|
Content
/ Colormap • Page 6165 • {1/77} (1)Thursday, 19 October 2000 [Open session]
--- Upon commencing at 9.23 a.m. (5) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Good morning to the technical booth, the interpreters. Good morning legal assistants and registrar. Good morning to the Office of the Prosecutor, Defence counsel, and General Krstic. We shall be continuing your testimony, and I wish to remind you (10)that you are continuing to testify under oath, and please answer directly as much as possible the questions put to you by Mr. Petrusic. If he asks you, for instance, what you were doing on the 5th of July, your answer should be, "On the 5th of July, I did such and such." So this is simply to focus the debate a little on questions and answers. (15)So, Mr. Petrusic, you have the floor now. I see Mr. Harmon on his feet.
MR. HARMON: Yes, Mr. President. I wanted to raise this point
before we start the testimony again of General Krstic.
Yesterday and the two previous days, we have received a number of
(20)exhibits that have English translations attached to them. I noticed in
the course of the presentation that there were errors in those English
translations in transposing dates and times from the original B/C/S to the
English. These are not official translations, and I've been informed by
colleagues of mine that there are errors in the text as well.
(25)My request, therefore, for the sake of both the Chamber and the
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Harmon, excuse me, but maybe I haven't quite understood. What did you mean by official translations: The translations should be reviewed by the translations service of the Tribunal, or should they be certified in some way? (10) MR. HARMON: I think they should be reviewed, and if there are errors, they should be corrected, and then an official certified -- not certified in the sense of having a seal, but a Language Service translation should be included in the record. JUDGE RIAD: [Int.] Excuse me, this is just as a pure (15)formality, or for some kind of real merit, on the merits, you think. Language can be official or unofficial.
MR. HARMON: Judge Riad, I'm not one that stands on formalities
for the sake of standing on formalities. I've been informed by members of
my staff that there are errors in the text itself which cause me concern
(20)that motivated me to raise this issue with the Chamber. I don't know how
many there are; there are apparently a fair number. And I think the
Language Service Section, which is available for review of these
documents, has at its disposal the draft, the unofficial version, which it
can use as a draft, and it shouldn't be too much difficulty for them to
(25)review those and prepare a final version of the translation.
JUDGE RIAD: [Int.] Thank you. JUDGE WALD: Mr. Harmon, we've had at least dozens now of these English translations. I don't know the exact count. Is there realistic expectation that they could be translated in time for your (10)cross-examination? MR. HARMON: I think, Judge Wald, I think the answer to that question is "Yes." The drafts, the unofficial versions, are comprehensive. The cross-examination, in all likelihood, will not start until next Wednesday, so I do believe, if given those unofficial versions (15)today, we could have official versions to the parties and to the Court by Wednesday. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Petrusic or Mr. Visnjic, have you any comments to make?
MR. VISNJIC:
[Int.] Mr. President, no particular
(20)comments. The only thing I can say is, to give a brief explanation, that
from the moment the registry was officially informed, that the registry
cannot take upon itself to translate those documents, which was some ten
days ago, did everything it could to get those documents translated. The
translations were done by several translators, so this may explain
(25)differences both in the quality and the use of certain standard terms that
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Visnjic, as far as I know, I think there are translations which the Defence did themselves, and there are others that were translated here in the Tribunal. Am I right? MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Yes, Mr. President. I cannot tell (10)you the exact date, but about two or three weeks ago the Defence offered the registry for the first time a certain number of documents for translation. The language section informed us that they cannot accept that quantity of documents for translation. In fact, I think what I was told was that they could do one document in three days. In the meantime, (15)knowing the schedule and our duty towards the Prosecution to service these documents in time, to serve these documents in time, we took steps to have these documents translated in Belgrade. Some of the documents translated by the language section remain here, and I think Ms. Krystal knows exactly how many documents were translated by the service. Some were translated (20)in Belgrade, and a third group, I'm afraid, remained untranslated. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Visnjic, can you identify which documents were translated by yourselves and which were translated by the Tribunal service?
MR. VISNJIC:
[Int.] Yes, Mr. President. During the
(25)first break we shall inform the registry about that.
THE REGISTRAR: I would just like to say that the registry received the Defence's exhibits on October 1st, and it was approximately (5)275 documents. In translators' terms, it came out to be 300-and-some-odd documents. Obviously, that wasn't possible to translate for an October 16th deadline, so 30 of the hottest documents were chosen to be translated by our section, and that's what we did. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] For the moment, it should be (10)said that the translation service did a very good job. So we have to see which of the documents that were translated here. I think we should not repeat the work, and perhaps we could have the other documents reviewed so as to speed things up a little. Mr. Harmon. (15) MR. HARMON: Perhaps I can add some additional clarity to this discussion. Our principal interests are in the documents that are documents of the Republika Srpska. We have less interest, although we would like to see accurate translations of the documents from the army of the -- Bosnian army. Our priority is, first and foremost, to have (20)official translations of all of the VRS documents, if that's of assistance. JUDGE RIAD: [Int.] And how much are they, Mr. Harmon?
MR. HARMON: I'm afraid, Judge Riad, I don't have that number at
my disposal. I'll take a look, with the assistance of Ms. Keith, and we
(25)can inform the registrar as well during the break. Thank you.
(10) MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours, my learned friends from the Prosecution.
WITNESS: RADISLAV KRSTIC
[Resumed] • EXAMINED by Mr. Petrusic: [Continued] (15) • Q.: [Int.] So we had stopped at the date of the 5th of July in the course of General Krstic's testimony yesterday. So, General, can you briefly tell us what your activities were on the 5th of July?
• A.: What I did on the 5th of July was the following: Together with
the Corps Commander and the other assistant commanders of the corps, we
(20)once again made an assessment of the overall situation in the area of
responsibility of the corps, particularly in the north-western part of
that area and within the area of responsibility of the corps. And we
reached the conclusion that it was possible that the forces of the BH army
would resume and continue the operation that had been halted and crushed.
(25)Also, we came to the conclusion that, in view of the decision of
• Q.: When did you leave for Pribicevac, or rather, when did you arrive (10)at Pribicevac? • A.: I arrived at the forward command post at Pribicevac, together with Colonel Vicic, or rather, I left for Pribicevac in the afternoon of the same day. • Q.: So on the 5th of July; you left on the 5th of July? (15) • A.: Yes. • Q.: Had units envisaged in the order for combat activities around Srebrenica reached their destination? • A.: Before I left for the forward command post, I had no information that the units had reached the areas where they would -- had been assigned (20)to in combat duty. But going to the Pribicevac command post and passing through Bratunac, I caught up with parts of the Zvornik Brigade who were heading towards Skelani and, from there, on towards the area of deployment as assigned.
• Q.: When you reached the forward command post, did you meet with the
(25)commanders of the units participating in the operation?
(5) • Q.: On what basis did the combat activities begin the next day, the next morning? That's on the 6th of July. • A.: The combat activities of all the units engaged in this operation began on the basis of the order for active combat action that the unit commanders had received as early as on the 4th during the reconnaissance. (10)In that order, there is the item specifying readiness for all the units, and that was 0400 hours on the 6th of July. And that was the only document, and there was no need for any other documents to be issued for the beginning, for the launching of the combat activities. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] I would now like the usher to place (15)Exhibit 77 on the ELMO. • Q.: This is a document number 08/95, dated July the 6th, 1995. It is addressed from the forward command post of the Drina Corps in Pribicevac and signed by Chief Radislav Krstic. In the English version -- this will probably be one of the (20)documents that Mr. Harmon referred to -- there is no indication of the location. There is no indication that this is the forward command post in Pribicevac, unlike in the original. General, can you please say in this record of yours, which is not signed, is this your report, and what does it refer to? (25)
• A.: I apologise; this is a document of the 6th of July, 1995. I am
• Q.: Yes, it is typed out, but there is no signature. • A.: This is an interim combat report that I sent from the forward command post in Pribicevac to the Drina Corps command and the Main Staff (5)of the VRS. The reason why it is an interim report is the fact that combat operations on the 6th of July, 1995, did not, did not go on in the way that we planned and expected. The basic reason was that the forces of the 28th Division on that day offered extremely strong and fierce resistance along all the axes on which our units were engaged. (10)This report, among other things, contains the decision for further activities which is exactly the same as the one issued by the commander in his basic concept. So, it does not diverge from the decision and the concept presented by the Corps Commander in his order for combat action where it is specified that the line that I had shown earlier, Guber (15)Banja-Zivkovo Brdo-Alibegovac feature, Kak feature had to be reached and taken. I can show it again. • Q.: No, I think we're familiar with the locations, but could you please tell us what, along what -- which axis this resistance came? • A.: Especially fierce resistance, we encountered it on Zeleni (20)Jadar-Srebrenica Bojna-Srebrenica. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] I would now like to ask Defence Exhibit 97 to be placed on the ELMO.
