons and ammunition that have arrived as specified in the document itself. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Exhibit 49B, please. • Q.: This is a document issued by the 1st Zepa Light Brigade. The number is 08-20-109/95, dated the 9th of February, 1995. It is addressed (15)to General Hadzihasanovic, and I quote: "The materiel from the delivery of the 6th and 7th of February, 1995 have been received in good order and have been stored in a safe location. We expected to get the delivery of the 8th and 9th of February, 1995 and we spent the whole night at the heliport. Please tell us whether the delivery will arrive on the 9th (20)to 10th of February of 1995 and whether we are to wait for it at the heliport." The document is signed by Ramo Cardakovic. So the arming, as is obvious, continued. Do you have any information --
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Mr. Petrusic, excuse me for
(25)interrupting you. But if you draw conclusions from the document, there is
MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] • Q.: General, could you please comment -- (5) MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Thank you, Mr. President. • Q.: -- can you please comment on this notice? • A.: Yes. This document shows that the deliveries of weapons and ammunition were quite intensive, and it went on on a daily basis. The person in charge, or rather the body in charge of this process was the (10)General Staff of the army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. To me it would be very logical, since the 28th Division was a part of the 2nd Corps of the BH army, or it was linked in many ways with this Corps, it would be logical to assume that the deliveries would be arriving from Tuzla. However, the situation was completely different. The supply (15)lines and the orders and the instructions go directly from the Main Staff of the BH army. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] The next exhibit is 48B.
• Q.: This is a telegramme sent by the 1st Zepa Light Brigade. The
number is 08-20-110/95, and the date is the 9th of February, 1995.
(20)The text goes as follows: "The delivery of the 7th of February,
1995 is correct as itemised. I need 30 personnel to report to me in the
course of the night at the destination as agreed by Ramiz and myself. I
await feedback. Regards from Semse."
This telegramme was sent to the Commander, Naser Oric, or
(25)alternatively to the Chief of Staff, Major Ramiz Becirevic. Can you
• A.: The Commander of the Zepa Brigade, after the arrival of the cargo, reports to the Division Commander in Srebrenica or the Chief of Staff of the Division about the arrival of the cargo. The Commander of the (5)Division in Srebrenica or the Chief of Staff already know about the delivery, and that is why the Commander of the Zepa Brigade reminds him of it. This document shows that a larger amount, a larger quantity, of materiel had arrived from Sarajevo because the distribution thereof -- (10)that a large number of livestock is required to report. What they mean is actually cargo animals to transport -- 30 cargo animals to transport the cargo. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] The next exhibit is Exhibit 50B.
• Q.: It is a notice from the 1st Zepa Light Brigade, number
(15)08-20-114/95, dated the 11th of February, 1995.
"Please be advised that I received the last night's cargo in full
and that I stored it in a safe location. There were some minor problems
because Chetniks fired at the helicopter, but you have already probably
been advised thereof."
(20)The last three lines of the order, in fact, of this notice, I
quote: "In the previous delivery, we received some money, about
308.000 DM, for which we do not know the purpose nor have we received any
instruction. We assume that it is earmarked for Srebrenica, and we would
like you -- to give you instructions in this regard. Signed, Commander
(25)Colonel Avdo Palic."
• A.: Yes. The Commander of the Zepa Brigade again reports to the General Staff of the BH army about the latest cargo that had arrived. He also notifies him that he has received some money, in fact, 308.000 German (5)marks, assuming that the money, that this amount was, in fact, earmarked for Srebrenica. I don't know what the purpose was for this money, so I can't comment on it, but if we know that it has reached the Commander of the Brigade, we can assume that it was meant for the soldiers, members of the (10)army, for their salaries, monthly salaries. • Q.: All these reports that we have gone through now refer to the landing of helicopters in the Zepa area. Can you explain to us, why did the helicopters land in this area, at least as far as these reports are concerned? (15)
• A.: Yes. The Zepa area was much more suitable for the landing of
helicopters, not only for the landing but also for the overflights of
helicopters from the locations from which the deliveries were sent. It is
much better than Srebrenica. It is mostly a wooded area, and it is very
difficult to spot the helicopters, and it is, in fact, very difficult to
(20)target the helicopters in the conditions that our units had to contend
with and that is the defence that we were engaged in. And the position of
the anti-aircraft units in the wooded parts of the areas of responsibility
of the units that were located in the Romanija plateau.
It was much easier to distribute the materiel from Zepa towards
(25)Srebrenica because that area was not occupied by our forces. That was an
MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] I would now like to ask the usher to place the documents 51 through 55 on the ELMO.
• Q.: This is a document issued by the army of the Republic of Bosnia
(5)and Herzegovina, the Command of the 28th Division. The number is
01-47/95, dated 22nd of May, 1995.
Paragraph 5 contains the actual order. I quote: "On the basis of
the information about the slump in the morale and the general chaos in the
ranks of the aggressor, assess the possibility and take offensive action
(10)even at the lowest-level platoon. In our conditions, it means that it is
possible to plan and carry out sabotage actions, but in the depth of the
enemy territory. In order to carry out such sabotage actions, it is
necessary to work out with the whole of the -- all of the officers in the
unit this order using the information about the situation in the ranks of
(15)the aggressor and to take any measures that are necessary to reconnoitre
the terrain and to carry out sabotage actions.
"Actions are to be planned and carried out in areas where we can
guarantee 100 per cent success and in the depth of the aggressor
territory, at least 5 kilometres further down from their defence lines
(20)towards the area of responsibility of the division. For the execution of
such actions, prior approval is to be obtained from the Division Command
and the plan for the execution of the actions is to be submitted to the
Command with all the details."
The document is signed by Chief of Staff, Major Ramiz Becirvic.
(25)This is the 22nd of May, 1995.
