|
Content
/ Colormap • Page 6404 • {1/83} (1)Thursday, 26 October 2000 [Open session] [The witness takes the stand] --- Upon commencing at 9.24 a.m. (5) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Good morning, ladies and gentlemen; good morning to the technicians, interpreters; good morning, legal assistant, registry; good morning, counsel for the Prosecution, counsel for the Defence. Good morning to you, General Krstic. We will be continuing with (10)your testimony. Let me remind you that you are still testifying under oath. And without much further ado, I will give the floor to Mr. McCloskey.
WITNESS: RADISLAV KRSTIC
[Resumed] MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, and good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours, counsel, and General Krstic. • CROSS-EXAMINED by Mr. McCloskey: [Continued] • Q.: General Krstic, we left off yesterday discussing the convoys that (20)were to come in to the Srebrenica enclave, and I believe you had explained that the Main Staff was the one that determined whether or not the convoys were allowed to go into the Srebrenica enclave; is that correct? • A.: Yes.
• Q.: And it was the job of the Drina Corps to implement the orders of
(25)the Main Staff in that regard, was it not?
• Q.: You received the communication from the Main Staff regarding which convoy could or could not go into the enclave; is that right? The Drina (5)Corps received that? • A.: I personally never received any such messages or orders to that effect. I mean while I was the Chief of Staff. I don't think that there was any single case involving a convoy entry to the protected area. • Q.: Who was the liaison officer for the Drina Corps for the Srebrenica (10)enclave? • A.: It was only during these proceedings that I realised that it was actually Major Nikolic who was an assistant commander to the Bratunac Brigade commander. He was an assistant for intelligence and security affairs. (15) • Q.: What position did -- I believe it's Lieutenant Colonel Vukovic -- have from the Skelani Separate Battalion, if I'm not mistaken? • A.: Colonel Vukovic was the commander of the Pribicevac Technical Group. • Q.: According to Colonel Karremans, Colonel Vukovic was one of the (20)principal liaison officers along with Major Nikolic. Do you recall that? • A.: I'm not familiar with that piece of information. I remember when he was testifying, I remember that Colonel Karremans was talking about a meeting that they attended -- whether it was in February or April, I don't remember -- that they were together at that meeting. (25)
• Q.: So you have no knowledge of Colonel Vukovic being the liaison
• A.: No. • Q.: Were convoys allowed into the Srebrenica enclave after the end of April 1995? (5) • A.: I don't know that. • Q.: Were you aware of the situation regarding the Muslim population and their conditions regarding food in the enclave after April 1995? • A.: No. MR. McCLOSKEY: If we could go to Exhibit 122A, and I believe 122B (10)should be the B/C/S. • Q.: And if you could, General, go to the little green tab, the first one in the group, and there should be an area that is highlighted on the first green tab, and I will briefly try to read this and ask you whether or not you believe it's credible. (15)It starts out -- MR. McCLOSKEY: Can we put the English on the ELMO? It's page number 63 in the English. For the record, this is the testimony of Colonel Thomas Karremans at the Rule 61 hearing that was played as part of this trial. (20)All right. I first want to start with that paragraph at -- is that page 63? If you can hand that to me, I can straighten that out. 122A, the English version, page 63. All right.
• Q.: And I will start to quote:
"At the end of April the real convey terror, as we called it in
(25)those days, started because as of 26th of April no convoy came in at
MR. HARMON: Thank you, Your Honour. Colonel Karremans,
yesterday you described the Bosnian Serb Army blockade that
slowly strangled the enclave as a convoy of terror. What
effect did this have on the occupants in the enclave?
