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/ Colormap • Page 6090 • {1/75} (1)Wednesday, 18 October 2000 [Open session] [The witness entered court] [The witness takes the stand] (5) --- Upon commencing at 9.25 a.m.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Good morning, ladies and
gentlemen; good morning to the technical booth, the interpreters, legal
assistants, registrar; good morning, counsel for the Prosecution, counsel
for Defence; good morning to you, General Krstic.
(10)We are five minutes late to begin our hearing today, but we will
try and stick to the new timetable today and in the following days as
well, of course, bearing in mind the health condition of General Krstic.
We will be working in blocks of one hour and a half with half-hour
breaks, and the last break will last one hour. The most important reason
(15)for this break was, actually this long break, the one-hour break, so that
we can all work and have lunch. So I should like to suggest the
following: Instead of having one hour and a half blocks of work, that we
should proceed with 45 minutes of work, which will enable General Krstic
to have more short breaks, and instead of having one-half-hour break, we
(20)will have two 15-minute breaks. So we will use the same timetable but
with a different length of breaks; that is to say, we will be working
until quarter past ten. Afterwards, we will have a 15-minute break, and
we will resume at 10.30. We will work until 11.15, which will be followed
by another 15-minute break, and the next block of work will start at half
(25)past eleven, and we will work until quarter past twelve. After that
MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Good morning, Mr. President; good (20)morning, Your Honours; good morning counsel for the Prosecution. The Defence should also like to bid good morning to everybody present in this courtroom.
WITNESS: RADISLAV KRSTIC
[Resumed] (25)
• EXAMINED by Mr. Petrusic:
• A.: After Srebrenica had been declared a safe area and after the boundaries of the safe area had been established, Zeleni Jadar, or to be more precise, one particular furniture factory located in Zeleni Jadar, remained outside the boundaries of the safe area; that is, it remained on (10)the territory of Republika Srpska. That is the territory which was under the Serb control, which can be clearly seen from this map when looking at the initial positions of the Drina Corps in the Krivaja 95 operation. I am referring to this axis here. I am pointing at the Zeleni Jadar locality. The positions in question are behind Zeleni Jadar facing (15)Srebrenica and further on the Bojna facilities. So these are the axes in question, and these are the forces deployed on their starting positions, so they were actually north of Zeleni Jadar. • Q.: Zeleni Jadar is therefore behind the red lines which indicate the positions of the Drina Corps forces, that is, the VRS? (20)
• A.: Yes, that is correct. The command of the armed formations of the
BiH army even after the boundaries of the protected areas had been
established, that is, those formations very often infiltrated themselves
in the factory, whether it was with a view of carrying preparations for
operations or to conduct operations from that particular locality. Very
(25)often, those formations took furniture and other fixtures from the
(15) • Q.: After the attack, or rather, at the time of the attack and those military operations, or perhaps sometime before that, were elite units grouped, elite units of the Drina Corps or the VRS, were they grouped in the area around Zeleni Jadar at the time of that operation?
• A.: First of all, I have to say that in view of the situation at the
(20)time and the period of time during which the VRS was acting, and also
because of the ever-present danger of a breakthrough of front lines in the
western part of the area of responsibility of the Drina Corps, that is,
from the direction of Tuzla, Kladanj, and Zivinice, the Drina Corps
command and the corps in general were not able to deploy any additional
(25)forces around the area of the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves, so that's one
• Q.: In one of your previous responses regarding this issue, you
indicated the area in question on the map, but technical conditions were
(25)not perfect, so I will try to clarify the issue through another question.
• A.: At the time Srebrenica was declared a safe area, those units were (5)indeed on their positions which they had held from before, that is, before Srebrenica had been declared a protected area. • Q.: General, you are referring to the north-western part of the theatre and to the military operations that were taking part at that time in the area of responsibility of the Drina Corps. Could you tell us what (10)was actually happening in the north-western part of your area of responsibility and what brigades and what units from your area of responsibility were engaged?
• A.: As part of the spring offensive of the BH army, on the 14th or,
actually, the 15th of June, 1995, forces of the 2nd Corps of the BH army
(15)launched an offensive that had been planned before. The offensive in
question was launched toward defensive lines of the Drina Corps, more
precisely, in the north-western area of the Drina Corps area of
responsibility.
The attack was carried out along two axes. The main body of
(20)troops of the BH army, of the 2nd Corps, were grouped along the
Tuzla-Zvornik axis, whereas the additional forces of the BH army were in
the area of Kladanj-Vlasenica, along the Kladanj-Vlasenica axis.
It was a synchronised attack, and it was directed against the
1st Bircanska Infantry Brigade and partially also against the 1st Zvornik
(25)Infantry Brigade but also against the positions of the 1st Vlasenica
• Q.: You don't have to use the map any more. (20) MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] I would now like to ask the usher to remove the map from the ELMO that's Prosecution Exhibit number 2, and to place Defence Exhibit 127 on the ELMO.
• Q.: So this is Exhibit 127, a report of the Drina Corps command,
number is 15-354/32, dated 15th of June, 1995. It is entitled "Report
(25)About the Combat Situation in the Drina Corps Area," and it is this
• A.: Yes. This is a report filed by the commander of the Drina Corps,
(5)General Zivanovic, to all his subordinate commanders within the corps.
This report shows that the Drina Corps Commander notifies his subordinate
commanders about the fact that the spring offensive of the BiH army is at
its peak, and that the forces of the Republika Srpska army managed in all
sections of the front to stop the forces of the BiH army, and in some
(10)cases, they created conditions for launching counter-attacks.
At the same time, he advises them that the BiH army has not ceased
with its attacks on the area of responsibility of the Drina Corps, and as
I have already stated, you can see that from this report, that an
offensive has been launched against the Drina Corps by the 2nd Corps of
(15)the BiH army. He further advises them that as part of this offensive
launched by the 2nd Corps, there is a simultaneous activity launched from
the safe areas of Srebrenica and Zepa against Drina Corps forces within
its area of responsibility. He also notifies them of the fact that the
forces of the 2nd Corps of the BiH army in the first stage of the
(20)operation, or rather, the offensive, did achieve some success, but that
the forces of the Drina Corps have managed to hold the offensive
successfully.
So the assessments of the Drina Corps Commander and of the
subordinate commands were correct, in fact, and the assessment was that
(25)the BiH army, or to be more specific, its 2nd Corps, would also be engaged
• Q.: Our next exhibit is Exhibit 88 issued by the Drina Corps command. Its number is 94/67-3 -- 94/76-3, dated 19th of June, 1995, issued by the (10)commander of the Corps, Major General Zivanovic. General, is this document in a way a result of the report, or how do you interpret the order issued as part of this document?
• A.: Precisely. This report is related to or deals with the initial
stages of the offensive launched by the 2nd Corps of the BiH army against
(15)the area of responsibility of the corps. In particular, in this report
the commander of the Drina Corps stresses and warns his subordinate
commanders about the fact that from the safe areas of Srebrenica and Zepa
and Gorazde, extremely strong forces are being infiltrated into the area
of responsibility of the Corps, more specifically, behind the forces that
(20)are engaged in the defence. He provides an example of that in the
direction of the Gorazde enclave when the forces of the
8th Division from Gorazde infiltrated their forces in behind the lines of
the 1st Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade, on which occasion they inflicted
enormous casualties on them.