• A.: This is the time just before the beginning of the spring offensive (5)launched by the BH army on the area of responsibility of the Drina Corps. It had already began against the positions in the area of responsibility of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, and this document clearly shows that the operations of the 28th Division in the safe area of Srebrenica primarily were very frequent. (10)The operations are carried out in the depth of the territory controlled by the Serbs, as is quite obvious from this order. They monitor the combat morale and the alleged chaos in the ranks of the Serbian side and assess that this was a moment when they should intensify combat operations and inflict casualties to their opponent, and they are (15)warned that only those operations in which success is guaranteed are to be carried out. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] The next exhibit is Exhibit 52, and we have this document and this exhibit in the English version. • Q.: This is an order of the 28th Division, and the number is 02-35 of (20)1995. The date is the 2nd of June, 1995. General, since we do have this document -- all of us have this document in the English language as well -- THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. Microphone. Thank you. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] (25)
• Q.: This is the order number 02-35/95, dated 2nd of June, 1995. Since
• A.: This order was issued by the Command of the 28th Division (5)regarding a distribution of ammunition and other materiel which had arrived in the meantime, up to that time, into the area of Srebrenica and Zepa. The distribution was carried out pursuant to a plan of organised activities, and the Commander of the division, that is, the Assistant (10)Commander for Operative Affairs is conducting the distribution of the said materiel and equipment. I'm now going to read out parts of this order which relate to the way the ammunition and materiel was distributed. For the 28th East Bosnian Light Brigade, there were 5.500 rounds (15)of 6.62 bullets. 7.9 bullets were distributed in the amount of 350 pieces. There were 35 pieces of hand grenades that were distributed and there were 12 hand-held rocket launcher shells.
• Q.: General, sorry I'm interrupting you, but in this document we can
see what the quantities are in question, so I don't think it is necessary
(20)for us to go through all of this, because I have already indicated that we
have the translation of this order.
What I should like to know is whether you can tell us something
about the quantity of the ammunition and other materiel and equipment for
one particular brigade, that is, what does that quantity represent for one
(25)brigade?
MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Our next document is document number 53, D53, which is an interim report of the command of the 28th Brigade, number 13-05-77/95, dated 2nd of June, 1995.
• Q.: I will quote from the document: "On the 31st of May, 1995, in the
(10)immediate vicinity of the UN checkpoint at Zeleni Jadar at around
9.00 a.m., our reconnaissance patrol encountered a Chetnik patrol near the
Opres locality. During that incident, the platoon commander and one
soldier of the 282nd Light Brigade were wounded and left on the locality
was one PHO. Around 13.00, two patrols were again dispatched, each
(15)containing four soldiers to search the terrain, the patrol in which the
Deputy Commander was, the Deputy Commander of the 282nd Light Brigade.
The two patrols met again and the first one opened fire, as a result of
which, two enemy soldiers were killed.
"On the 1st of June, 1995, in the early morning hours, the enemy
(20)led an ambush in the area of Podravanje. In that incident, two of our
personnel were killed close to the asphalt road near the workshop, and
near the SS curve, a soldier of the 285th Brigade was killed, together
with four additional soldiers of the 285th Brigade."
The document was signed by Nedzad Bektic.
(25)General, according to your interpretation of this information
• A.: Well, it was not necessary to conduct patrols inside the area of (5)responsibility of the 28th Division. From the documents that we have seen so far, we could see that the reconnaissance activities and operations of sabotage and terrorist units were carried out outside the area of responsibility or further in the rear of the territory which was under the control of the Serbian side. (10)The incident that took place in Zeleni Jadar occurred outside the boundaries of the area of responsibility. Mentioned here is the village of Podravanje, which was also situated outside the area of responsibility, some 3 or 4 kilometres away. It is true that this area was not under the control of the forces of the VRS; however, the VRS was able to control it (15)from time to time and search the terrain. As a result of that, a conflict between two patrols occurred, a clash involving one patrol of the VRS and one patrol of the BH army. • Q.: Referring to the area that you just mentioned, did it actually belong to the Serbian side, to the Serbian party? (20) • A.: Yes. After the boundaries of the safe area were established, both Podravanje and Zeleni Jadar actually belonged to the Serbian side. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Exhibit 94 has been -- I'm sorry, 54 has been translated, I believe.
• Q.: So the next exhibit is Exhibit 54, and it's again an order, number
(25)01-80/95, dated 5th of June, 1995. The order was issued by the
• A.: The order in question was issued on the 5th of June to one of the (5)commands of a brigade which was part of this division. Briefly, the Command of the 28th Division is still issuing orders and has its units under control, and it is supervising the conduct of offensive activities of its units; and also it is controlling the sabotage and terrorist activities which were carried out in the territory under the Serbian (10)control, that is, in the rear area of the VRS forces, that is, the forces of the Drina Corps, which were deployed around the protected area. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Our next exhibit is D55, which has also been translated into English, and I should like you to put it on the ELMO as well. (15) • Q.: It is a report, number 03-49-5/95, of the 5th of June, 1995, issued by the Tuzla Defence Secretariat Department in the municipality of Srebrenica. The document was signed by Suljo Hasanovic. General, I should like to hear your opinion and to comment for us on this particular information report bearing in mind the overall (20)situation. The time frame is the beginning of June 1995.
• A.: Yes, you are right, it's early June 1995. And the Chief of the
Defence Secretariat in Tuzla is an authority which is in charge of
replenishment of units of the 28th Division in that particular area, and
they are hereby informing the Tuzla Defence Secretariat about the
(25)quantities of supplies that have arrived and have been distributed to the
• Q.: Speaking of the quantities of supplies, were they part of the (15)humanitarian aid that was distributed? • A.: Yes, this was taken out from the humanitarian aid. So it is obvious, one can see that the humanitarian aid was not distributed or, rather, was not distributed in sufficient quantities to those who were really in need. (20) • Q.: In this particular case, the quantities stated, had they been received from the Dutch Battalion? • A.: Yes, that is correct, that the quantities indicated here were received from the Dutch Battalion.
MR. PETRUSIC:
[Int.] Mr. President, at this point I
(25)should like to suggest a break.
(5) --- Recess taken at 10.42 a.m. --- On resuming at 11.04 a.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Petrusic, you may continue. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Thank you, Mr. President. Document 57B, could it be placed on the ELMO, please. Please turn (10)to page 2 of this document. Actually, on the bottom of page 2. That's it. Raise it up a little, please. Move it up. • Q.: It is a document issued by the Command of the 283rd Brigade, number 03-358-41/95, dated 7 June 1995, and entitled "Opinion and Approval of the Division for Suggestions and Appointments Listed." (15)This document -- JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Petrusic, excuse me for interrupting you. Perhaps I'm lost, but the references that you gave us regarding this document, 57B, do not seem to correspond, because I see it is a document dated the 8th of June and you said it was dated the 7th of (20)June. So I don't know. Are we talking about the same document, 57B? MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Yes, it is document 57B. However, the document which the Defence would like to comment on is to be found on page 2, at the bottom of page 2, where we see the number of the document and the date. (25)
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Okay. Very well. So we can see
MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] The number D57 applies to the order number 03-358-41/95, dated the 7th of June, 1995. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well. Thank you for (5)clearing that up. You may continue. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Mr. Usher, would you please turn to the next page of that document. • Q.: General, this document gives a proposal for the composition of a certain unit. I would like to avoid making any comments, so could you (10)tell us what this document is about?