• Q.: This is document number -- order number 04/95, dated 6th of July,
1995 issued from the forward command post of the Drina Corps in
(25)Pribicevac. This order is not signed either -- or rather, it cannot be
• A.: This is an order that was issued to all the subordinate units from (5)the -- taking part in the operation from the Pribicevac forward command post. I signed it. Immediately after I sent the interim combat report to the commander of the corps and after he received it and studied it, he called me and told me, ordered me, that combat actions should continue in (10)accordance with his decision and his concept, and that, in this sense, I was to issue additional orders, and I did that. And this is precisely the order that I'm talking about. So since on the 6th of July the combat operations did not go on at a pace that we planned and expected, and after I reported to the (15)commander, I issued this order. There is also the decision for the extension of the attack. The attack was to continue on the 7th of July, 1995, and it is stated that all units which had reached a certain lines on the 6th of July, that they should stop where they are, fortify their positions, and set up their (20)support because there was a risk of attack on those units. And then, at dawn on the 7th, they were to continue with their attack and put under their control the line that they were ordered to in the order of the Corps Commander. You can see that this is indeed so from the tasks that I assigned to these units. (25)
• Q.: Does that mean that this order is in the spirit of the basic order
• A.: Yes, it is fully compliant with the order for active combat action. You can see this from item 2 of the order of the Drina Corps Commander for active combat action. (5) • Q.: General, on the 7th of July, what were you doing on that day, and what were the units in the area doing? • A.: My activities on the 7th of July, very briefly, were the following: Together with Colonel Vicic, we carried out an additional assessment of the situation, and we established the basic reasons why the (10)operation did not go on as envisaged in the decision of the Drina Corps Commander, the basic reasons being that the 28th Division really offered extremely strong and fierce resistance along all the attack axes, in particular on Zeleni Jadar-Bojna-Srebrenica axis. On the 7th of July, the weather conditions were extremely bad in (15)the area, so that the Drina Corps units were, so to speak, virtually unable to carry out any combat activities except for those measures that they were ordered to carry out on the 6th of July. That is what they were to do at the lines that they had reached. There were virtually no combat operations, but the commanders of subordinate units did carry out (20)additional reconnaissance for the purpose of continuing the attack. • Q.: On the 8th of July, where were you and where were the units and the subordinate commanders?
• A.: On the 8th of July, I was still at the forward command post, and
the subordinate commanders were with their units on the axes where the
(25)attacks were carried out.
• A.: On the 8th of July, the attack continued by all the units that were engaged in the operation, so that, during the day, reports reached us at the forward command post about the activities and successes achieved by (5)the units. On the 9th of July -- • Q.: I apologise, General. • A.: So the commander of the Zvornik Brigade reported -- so the commander of the Zvornik Brigade reported at the end of the day that his units, in fact, the 1st Battalion, that was composed of parts of the (10)Zvornik Brigade, that it had managed to place under its control the facility of Tri Sise. That is slightly behind and to the north of Zelini Jadar. The unit commanders, Lieutenant General Andric and Trivic, reported that the 2nd Battalion, composed of their units, managed to place under its control the wider region of Podravanje and Kostur, and that they (15)were continuing their action as ordered in the decision of the Corps Commander towards the Alibegovac and Kak features. The combat group from the Bratunac Brigade did not have any success on that day on the Kvac-Banja Guber axis.
MR. PETRUSIC:
[Int.] I would now like Exhibit 78 to be
(20)placed on the ELMO. This is a notice of the Drina Corps command. The
number is 04/156-5, 8th of July, 1995, signed by commander Major-General
Milenko Zivanovic, and it is addressed to the Pribicevac forward command
post, attention Chief of Staff, Major General Radislav Krstic, and to the
Main Staff of the VRS, attention Major-General Zdravko Tolimir, for his
(25)information.
• A.: Yes. This document reached me at the forward command post in Pribicevac. This is a document issued by the Main Staff, or rather, General Tolimir, and it was sent to the Drina Corps command. And the (5)Drina Corps commander studied it and forwarded it to me in its original version to the forward command post at Pribicevac. And also it sends the feedback, the return information, to General Tolimir at the Main Staff, informing him that he had studied the document and that the same warning was sent to me at the Pribicevac forward command post. This is in fact a (10)warning to the forces of the Drina Corps engaged in the operation around Srebrenica not to target UNPROFOR forces, because an order had -- or a warning had been received from the UNPROFOR command in Sarajevo by the Main Staff in which it was indicated that such things were happening. At that time, I was not aware of the case. They specify a case in (15)which an UNPROFOR post in Zeleni Jadar area was targeted. At that time, I was not aware of that fact, but I cannot exclude the possibility because of the fact that the 28th Division forces were located in the vicinity, that perhaps a round had gone -- had hit the UN observation post in the Zeleni Jadar area. (20) • Q.: In the course of the 9th of July, was the composition of the staff officers at the forward command post the same as at the time the forward command post was taken up?
• A.: On the 9th of July, at the Pribicevac command post, the officers
are the same, that is, the officers belonging to the Drina Corps command.
(25)However, in the afternoon hours of the same day, General Gvero arrived,
• Q.: So you mean that he made suggestions, certain recommendations, and (20)that he consulted you, advised you, and that he in no way issued orders or took command over the units? • A.: Yes, you are right. He didn't take command; he didn't issue orders.
MR. PETRUSIC:
[Int.] I should like to have the Exhibit
(25)79 placed on the ELMO, please. This is a document which was issued by the
• Q.: General, could you give us your view and your interpretation of this document?
• A.: This document confirms what I have just said, that on the 9th of
(10)July, General Gvero arrived at the Pribicevac forward command post. It
can be seen from the document that both myself and General Gvero were the
addressees of the document, but that the document was also forwarded to
the president of Republika Srpska. Obviously, the general staff of the
VRS had received from the Drina Corps command certain information and
(15)reports, and it's also clear that they were following the situation and
informing the general command of the army of Republika Srpska about the
situation.
In this document, one can also see that the president of Republika
Srpska is ordering that combat activities be continued, and that members
(20)of UNPROFOR be protected as well as the Muslim civilian population in the
area of Srebrenica, and that safety should be guaranteed to them if they
crossed to the territory of Republika Srpska.
I don't think I should comment on this particular bit, if they
crossed to the territory of Republika Srpska. I think that they're
(25)probably referring to UNPROFOR forces here.
MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] For the record and for the Chamber and my learned colleagues, I should like to say that this document is (5)identical to the Prosecution document 432 as regards its contents; however, these two exhibits differ as to the manner in which they were typed and processed, so they probably come from two different sources. This is just for your information. • Q.: General, I should like to move on to the 10th of July at this (10)point. • A.: On the 10th of July -- JUDGE RIAD: [Int.] Excuse me, perhaps -- you said, "Protect the Muslim population if they cross to Republika Srpska." If they crossed or if they crossed to -- are they going to Republika Srpska? (15) • A.: I'm sorry, are you addressing the question to me, Your Honour? JUDGE RIAD: [Int.] If they crossed to the territory. Is it just the passage, or -- • A.: I believe they're referring to the members of UNPROFOR here in this portion of the text: If they cross over to the territory of (20)Republika Srpska, if they cross over to the army of Republika Srpska for the purposes of their protection. No, not the Muslim population because President Karadzic is saying here how the civilian population should be treated inside the protected area of Srebrenica. (25)
MR. PETRUSIC:
[Int.] Can we have exhibit number 432
THE INTERPRETER: Microphone. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] • Q.: Exhibit 432, let us try to clarify and to avoid any (5)misunderstandings. I'm referring to paragraph 3 of this document. Would you read it out for us, General? • A.: In paragraph 3 of this document, the president of Republika Srpska ordered that combat operations be continued and that full protection be ensured to UNPROFOR members and the Muslim population, and that they be (10)guaranteed safety in the event of their crossover to the territory of Republika Srpska. JUDGE RIAD: [Int.] Thank you. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Mr. President, if you intend to stick to the timetable that we adopted, I should like to suggest a break (15)at this point. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, we will have a 15-minute break. --- Recess taken at 10.16 a.m. --- On resuming at 10.32 a.m. (20) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Petrusic, please continue. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Thank you. • Q.: Let us go back briefly to these two exhibits, OTP 432 and D79, please. Please tell us when they were received at the forward command post. (25)
THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] • Q.: So we are talking about the document P432, and the document that (5)has been marked as 79? • A.: I don't have that document in front of me. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Mr. Usher, could you please provide the witness with document 79. • A.: This second document was received at 23 -- I'm afraid I can't read (10)the rest. It's illegible. It looks as if it's 2300 hours. • Q.: Thank you. Before we go on to the 10th of July, tell us, please: On the 9th of July, in addition to these reports that arrived at the forward command post, were there any other activities of any significance going on? (15)
• A.: In addition to receiving these reports at the forward command post
of Pribicevac, reports were also coming in from subordinate units about
the progress in combat operations, so that the commander of the 1st
Battalion, which belonged to the Zvornik Brigade, reported -- this was a
report in the evening -- that his units had gained control of Zivkovo Brdo
(20)feature and reached the line of deployment assigned to him in the order
for active combat action by the Corps Commander.