(25)We have information that the forces of the 28th Division from
MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Document 89. This is a document (10)issued by the Command of the 1st Milici Brigade, and the number it bears is Roman numeral I/01-617-1. It is dated the 19th of June, 1995. It is signed by the Commander of the brigade, Captain First Class Milomir Nastic. The document is entitled: "The Activities of the Reconnaissance and Terrorist Groups of the Enemy, Intelligence Report." (15) • Q.: The Milici Brigade was around the area, the safe area of Srebrenica, and it was a subordinate brigade, brigade that was subordinate to the Drina Corps. I should like to ask you to comment on this document.
• A.: The Milici Brigade was engaged in the defence of the area west of
(20)the safe area of Srebrenica. This report was written by the Commander of
the Milici Brigade, and he sent it to all his subordinate units within the
brigade.
This report primarily deals with the activities of the
28th Division, which is carrying out reconnaissance and sabotage
(25)activities against the positions of his brigade and deep behind the lines
(10) • Q.: This is the 19th of June that we are talking about. What was the situation like in the north-western area of your corps' area of responsibility had it been stabilised? • A.: Yes. It is indeed the 19th of June, 1995, and as I have already said, the forces of the Drina Corps had managed to halt the offensive of (15)the 2nd Corps of the BH army to stabilise its defensives and to restore lost territory, restore control over the lost territory. The activities of the 28th Division continue uninterruptedly before the offensive and during the offensive. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] The next exhibit is Exhibit (20)number 90. This is a regular combat report of the Command of the 1st Bircani [Realtime transcript omitted "Bircani"] Brigade. The number is 03/1 -- sorry -- 03/1-691, dated the 21st of June, 1995. So it is a regular combat report to the Command of the Drina Corps, signed by Commander Colonel Svetozar Andric. (25)
• Q.: What is this report by Colonel Andric informing the Corps Command
MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, I apologise, but in the transcript it says the "1st Brigade" but not the "1st Bircani Brigade." (5) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well. We've corrected it now. It is indeed the document issued by the Command of the 1st Bircani Infantry Brigade. Thank you. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] • Q.: Please continue, General. (10)
• A.: The Command of the Drina Corps had correctly assessed that the
forces of the 2nd Corps of the BH army would not give up their intention
of re-launching the offensive or, rather, of continuing it. So on the
21st of June, once again along the Tuzla-Zvornik axis, they carried out
synchronised attacks against the positions of the 1st Bircani Brigade,
(15)partly the Vlasenica Brigade, and partly the Zvornik Brigade.
In this report, the Brigade Commander informs the Corps Command
that an attack has been launched, that the attack is an extremely powerful
one, that very large infantry units were engaged in the attack, of course,
supported by artillery and other logistic support. He also informs the
(20)Command of the Drina Corps that in this renewed offensive or, rather, the
continuation of the offensive, the forces of the 2nd Corps of the BH army,
in view of the circumstances, were extremely successful. After having in
the area of Kalesija, Bis, the territory of the Serbian municipality of
Osmaci, having formed a bridgehead on the Spreca River, they managed to
(25)gain control of the village of Vukovina, the village of Markovici, the
• Q.: That is fine, General. In the meantime, that is, during the period we were discussing and the events you described for us, where were you situated? (5) • A.: Throughout the duration of the operation, that is, from the 14th of June until the offensive was crushed on the 26th of June, I was within the area of responsibility of the 1st Bircani Brigade, that is, on the forward command post of this brigade in the village of Osmaci where, together with the other officers, and I have in mind in the first place (10)the commander of the 1st Bircani Brigade and the 1st Zvornik Brigade as well as of another officer from the commander of the Drina Corps, that is, Colonel Milanovic, I monitored the combat operations. Together with the commander of the 1st Bircani and 1st Zvornik Brigades, I undertook measures to halt the offensive of the 2nd Corps of the BiH army. (15) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Petrusic, would this be a good moment for the break? So please look at your watches now, and come back in a quarter of an hour, please. --- Recess taken at 10.16 a.m. --- On resuming at 10.31 a.m. (20) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Madam Registrar is not here yet, but I think we can still proceed. Mr. Petrusic. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Thank you, Mr. President. • Q.: General, you went back from the area of the Bircani Brigade to your command post in Vlasenica; is that correct? (25)
• A.: Yes.
• Q.: This exhibit is an interim combat report issued by the command of the 1st Bratunac Brigade, number 03-253-82/1, dated 23rd of June, 1995. (5)The document is signed by the commander, Colonel Vidoje Blagojevic. Did this interim combat report reach the command post in Vlasenica, and what was the issue that Colonel Blagojevic wanted to notify you of in this document? • A.: After I had come back to the command post, from the forward (10)command post of the 1st Bircani Brigade -- JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Visnjic, is there a problem? MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, there is a discrepancy in Exhibit 91A and 91B. I'm sure that it is a mistake in (15)translation. In the heading of the document 91B in the original, it is stated, "Command of the 1st," and then there is an abbreviation which means the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade. However, this acronym was translated into English the "1st Bircanska Light Infantry Brigade." It should be corrected. The brigade in question is actually the 1st Bratunac (20)Brigade which was commanded by Vidoje Blagojevic. I just wanted to draw your attention to this mistake in translation.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Thank you very much,
Mr. Visnjic. I have also noticed this discrepancy which will have to be
(25)corrected. Bircanska will have to become Bratunac, the 1st Bratunac
MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] • Q.: General, I should like to know whether you are familiar with this (5)report, and whether the command of the corps was notified of this report, and what the report is all about. • A.: After I had come back from the forward command post of the 1st Bircanska Brigade, that is from the area of Osmaci to the command post in Vlasenica, I was briefed on a number of documents of this kind, like this (10)combat report that we have here which was submitted by the commander of the 1st Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade. Throughout the time of this offensive, the 28th Division was very active towards our defensive lines in Srebrenica, around Srebrenica, and also by infiltrating themselves into the depth of our territory around the (15)enclave. As regards this particular report, the Commander of the 1st Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade is informing the Drina Corps Command about one particular operation which was carried out by the members of the 28th Division against his positions. In this report, he makes mention of (20)the losses he sustained in the operation. One soldier was killed, a member of his brigade, of a unit which was deployed in the area where this incident took place.
MR. PETRUSIC:
[Int.] Our next exhibit is document
number 92. This document is also a report of the Bratunac Brigade and
(25)bears the number 02/415-1, dated 24th of June, 1995. The document again
• Q.: General, these two reports follow one another day after day. Could you tell us something about the contents of this other document, document number 92, and what this document is all about. (10)
• A.: This document is another document in the series of reports to the
Drina Corps Command to its subordinate units whereby the Command of the
corps is informed of the activities of the 28th Division from Srebrenica.
The commander of this brigade is informing the Drina Corps Command
about the fact that in the past previous days, the 28th Division did not
(15)engage in major operations against the positions of his brigade. However,
he learned that from the headquarters, and he's probably referring to the
General Staff of the BH army, an order was issued to emphasise sabotage
and terrorist activities and to continue with the infiltration of such
groups, that is, to focus on infiltration activities, and that with such
(20)activities, the objective can be reached in the most efficient way while
incurring major losses within the enemy forces and causing panic amongst
the enemy forces both with the members of the Drina Corps units and also
amongst the population living in the area of responsibility of the Drina
Corps, that is, in the theatre of these operations.