• A.: Within the framework of the elaboration of the establishment for
the Command and units of the 28th Division in Srebrenica and Zepa, the
Commander of one of the units of the 28th Division -- in this case we are
talking about the 283rd Eastern Bosnian Light Brigade -- is conveying his
(15)opinion and approval for the proposed establishment and appointments in
the Brigade Command.
It can clearly be seen from this document that the Commander of
the brigade is fully replenishing all the bodies in the Command, all his
assistants. And within the framework of the bodies of the Brigade
(20)Command, he is filling in all the vacancies envisaged by establishment,
starting from the highest to the lowest-level officers.
The document also shows that this Brigade Command has 22 officers
or staff members as a whole. That is a peacetime structure, the kind of
structure envisaged in the former Yugoslav People's Army. If the Command
(25)of this brigade - and also this applies to other brigades as well - has so
• Q.: When talking about this particular military unit, can it be said (5)that it is a fully-established military unit? • A.: Yes, fully established in terms of the Command. And I also believe that appointments were made in lower-level units of this brigade. I am referring to battalion commands, to the lowest-level units, and that is a platoon. (10) • Q.: According to this structure, how many soldiers could this unit have according to establishment? • A.: We will later see that this division -- and this is a very concrete example showing that the 28th Division of the army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was structured in every respect in the same (15)way in which units of the same level were structured in the former Yugoslav People's Army. The divisions in the former Yugoslav People's Army, consisting of Light Brigades, numbered between 6.000 to 10.000 men, which meant that every brigade within this division could have had between 1.000 and 1.800 men. (20) MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] The next exhibit is D59. And would you prepare all the exhibits as far as D67, please.
• Q.: So we're now talking about D59. This order was issued by the
General Staff of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The number is 1/825-84,
dated the 17th of June, 1995. It was issued by the Chief of Staff of the
(25)2nd Corps, Sulejman Budakovic.
• A.: Clearly all preparations for the spring offensive by the army for the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina were prepared, the aim of the offensive (5)being to liberate the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This order addressed to the Command of the 28th Division was issued by the 2nd Corps of the army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And the Command of the 2nd Corps is ordering the Command of the 28th Division to carry out all preparations for offensive combat operations with the aim of (10)liberating the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to stretch out and inflict casualties on aggressor forces whereby it will be assisting the BiH army forces engaging in operations in the area of Sarajevo, which means that the spring offensive is well underway in the territory of Sarajevo against units of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. (15)The Commander of the 2nd Corps of the BH army further warns the Command of the 28th Division that it should realistically plan tasks which will be certain of success. We have already seen, and we will see later on, that the Command of the 28th Division and its units did indeed participate in the execution of offensive actions from the direction of (20)Tuzla towards Srebrenica and Zvornik, carrying out a variety of combat operations in order to stretch out the forces of the Drina Corps. And this document is signed by the Chief of Staff of the 2nd Corps, General Budakovic. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] The next exhibit is D60. (25)
• Q.: It is an order of the Command of the 28th Division, number
• A.: The 14th of June, 1995, is the day prior to the beginning of an
offensive by the forces of the 2nd Corps of the army of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The Command of the 28th Division is well aware of that
because it had already received orders and information to that effect and
(25)a whole series of orders regarding action that needed to be taken in
MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] The next exhibit is D61. • Q.: It is a brief report of the 285th Brigade from Zepa. The number (10)is 08-21-208/95, dated the 23rd of June, 1995, addressed to the General Staff of the army in Kakanj, attention Brigadier-General Enver Hadzihasanovic, and I shall quote: "Yesterday, on the 22nd of June, 1995, at 430 hours, a group of 20 men was crushed which had illegally set off towards Kladanj from our (15)area of responsibility and in the area of Han Pogledi, on the road between Han Pijesak and Vlasenica. One wounded managed to escape and reach our positions at Kupusna. Regarding the fate of the others, nothing is known. These are mostly persons who, before the war, lived in Vlasenica municipality. Signed, PK for Security, Salih Hasanovic." (20)Reading this report, does it mean that certain persons, in this case from the safe area of Srebrenica, are continuing to cross towards Tuzla and Kladanj?
• A.: Regardless of the fact that offensive operations are under way
from Tuzla and Kladanj, and regardless of the fact that the 28th Division
(25)is actively participating in that offensive, there still exists a problem
MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] The next exhibit is 62. • Q.: It is a report of the Command of the 2nd Corps, number 02/8-01-998, dated the 27th of June, 1995. It is dispatched to the Command of the 28th Division, and I quote: (10)"In the morning hours of the 26th of June, 1995, our forces from the Srebrenica area attacked and set the village of Visnjica on fire. According to information that has yet to be confirmed, Chetniks suffered civilian casualties." The village of Visnjica in the materials used so far is (15)mentioned. What happened on the 26th of June, 1995? You can also point things out on the map.
• A.: The village of Visnjica is deep inside the territory of the Milici
municipality. I see that it is deep behind the lines of the Milici
Brigade, which is in a defensive position against Srebrenica. This
(20)village is, in fact, on the axis towards the Han Pijesak municipality.
That morning, on the 26th of June, from the safe area of
Srebrenica and Zepa and into the area of Radava, which is north to the
Zepa safe area, extremely strong sabotage forces were infiltrated into
that area along two axes.
(25)The first axis was towards the village of Visnjica, and on that
• Q.: In this report, we are still dealing with Exhibit 62, it's stated (10)that "At 1421 hours it has been reported that our forces had carried out an attack in the Krivaca area." When you talk about the attack on the Main Staff Command in Han Pijesak, is that the axis that you're talking about? • A.: Yes. This is the axis to the east of the area where the Main (15)Staff in fact was deployed. • Q.: On page 2 of this report, it is said that: "From the communications centre in Pjenovac, we were informed that our forces had carried out an ambush in an unknown, unidentified terrain, destroying three aggressor soldiers." These are the young soldiers. That, then, (20)would be the site and the event that you have just described.