However, another report came from the same commander, Lieutenant
Colonel Pandurevic, that forces of the 28th Division, during the night,
sometime around midnight, had staged a counteroffensive and pushed back
(25)his forces from this feature. A report came from the command of the 2nd
THE INTERPRETER: Banja Guber. The interpreter corrects herself. Banja Guber. (10)
• A.: Sometime in the afternoon, in the late afternoon, about 1700
hours, at the Pribicevac forward command post, without any prior
announcement, without me being informed about it, General Mladic, the
commander of the Main Staff, arrived, together with the commander of the
Drina Corps, General Zivanovic.
(15)Of course, I reported to the Superior Commanders and briefed them
on the situation and the problems we had encountered up to then in
implementing the idea, or rather, the decision of the Corps Commander on
active combat action.
They continued to monitor combat operations because the Drina
(20)Corps units had still not reached the line assigned to them, Divljakinje,
Banja Guber, Zivkovo Brdo, Alibegovac, and the Kak feature. They did not
interfere very much regarding the actual conduct of operations, they just
monitored them.
I said that this was a surprise for me, I mean their coming to the
(25)forward command post, because General Gvero was there, and then General
• Q.: On the 10th of July, did all the senior officers you have just mentioned, General Gvero, Mladic, and Zivanovic, did they all attend; and what was happening in the surroundings? (10)
• A.: On the 10th of July, 1995, at the Pribicevac forward command post,
all the senior officers who had been at the forward command post remained,
and that is myself, Colonel Vicic, Lieutenant Colonel Osoric, Major
Jeldjevic, and Lieutenant Amovic. General Gvero was no longer there.
General Mladic and General Zivanovic were also there.
(15)Immediately after coming, they joined in observing and monitoring
the combat operations, and after the unit commanders had sent their
reports, the commander of the 1st Battalion of the Zvornik Brigade
reporting that he had regained control of Zivkovo Brdo in the early hours
of the morning, whereby he reported that he had accomplished his task.
(20)The commander of the 2nd Battalion, Colonel Andric, and as I have
already said, that battalion consisted of the forces of the 1st Bircani
Brigade and the 2nd Romanija Brigade, so Colonel Andric and Colonel Trivic
were there. He is the commander of the 2nd Romanija Brigade. And Colonel
Andric reported that they had reached the line formed by Alibegovac and
(25)Kak, and that they had gained control of those points, and thereby
(15) • Q.: Where was General Zivanovic after that? Do you have an active role in the command?
• A.: After General Mladic assumed the command or the role of the
commander, General Zivanovic and myself no longer had this role. We were
merely following the orders of the chief of Main Staff and the way in
(20)which the units were implementing these orders. Those who knew General
Mladic from previous events and cases, it was known that he very often
took over in certain parts of the front in Bosnia-Herzegovina of -- he
took upon himself the role of the battalion commander, or a company leader
even in some cases. He told us, "You see now, this is the way to exert
(25)command."
• A.: General Gvero had left the Pribicevac forward command post in the (5)afternoon of the 9th of July. I have already said that. At the Pribicevac forward command post, in addition to the group that we already know of that was there from before, Generals Mladic and Zivanovic were present there too. On the 11th of July, at dawn, the units engaged in this operation (10)continued their attack in order to carry out the orders received by General Mladic. He was in continual contact with them and he issued his commands to them over a Motorola. On all the attack axes, and I'm referring now primarily to the 1st and 2nd Battalions, there was virtually no resistance by the 28th Division except again ahead of the front where (15)the first Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade attacked towards the Divljakinje feature and in the location of Guber Banja. These were the only features. They are very close to Srebrenica, and that is the reason why there was still resistance that was slightly stronger. • Q.: Were reserve forces committed to battle on this axis? (20)
• A.: Since the commander of the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade
reported directly to General Mladic that he was encountering problems with
his personnel that was assigned to carry out the attack and that they
simply were unable or did not want to go ahead, and some of them had in
fact fled, General Mladic ordered that, on this axis, an attack should be
(25)launched at any cost, and he orders General Zivanovic to provide
(10) • Q.: These units that obviously continued with their attacks and the actual entry into the town of Srebrenica, you said that they did not encounter any significant resistance. So they enter Srebrenica. What happened in that interval between the morning hours and the entry into the town itself? (15)
• A.: After the Drina Corps units, in my opinion, I would say, were on
the surrounding heights from the east -- to the east and south of
Srebrenica, the heights that are close to the city and around it, in the
afternoon, I think it was sometime between 1300 and 1400 hours, the
aviation started to target our positions, primarily in the Kvac feature,
(20)Pribicevac feature, and Bojna feature. This attack, if I remember
correctly, lasted for about 30 minutes. And in light of the previous
overflights of the airplanes which did not fire, and after they did open
fire on the features that I have just mentioned.
When the airstrikes stopped, General Mladic ordered the unit
(25)commanders to take all measures to air defence, to defend themselves from
• Q.: At that time, you were at Pribicevac? (5) • A.: Yes. I was at Pribicevac. General Zivanovic, the Corps Commander, and General Mladic was there, and the rest of the group that I have mentioned earlier. • Q.: Do you get information that the units have entered the town? • A.: Sometime in the afternoon, I think it was around 1700 hours, the (10)commander of the 1st Battalion of the Zvornik Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Pandurevic, reported to the chief of Main Staff that he had entered the town, that part of his units had entered the town, and the other commanders reported that their units are on the heights around the town, in the vicinity of the town, very close to it. (15) • Q.: If I understand you correctly, not all of the units entered the town. • A.: Yes. After Lieutenant Colonel Pandurevic reported to the chief of Main Staff that a part of his unit had entered the town, then General Mladic commanded me and General Zivanovic to follow him to Srebrenica, to (20)come with him to Srebrenica. Of course, we immediately set off in our respective vehicles along the Pribicevac-Zeleni Jadar-Bojna-Srebrenica route. As we entered Srebrenica, we encountered Lieutenant Colonel Pandurevic, who reported to the chief of Main Staff, saying that a part of his unit, around a hundred soldiers, had entered the town. (25)
• Q.: Who did you find in the very centre of the town?
• Q.: So in the centre of the town, there's you, General Zivanovic, General Mladic, and a report is being made to General Mladic. Was that a regular thing to do in terms of ranks? Was it a customary thing, to report to the highest-ranking officer? (10) • A.: Yes, it is a common military rule. • Q.: As you entered the town, in addition to the officers that you have mentioned, did you also see Lieutenant Colonel Popovic and Lieutenant Pelemis who was the commander of the 10th Sabotage Detachment? • A.: No. (15) • Q.: In the course of this operation, throughout that period of time, did Lieutenant Colonel Popovic -- was Lieutenant Colonel Popovic present in any way, either on a regular basis or from time to time, at the Pribicevac forward command post? • A.: No. Lieutenant Colonel Popovic did not at any point in time show (20)up at the Pribicevac forward command post. • Q.: When you entered Srebrenica, did you see members of the 10th Sabotage Detachment?