(25)The Commander of the 1st Bratunac Brigade, in this report, gives a
(15) • Q.: This report and the previous report were sent at the time while the operation and combat activities were still ongoing in the north-western area of responsibility of the Drina Corps, that is, the area of responsibility of the Bircani Brigade. • A.: Yes. The forces of the 28th Division, in this period of time, (20)were conducting the assignments of the Skakavac operation, but they were also actively involved in these type of activities, cooperating with the forces acting from the direction of Tuzla. Those forces were attacking along the Tuzla-Zvornik axis towards the area of Podrinje and Srebrenica.
• Q.: You mentioned on several occasions, both today and yesterday, that
(25)Skakavac operation. What was the final objective of that operation?
• Q.: During that period of time and also before that, that is, during the combat activities around the area of Zeleni Jadar at the beginning of June, did you and your command engage in the preparations for the Krivaja 95 operation; and the activities that were going on around the area of the (15)Zeleni Jadar that were conducted by the members of the Drina Corps, were they some kind of introduction to the preparatory phase of the Krivaja 95 operation?
• A.: In view of the situation that the command of the Drina Corps found
itself in, as well as its units, and that was the period of the
(20)preparations for and implementation of the spring offensive against the
area of responsibility of the Drina Corps, and in view of the activities
of the 28th Division from safe areas, I wish to state with full
responsibility that in the command of the Drina Corps, no one in those
days, before those days and at that time, had any plan for an attack
(25)against Srebrenica.
MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] One more exhibit, please, D93. It is an interim combat report of the 1st Milici Light Infantry Brigade, (10)number 332-1684, dated the 26th of June, 1995. The report is from Milomir Nastic. • Q.: This interim combat report coincides with the period when the offensive was being thwarted in the northwestern part of the theatre of the area of responsibility of the Drina Corps. So, the date is the 26th (15)of June, 1995, and the report relates to the activities of enemy units engaged in from the safe area. Could you comment, please, and give us your interpretation of this combat report which was addressed to the command of the Drina Corps on the 26th of June. (20)
• A.: This is the period when the offensive was still ongoing and was
being repulsed, the offensive by the 2nd Corps of the BiH army. The 28th
Division, however, was still extremely active in sabotage and terrorist
activities in the rear of the lines of our units deployed towards
Srebrenica and Zepa.
(25)This report of the 26th of June in which the commander, or rather,
• Q.: After the offensive was crushed or, rather, at the end of combat
operations in the area of responsibility of the Bircani Brigade, did that
brigade and the Corps Command engage in certain activities to reclaim and
clean up the theatre in the areas of Osmaci and other places that you
(25)mentioned?
• Q.: Let us briefly comment further on this particular date, the 26th of June.
MR. PETRUSIC:
[Int.] Exhibit number 94, please. It is a
(25)regular combat report, number 03-253-86 of the 26th of June, 1995, signed
• Q.: In the heading of this document, we do not have the name of the brigade, but in view of the signatory, General, would this be a report of the Bratunac Brigade? (5) THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, Mr. President. Microphone. Microphone. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Excuse me. Is there a discrepancy again that you wish to attract our attention to? MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Yes, Mr. President. On the original (10)document the number is 03-253-86, but the translator said 03-253-85. So this last number differs between the original and the English text. But I think that the mistake is in the original, in view of the order in which the documents have been marked. So strictly speaking, the translation differs from the original. (15) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] So we will take note of it and make the correction. My translation that I received was that this was a Prosecution Exhibit. Is that correct? MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] No. No. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Never mind. But that was the (20)interpretation I received, and I was a bit confused. But please continue. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] • Q.: General, first of all, is this a document issued by the Bratunac Brigade? (25)
• A.: Yes. You can see that from the signature which is at the bottom
• Q.: Does this regular combat report indicate -- can it be concluded on its basis that the activities continue, that the enemy operations in the (5)area of the Zvornik Brigade, that they continue? • A.: Yes. In paragraph 1 of this report, the operations of the 28th Division against some parts of the positions of this brigade are discussed, so this is not the infiltration but the operations launched from the safe area against the positions of the brigade. (10)More specifically, he states the area, the section of the positions from which his forces came under an attack, that is to the north of Buljim. I apologise, of Buljim. • Q.: Were members of the 5th Engineer Battalion also engaged in this area? I mean the engineer battalion of the Drina Corps. (15)
• A.: In the area of responsibility of the Bratunac Brigade, or more
specifically, on its positions to the east of the safe area, mention is
made of the engagement of the forces of the 5th Engineer Battalion. I
have already spoken about the use of this battalion, explaining the
documents of the army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These
(20)were their reports in which they indicated that they had noticed the
construction machinery at work to the east of the enclave.
This Caus facility, more specifically, the positions of the
Bratunac Brigade, were fortified, or the fortifications were reinforced on
the Caus facility. As I said yesterday, there was no need to fortify your
(25)positions if you were planning an attack, or at least, not to such an
• Q.: I would now like to go on to the planning of the operation Krivaja (5)95. As you have already said on several occasions, you were aware of the Security Council resolution as regards the establishment of the safe areas of Srebrenica and Zepa. • A.: Yes, I was aware of the Security Council resolution establishing Srebrenica and Zepa as safe areas. (10) • Q.: You spoke about the demilitarisation agreement, and we really do not need to go back to that, but were the units of the Drina Corps that were deployed around the Srebrenica safe area in compliance with the Security Council UN resolution indicating that the safe areas should not be attacked? (15)
• A.: As far as I know, because I was absent for a longer period of time
after taking over the post of the Chief of Staff, and I did not spend a
long time in the Corps command even thereafter. There are no examples of
the 1st Bratunac and Milici Brigades and the independent Skelani Battalion
that were deployed around the safe area of Srebrenica, that they violated
(20)the UN Security Council resolution.
There are no examples so far of any -- not a single instance when
any of these units entered into that safe area. If there were some
activities launched from the front lines, from the defence lines, then it
was only carried out in response to the fire being opened by the 28th
(25)Division against their positions.
• Q.: The heading of this document indicates the following: Military postal code; and the number is 161-1; date, 14th of March, 1995; Milici; (5)and it is unsigned. You were aware of the military structure and organisation that existed within the zone of the Muslim forces. • A.: Yes, I was, primarily from the intelligence, the ones that I received either from the subordinate units or from the intelligence organ (10)of the Drina Corps command. • Q.: Was this -- the intelligence about their structure contained in this exhibit?
• A.: Yes. This is the intelligence, the data, but from the time period
when the forces of the BiH army in the safe areas of Srebrenica and Zepa
(15)were organised as part of the 8th Operative Group, from mid-1994 until the
May of 1995.
I spoke about the restructuring, the strong restructuring and the
reestablishment of the units of the 28th Division, and in this process,
they became larger. So this formation in the safe area had 5.000 -- had,
(20)I apologise, had five brigades.
At the time when the units of the BiH army in the safe areas were
organised as the 8th Operative Group, the 8th Operative Group had five
brigades, and all of them were deployed in the safe area of Srebrenica.