• A.: Yes. The communications centre in Pjenovac is mentioned here; it
is a centre in the local community to the west of Han Pijesak, 12
kilometres away, in the direction of Olovo. This is where the young
soldiers were deployed, the young soldiers who were undergoing training at
(25)the time.
(5) • Q.: Thank you. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Our next exhibit is number 63B.
• Q.: This is a document issued by the General Staff of the BH army, and
the number is 1/825-564, dated the 28th of June, 1995, and it is sent to
the 2nd Corps Command. I quote:
(10)"Several members of the BH army who had deserted from the
territory of Srebrenica were moving along the march route Srebrenica,
Zepa, Radava, Veliki Dzep, Makote, Donja Medja, Visocnik, Pjenovac,
Nevacka, Rjecice, Donja Brdo, Sokoline, and along the Jezernica River to
the tunnel in Kladanj, and along the route they did not notice any Chetnik
(15)formations or v/p. According to their testimony, there are no elite
forces or larger military formations around Srebrenica. More than 50 per
cent of the trenches are empty, and the lines are manned mostly by old
men.
"On the Han Pijesak-Sarajevo road, on the 21st and the 22nd of
(20)June, 1995, they noticed very intensive traffic in both directions. In
the night from the 21st to the 22nd of June, 1995, they noticed a column
consisting of 12 trailer-trucks covered with canvas escorted by military
and civilian police, escorting large cargo heading towards Sarajevo.
Signed, Brigadier-General Enver Hadzihasanovic."
(25)General, the time is the 28th of June, 1995. According to the
• A.: I would like to say something about the axis that you just
mentioned from this document, referring to the people who had illegally
(5)left the safe area. This is a route, in fact it is a corridor, I would
call it, that the forces of the 28th Division had already established
towards Kladanj not only for the purpose of illegal desertion of the safe
areas but for the purpose of planned transfer of forces towards Tuzla and
Kladanj. Of course these men, as they moved from Srebrenica and Zepa
(10)towards Kladanj, they reconnoitred the area and they noticed many things
that were of interest for the Command of the 24th Division in Kladanj.
I'm primarily referring to the information about the military forces,
information about the army of Republika Srpska.
This document, among other things, mentions the situation and the
(15)positions of the VRS around Srebrenica. It is stated that more than
50 per cent of the trenches are empty and that the personnel that is
there, that these are mostly old men. This was indeed the fact.
Bearing in mind the situation of the Drina Corps at the time, and
in light of the spring offensive that was under way from the direction of
(20)Tuzla and Kladanj towards the area of responsibility of the Corps, and
bearing in mind everything that was happening inside the responsibility of
the Corps, I mean the Sabotage and Terrorist Units, the Command of the
Drina Corps and its subordinates units did not have any possibility to
allocate any elite forces, to deploy them around Srebrenica. They were
(25)unable to deploy any units there because we were fully engaged in the
• Q.: In this report, mention is made of a column of trailer trucks covered in canvas that were heading towards Sarajevo. So this road to Sarajevo, is it in the same direction or in the opposite direction in (10)relation to the safe areas both of Srebrenica and Zepa? • A.: This route is to the west of the safe area of Srebrenica and the safe area of Zepa. It is the Vlasenica-Han Pijesak-Sokolac-Sarajevo road. I really don't know what the cargo in question was. It is possible that it was a military transport for the purposes of the Sarajevo and (15)Romanija Corps, which was at the time defending itself and the spring offensive against it had already been launched. This cargo, this transport, was probably organised by the VRS, the Main Staff of the VRS. • Q.: So this road is, in fact, going in the opposite direction from the Srebrenica zone. (20) • A.: That road that I had just mentioned and you quoted yourself is indeed leading away from the safe areas of Srebrenica and Zepa, to the west, as I have said. So this is Srebrenica, and the road goes to the west of the safe area, Vlasenica, Han Pijesak, Sokolac, and then on to Sarajevo. (25)
• Q.: Thank you.
• Q.: This is a document from the 28th Division Command, and number is 08-21-244/95 [sic], issued on the 28th of June, 1995, to the 2nd Corps (5)Command. This is a combat report. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Petrusic, excuse me for interrupting you, but I think that the document you have mentioned has been marked 65. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] The document is 64B and A, the (10)English version being 64A, and the number on the document is 01-148/95. I'm comparing both language versions and they coincide. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well. I have just received 64, but I have here document 65, which bears the same number that you can see on page 31, line 13 of the transcript. Something has gone (15)wrong, I think. So you are now going to comment on document number 64, are you? MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Yes. Yes, precisely so, Your Honour. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes. But the document I see (20)here has a reference number 0-148/95 [sic], it is not the same number as we see on page 31, line 13 of the transcript. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Very well, Mr. President. We will withdraw this document for the time being. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well. (25)
MR. PETRUSIC:
[Int.] So we'll go on now to document 65.
THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter misspoke with the numbers. This is the reason for the error in the transcript, that is all. (5) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] I think there was an error in the translation. So please continue with your work, Mr. Petrusic. I apologise. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Mr. President, I apologise. My colleague Mr. Visnjic has just informed me that something's wrong with (10)General Krstic or that he has some problems. I don't know whether we should continue or request a short break at this point. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] General Krstic, do you wish to notify the Chamber of something? Do you need a break? • A.: Your Honours, altogether the situation is not too bad, but I have (15)just felt a sharp pain, a phantom pain. I hope it will pass quickly if we have a break at this point. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Twenty-minute break. --- Recess taken at 11.55 a.m. --- On resuming at 12.16 a.m. (20) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] General Krstic, are you feeling better?
THE WITNESS:
[Int.] I do apologise for asking for this
short break. These are problems that I'm having constantly, I'm afraid.
Sometimes the pain is strong; sometimes it's not so strong. But just now
(25)it was really bad. It's better now. Thank you.
MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Thank you very much. Thank you, (5)Mr. President. So we are now on document 65. This document exists in the English translation too. • Q.: It is the document bearing the number 08-21-244/95, dated the 28th of June, 1995, issued by the 285th Brigade from Zepa to the Command of the 28th Division in Srebrenica. (10)General, could you please describe the events that are referred to in this document?