• A.: In Srebrenica, I did see soldiers, but I don't know what unit they
belonged to, the soldiers who were in Srebrenica. I thought that they
(25)were the soldiers of the Drina Corps units. So I didn't notice, nor did I
• Q.: The members of the 10th Sabotage Detachment have a typical uniform, if one can call it that way. It is a black uniform, and I should like to know whether you could observe, whether you indeed noticed that (5)black uniform which would enable you to identify them as members of the 10th Sabotage Detachment? • A.: Due to the length of time that I spent at my post as the Chief of Staff of the corps, I was not in a position, I was not in a situation to know all of the officers at the corps, so I didn't know all of the (10)battalion commanders in subordinate units, let alone know the soldiers from some other unit which was not part of the organisational structure of the Drina Corps. The fact that they were wearing black uniforms, I wasn't paying any attention to that. In those times, various uniforms were being worn. (15)We had soldiers who wore uniforms which resembled the uniforms worn by NATO soldiers. We even have uniforms which were similar to the uniforms of the BiH army soldiers. I simply didn't pay any attention to them, and the fact that I passed by didn't enable me to notice anything in particular. It didn't (20)strike me as anything strange. I didn't even think about that. I didn't think about what unit they may have been members of and what soldiers they were.
• Q.: While you were at the forward command post, did you at any point
in time receive any piece of information to the effect that that
(25)particular unit might show up in Srebrenica and take part in the
• A.: No. Neither myself nor any of my staff officers, I'm referring to the group who came with me to the forward command post, we didn't have any knowledge, any information to the effect that the 10th Sabotage Detachment (5)had arrived in the area of Srebrenica. • Q.: Colonel Trivic reported to General Mladic. What happened next amongst the officers who were there?
• A.: After Colonel Trivic had made a report to the commander of the
Main Staff and after we had greeted the present officers, the commander of
(10)the Main Staff ordered the brigade commanders to continue immediately with
the attack in the direction of Potocari and Bratunac. After he had issued
such an order, we were confused, and we realised that his decision, his
order, was not a logical one. It made no sense, simply because, through
our intelligence data, we knew that the civilian population from the
(15)surrounding villages of the town of Srebrenica, in particular to the south
of Srebrenica, on the previous days and on that very day, had already set
out in the direction of Potocari, towards the UN base.
This is what the brigade commanders said to the commander of the
Main Staff, and they explained to him that, should the units continue with
(20)the attack towards Potocari and Bratunac, there would be extremely severe
consequences for the VRS and also for the civilian population which was
already in Potocari.
At the time, we still didn't know and we still didn't have contact
with the 28th Division. We didn't know whether they had managed to pull
(25)out. We didn't know whether the members of the 28th Division were perhaps
• Q.: You said that General Zivanovic had issued an order and that there (15)was a danger because of the euphoric state of mind that the soldiers were in. What General Zivanovic are you talking about? • A.: I believe I said General Mladic and not General Zivanovic. • Q.: You have probably misspoken, General. You were talking about the activities of General Mladic. (20) • A.: Yes, I'm referring to the order which was issued by General Mladic. • Q.: This order concerns both you and General Zivanovic.
• A.: Yes. It concerns myself and General Zivanovic. After the brigade
commanders had received the order to hold the attack on the lines that had
(25)been reached and to stabilise the deployment of the units, they indeed did
• Q.: So you left Srebrenica and went to Bratunac? • A.: No, I didn't leave Srebrenica for Bratunac. Immediately after we had received the order and had been informed about the meeting -- the time of the meeting and my presence there, I went back to the Pribicevac (10)forward command post along the Srebrenica-Bojna-Zeleni Jadar-Pribicevac axis. So, I went back. • Q.: Who did you find at Pribicevac? • A.: At the Pribicevac forward command post, I found Colonel Vicic, Lieutenant Colonel Kosoric, and the commander of the staff command, (15)Lieutenant Amovic. • Q.: So those were probably already evening hours? • A.: Yes, it was already evening, around 8.00. • Q.: Did you, at that point, leave Pribicevac and go to Bratunac?
• A.: After I had briefed Colonel Vicic about what General Mladic had
(20)ordered, that is, that the units should stop at the lines and stabilise
their positions, I ordered Colonel Vicic to continue monitoring the
situation in the units. And after that, I left for Bratunac along the
Pribicevac-Sase-Bratunac route.
So I left along this route, Pribicevac-Sase-Voljevica-Bratunac,
(25)and I arrived in the Bratunac Brigade command.
• A.: No, this route didn't go through Potocari. This was the route that we had used prior to the beginning of the operation in order to reach (5)the forward command post at Pribicevac. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] At this point, Mr. President, I should like to suggest a break. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, let us have a 15-minute break. (10) --- Recess taken at 11.16 a.m. --- On resuming at 11.35 a.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Petrusic. Please continue. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] (15) • Q.: Briefly, General, talking about the 11th of July, when the NATO forces were operating, were there any casualties among members of the Drina Corps? • A.: After the NATO air force shelled Caus, Pribicevac, and the Bojna feature, after they bombed these features, the forces of the Drina Corps, (20)in terms of personnel, did not suffer any casualties. There was only a large number of soldiers who suffered contusions -- concussions because of the explosions, and there was damage on motor vehicles. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Could we have Exhibit 80, please.
• Q.: So you reached the forward command post at Pribicevac from
(25)Srebrenica. You issued certain assignments to Colonel Vicic; is that
• A.: Yes. • Q.: Exhibit number 80 bears the number 03/4-1617, dated the 11th of July, 1995. It is issued by the Main Staff of the Army of Republika (5)Srpska, by assistant commander Major-General Milan Gvero to the Drina Corps command at the forward command post number 1. Were you familiar with the contents of this document?
• A.: After I went back to the forward command post at Pribicevac from
Srebrenica, I was given this document and I was familiar with its
(10)content. It is directly addressed to the Drina Corps command at the
forward command post number 1 of the Drina Corps at Pribicevac. Just as I
was familiar with the previous warning with respect to UNPROFOR, so I also
studied this document sent by the assistant commander for morale, legal,
and religious issues, General Milan Gvero.
(15)I do not recollect what day it was prior to this date when the
commander of the Zvornik Brigade, Colonel Vinko Pandurevic, informed me
that forces, or rather soldiers of the Dutch Battalion who were at a
checkpoint near Zeleni Jadar had surrendered, or rather had crossed to the
forces of Republika Srpska, the reason being that they were afraid of
(20)retaliation by troops of the BH army and of the 28th Division and that
they might be used against the forces of the VRS and that they simply
would be having trouble with them.
I was also informed by the commander of the Zvornik Brigade that
this group of soldiers was sent to Bratunac. I don't remember what day
(25)that was. It could have been sometime between the end of the day of the
• Q.: So you arrived from Pribicevac to Bratunac, to the already scheduled meeting. This is the evening by now, so could you explain what was happening that evening and where the meeting was held. (5) • A.: The commander of the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska, as I have already said, ordered General Zivanovic, myself, Major Jevdjevic, and the brigade commanders engaged in this operation to report to him at a meeting of the command of the Bratunac Brigade at 2200 hours. When I arrived to the command of the Bratunac Brigade, in the hall (10)where the meeting was due to be held, I found the following officers: the commander of the 1st Zvornik Infantry Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Pandurevic; the commander of the 1st Birac Infantry Brigade, Colonel Andric; the commander of the 1st Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade, Colonel Blagojevic; the commander of the Milici Brigade, Major Nastic. Also (15)present when I arrived was Major Jevdjevic, who was not at the forward command post Pribicevac when I returned there from Srebrenica. After some time, around 2000 hours -- no, I'm sorry, about 2200 hours -- not later, it may have been a couple of minutes earlier than that -- General Mladic arrived at the brigade headquarters, together with (20)General Zivanovic, when the meeting actually began. • Q.: In addition to the commanding officers you have listed, were officers from the Security Service also present at any level whatsoever? • A.: No, not a single officer of any level from the Security Service was present. (25)
• Q.: What about the intelligence service?