Also as part of the 8th Operative Group, in addition to the five brigades,
(25)there was also the independent battalion composed of the crack troops from
• Q.: According to your estimate, or rather, the estimate of the Drina (5)Corps command or the relevant organs, how many soldiers, active soldiers of military age were involved in these brigades? • A.: The data obtained from the intelligence organ of the 1st Milici Light Infantry Brigade referring to the strength of each of the brigades, I would say that they are indeed correct, so that we can draw the (10)conclusion that the 8th Operative Group at the time when it existed as the 8th Operative Group numbered about 6.000 soldiers. However, later when the 8th Operative Group was restructured as the 28th Division, their strength changed considerably so that each brigade had between 1.000 and 1.800 soldiers. (15) MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] General, I suggest we make a break now, and we can continue at 11.30. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, very well. Thank you very much. We are now going to have another 15-minute break. --- Recess taken at 11.15 a.m. (20) --- On resuming at 11.30 a.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Petrusic, you may continue. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Thank you, Mr. President.
• Q.: General, I should like to know something about the structure of
the weapons that the units which were concentrated in the protected area
(25)had. I'm referring to the units of the 28th Division or the 8th Operative
• A.: From this report, which among other things provides information
about the type of weapons which the units of the 28th Division had, were
armed with, one can see that the said units were armed with light infantry
(5)weapons or, rather, infantry weapons, which should also include weapons
for combat at close encounters, such as Zoljas and Osas, the hand-held
rocket launchers, then hand-held rocket launchers M57, then mortars of
60 millimetre calibre. They also had anti-aircraft weapons whose calibre
was 20 millimetres. One can see here that some heavy weapons were also
(10)used by this division. Mention is made of a howitzer which was concealed
or, rather, dug in somewhere inside the protected area of Srebrenica.
I should, however, stress that the units of the 8th Operative
Group, when it comes to their further organisation in terms of formations
according to establishment, were additionally armed, received additional
(15)weapons. And this is something that I spoke about yesterday and the day
before when I said that weapons were being brought into the area from the
direction of Tuzla and Kladanj.
On one occasion, I interpreted one of the documents of the
BH army, and I noted that they had 120 millimetre mortars as well. Those
(20)units were additionally armed with infantry weapons, as the units of the
28th Division were growing in strength. And the 8th Operative Group was
renamed 28th Division at the beginning of May 1995.
At that time, apart from the Division Command, it also had
headquarters units, staff units, and an independent battalion which
(25)consisted of elite units from that area. The division also had five --
• Q.: For the record, can we just conclude that there were five brigades altogether? • A.: In Srebrenica as part of the 8th Operative Group, there were five brigades during that period of time. Later on when the 8th Operative (15)Group was renamed 28th Division, there were five brigades in Srebrenica, plus one independent battalion, and one additional brigade which was located in Zepa. • Q.: Thank you. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] I should like to have the exhibit (20)number 33 put on the ELMO, please.
• Q.: We spoke about this particular exhibit yesterday, and I should
like to ask you to tell us briefly whether the information that you had,
that your command had obtained as regards the organisational structure of
the 8th Operative Group and later the 28th Division, so I'm referring both
(25)to the organisation of the unit and the types of weapons that they had, so
• A.: According to what we received from the intelligence department of (5)the 1st Milici Brigade and when we compared their report with this particular exhibit, it was obvious that the 8th Operative Group was organised as -- in a way described in this document that we have previously seen. So there were five brigades in Srebrenica, and there was one independent mountain battalion. The brigades are the 28th East (10)Bosnian Brigade, 281st East Bosnian Light Brigade, 282nd East Bosnian Light Brigade, and 283rd East Bosnian Light Brigade, 284th East Bosnian Light Brigade, and one independent battalion, mountain battalion. • Q.: General, could you tell us something about how you and the Drina Corps command came to the decision to plan the Krivaja 95 operation, and (15)how a decision was made to attack Srebrenica?
• A.: So far I have spoken about the intentions, objectives, and
specific measures that were undertaken in respect of the spring offensive
of the BiH army, the main objective being, let me repeat, the linking up
of the protected areas with the territory of Tuzla, Zivinice, and
(20)Kladanj.
However, what is far more important and what should be emphasised
is the fact that Srebrenica, like Zepa, were never really demilitarised.
There was a large amount of military-able men and troops that were
organised in five or six brigades. The brigades were constantly
(25)conducting combat operations against the positions of the Drina Corps area
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Petrusic. Mr. Visnjic, I'm sorry. MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, page 30, line 20, the word that we can see on the transcript is "Monday," and I don't think that (15)it was mentioned. The word should probably be "amongst" the civilian population. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, thank you, Mr. Visnjic, but I think that it's one of the mistakes that are corrected on a regular basis by the typists later on. Of course, no mention was made of (20)"Monday." I'm sure that the typist will be able to correct the mistake. Mr. Petrusic, please continue. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.]
• Q.: General, did you and the command of the Drina Corps become
familiar with the directives number 7 and 7/1, directive 7 having been
(25)issued by the Supreme Commander of the armed forces of Republika Srpska,
• A.: Yes. The Drina Corps Command knew about those directives that were issued by the Supreme Command of Republika Srpska and the Main Staff of the VRS. The directives in question are directive number 7 and (5)directive number 7/1. In these directives, the Drina Corps Command had -- these directives constituted a formal basis for the Drina Corps Command to plan and conduct an operation of this kind. However, I have already mentioned the main reasons which governed the decision of the Drina Corps Command to (10)plan and implement this type of operation. In directives number 7 and number 7/1, specific assignments or, rather, general assignments were given to all units of the VRS, including the Drina Corps, and the directives also made mention of the type of activities that had to be taken around the protected areas. (15) • Q.: On the basis of what did you or, rather, the command make the decision to plan and carry out the operation Krivaja?
• A.: Naturally, the Drina Corps Command, in spite of these two
directives and in spite of the situation in the area that I have described
at length, could not make such a decision independently. The Command of
(20)the Drina Corps was given an oral order from the commander of the Main
Staff immediately to prepare and carry out this operation, being guided
exclusively by all the developments in the safe areas which climaxed, I
would say, on the 26th of June when units of the 28th Division broke into
the villages of Visnjica and Rjecice, and when they attacked the Main
(25)Staff from the direction of Banja Lucica and Krivace.
• A.: The basic concept of the Drina Corps Commander, which would later be translated into a decision, was exclusively to separate the two enclaves, Srebrenica and Zepa. (5) MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Could we have Prosecution Exhibit 427, please. That's fine. Thank you. It is the preparatory order number 1 of the Drina Corps Command. • Q.: What was your response to the order or notification in view of the concept of the commander to separate the two enclaves, Srebrenica and (10)Zepa, and what did you actually do?
• A.: As soon as the commander of the Drina Corps, General Zivanovic,
returned from the Main Staff, and that happened on the 2nd of July, 1995,
he convened his assistants -- and I was one of them as the Chief of Staff
and his deputy -- and he told us what was the assignment given to him by
(15)the Commander of the Main Staff, saying that we must urgently prepare and
carry out the operation Krivaja 95. And on that occasion, a very brief
assessment was made of everything that was happening at the time in the
north-western part of the corps area of responsibility and also within the
area of responsibility of the Drina Corps, and I am referring primarily to
(20)the activities of the 28th Division, saying simply that the area between
the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves has to be placed under control.