• A.: This is a report submitted by the Commander of the 285th Eastern
Bosnia Light Brigade from Zepa which is dispatched to the Command of the
2nd Corps in Tuzla, to the Chief of Staff of the 2nd Corps, and that's
(15)General Budakovic; and to the Chief of Staff of the 28th Division in
Srebrenica, attention of Major Ramiz Becirevic.
I say the 285th Brigade because previously the title of this
brigade, according to the establishment, was the 1st Zepa Brigade. But
after the reorganisation and the renaming of the units in the 8th
(20)Operative Group, which became the 28th Division, this brigade from Zepa
was given the establishment number 285th Eastern Bosnia Light Brigade.
At the beginning of this document or, rather, the report, the
Commander of the 285th Brigade refers to the order of the Deputy Commander
of the 28th Division in Srebrenica. The question is why isn't he
(25)referring to the Commander of the 28th Division. As is known, General
• Q.: General, if you'll excuse me for a moment. Do we have nine sabotage terrorist groups which have been infiltrated and are active in (15)the depth of the territory of the area of responsibility of the Corps? • A.: Yes, precisely. According to the order of the Brigade Commander, nine sabotage terrorist groups have been formed, ranging in strength from ten soldiers to the strength of a reinforced platoon. They are dispatched into the depth of the area of responsibility of the Drina Corps, to the (20)west of the safe areas of Srebrenica and Zepa. • Q.: We do not have to go through all the locations mentioned here and with which each of the groups was tasked. Do they report on their activities, and what kind of reports are we talking about? (25)
• A.: Yes. After the execution of the tasks assigned by the Commander
• Q.: All of those nine groups, were they acting simultaneously? Were they synchronised? • A.: Yes, they were acting in a synchronised manner and they were commanded and controlled from the command post in Zepa. They started (15)executing their missions at the same time. In the places where they were not sure of the success of their mission, they did not embark upon it at all. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] The next exhibit is number 66.
• Q.: Command of the 28th Division, number 04-113/95, dated 30th of
(20)June, 1995, sent to the Command of the 2nd Corps, Morale Section, and I
quote: "On our part, planned combat missions of sabotage character were
carried out in order to draw the aggressor forces away from the Sarajevo
theatre. On the order of the Deputy Commander of the 28th Division, dated
20th of June, 1995, our sabotage groups were infiltrated into the depth of
(25)the aggressor temporarily occupied territory. On the 23rd of June, 1995,
• A.: I have already said that all this was done, as far as the 28th Division was concerned, in accordance with the order of its Superior Commands in Sarajevo and Tuzla. All the activities that you mentioned, (15)and I would say quite a few many them that you didn't mention, were carried out deep inside the territory controlled by the Serbian side. For instance --
• Q.: If you will allow me, General, we may be thinking the same thing,
so I will continue with my quoting from the report.
(20)"On the 23rd of June, 1995, in the Koprivna area, in the location
of Bijelo Stijenje, the Sabotage Reconnaissance Group from the 282nd
Brigade liquidated three aggressor soldiers and seized one light
machine-gun, M72. On the 26th of June, 1995, in the depth of the enemy
territory in the territory of the Vlasenica and Han Pijesak
(25)municipalities, 20 to 40 kilometres deep, the members of the 28th Division
• A.: Yes, that is precisely the case. The village of Visnjica is an
obvious example of that. It is behind the positions of the Milici
(15)Brigade.
I would also like to say that all the operations launched both
from Srebrenica and from Zepa were coordinated and commanded by the
Command of the 28th Division. This simply encompassed the whole area
outside of the borders of the safe areas to the east of Srebrenica and to
(20)the west of Srebrenica and to the east of Zepa.
For instance, the case that happened in the area between Zeleni
Jadar in the Osmace village area. That's on the road Zeleni
Jadar-Osmace-Skelani. This is deep, deep behind the lines of the
Independent Skelani Battalion. And all the other cases are to the west
(25)behind the forces of the 1st Milici Brigade, which was engaged in the
• Q.: It is a rather long report. I would not -- I do not propose to go through it and read it and comment it, but please comment on the (5)following: This report mentions the existence of construction machinery in the vicinity of the Caus elevation. This construction machinery and the construction works, were they carried out by members of the Drina Corps or were they carried out by the forces of the 28th Division, using their machinery? (10)
• A.: These works were carried out by the Drina Corps, a company -- a
bridge construction company from an Engineer Battalion located in Konjevic
Polje. This company, from mid-May until the end of June, was engaged
in -- on the axis from the village of Sase to Pribicevac, and this is
where the facility Caus is located. It is, in fact, to the north of this
(15)road.
The construction machinery was deployed there in order to further
fortify the positions of the Bratunac Brigade. Why would it be engaged on
any other tasks? If an attack is planned, then you do not fortify your
firing positions or not to the extent which goes beyond what is
(20)necessary. In addition, this road and bridge construction company was
carrying out road repairs from Sase to Pribicevac and to Zeleni Jadar.
This was a macadam road which was in a bad state of repair, and it was
required to be repaired in order to be able to supply the lines in that
part of the front more easily, I mean the Bratunac Brigade and the
(25)Independent Skelani Battalion.
• Q.: It is a document of the Command of the 28th Division, number is 04-114/95, dated 30th of June, 1995. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Petrusic, I think that this (5)number is not correct, I think. The number is 01 and not 04, I think. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Mr. President, it was a typing error or, rather, a translation error. The original version, in the B/C/S version it's 04, so that the English version needs to be corrected from 01 to 04. Thank you. (10) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, we take note of the discrepancy in the numbering of the B/C/S document and the English translation of the document. I was reading the document in English and that's how I noticed. Thank you. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] (15) • Q.: So the exhibit bears the number 04-114/95; the date is the 30th of June, 1995. General, this is an operative report submitted to the Command of the 2nd Corps in Tuzla, submitted by the Chief of Staff, Becirevic. Can you comment on this report, please? (20)
• A.: Yes. It is a report submitted by the Command of the 28th Division
to the Superior Command in Tuzla, to the information section, advising the
Superior Command in addition to the execution of combat missions by
members of the 28th Division; and also mentions problems involving food
and the preservation of the free territory.