• Q.: So the meeting began, and who chaired the meeting? • A.: The meeting started, and it was chaired by General Mladic. • Q.: Tell us, what was the topic of the meeting? (5) • A.: The first thing he told us was that he and General Zivanovic had just returned from a meeting with a commander of the Dutch UNPROFOR Battalion, Colonel Karremans. He did not provide any details regarding the substance of that meeting; he just told us that it had been held. After that, he ordered that the forces of the Drina Corps which (10)had participated in the operation Krivaja 95 until Srebrenica was entered, should, during the night, be pulled out and gather in the area of Viogora, in the area of Viogora to the west of Srebrenica, as indicated by these arrows. This is the area he meant. • Q.: So for the record, it should be noted that it is the area of the (15)mountain of Viogora which is to the northwest of Srebrenica; is that correct? • A.: West of Srebrenica, west of Srebrenica. And after that, that they should organise a march and head for -- along the following route: Viogora, Suceska, Derventa, Milici, Vlasenica, Han Pijesak, Plane, and (20)that they should prepare for offensive operations for Zepa. In that connection, he also said the following: He ordered, saying, "General Krstic will be the commander of these forces that will be conducting the operation for Zepa."
• Q.: Did you or any of the others present comment on the decision or
(25)order issued by General Mladic?
• Q.: Were there any further questions or comments? • A.: Yes. He said, "I will be in command of these and other forces in (15)this area, and you will go where I have ordered you to go." Also, General Mladic, as soon as he had issued his order for the forces of the Drina Corps to pull out and congregate in the area of Viogora mountain, he ordered Jevdjevic to go to the next forward command post. Major Jevdjevic immediately left the meeting and went to carry out his assignment. (20) MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Mr. Usher, can we have exhibit number D98.
• Q.: This is the order number 03/4-1616, dated the 11th of July, 1995.
It is issued by the commander Lieutenant General Ratko Mladic. It is
designated as very urgent and it is addressed to the command of the Drina
(25)Corps, the 65th Protective Motorised Regiment, the 67th Communications
• A.: I have never seen this order before. In fact, I did study it so
(5)that I can give you a comment. This is an order to the Drina Corps
command, to the 65th Protective Motorised Regiment, and the 67th
Communications Regiment -- this was also a unit of the Main Staff -- and
for the information of the Drina Corps units. That's the 2nd Romanija
Motorised Brigade; the 1st Vlasenica Brigade, Infantry, Light Brigade; the
(10)1st Milici Light Infantry Brigade; and the 1st Podrinje Light Infantry
Brigade. It refers to the information related to the request of the 28th
Division, of the command of the 28th Division, for the forces of the 28th
Division that had been transferred from Srebrenica and Zepa, as planned,
to the Sarajevo theatre, for them to immediately head to Srebrenica, or
(15)return to Srebrenica.
This order also provides the axes along which they are to return,
and these are the shortest routes leading to Srebrenica and Zepa, and I
will mention them.
The first axis was Medov Do -- I will show it later -- Sljemenska
(20)Planina, Devetak, Boksanica Mountain, Zepa, Srebrenica. This is the wider
area of the municipality of Olovo, Medov Do, then -- I'm showing it on the
map now -- Sljemenska Planina, Devetak -- it is not on the map -- the
Boksanica Mountain -- it is not on the map -- Zepa, and on to Srebrenica.
The second axis was Spiljanska Stijena, Igrista, Partizansko
(25)Polje, Zezenica, Kupusna, and on through Stedra and Nurici, towards Kosovo
(25)
• Q.: Does that mean that this task had already been given to the 65th
• A.: This order specifies that this is a task that the regiment had received earlier. • Q.: So you received this order at that meeting, and did the meeting (5)end with this order? • A.: No. The meeting did not end as yet -- MR. HARMON: The witness testified that he had never seen this order before and the question says -- that was asked by my colleague was, "So you received this order at the meeting," which appears to be a (10)conflict between the two, and we would object to the leading question. And if there is a clarification that needs to be made, perhaps it should be made by General Krstic. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Mr. President. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, yes, Mr. Petrusic. (15) MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Mr. President, when I was asking my last question to which Mr. Harmon objected, I was referring to the order that General Mladic issued at the meeting on the 11th of July in the evening at 2200 hours, and the order referred to the operation that was supposed to be taken towards Zepa, and I was not referring to the order (20)that General Krstic has been commenting on. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Thank you, Mr. Petrusic, but you should try and ask your questions as clearly as possible in order to avoid any confusion. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] (25)
• Q.: General, after General Mladic in the evening hours of the 11th had
• A.: No. The meeting went on for a little while, and during that time, General Mladic informed all those who were present at the meeting of the fact that he had received a decree from the president of Republika Srpska (5)to the effect that the civilian commissioner in Srebrenica should be appointed, and that Mr. Deronjic should be appointed commissioner, and that he was supposed to establish a civilian authority in the town itself and in the territory of the Srebrenica municipality. • Q.: Did you as Chief of Staff at that meeting, you and other officers (10)who were present at the meeting, did you know anything about the 28th Division and the route via which it was leaving the enclave? • A.: Even before this meeting, immediately after we had entered the town and also during the meeting at the Bratunac Brigade headquarters, we didn't know anything, we didn't have any knowledge about the forces of the (15)28th Division. • Q.: What were your activities after the meeting ended? What did you do? • A.: After the meeting, General Mladic ordered me to come to a meeting that was supposed to be held at 2300 hours at the Fontana Hotel in (20)Bratunac. After he had ordered me that, he left the headquarters, together with General Zivanovic. • Q.: That order, or rather, notice about a meeting, was it received by any other officer who was present at that meeting?
• A.: No. None of the officers who were present at the meeting received
(25)this order.
• A.: Yes. The meeting began at 2300 hours on the 11th of July. • Q.: Who were the participants of that meeting? • A.: The meeting at the Fontana Hotel in Bratunac which started at 2300 (5)on the 11th of July was attended by General Mladic, myself, then there was a colonel whom we hadn't seen from before but later on. During the proceedings in this case, mention was made of Colonel Jankovic, and that was him. Present at the meeting was also the chief of security of the Drina Corps, Lieutenant Colonel Popovic, and my assistant commander for (10)intelligence affairs, Lieutenant Colonel Kosoric. There were several other individuals from the civilian authorities, and I believe that the meeting was also attended by the president of the municipal assembly of Bratunac, Mr. Simic. Colonel Karremans, the commander of the Dutch Battalion, also (15)attended the meeting, together with one or two other of his officers, his subordinates. Present at the meeting was also the representatives of Bosniaks, Mr. Mandzic, whom I didn't know, whom I hadn't met before. • Q.: Was General Zivanovic present at the meeting? (20) • A.: No, General Zivanovic was not present at that meeting. • Q.: Do you know whether General Zivanovic, the Corps Commander, and we are talking about the 11th of July, was he the commander at that time?
• A.: Yes, he was the Corps Commander, and the reason why he was absent
was probably because he was involved in some other matters according to
(25)his own plan or pursuant to orders of General Mladic.
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Petrusic, please, would you (5)ask your witness for specific information and do not engage in speculation. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] • Q.: General, at that time while this meeting was being held, do you know whether anyone was involved in the preparations of everything that (10)should accompany an operation such as the Zepa operation? • A.: No. At that moment, I -- all I could do was to think about the manner in which the Drina Corps forces could be taken to Zepa and used further on. That was my job. That was my responsibility. I was the only one who could do that because General Mladic had issued a clear order to (15)the -- that I was to be the commander for those operations. • Q.: Let us go back to the meeting. What was on the agenda? • A.: The subject of the meeting -- JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Petrusic, I'm sorry to interrupt you, I don't know if I am right, but it seems to me that General (20)Krstic would need a break at this point. I don't know whether -- it seems to me that he's in pain. I might be wrong. Am I right or wrong, General? THE ACCUSED: [Int.] Your Honour, Mr. President, you are right. I would need a break at this point. (25)
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Yes, very well. We will have a
--- Recess taken at 12.14 p.m. --- Upon resuming at 12.32 p.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Petrusic, you may continue. (5) MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] • Q.: General, we had stopped at the meeting of the 11th, at 2300 hours. Could you tell us, what was the agenda of that meeting?
• A.: It is very hard for me to remember the exact contents of the whole
meeting, but I will tell you what I do remember. General Mladic, with the
(10)representative of the Bosniak side, Mr. Mandzic, was having a dialogue.
Of course, he spoke much more than did Mr. Mandzic. He was saying to
Mr. Mandzic that the Muslims in the area, from the very beginning of the
conflict to that day, had committed great atrocities against the Serb
population and that is why the army of Republika Srpska had been forced to
(15)carry out such an operation. He also said that he had nothing against the
civilian population, that the aim of the Republika Srpska and its army was
not the civilian population, but he wanted him to give him information as
to the location of the 28th Division, where they had gone to.