After making a brief overview of the situation and of the measures
taken by the BH army against the area of responsibility of the Drina Corps
and within that area, the commander conveyed his concept, his idea, and
(25)that was to separate Srebrenica and Zepa. To that end and prior to the
(5) • Q.: What was the key aim of this preparatory order? • A.: The substance of that order is to give commanders a very brief assessment of everything that had taken place until then in relation to the area of responsibility and within the area of responsibility of the Drina Corps. In other words, for the brigade commanders to be reminded (10)once again, though all this was still fresh in their minds, these operations were still ongoing. The very substance of this preparatory order was for the brigade commanders who received that preparatory order to assess the situation in their respective areas of responsibility and to set aside a part of the (15)forces which would take part in the execution of his concept or decision. I said to make an assessment because the situation in the area of responsibility and around it was still extremely complicated and there was a danger that the offensive from Tuzla and Kladanj, and also from Olovo even, would be renewed and continued, and we had certain information to (20)that effect. • Q.: So the Corps Commander tasks his subordinate units from among their forces to detach a certain number of units that would take part in the execution of a future task. Does he define that task in this order?
• A.: No. The Corps Commander, in this preparatory order, does not
(25)define the task within the framework of Krivaja 95. The detachment of
• Q.: What was your role as the Chief of Staff in the implementation and execution of this preparatory order? • A.: My role and tasks as the Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps are prescribed by the regulations on the work of commands and staffs, also the (10)regulations of the land forces, and other documents. In this particular case, my role was to assist the brigade commanders, and that was the duty not only of me but the other assistant commanders, for the segment of the forces to be pulled out from the front so that this preparatory order could be implemented. (15)After ... • Q.: The Corps Commander, did he consult with you and other assistant commanders regarding the strength of the forces that needed to be deployed for this decision to be carried out?
• A.: That is regulated by our rules and regulations, by the rules of
(20)combat governing warfare and the conduct of operations. If the Corps
Commander could do that on his own, then he wouldn't need assistants, any
one of those assistants.
When it comes to this particular situation and his decision or his
main idea to separate the enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa, the commander
(25)did not really need to consult with his assistants and with me
• Q.: Did you participate with the commanders of the subordinate units
in making the assessments as to the forces which could be pulled from the
front of the -- held by the subordinate units without upsetting the
balance of power, balance of power at the front and causing problems in
(25)this respect?
• Q.: After this preparatory order was issued and this whole process that you just talked about was completed, what was the next step taken by the Drina Corps command in the implementation of the preparatory order? (15)
• A.: First of all, after the assessments were made and the units were
inspected by the command organs, the corps command organs, on the 2nd of
July, 1995, in the afternoon, the Drina Corps Commander, General
Zivanovic, formed a group that was to carry out the command reconnaissance
at the corps command level.
(20)This group consisted of the Drina Corps Commander, General
Zivanovic; myself as the Chief of Staff; then there was the chief of the
operations and training section, Colonel Micic; then the chief of the
intelligence section, Lieutenant Colonel Kosoric; chief of the
communications in the Drina Corps, Lieutenant Colonel Blagojevic; and
(25)there was one of the commanding officers from the logistic organ of the
• Q.: Could you please repeat the first point. • A.: The first was the Pribicevac area, the second one was Besica Brdo, (10)and the third one was the area of Bracani. After we conducted the command reconnaissance at the Drina Corps command level and verified what the commander of the corps had issued to the subordinate units in his preparatory order, I mean the strength and the forces that are to be engaged in the execution of this task, we went (15)back to the command post in Vlasenica and continued our work on the preparation for the execution of this task. • Q.: So all these activities were part of the preparatory order? • A.: Yes, precisely. All these activities of the Drina Corps command, the involvement of the Drina Corps command and their activities, were (20)connected to the preparatory order issued by the Corps Commander and his basic concept that he communicated to us. But only after the command responsibility was the final decision of the Corps Commander made, and he issued specific tasks to his subordinate units, and all the other issues related to that were solved. (25)
MR. PETRUSIC:
[Int.] Can I please have the Prosecution
• Q.: After that, the Commander's decision was issued. Is this decision the order for active combat activities? • A.: Yes, precisely. This is the order for active command activities. (5) • Q.: General, could you please explain to us what is the meaning of this document, in fact, who issues the document, who takes part in it, all that is relevant for the issuing of such a document? Of course, I asked several questions as part of the single question, but let us answer them one by one. (10) • A.: This document is the order for active combat activities or, in other words, this is the decision of the Drina Corps Commander for the implementation of his basic concept that I have spoken about earlier. • Q.: Item 1 in this order contains the information about the enemy.
• A.: Yes. This was the usual practice as regulated by the manual when
(15)it comes to the drafting of this document and similar documents about the
execution of combat activities.
Item 1 is the item containing information about the enemy, the
assessment of his intentions, objectives, what the enemy had been doing in
a certain period, what the enemy's doing now, and what the enemy intends
(20)to do.
If you will allow me, I would like to read this item and explain
parts of this item.
The first portion of item 1 refers to the general assessment of
the enemy, stating -- the enemy, unfortunately, I have to say, and the
(25)term is used to refer to the forces of the army of Bosnia and
(10) • Q.: General, I'm sorry to be interrupting you. I think that the Trial Chamber has shown a great deal of understanding in setting our schedule for today, and I would like to suggest that we have our break now. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Petrusic. I hope I have understood you correctly. (15) MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Yes, you have.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Perhaps we could go a little
faster. It's true that I do not wish to give you any instructions
regarding the conduct of your case -- it is up to you -- but if we have a
document and if we have a translation of that document, surely it is not
(20)necessary to read it and repeat it. I understand that there is a case
that you wish to present, and then in that context, you could put
questions to General Krstic to refer to this document or to make an
explanation, if necessary. I'm just making this observation to avoid any
further loss of time.
(25)In any event, we are now going to have a 15-minute break.
--- On resuming at 12.42 p.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Petrusic, you may continue. We will work until quarter past twelve, and after that we will have a (5)one-hour break. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] I have to apologise, Mr. President, for this delay. The Defence didn't understand you correctly, so it is our mistake. • Q.: General, in view of the order of the commander for active military (10)activities and pursuant to that order, you give an assessment of the situation and the deployment of enemy forces. We are not going to comment on the document in detail, but please tell us briefly about it.
• A.: As regards the first part of the order, the first item of the
order of the Drina Corps Commander, I can say that the basic elements were
(15)given concerning the intentions and objectives, further intentions and
objectives, of the BiH army forces towards the area of responsibility of
the Drina Corps and inside that area of responsibility itself.
I should say that this was known to the commanders of subordinate
units; however, while drafting such documents, one must include these
(20)elements as well, this particular data, so that the units can be prepared
in the best possible way for the execution of the assignment.
Further on, the Corps Commander gives the essential data, the
essential information about the forces inside the protected area of
Srebrenica, where its exact deployments are and what their objectives and
(25)intentions are.
(15) • Q.: General, it was not my intention to have a detailed description of the deployment of forces, but let us say something about the tasks that the Drina Corps units were given, the units which were detached from their original units. Could you tell us something about their specific tasks? You don't have to go into details. (20)
• A.: I have already referred to the decision of the Commander of the
Drina Corps or, rather, the idea emanating from that decision, and that
was to separate the two enclaves, Srebrenica and Zepa.