(25)But they are resolute to defend the free territory and to give
• Q.: All right. Thank you very much. • A.: This report also provides detailed information about all this that (10)I was talking about as regards the execution of combat missions. If there is any need for me to comment in each case, I can do that. • Q.: Thank you, General. The report that we followed -- the reports that we've followed so far and covered as exhibits, these are all the reports that were submitted by the Muslim army, in other words, the 28th (15)Division, the 2nd Corps, and the Main Staff of the BH army. We covered the period through them from the end of 1994 until the 30th of June, 1995, and we have seen the activities carried out by the army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Our next topic that I would like to deal with would be your (20)knowledge about the activities of the Drina Corps. After your return in May 1995, primarily related to the operational documents and all those things that I assume your Deputy informed you about, and that's General Skocajic or Colonel Lazic, because if I'm not mistaken, in May when you came back, Colonel Lazic was actually on this post. (25)
• A.: Yes.
• A.: If I may just briefly. • Q.: No, please allow me. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] I would like document 123 to be (5)placed on the ELMO. • Q.: General, please go ahead with your explanation.
• A.: After my return to my post, in addition to all the other
information I had been given and that we have just discussed, I was also
briefed about the orders, decisions and combat orders, of the Drina Corps
(10)Command and the Main Staff of the army of the Republika Srpska.
In the course of the briefing, I was told that the army of the
Republika Srpska in the previous period did not plan any combat
operations; that the units of the Drina Corps remained on the positions
they held in 1994 both in the north-western portion of the front facing
(15)Tuzla, Zivinice, Kladanj, and Olovo, where the main body of troops of the
Drina Corps were deployed, and to the enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa too,
and partly facing Gorazde.
When it comes to active combat, there were no specific operations
launched by the Drina Corps except for the fact that some of the units had
(20)to pull out from some parts of the territory in order to conduct clean-up
operations and to fight against the sabotage terrorist units that we were
talking about.
These were the only activities that the Drina Corps units had
engaged in in the previous period, until the second half of May 1995.
(25)Which exhibit, please?
• A.: While commenting on a number of previous documents and everything that I was briefed about after my return to work, we noted that during the previous period of time there had been very -- there had been few overflights of helicopters from the area of Kladanj and Tuzla towards the (10)area of the safe havens of Zepa and Srebrenica. The Drina Corps Command undertook appropriate measures with the objective to prevent overflights of helicopters, because there was a ban which was in force at that time; and to prevent not only overflights but also to try and shoot them down, because we knew, we had information, as (15)we have already seen from previous documents, that the helicopters in question were often used to transport weapons and ammunition whereby the units of the 28th Division were additionally armed and reinforced. One such order was the command which was issued by the Drina Corps Command, which you have just mentioned. The Drina Corps Command in this (20)document issued assignments to its subordinate units, the subordinate units which were in charge of the areas which were overflown by the helicopter.
• Q.: My colleague, Mr. Visnjic, has drawn my attention to an
inconsistency in the transcript. Let us clarify the issue.
(25)Were there several overflights or were there many overflights?
• Q.: Thank you. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Our next document is document 124. • Q.: This is an order issued by the Drina Corps Command, number 08/8-5, (5)date the 7th of February, 1995. The order was issued by the Deputy Commander, General-Major Milutin Skocajic. This order, was it issued to the subordinate units, and did it relate to the same topic as the previous order we have just seen? • A.: Yes. This order followed immediately the order which was also (10)issued by the Drina Corps Command and which referred to the overflights and landing of the helicopter. The document was signed by General-Major Milutin Skocajic, who was replacing me at the time, who was acting on my behalf, who was actually the Deputy Commander at that time. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Harmon, is there a problem? (15) MR. HARMON: I was trying to communicate with the registrar. We don't have a copy of Exhibit 124. I now have one. Thank you. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Okay. Thank you. MR. HARMON: Pardon me for interrupting, General Krstic. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Petrusic, you may (20)continue now. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] So our next exhibit is document number 125.
• Q.: This document contains an order issued by the Drina Corps Command
again which bears the number 08/8-13 and is dated the 18th of February,
(25)1995. The order was issued by General-Major Milutin Skocajic as Deputy
• A.: Yes, I can do that. The order is of the same or similar contents as the previous documents that we have seen with one exception. This time (5)it is addressed also to the units which are deployed towards the area of Tuzla and Kladanj; namely, the Zvornik and the Vlasenica Brigades; then the Bratunac Brigade situated near Srebrenica, the Milici Brigade also situated in the vicinity of Srebrenica, and also to the Independent Battalion of Skelani. The order was also issued to the Command of the (10)Pribicevac Tactical Group. The difference here is that for the first time we can see that helicopters are landing in Srebrenica. They're flying from the direction of Tuzla and Zivinice, overflying the positions of the Zvornik and Bircani Brigade, and further down into the depth of our area of responsibility and (15)landing eventually in Srebrenica. Whereas previous landing of helicopters, when it comes to the 28th Division in general, mostly took place in the area of Zepa or in the wider area of Zepa from where the equipment and the cargo which was carried by those helicopters were distributed towards Srebrenica. (20)The document, again, is signed by the Commanding Officer Deputy, General-Major Milutin Skocajic. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Our next exhibit is document number 126.
• Q.: The document is issued by the Drina Corps Command and bears number
(25)08/8-15, dated 25th of February, 1995.
• A.: The contents of this document are similar to the contents of the (10)previous orders. It is the same time of the year, that is, the month of February 1995, during which period of time we had a great number of overflights and landing of helicopters. This particular order was sent to all subordinate units of the Drina Corps. As I have already stated while commenting upon one of the (15)previous documents, the assignment was given also to the units which were deployed towards the area of Kladanj, Tuzla, and Zivinice, as well as to the units which were deployed as a defence of the lines around the area of Srebrenica. So we have the same case again. • Q.: Your forces which sighted those overflights and landings, were (20)they successful in shooting down any of such helicopters and getting hold of any of the cargo they may have carried? What kind of information do you have to that effect?