He also told him that all those who had committed crimes from
(20)among the members of that division must be held to account for what they
had done. He requested that he get in touch with the 28th Division and
that he should advise them to surrender their weapons, to lay down their
arms and to surrender, and that it is quite normal that measures would be
taken against those for which there is available information that
(25)they -- and evidence that they had committed war crimes. And he
• Q.: You and the others attending the meeting did not take the floor? (20) • A.: No. No one except General Mladic took the floor about anything at that meeting. • Q.: After that meeting, did you have any contact or conversation with General Mladic?
• A.: No, I had no contact, but he only told all those present that
(25)there would be another meeting the next day, on the 12th of July,
• Q.: Where did you go after that meeting? • A.: When the meeting ended, I went to the headquarters of the Bratunac (5)Brigade, to sleep there. • Q.: The next day, the 12th of July, what did you do?
• A.: My activities were primarily linked with the tasks assigned to me
in connection with the Zepa operation. I got up early, at 6.00. I
dropped in to see the duty officer, and he told me that General Mladic had
(10)ordered that I should attend again the meeting at 1000 hours.
After that, I immediately went to the forward command post at
Pribicevac, where I found Colonel Vicic and the commander of the staff
command, Lieutenant Amovic, at the forward command post Pribicevac. I
went to Pribicevac from Bratunac, taking the same route I had taken to go
(15)to the meeting, and that is Bratunac, Voljevica, Sase, Pribicevac.
When I reached the Pribicevac forward command post, I conveyed to
Colonel Vicic immediately the tasks we had been assigned linked to Zepa,
and I told him that, in that connection, we had very, very little time
because the units had to be congregated, led to the deployment lines, and
(20)that we needed to prepare the most fundamental documents linked to that
operation.
On the spot, we discussed this assignment. I gave Colonel Vicic
the basic guidelines as to what he had to do while he was still at the
Pribicevac forward command post in that connection, and I passed on to him
(25)certain points regarding the drafting of the order and the specification
(5) • Q.: Can you tell us who attended that meeting? • A.: That meeting was attended by the same persons, almost by the same persons who had attended the previous meeting, except for one additional representative of Bosniaks, a lady that was there as well. As for the Serb side, the participants were mostly the same as those present at the (10)previous meeting. • Q.: So the Muslim side was represented by Mr. Mandzic? • A.: Yes. Mr. Mandzic and this lady whose name escapes me at the moment. • Q.: As regards officers of the Drina Corps or the Main Staff? (15) • A.: From the Main Staff, present was General Mladic, Colonel Jankovic. I can't remember whether anyone else was present. As for the Drina Corps, I myself was there, Lieutenant Colonel Popovic, and Lieutenant Colonel Kosoric. Yes, I remember. There was one other officer from the Main Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Milutinovic, who was chief of (20)intelligence service at the -- information service at the information, morale, and religious department, religious issues department. The meeting was also attended by the president of the Bratunac Municipal Assembly and the newly-appointed commissioner for Srebrenica, Mr. Deronjic. (25)
• Q.: What about the Dutch Battalion?
• Q.: Could you tell us something about the agenda of that meeting.
• A.: The agenda was more or less the same as during the first meeting,
and again General Mladic spoke at some length, or rather talked to the
(5)representatives of the Bosniak community, especially with the lady who
attended the meeting. He requested that Mr. Mandzic and the lady, that
they should tell him what the residents of Srebrenica, or rather the
protected area of Srebrenica, had decided. As far as I remember, the lady
said that they had decided that they would go to the free territory.
(10)General Mladic said the same he did at the previous meeting. He told
Mr. Mandzic that they could decide to remain in the territory of Republika
Srpska or to leave for the free territory. I think that she said that
they had decided that they would go to Tuzla and Kladanj.
The lady engaged in a conversation for some time with the people
(15)whom she knew. I believe she talked to Mr. Deronjic, but I cannot
remember the details of their conversation. And as far as Colonel
Karremans is concerned, he told him the same thing as at the previous
meeting; he requested fuel again and the surrender of the 28th Division.
But I can't remember what Colonel Karremans told him about the fuel, but
(20)as far as the 28th Division is concerned, he said he was unable to meet
his request because it was simply impossible. He also said that should
the population be moved, or rather evacuated, that in that case, as far as
the escort is concerned, the UNPROFOR forces should also take part in
that.
(25)At that time, it was already obvious that the evacuation would
• Q.: After the meeting had ended, where did you go?
• A.: After the meeting, which I believe ended around 1200 hours on that
day, I went back to the Pribicevac forward command post. My intention was
to pass through Srebrenica on that occasion, but I ran into a checkpoint
(15)at Potocari which was manned by the troops of the 65th Protective
Motorised Regiment, and the soldiers there told me that nobody could pass
through the checkpoint before General Mladic and that that was his order,
and indeed this is how I interpreted that: as an order. So I respected
it, because the soldiers are supposed to respect orders issued by their
(20)superiors. And also I thought -- I didn't have anyone with me as my
escort except for my driver, and I actually didn't know what was happening
with the refugees up there, so I respected the request that was made by
the soldiers manning the checkpoint.
While I was there for this very brief period of time, I listened
(25)to those soldiers, but at the same time I noticed the presence of a TV
(10) • Q.: What did you order to Lieutenant Colonel Kosoric? • A.: Well, Lieutenant Colonel Kosoric is my -- I'm superior officer to him. He was the assistant commander for intelligence section. • Q.: After the interview -- actually, tell us about the contents of the interview, first of all. (15) • A.: The topic of the interview concerned the task that we were accomplishing. They wanted to know what I thought about NATO air strikes, and I gave my opinion. They asked me about the civilians, and I told them that a meeting had just been completed and that it had been agreed that they would be transferred to the free territory, and also that safety and (20)security was guaranteed during the evacuation through their representatives who attended the meeting. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Harmon, you're on your feet.
MR. HARMON: Yes, Mr. President, and my apologies for the
interruption. I'm not sure if this is a mistake or not, but on line
(25)12:56:08 is a reference, "Colonel Popovic because I was not his
MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Obviously the record is not correct. Let us try and clarify it through a question. Thank you, (5)Mr. Harmon. • Q.: Lieutenant Colonel Popovic, is he your subordinate? • A.: I said that he was not my subordinate officer and that I was not his superior officer. He was an assistant commander to the Corps Commander with the same level as myself, who was the Chief of Staff; and (10)he had the same authority as myself when -- in terms of relationship with the commanders from his section. • Q.: Thank you. So you saw those officers at the checkpoint, Kosoric and Popovic, and after the interview, where did you go? • A.: After I gave the interview and after I told Colonel Kosoric to (15)report to me at Krivace, I went back in the direction of Bratunac, but I turned in the direction of Voljevica and took the same route to go back to Pribicevac, the same route I had used to come to the meeting: Bratunac, Voljevica, Sase, Pribicevac. • Q.: Did you find Colonel Vicic there? (20) • A.: Yes. That's where I found Colonel Vicic. • Q.: Did Colonel Vicic report to you about what he had done in the meantime as regards the task that he had been assigned?
• A.: Yes. He briefed me or reported to me that he had carried out work
in the spirit of the order that he had been -- the task that he had been
(25)given, and that he had drafted the basic combat documents for the command
(5) • Q.: Is this where you -- is this the point from which you went to the new forward command post at Krivace? • A.: When I arrived at the forward command post at Pribicevac from the meeting in Bratunac, it was around, I think, 1330 or maybe 1400 hours. I stayed there for a while, acquainted myself with what Colonel Vicic had (10)done, we had lunch together, and then we went together to Viogora, where the units were supposed to assemble. This was the assembly area for the units engaged in the operation. We headed towards Viogora on the route Pribicevac, Zeleni Jadar, Srebrenica, Viogora. • Q.: General, there's no need for you to point at the map; it is (15)sufficient for you to name the locations along the route. • A.: I just wanted to indicate that the part of the route from Srebrenica to Viogora, as I said, Viogora is to the west of Srebrenica, and there is a road leading from Srebrenica-Viogora-Suceska-Derventa to Milici. (20) • Q.: So did you, on your way to Viogora, catch up with the units of the Drina Corps, or in general, where were these units at the time?