The forces of the Drina Corps that were engaged for this operation
had the task of gaining control of the feature Preda and to reach the line
(25)of Predala
[phoen], Guber Banja, and then Zivkovo Brdo, Alibegovac,
• Q.: So in effect, that would mean the completion of and the execution (5)of the decision of the Commander. • A.: Exactly. Thereby, the units of the Drina Corps would have carried out the task assigned to them by the Drina Corps Commander. • Q.: In this order, we see that some reserve forces have been planned, amounting to two to three companies of MUP and the 1st Company of the (10)Vlasenica Brigade. Could you explain to us the tasks of a reserve force and what is implied by the concept of a reserve force in general in this order? • A.: It is correct that this order by the Corps Commander with respect to the reserves says that these reserves of the Drina Corps should amount (15)in strength to two to three companies of MUP and one company of the Vlasenica Infantry Brigade. In all such documents for combat operations, the officer making such a decision also designates the reserve which may be introduced. He envisages such a reserve force, and depending on the situation, he would (20)deploy it.
• Q.: General, in this order, in the introductory part of that order,
the commander is addressing to the 1st Zvornik Infantry Brigade, the 1st
Bircani, the 2nd Romanija, the 1st Bratunac, the 1st Milici, and the 5th
MUP, a MUP is being provided -- oh, I'm sorry, and the 1st MUP, so the MUP
(25)forces and the company of the Vlasenica Brigade.
• A.: In this order, as can be seen, the forces planned as reserves are (5)not given this order for active combat action; therefore, not a single unit of the Ministry of the Interior received such a document, nor did the 1st Vlasenica Infantry Brigade, but only those units that are listed in the document. • Q.: The 1st Vlasenica Brigade, or rather, one company from that (10)brigade which had been planned as a reserve force, was it engaged in combat? • A.: Because of the extremely complex situation along the defence front for the Light Vlasenica Infantry Brigade where there was a constant threat of the front lines being broken through from the direction of Kladanj, I (15)have already said that this brigade did not receive a copy of this order. However, because of the fact that the need arose on the 11th of July, the Corps Commander nevertheless decided to call on the commander of the Vlasenica Brigade to form a small unit of 50 to 60 men in addition to all the defence measures that need to be taken towards Kladanj, for that (20)company to be brought to the region of Korc [phoen], which is east of the Srebrenica safe area, to take up positions of the Bratunac Brigade. • Q.: Why did the Corps Commander decide to use a part of this company after all which it had designated as a reserve?
• A.: There were certain problems with the Bratunac Brigade because
(25)these were mostly elderly people, and they simply never made any progress
• Q.: So, when the Corps Commander engages this unit from the reserve (5)force, in this case, a company from the Vlasenica Brigade, did it then receive specific orders and specific assignments? • A.: Exactly so. The commander of that company is given a concrete task on the spot. • Q.: We have another unit in reserve, and that is two to three (10)companies of MUP forces. My first question is, were MUP forces informed at all about the preparations for the operation? Did they engage in reconnaissance together with you, and was a copy of this order sent to them?
• A.: I assert with full responsibility that no one from the command
(15)structure in the area of the centre of -- covered by the centre of
Security Services in Zvornik knew, even, that we were planning and
preparing for this operation. They did not engage in any kind of
reconnaissance, not when the Corps command engaged in reconnaissance, nor
when brigades engaged in reconnaissance, and this was on the 4th of July.
(20)The rule as prescribed by our regulations is that when it comes to
the engagement of MUP forces, the chain of command has to be strictly
respected regarding a decision on the use of a particular unit, be it a
MUP unit or a military unit. Therefore, if the Corps Commander felt that
he needed to engage MUP forces in this operation, then he had to address
(25)such a request to the Superior Command, in this situation, to the Main
• Q.: Could it be said that the combat situation developed in such a way on the ground that the need arose which led the commander or other commanding officers in the Drina Corps to ask the Main Staff and the Main Staff -- the Ministry of the Interior, for such an engagement? (15) • A.: When it came to the implementation of the decision of the Corps Commander, the implementation of his main idea, and as the operation developed later on, there really was absolutely no need to engage MUP units. • Q.: In this order, a certain amount of artillery support is envisaged (20)for units of the Drina Corps which are engaging in combat activities. Tell us, what is the structure of this artillery support?
• A.: If I may, let me go back briefly to your previous question. I
really do not understand under whose orders and who it was that sent a
special detachment of a MUP brigade, which appeared on the 11th of July in
(25)Bratunac.
• Q.: Were, and in any way if they were, the forces of the 5th Engineer Battalion of the Drina Corps engaged in any way? (25)
• A.: The 5th Engineer Corps was also engage in a certain way in this
• Q.: In this order, you or, rather, the Drina Corps, also determined the forward command post. Was this the location or the area from which the operation was commanded or from which the whole corps was commanded?
• A.: If I may, I would like to explain what a command post is as
(10)opposed to the forward command post. The term "command post" refers to a
wider area in which all the command organs, command organs of the corps,
are deployed. It should facilitate the successful command and control
over all the units in the area of responsibility of a corps or some other
operational unit which is similar to a corps.
(15)As regards the term "forward command post," it's a smaller area in
which only a part of a certain command is deployed. In this case, it is
the part of the Corps Command. It is selected and determined, its
location, very close or indeed inside of the area in which combat
activities will be conducted. It is an area which enables direct
(20)influence over the course of the execution of combat operations. The
command post was -- the forward command post, in this case, was set to be
at Pribicevac. I have already spoken about it. It was the command post
of the Tactical Group Pribicevac. But now it was necessary to improve the
conditions there, which would enable the part of the Corps Command to get
(25)there and to deploy at the forward command post and to carry out the tasks
• Q.: Speaking about the Pribicevac forward command post, who was assigned to take up positions at the command post? • A.: Because of the highly complex situation in front of the area of (5)responsibility of the Drina Corps and indeed inside of the area of responsibility and in order to command and control the units within the area of responsibility of the Drina Corps as successfully as possible, the Drina Corps Commander, General Zivanovic, with the larger part of the command of the Drina Corps remained at the command post in Vlasenica and (10)exerted command over all the units in the area of responsibility of the corps from there. And in that, I also include the temporary formations that were part of the Krivaja 95 operation, through me and in the whole area of responsibility, through the Brigade Commanders and the chiefs of staff that remained there after the Brigade Commanders brought in the (15)units that were necessary to implement the order of the Commander. The Drina Corps Commander assigned a group to take up positions at the forward command post, which consisted of myself as the Chief of Staff and his second in command; then the Chief of Staff of the operations and the training section of the Drina Corps, Colonel Vicic; Chief of the (20)Intelligence Section of the Drina Corps Command, Lieutenant Colonel Kosoric; the Commander of the Communications Battalion of the Drina Corps, Major Jevdjevic; and the Commander of the Staff Command, Lieutenant Amovic. • Q.: What was your role at the Pribicevac command post? (25)
• A.: My basic role at the Pribicevac forward command post was, first of
(10) • Q.: So, you were in a position to issue orders to subordinate units or to units which were engaged in the operation? • A.: Yes. I was in a position to issue orders to all the units, to commanders of all the units engaged in the operation until the arrival of the commander to the forward command post. (15) • Q.: You mentioned Colonel Vicic. He was the chief of the operations and training section. Is that the post which is well known -- generally known as the operations officer? • A.: The chief of the operations and training section is a person with the largest scope of tasks within a corps command. In a way, he is the (20)link between the Chief of Staff and the Corps Commander. The tasks he is given, either by the Corps Commander or the Chief of Staff, are formulated into orders by him, and he also drafts reports and other documents on the basis of what he has been ordered.