• A.: Overflights and landing of helicopters in safe areas mostly
occurred during night-time and the visibility was relatively bad. When I
(25)say "relatively bad," I'm referring mainly to the use of anti-aircraft
• Q.: Thank you, General. (10) MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Mr. President, if I have correctly understood your decision, we were supposed to have one additional break today, three breaks in total. If that is the case, I should like to suggest a break at this point, bearing the mind the fact that we are supposed to go on until 2.00. (15) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Petrusic. I was going to suggest a 10-minute break. I hope it will be sufficient for us to have some rest, which will leave us with 40 minutes of work, more or less. Ten-minute break. --- Recess taken at 1.05 p.m. (20) --- On resuming at 1.15 p.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Petrusic, you may continue. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Thank you, Mr. President. Exhibit number 114.
• Q.: The exhibit contains an order issued by the Drina Corps Command
(25)and bears the number 04/38-3 (correction 2), and is dated the 19th of
• A.: First of all, this order was issued while I was still undergoing (5)treatment, that is, in the month of February. It is, in all aspects, appropriate, bearing in mind the situation in which the Drina Corps had found themselves, and not only the Drina Corps but the VRS in general. The time frame is the period of preparations for an offensive by the BH army, whose objective at the time was to liberate the entire (10)territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It follows from the text of this order that only those measures whose objective was the defence of the existing positions were ordered. So I have to stress that it was indeed in the spirit of the doctrine of the VRS. (15) • Q.: Is this order also in the spirit of the agreement which was signed at the time, the agreement on the cessation of hostilities? • A.: You're right. The order is in the spirit of the agreement on cessation of hostilities which was still in force at the time. However, because of its knowledge about the preparations for the spring offensive, (20)the Corps Command had to react in this way. No combat operations were being prepared. They were merely reinforcing and fortifying the existing positions and forces which were deployed in the north-western area of its area of responsibility and also fortifying the positions of the forces which were deployed in the direction of the enclaves. (25)
MR. PETRUSIC:
[Int.] Next document is Exhibit
• Q.: This document was issued by the Drina Corps Command and bears the number 04/58-1, and is dated 20th of February, 1995. The order was issued to the subordinate units by the Commander of the Corps. (5)Could you tell us something about this particular order, General, especially in view of the fact that it is labelled as "urgent," which is followed by the following text: "Control of the territory and prevention of the Muslim groups' movements through the Corps' zone of responsibility." (10) • A.: Yes, this order was issued for the purpose of controlling the territory and preventing movements of the BH army forces through the area of responsibility of the Corps. • Q.: Why urgent?
• A.: Well, on the basis of the intelligence data which was at the
(15)disposal of the Command of the Drina Corps at the time and in view of the
fact that at that time from the direction of Srebrenica and Zepa towards
Kladanj and Tuzla, there was a number of infiltrations through the area of
responsibility of the Corps. The infiltrations consisted of relatively
strong forces whose objective was, first of all, to supply the units with
(20)weapons and ammunition from Tuzla and Kladanj.
I'm quoting: "There is unchecked information that a group of
20 Muslim policemen will start from Srebrenica towards Tuzla on the
21st of February, 1995, allegedly to provide uniforms and official
identity documents."
(25)The document further states the route that was supposed to be
• Q.: The order was issued to the Zvornik and Vlasenica Brigades, to the
2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade, to the Milici Brigade, also to the
(15)Bircanska and Bratunacka Brigades, to the 5th Engineer Battalion, as well
as the Independent Skelani Battalion. So this order was actually a
command which was issued to the said units.
In paragraph 2 of this order we can read the following: "Brigades
will organise control of the territory with the help of the Ministry of
(20)Home Affairs of the Serb Republic in the depth of the territory."
My question is as follows: In the heading of the order, we do not
have mentioned that the order is also addressed to the Ministry of the
Interior; however, in the body of the document itself, in the text, we can
read that the subordinate units will carry out the task together with the
(25)MUP.
• Q.: Their subordinate command being the Ministry of the Interior. (10) • A.: Yes, the Ministry of the Interior of the Republika Srpska, and also the Centre of Security Services in Zvornik, which had the territory in question under its jurisdiction. Because mention is made here of cooperation and not orders that would have been issued to the MUP. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] The next exhibit that the Defence (15)wishes to discuss is Exhibit 116. • Q.: This is an order again issued by the Drina Corps Command; it bears number 04/62-1 and the date is 28th of February, 1995; the order is issued to all subordinate units. General, could you explain to us what the essence of this document (20)is?
• A.: Well, in essence, this document or, rather, this order is that a
certain number of measures need to be undertaken after what had occurred
on one portion of the terrain of the Milici Brigade, which was engaged
towards Srebrenica. There had been an attack in that area by the members
(25)of the 28th Division, and the area in question is the area of Ravno and
MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] The next document is 117. (10) • Q.: Issued by the Command of the Drina Corps, the number is 04/63-2, dated the 1st of March, 1995, to the Command of the Bircanska and Milici Brigades. Could you please comment on this order for us, General?
• A.: This order was written on the basis of the order issued by the
(15)Main Staff of the army of Republika Srpska relating to the expected spring
offensive by the forces of the BH army; and among other things, the
expectation is that the already signed ceasefire will not be respected and
that the offensive will be launched even before the expiry of the signed
ceasefire agreement. Most probably the offensive will begin towards the
(20)area of responsibility of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and partly the area
of the Drina Corps.
This order is addressed to the 1st Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade
and the Milici Light Infantry Brigade telling them what they should do to
replace the units that had been holding positions outside their areas of
(25)responsibility, specifically towards Kladanj; and that the Bratunci
• Q.: Excuse me. But my question is: Because we come across the 65th (10)Protective Motorised Platoon for the first time, could you explain to us what kind of unit that was, and what are the positions held by this 65th Motorised Platoon? • A.: It is, in fact, an infantry battalion which, from the very outbreak of the conflict, was deployed towards Zepa; it is a combat unit (15)consisting of mostly elderly people. They would defend the areas between Han Pijesak and Zepa, which means west of Zepa. It says here in specific terms that the Milici Brigade should establish contact and cooperate with these forces when controlling and covering the area between Srebrenica and Zepa, as far as that is (20)possible. • Q.: So this 65th Protective Motorised Regiment consists of two battalions. One is this infantry battalion which should cover that area.