• A.: At the moment when we were just very close to Viogora, we caught
up with the -- some of the units that were pulling out from their previous
positions. But at the time when we came to the Viogora itself, I was
(25)informed that all the units had already gathered in the area, in
• Q.: Did you find the commanding officers of these units there? • A.: Up there, I found Lieutenant Colonel Pandurevic, then Colonel Andric, Colonel Trivic, and Major Nastic, the commander of the Milici Brigade. (15) • Q.: Did you issue any orders to them for the purpose of the next action? • A.: I stayed there for a very short time, and I ordered them to speed up the process of assembling and moving the units in order to execute the next task. (20) • Q.: Do you have any knowledge about the security or protection for the march route towards the Krivace forward command post?
• A.: Since Major Nastic was at the meeting in Bratunac and since he had
heard the axis along which the forces from Viogora were to organise
themselves and to march on the Milici-Vlasenica-Han Pijesak route,
(25)immediately upon his return he took appropriate action to secure the
• Q.: So the units of the Drina Corps, or parts of the Drina Corps, were assembling in the area of the Viogora Mountain. What road will they use -- or rather, who designated the road that they were to use to get to the point where they would be executing their next mission? (10)
• A.: General Mladic ordered which route should be taken, the march
route that was to be taken to the area of deployment or the area of
engagement, towards Zepa, of course for those forces that would be
carrying out the attack on Zepa from the direction of Han Pijesak.
However, I had been thinking ever since that time about many more
(15)things, about what the Bratunac and Milici Brigade would be doing, because
Colonel Vicic and myself, while we were still at Pribicevac, we had been
discussing the possible routes and the forces to be engaged along those
routes or axes. That is why the forces of the Zvornik Brigade, of the 2nd
Romanija Brigade, the 1st Birac Brigade, were organised, and they marched
(20)from Viogora, along Viogora-Suceska-Derventa-Milici-Vlasenica-Han
Pijesak-Plane.
As regards the Milici Brigade and the Bratunac Brigade and the
Skelani battalion, the order was that, taking all safety precautions, they
should assemble and go to the wider area of Podravanje, Bracani and Rudnik
(25)-- or, I'm sorry, the bauxite mine.
MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Mr. President, the Defence would like to stop here, and we suggest that we have the lunch break now. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Petrusic. We will have our one-hour break at this point. (15) --- Luncheon recess taken at 1.16 p.m. --- --- On resuming at 2.17 p.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Petrusic, please continue. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Thank you, Mr. President. (20) • Q.: General, before the break, you talked about the Bratunac Brigade, the Milici Brigade, and the Skelani Independent Battalion and their assembly area. Why this area, the area of the Podravanje-Bracani-Rupovo Brdo is a different area from the area in which other units taking part or preparing for the combat operations against Zepa are being assembled? (25)
• A.: This was done for the following reason: When I was with Colonel
• Q.: Was this an order that was issued to these units? (15) • A.: No. At that time, the order had not yet been issued to these units, but as I passed through the Viogora area, I conveyed all this, communicated all this, to Major Nastic, and he was to communicate this to Colonel Blagojevic. And later on, we will see that when they gathered at the Krivace forward command post, that I did issue that order to the (20)brigade commanders. • Q.: Where did you go after this assembly was over, and can you describe the routes that you took -- you don't need to show us on the map -- and where did you arrive? What happened, briefly, on that day? I think it's the 12th. (25)
• A.: Yes, this is still the 12th of July, 1995. After a brief stay at
(5) • Q.: Sorry, did you arrive at the command post in Vlasenica, you mean the Drina Corps command post? • A.: Yes, that's correct, the Drina Corps command post in Vlasenica. • Q.: Whom did you find there at the command post? • A.: At the command post in Vlasenica, I'd say that the situation there (10)was business as usual. I did not notice any increased presence of officers. I did not go to all of the offices of the organs of the command to determine in any way which of the officers were present there, but in the operations room I did find the duty operations officer of the Drina Corps command. (15) • Q.: Did he brief you or submit any kind of report to you?
• A.: I think that, on that day, as far as I can remember, the duty
operations officer was Colonel Jocic, Predrag Jocic. He was also from the
corps staff in the operations and training section. He was there as the
duty officer on that day. He gave me a brief report about the situation
(20)in the corps, in particular as regards the area of responsibility of the
corps, which I had not visited for several days.
He said that in the Romanija plateau, which is an area on -- in
the direction of Sarajevo from Vlasenica where the forces of the 2nd
Romanija Motorised Brigade were defending their positions against Kladanj
(25)and Orlovo, and the 1st Podrinje Brigade from Rogatica towards Gorazde and
• Q.: At the Vlasenica command post, did you encounter General Zivanovic there? (10) • A.: No. • Q.: How come that the report was submitted to you by the duty operations officer? Was this in accordance with the rules? • A.: Yes, that was the rule. It was his duty to monitor the situation in the area of responsibility of the corps and to take appropriate (15)measures that are within his jurisdiction. The problems that he is unable to solve, of course, he has to report to the superior officer. • Q.: After his report, did you take any measures in light of his report? • A.: No. I did not take any measures to that effect. (20) • Q.: In light of the situation, was there any indication that the combat operations against Zepa would be cancelled, aborted? • A.: No, there were no indications. I did not get any signals from anyone that it was possible, that there was any possibility that the operation against Zepa would be postponed. (25)
• Q.: What was your opinion in this respect?
• Q.: How long did you stay at the corps command? • A.: I stayed there for a very short time. After I received the report from the duty operations officer, I personally carried out some preparations for my departure for Zepa. (15) • Q.: Was Colonel Vicic with you there? • A.: Yes, Colonel Vicic was with me. In addition to carrying out these preparations, I also ordered him draft the text and to prepare a graphic overview of the documents regarding the Zepa operation, as we have agreed at the Pribicevac forward command post. (20) • Q.: Where did you go after you left Vlasenica? • A.: After I left Vlasenica, I went to Han Pijesak. • Q.: So this is still the 12th of July?
• A.: Yes. This is the evening of the 12th of July. I went to Han
Pijesak to visit my brother and my mother, and then my wife's family in
(25)the village of Kusace, near the forward command post at Krivace. The
• Q.: When did you arrive at Krivace? • A.: I said that I visited my brother and mother. That's the village of Ljeskovac, four kilometres to the south of Han Pijesak. Then this is (5)the village of Kusace, further down the road, where my wife's family live. That's near the road Han Pijesak-Pozeplje-Zepa. The village of Krivace -- that was the forward command post of the Drina Corps -- is on the eastern slopes of the Zep Mountain, immediately to the east, and the forward command post was between the feature itself and the village of (10)Krivace. MR. HARMON: Excuse me, Mr. President. I apologise for interrupting, but we never got an answer to the question that was posed by my colleague. The question was: When did you arrive at Krivace? And we still have not heard the answer to that question. (15) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Petrusic. Continue, please. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Yes. That was my next question. • Q.: When did you arrive at the forward command post at Krivace? • A.: I arrived between 2200 and 2300 hours at the forward command post, (20)after having spent quite some time with my brother, my mother, and my wife's family. • Q.: Can you tell us: What was going on at the forward command post and where did you go after that?
• A.: It was quite late at night already. I just came to the forward
(25)command post. I saw several soldiers from the staff command, from the
• Q.: So now we go on to the 13th of July. What happened on that day? • A.: On the 13th of July, after I had spent the night, I went straight (10)to the forward command post at Krivace. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] I would now like to ask the usher to place the Prosecution Exhibit 483 on the ELMO. • Q.: So, General, you arrive at Krivace. Where did you go after that that morning? (15)
• A.: After I had arrived at the Krivace forward command post, I
established what the situation was at the forward command post, what its
capacity was to be used as the command and control post before the actual
beginning of the operations. At the Krivace forward command post I found
Lieutenant Colonel Kosoric; Lieutenant Colonel Jevitski; Major Jevdjevic;
(20)the commander of the staff command, Lieutenant Amovic; and the soldier of
the communications battalion and the staff command.
After I had made a tour of the post, I went back and proceeded on
to Vlasenica, to the command post in Vlasenica, in order to establish how
far Colonel Vicic had gone in his drafting of the combat document, and
(25)also in order to take him back to the Krivace forward command post.