MR. PETRUSIC:
[Int.] The Defence, Your Honours, would
(25)now like to suggest a break until quarter past two.
--- Luncheon recess taken at 1.16 p.m.
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Petrusic, you may continue. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] • Q.: General, could you briefly tell us the following: You mentioned (5)the order of the Assistant Command for Intelligence Affairs at the forward command post, and you also mentioned the presence of the Commander of the Communications Battalion as well as the Commander of the Staff Command. I should like to know what their duties and responsibilities were at the Pribicevac forward command post. (10)
• A.: I have already spoken about the composition of the group which was
sent by the Corps Commander to take up positions at the forward command
post and what assignments were included. I was there myself, and I also
mentioned that the Chief of the Intelligence Section of the Drina Corps
was there as well, Colonel Kosoric. His task was the one that he would
(15)have had at the Vlasenica command post, that is, to collect data about the
BH army, to obtain information about its objectives and intentions as well
as specific measures that it was undertaking in that situation.
So the focus of his task at the time was to gather data about the
forces of the 28th Division. Once such data was obtained, he was supposed
(20)to provide me with his conclusions, not only me but also the Chief of the
Operations Section, with the purpose of facilitating the conduct of
operations in terms of what units should be given what tasks.
In addition to Colonel Kosoric, the group also involved the
commander of the Drina Corps Communications Battalion, Major Jevdjevic.
(25)His task was a similar one as he would have had at the main command post,
(15) • Q.: Apart from the Pribicevac forward command post, there was also the forward command post and 1DK in the area of Jasenova? • A.: Let me first indicate on the map the location of Jasenova. Jasenova is located in this area here. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Petrusic, sorry to interrupt (20)you, but if the answer is "Jasenova is here" without any further references, perhaps we will not be able to know exactly where, to know exactly where the place was indicated on the map. So you can perhaps describe for the record the exact location.
MR. PETRUSIC:
[Int.] Yes, you're right, Mr. President, I
(25)was just about to suggest an explanation.
• A.: Yes. I apologise to the Chamber for not being precise enough. Jasenova is located to the southwest of Zeleni Jadar for approximately two kilometres away. (5) • Q.: Can we say that it is located on the territory outside the territory of the protected area? • A.: Yes, you're quite correct. Jasenova is outside the territory of the protected area. • Q.: Why was that second forward command post envisaged at all? (10) • A.: The main reason why in this operation we decided to have this forward command post N1 was because we were acting pursuant to the decision of the Corps Commander whereby units of the Drina Corps deployed for the purposes of this operation, after the completion of their task, along the axis Divljakinje-Guber Banja, which I indicated previously, (15)Zivkovo Brdo, Alibegovac, Kak, be pulled out of that line and would assemble in the wider area of Jasenova and Podravanje. This here is the area of Podravanje, Jasenova is here and this is the area of Podravanje. THE INTERPRETER: Microphone. (20) MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] • Q.: So the area of Podravanje is situated south of Jasenova?
• A.: Yes, that is correct. It is situated a kilometre, kilometre and a
half away from Jasenova in the southwestern direction. So that was the
area where the units were supposed to assemble after the execution of the
(25)task pursuant to the general concept of the Corps Commander. And after
• Q.: For the purposes of clarification, could you tell us briefly about (10)the abbreviation IKMN-1. Does that mean "forward command post further one"? • A.: Yes, that is correct. Pribicevac was the initial -- the main forward command post, and the further -- the next forward command post was the forward command post N1 which was outside the territory of the (15)protected area of Srebrenica. • Q.: Except for this order request for combat activities, could you tell us what other documents you yourself drafted for the purposes of the Krivaja 95 operation? • A.: In view of the overall objective of the operation, that is, the (20)decision of the Corps Commander, as to which line was supposed to be reached and occupied as part of the execution of the decision of the Corps Commander, we drafted only certain basic documents. One such document is actually the written part of the decision of the Corps Commander. After that -- (25)
MR. HARMON: Mr. President, the question that was asked of General
(5) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Petrusic, have you understood the meaning of the objection? MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Yes. When I put my question as to which documents you drafted in addition to the order, I had in mind the command of the Drina Corps, implying the General as a member of the Drina (10)Corps. I wasn't asking him in person. So my question related to the Drina Corps command. • Q.: In addition to the command itself, which documents were drafted by the Drina Corps Command for the Krivaja 95 operation? And of course, in future, I will bear in mind Mr. Harmon's (15)suggestion.
• A.: In addition to the order of the Drina Corps Command on active
combat activity, a plan of surveyance was elaborated at the level of the
Corps Command, and a surveyance plan for the subordinate commanders of the
units that would be participating in the operation, and also a plan of
(20)quartermaster support for units of the Drina Corps which will be
participating in the operation. So those are these three basic
documents.
We felt that it was not necessary to draw up all the plans
stipulated in the regulations for the work of commands because this was an
(25)operation of a limited scope. We expected it would not last long and
• Q.: Does that mean that when drawing up these documents, the command bore in mind the main idea of physically separating the enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa and that is why it drafted only the documents that you (5)have mentioned? • A.: Yes. • Q.: The concept of the commander or, rather, his order, had it been to eliminate the enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa, would that imply a lengthier analysis of the preparation and the organisation regarding the (10)execution of the operation itself and would it also imply the need to draw up other documents and plans as well?
• A.: Yes. Then that would be an operation of a broader scale. The
planning of such an operation and its preparation would have lasted much,
much longer. For this type of operation, that is, operations of a broader
(15)scale, preparations last a minimum between 20 and 30 days.
If the purpose of the Krivaja 95 operation had been to eliminate
the enclaves, then we would have had to strictly comply with the
regulations which prescribe the compilation of all the documents which are
necessary for the control and command of the operation, and that means
(20)that we would have to draw up an order for active combat, then we would
have to, in text form and in graphic form on maps, detail the operation's
plans by day and by hour and indicate the specific lines and features.
Finally, we would also have to determine the duration of the operation,
both in the text and in the maps. Also, we would have to draw up other
(25)documents such as the plan of intelligence security, the plan of
(10) • Q.: Would that imply also the need to draw up a plan for contacts and cooperation with UNPROFOR, if we could call it that? • A.: If through the process of operation planning our aim was to include in the implementation of that plan the authorities in the area of responsibility of the Drina Corps or, more specifically, around the safe (15)area of Srebrenica, then we should have had to draw up a plan of cooperation with civilian bodies in the area. We would also have had to draw up a plan of cooperation with the United Nations forces in the area. All these documents that I have mentioned were not prepared, except for the order for combat operations and maps of the commander's (20)decisions, that is, a graphic presentation of the text of the decision, and we did a plan of reconnaissance and a plan of quartermaster support. • Q.: Does this mean that the plans you just mentioned were not drawn up by you because the idea of the commander, in the form of a decision, was not to eliminate the enclaves? (25)
MR. HARMON: Objection, Your Honour.
MR. HARMON: I'm going to object to the leading nature of the question. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Petrusic. Please ask (5)the witness what happened. Don't ask him what the intention was. Ask him about the results, please, the outcome. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] • Q.: So did you draw up those plans or not? • A.: No. (10) • Q.: When I say "you," that means neither you personally nor the Drina Corps Command. • A.: In addition to the corps staff, all the other bodies participate in the drafting of plans, all the other bodies of the Corps Command, of course, including the Corps Commander. (15) • Q.: When working on this order, did you have information about anything that would relate to civilian matters linked to the safe area? • A.: No. • Q.: So does this mean neither you personally nor the Drina Corps Command? (20) • A.: The Drina Corps Command as a whole. • Q.: So after the order was compiled, was a map drawn?