• A.: According to establishment, as far as I can remember, the 65th
Motorised Regiment, in addition to the military police and mechanised
(25)platoon, had two infantry battalions. The first mostly consisted of
(5) • Q.: In this order there is reference to the cessation of hostilities for a period of four months. Were you aware, as this is dated the 1st of March, 1995, were you aware of the agreement signed by the two warring parties about a four-month cessation of hostilities? • A.: I knew in general terms but not about any particular details. (10) MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Document 118 is an order of the Drina Corps, number 04/95-1, dated the 18th of March, 1995. It is marked "extremely urgent," heading, "Protection of Property (Factories) in Zeleni Jadar", addressed to the Command of the Tactical Group Pribicevac, the 1st Bratunac, and the Independent Skelani Battalion, signed by the (15)Deputy Corps Commander, Major-General Milutin Skocajic. What kind of order is this in this particular case as mention is made of the Zeleni Jadar factory in it?
• A.: When talking about the factory Zeleni Jadar, it should be noted
that in Zeleni Jadar there was and still is a furniture factory. In those
(20)days, it was one of the most up-to-date factories manufacturing furniture
in the former Yugoslavia as far as of the products it was manufacturing
and selling are concerned.
After the establishment of the borders of the safe area of
Srebrenica, that is, after the UN resolution relating to Srebrenica, this
(25)factory remained within the territory of Republika Srpska. The Muslim
• Q.: Do you have any knowledge as to whether UNPROFOR representatives
(25)were informed that the equipment and property and furniture was being
• A.: Well, it is stated in this order, the order addressed to the units I have named, that they should carry out this task with the assistance of UNPROFOR, and if that does not produce results, to caution the UNPROFOR (5)forces that we would take measures to prevent such looting of the factory by force. • Q.: This order is issued to the Command of the Tactical Group Pribicevac. This is the first time we come across this phrase. Could you tell us what the Pribicevac Tactical Group stands for? (10) • A.: The Pribicevac Tactical Group is a group, a combat group. I say "combat group." I am speaking in accordance with the combat rules of the former Yugoslav People's Army, and in most cases, its strength was between two battalions to a reinforced brigade in strength. After the completion of the operation of 1993, that is, before the (15)Security Council declared Srebrenica a safe area, this Tactical Group was formed in that area, consisting of the Bratunac Brigade and the Skelani Independent Battalion, and as such, it existed until the end of the operation Krivaja 95. • Q.: So it secured the borders. (20) • A.: Yes. Actually, until the beginning of the implementation of Operation Krivaja 95, they held positions around the safe area, that is, east of the safe area, and that is Bratunac, the village of Sase, Pribicevac, Zeleni Jadar, and the feature Jasinovo.
MR. PETRUSIC:
[Int.] The next exhibit is 119, issued by
(25)the Command of the Drina Corps on the 20th of March, 1995. It doesn't
(10) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] I'm sorry for interrupting you, Mr. Petrusic. Perhaps it would be advisable to put the document on the ELMO, because then the interpreters will be able to follow on the ELMO. Thank you, and I apologise for interrupting you. The English version. (15) THE INTERPRETER: I'm afraid the translation is not quite identical with the original. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Please continue, Mr. Petrusic.
MR. PETRUSIC:
[Int.] So: "We cannot tolerate Muslim
formations obstinately leaving the enclave and attacking areas out of the
(20)enclave borders. In the interests of peace, we think you should do
something, and you certainly can do something, so that the Muslims would
be in the enclave protected by your units. Otherwise, I will be forced to
order that Muslim formations which are outside the enclave be removed from
our territory by force.
(25)"Please inform me through Colonel Vukota Vukovic of the time of
• A.: This letter is the product, I would say, of what we have been (10)discussing so far with respect to the combat operations by the 28th Division outside the limits of the safe area. However, it relates more to the capture of a part of the area outside the borders of the safe area such as Podravanje and Zeleni Jadar, and that is why the Corps Commander is also addressing himself to UNPROFOR forces in Srebrenica and requesting (15)that the Muslim forces go back to within the borders of the safe area. • Q.: This letter is sent via Captain Nikolic. Is he the liaison officer for UNPROFOR forces?
• A.: Captain Nikolic, like some other officers in the Drina Corps
depending on the area of responsibility we were talking about, was the
(20)liaison officer of the Main Staff in the area of Srebrenica, or rather in
Bratunac. The liaison officer is nominated by the Main Staff of the army
of Republika Srpska and not by the Corps Commander.
So it says clearly here that this request should be carried out
through the involvement of Colonel Vukovic, who was in fact the Commander
(25)of the Pribicevac Tactical Group. So his task is to assist in every way
• Q.: Talking about the liaison officer, did the Drina Corps have a (5)liaison officer? • A.: The Drina Corps did not have a liaison officer. It had one that was appointed from amongst its members, but I said that he was appointed by the Main Staff. • Q.: So Captain Nikolic is from the Bratunac Brigade, the Bratunac (10)Brigade is part of the Drina Corps -- • A.: Yes. • Q.: -- and the personality, the individual himself, is appointed by the Main Staff. • A.: Yes. Let me add that Captain Nikolic was Assistant Commander for (15)Intelligence and Security of the Bratunac Brigade, and in addition to those duties, he was also a liaison officer of the Main Staff liasing with UNPROFOR, because with respect to relations and cooperation with UNPROFOR, everything went through the Main Staff. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Document 86, please. (20)
• Q.: So finally we have document 86, issued by the Command of the 1st
Bratunac Brigade. The number is 03/253-77, dated the 17th of June, 1995,
and it is a regular battle report submitted to the Command of the Drina
Corps.
In this report, General, the Command of the Bratunac Brigade is
(25)informing you that large numbers of enemy soldiers have been observed
• A.: Yes. This was a time when the offensive was already ongoing by the forces of the 2nd Corps of the BH army from the direction of Tuzla, towards Zvornik and Srebrenica. And on the basis of orders received (5)previously, the Command of the 28th Division took steps to prepare its forces for participation in this offensive. Also, the Brigade Commander informs the Superior Command that from those positions fire is being continuously opened and that those forces are provoking his brigade forces. (10) MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Mr. President, the Defence would thereby complete today's hearing. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very good, Mr. Petrusic. We agree to adjourn for today. Let me remind you that tomorrow we will begin according to the new timetable for our hearings, which means at 9.20, (15)finishing at 3.00 p.m., with two breaks. We'll try to stick to this timetable, but in view of General Krstic's problems, we will see. In any event, we will meet again tomorrow at 9.20. --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.04 p.m., to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 18th day of (20)October, 2000, at 9.20 a.m. |