• A.: At the Vlasenica command post, like on the previous day, I found the duty officers, the operations duty officer, a number of other officers, and a number of civilians who were there as part of their (5)military obligation. After a while, General Mladic arrived, together with General Zivanovic, from the direction of Bratunac and Milici, and upon their arrival, General Mladic orders that all of the officers and civilian employees who were there should assemble, the people who were there in the (10)corridor of the Corps command. He asked me about the preparations for the Zepa operation, and after I told him that the preparations were underway and that it was possible to proceed with the attack that had been ordered by him, he spoke to the officers and civilian employees who were there. He congratulated (15)them on the success of the Drina Corps units in the Srebrenica operation, and he told me, "Krstic, you are the commander of the forces engaged towards Zepa." So he told me, actually, the same thing, the same thing that he had ordered me in Bratunac: "Until the completion of the Zepa operation, you should not be coming back to the Vlasenica command post." (20) • Q.: After that, after he had spoken those words, what did you do?
• A.: After that, together with Colonel Vicic but in two separate
vehicles, we set off in the direction of Han Pijesak. Together with
Lieutenant Savic who also went with me, I went to the hospital of the Main
Staff in Sokolac to visit the wounded there. As for Colonel Vicic, he
(25)continued to the Krivace forward command post.
• A.: Yes. • Q.: How long did you stay there? • A.: I stayed for about one hour at the Sokolac military hospital. I (5)visited the wounded, and I left the hospital after that, together with Lieutenant Savic. And on the way to Sokolac from Han Pijesak, we passed through the village of Sokolovici, Sokolac-Han Pijesak. So on my return journey from Sokolac towards Han Pijesak, we stopped at the village of Sokolovici where Lieutenant Savic's mother lived. (10)So we went to his mother's place; we had lunch together, and thereafter I returned to the Krivace forward command post. We stayed at his mother's for about one hour, not more than that. • Q.: In the afternoon hours of the 13th of July -- actually, I should like you to tell us the time when you left the Sokolac military hospital (15)and came to the Krivace forward command post, having passed through the village of Sokolovici. • A.: After our visit to the village of Sokolovici, together with Lieutenant Savic, I visited my in-laws in the Kusace village. We had coffee there. We stayed there for a short time, and after that, I went to (20)the Krivace forward command post. • Q.: Could you tell us the time it was? • A.: I think that it was sometime between 17 and 1800 hours that day. • Q.: So what did you do once you arrived --
MR. HARMON: Excuse me, Mr. President. It's unclear to me whether
(25)the last answer related to the time that he visited -- that General Krstic
(10) MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] I will repeat my question. Yes, Mr. President? JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Petrusic, I think that we need some clarification. I think it is always possible to clear up any misunderstanding. (15)General Krstic said that he had arrived at Krivace around 17 or 1800 hours, but before that, they had had lunch in the village of Sokolovici at the place of the mother of one of his officers. We have two places here, and we need to know the time. If you can help us with that, please, Mr. Petrusic. (20) MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] • Q.: General, could you perhaps remember the time when you left the Sokolac military hospital?
• A.: So I'm talking about the 13th of July, after I had left Vlasenica
together with Lieutenant Savic and went to the military hospital of the
(25)general staff. That happened on the 13th of July.
• A.: I believe that it was sometime between 14 and 1500 hours. (5) • Q.: My next question is, what was the time when you left the village of Sokolovici and went to the forward command post in Krivace? • A.: After we had spent one hour with the mother of Lieutenant Savic, we left for the village of Kusace to see my in-laws, so this could have been sometime around 1600 hours. We stayed there for a short period of (10)time on that same day in the village of Kusace, and we finally arrived at the Krivace forward command post between 17 and 1800 hours. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] I hope that the issue has been clarified with respect of time. • Q.: So General, finally, you reach the forward command post. What do (15)you do then? Who do you find at the forward command post, and what is the situation there at Krivace?
• A.: When I arrived at the Krivace forward command post, the place was
fully functional, and it was possible to exert command and control from
that post. And I received a report by Major Jevdjevic to that effect and
(20)also by the commander of the staff command, Lieutenant Amovic.
Together with Colonel Vicic, once again I had a look at the
documents that had been prepared by Colonel Vicic in the meantime, and
after that we called -- that is, Colonel Vicic had already told the
brigade commanders to come to the forward command post in order to receive
(25)their assignments and to execute a command reconnaissance.
• A.: Yes, that is the document in question, and that is the order. • Q.: This document, General, was it handed over to the unit commanders, and if so, to which units and what units were to take part in the operations that would start the next day? (10) • A.: Yes. After the brigade commanders arrived at the forward command post, they were given this order for the Zepa operation, which had the secret codename "Stupcanica 95." The order was given to the following commanders: the commander of the 1st Zvornik Infantry Brigade, the commander of the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade, commander of the Birac (15)Infantry Brigade, commander of the 2nd Romanija Motorised Brigade, commander of the 1st Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade, commander of the 5th Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade, commander of the 1st Milici Light Infantry Brigade, commander of the 1st Vlasenica Light Infantry Brigade, and the commander of the 5th Mixed Artillery Regiment. (20) • Q.: Pursuant to this order, did parts of the basic units of these brigades take part in the operation, and what was the strength of those units that were engaged in this operation?
• A.: Except for the 1st Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade and the 1st
Milici Light Infantry Brigade, which were engaged in their entirety in
(25)this operation, as far as other brigades are concerned, only certain
• Q.: So we are talking about 20 per cent of those brigades, so that 20-per-cent portion of the brigade was commanded by the brigade commander? • A.: Yes. • Q.: General, isn't that somewhat illogical, in view of the fact that (10)the major part of the said units had remained at their defensive lines? Who commanded them? • A.: Seen from the military perspective, that is entirely logical, because we are talking about offensive activities here. It is correct that the main body of forces of these particular units are in their (15)original areas, securing defence of those areas, and they were commanded by the Chiefs of Staff of these brigades. The officers in question are very experienced officers with many years of experience on their post. They were always ready to replace the brigade commander at any point in time. Furthermore, they were commanding the forces who had been at their (20)defensive positions, at their defensive lines, ever since the beginning of the conflict. So we are talking about very well-fortified lines. So for these reasons, this set-up is not illogical at all, as far as I'm concerned.
• Q.: You said, if I'm not mistaken, that the Milici and Bratunac
(25)Brigades -- strike that. Could you tell us the whereabouts of these two
• A.: The 1st Milici Light Infantry Brigade and the 1st Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade are still assembling in the area that was -- that had been ordered to them as the starting point to execute their task as part (5)of the Zepa operation. • Q.: Were they complete or did they arrive in parts? • A.: Except for these two brigades -- these two brigades were completely engaged in the execution of their assignment towards Zepa. • Q.: In this order that you yourself prepared, on page 2, paragraph 7, (10)the text is as follows: The first Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade was supposed to detach a unit to the strength of a company which would be made part of the Milici Brigade and carry out assignments, the same assignments that were given to the Milici Light Infantry Brigade, and that they should report to the commander of the Milici Brigade in the area of Bracani by (15)1800 hours on the 13th of July, 1995. • A.: Yes. • Q.: Why?
• A.: Because of the situation in which the Milici Brigade had found
itself. I have already spoken about the problems this brigade was faced
(20)with regarding infiltration and sabotage activities in its rear. It had
to be reinforced with one company from the Bratunac Brigade in order to
successfully conduct the search of the terrain in the depth of its area of
responsibility, and it was later engaged in an attack on the wider
frontage towards Zepa. As I already said, it had to be reinforced because
(25)of that.
(5) • A.: We are not talking about engaging these forces but about a cooperation with the MUP forces that had been deployed for the purposes of the Zepa operation. The area in question is deep in the area of responsibility, which was west to the Zepa enclave, towards Han Pijesak and Vlasenica. It is true that the MUP is mentioned here, and as I have (10)already stated, those were its common assignments: to protect the villages or certain facilities, communication lines, and other features and facilities that were essential for the life and work of the population in a given area. • Q.: This order, at least in its introductory part -- or let me (15)rephrase the question. Was this order forwarded to the MUP units? • A.: No. Except for the brigades that can be found in the title of the document, no, the order was not forwarded to these units. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Mr. President, the Defence should like to suggest that we break at this point and continue tomorrow. I hope (20)that tomorrow we will be able to proceed at somewhat faster pace. And I cannot promise that we will be able to complete the testimony, but on the next day I'm sure -- on the day after that I'm sure that we will be able to finish the examination-in-chief.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Yes, Mr. Petrusic. Thank you.
(25)It's always good to hear good intentions and wishes. Let me just remind
--- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.05 p.m., to be reconvened on Friday, the 20th day of October, (10)2000, at 9.20 a.m. |