• A.: I think I've already answered that question. A map was drawn to
reflect the commander's decision. It is a graphic presentation of the
actual textual part of the commander's decision.
(25)This graphic presentation of the text of the commander's decision,
• Q.: So after all this was done, what was the first activity that you personally undertook to implement the order, the order for combat action? (5) • A.: The first step that I took in connection with the commander's order, the order of the Drina Corps Commander for active combat operations, was to draw a graphic presentation of the commander's decision on the map, then also to prepare a surveyance plan together with subordinate commanders who would be participating in the implementation of (10)the commander's decision, so that on the 4th of July, 1995, we carried out this surveyance together with all the commanders whose units or parts of units took part in the operation -- reconnaissance activities. THE INTERPRETER: Correction by interpreter. • A.: I personally was in charge of these reconnaissance activities, and (15)at the level of the Corps Command, as I have already said, the leader of those reconnaissance activities was General Zivanovic. After the plan had been prepared on the 4th of July, 1995, we carried out reconnaissance together with the brigade commanders from those same three locations from which the Drina Corps had carried out (20)reconnaissance. And that is the forward command post at Pribicevac, that is one location; the other is Besica Brdo; and the third is the feature Bracan. I should like to show once again those three locations.
• Q.: General, I think that is not necessary because we have already
pointed them out on the map once, and the Chamber is aware of that, so you
(25)may now continue.
• A.: Yes. • Q.: What were your activities? What were you personally doing, you the Chief of Staff, on the 3rd of July? (5)
• A.: On the 3rd of July after we carried out the reconnaissance at the
Corps command level, and that was on the 2nd of July in the afternoon
hours, I did the following: control in the subordinate units that will be
engaged in the operation. When I say "control," I mean -- I also include
other organs in the Corps command. This control operation was carried out
(10)in such a way that we as a team visited the units, assigned three groups,
one of which was to visit the command of the Milici Brigade, of the
Bratunac Brigade, and the Skelani Battalion.
The second group visited the command of the 1st Bircani Brigade
located in Sekovici and the command of the Zvornik Brigade in Zvornik, and
(15)the third group visited the command of the 2nd Romanija Brigade in
Sokolac.
The purpose of the control, as I have already stated, I think, was
to carry out the assessment of the situation together with the Commander
and to determine whether they really can detach the forces that they have
(20)been ordered to detach and what else needs to be done. These were the
issues from the domain of the logistic support.
After all the teams had returned from the control in the
subordinate units, we submitted the report about this activity to the
Commander and then continued with the drafting of the documents that I
(25)have already spoken about.
• A.: After I conducted the reconnaissance with the commanders of the subordinate units on the 4th, I went back to the command post in (5)Vlasenica, and on the 5th of July I continued to perform my usual daily duties and obligations, the focus being on issues related to the implementation of the decision of the Corps Commander. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Petrusic, excuse me, perhaps I should remind General Krstic: You're a man of action. Mr. Petrusic (10)asked you, what was the time -- how did you spend your time as Chief of Staff on the 5th of July. You answered you engaged in your regular duties. I think we need to have a precise answer. You're a man of action, not a man of the philosophy of action, so give us a direct answer if possible, please. (15)Excuse me for interrupting, Mr. Petrusic. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] In this sense, I would like you to place Defence Exhibit number 96. • A.: If I may say something. I was about to answer the question that was asked of me, but Mr. Petrusic interrupted me by asking for the exhibit (20)to be placed on the ELMO. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] • Q.: Please go ahead, General.
• A.: As the Chief of Staff, on the 5th of July I carried out the
following tasks: The Corps Commander, after the reconnaissance had been
(25)conducted, both at the level of the Corps command and the subordinate
(10) • Q.: So we have Exhibit 96 on the ELMO. It is an order issued by the Drina Corps command. The number is 04/156-4, dated the 5th of July, 1995. It is designated as "very urgent," and it is addressed to the commands of the 1st and 5th Podrinje Light Infantry Brigades. It is issued by the commander, Major General Milenko Zivanovic. (15)Are you familiar with this order, and what does this order relate to?
• A.: Yes, I am aware of this order in full, and this order has to do
first of all -- the purpose of the order is first of all to inform the
commanders of the 1st and 5th Podrinje Brigades which were engaged on the
(20)positions around Zepa in the defence. The Corps Commander, among other
things, states the casualties sustained by us.
Because the area between Srebrenica and Zepa has not been taken up
or occupied because the two enclaves have not been separated and because a
corridor has been established between the two safe areas, the Drina Corps
(25)Commander informs them that preparations are underway for active
MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] I would now like the Exhibit 76 to (10)be placed on the ELMO, please. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Petrusic, I will take advantage of this little break. I need to say something to the technical booth or the registrar, rather. When a witness is analysing or discussing a document, the document in question has to be broadcast for the public (15)gallery, if that is possible. We first have to have a general view of the whole document, the entire document, and afterwards, once the witness has started analysing the document, the document has to be broadcast for the public. I hope that we will be able to achieve this. I'm sorry for this interruption, Mr. Petrusic. Please continue. (20)
MR. PETRUSIC:
[Int.] In the original version, that is,
the version in Serbo-Croatian, it is stated that the document has been
issued by the Drina Corps. Its number is 04/156-4-1. However, in the
English version, the title of the command actually issuing the document is
not there, is missing. We assume that it is an error on the part of the
(25)translators. The document is dated the 5th of July, and it is issued by
• Q.: General, could you please tell us something about the contents of (5)this document and an interpretation of this document? • A.: Very briefly. This is a report and a request to the Main Staff of the VRS. The Main Staff of the VRS is advised that the units of the Drina Corps had carried out all the preparations for the separation of the two enclaves, Zepa and Srebrenica, and that's one item. (10)In addition, a request is submitted to the VRS to provide cooperation of the 65th Protective Motorised Regiment, in other words, of the forces that are engaged on defensive lines against the Zepa enclave in order to prevent the forces of the Zepa Brigade from being detached and to prevent their possible action behind the units, our units, that will be (15)engaged against Srebrenica. And cooperation with the 1st and 2nd Podrinje Light Infantry Brigades is requested, and they had also been given the task assigning the measures that they would have to take again the Zepa enclave. • Q.: So is this sent to the Main Staff in order for the Main Staff to (20)be able to give an order to its unit, the 65th Protective Motorised Regiment? • A.: Yes, precisely, because we did not have the authority to issue orders to the units of the Main Staff, and that is why we ask for their cooperation. (25)
• Q.: Can we say then that this battalion that -- is permanently
• A.: Yes. This battalion, before the outbreak of the conflict, was deployed on positions towards Zepa, engaged in the defence activities after Zepa was declared a safe area, and this is where it's remained until (5)the end of the war. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Mr. President, the Defence would now stop with the examination-in-chief. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Petrusic. It's indeed time that we wind up for today. We have other obligations this (10)afternoon. So will see each other tomorrow at 20 minutes past 9.00.
--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.05 p.m.
to be reconvened on Thursday, the 19th day of
October, 2000 at 9.20 a.m.
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