(25)"A. I would like to stipulate some things which I have said
(5) • A.: I apologise, Mr. McCloskey. The second part that you have just read out, I cannot find it in B/C/S. I don't even know what page it is on. As to the portion that was marked with this green tab, I believe that that indeed refers to the issue you've brought up. (10) • Q.: General, if you could take a moment. The second green tab is the second piece that I read. So if you start with the second green tab, and it should also be highlighted for you. • A.: Yes. Yes, I've found it. • Q.: Were you aware that people in the enclave were starving to death (15)at this time in May and June of 1995? • A.: I really didn't know that. I wasn't familiar with the situation. As to the description given here by Colonel Karremans, I can, therefore, offer no comment on it. • Q.: Let's go back to Krivaja 95, if we could. Exhibit 428A. (20) JUDGE RIAD: General Krstic, just concerning your no comment on it, what does that mean? You don't know about it?
• A.: Your Honour, I simply wasn't familiar with that. I have already
said that, as regards convoys and other similar matters related to the
protected area, that that was under the jurisdiction of the Main Staff.
(25)At that time, at the beginning those events, I was still undergoing
(5) JUDGE RIAD: So the answer is that you have no knowledge? Is that the answer? • A.: Yes. MR. McCLOSKEY: • Q.: General Krstic, did you have to consider in planning for Krivaja (10)95 the possible military activities of NATO and NATO forces and their possible intervention? • A.: At the time we were planning the operation, and at the beginning of the operation, whose purpose was to separate the two enclaves, we did not take into account the possibility of military activities of NATO and (15)NATO forces from air. Our starting point was that the act of separating the two enclaves was a legitimate one and that we were not doing anything that would possibly endanger the civilian population and the protected area itself. • Q.: Did you ever make a plan or incorporate in this plan, Krivaja (20)95 -- well, I'm sorry. Let me start over with that question. Did you ever incorporate into this plan the possibility of intervention by NATO forces?
• A.: In each order, so as in this one as well, it is envisaged that a
battle may occur involving targets in the air. The order makes mention of
(25)measures that need to be undertaken in case of NATO airstrikes, but we had
• Q.: So this order does anticipate what you should do, what the VRS forces should do in the event of intervention by NATO forces? • A.: Yes, but it is only envisaging the possibility of airstrikes. It (10)was actually not a real possibility for us, because we thought that our aim was a legitimate one, and we didn't even count with the airstrikes. And at the time the operation to separate the two enclaves was launched until the final aim was realised, there were no airstrikes by NATO forces. The attack came later on, after the order was issued to continue (15)with the attack. • Q.: You testified yesterday that this was a very serious document. Is there paragraphs or material in this document, Krivaja 95, that are completely unimportant and not applicable, and are just, as you've suggested, a matter of something you always have to fill out when writing (20)one of these orders? • A.: Yes. Everything is important in this order. • Q.: In the event of an airborne assault by NATO, whose job was it to take on the airborne NATO troops under this order?
• A.: Every unit had certain devices for combat with targets that were
(25)airborne, starting from 20- and 30-millimetre guns and Strela 2-M.
• Q.: What I meant to ask was: How does this plan anticipate NATO troops landing on the ground, either from the air, from either helicopters (5)or parachutes? Who is supposed to deal with NATO troops under this plan? • A.: Yes. • Q.: Have you been able to find that section in the report? I can refer you to paragraph 9 in the -- excuse me -- in the order. • A.: Yes, yes. I've found the paragraph. It is paragraph 9 of the (10)order. • Q.: And it basically says that if NATO forces make an airborne landing in support of UNPROFOR, the units closest to the landing place and reserve forces will engage in combat with them. So this plan anticipates the reserve forces taking on any NATO forces that land in this manner; is that (15)correct? • A.: This doesn't apply only to reserve forces, but all the units engaged on the front. • Q.: All right. But it certainly anticipates the reserve forces as well as, like it says, the people that they happen to land on top of? (20) • A.: Yes, if there are any reserves, of course. • Q.: You listened to General Dannatt's testimony about reserves and the importance of reserves, and I know you've received training and experience. It's important to have reserve forces in any military operation, is it not? (25)
• A.: Yes, we did envisage them, but this order was not handed to forces
(5) • Q.: So if we go to page 5 of Krivaja 95, we can see those reserve forces are noted in their own paragraph. "Reserve forces ..." and I'm reading now, and it's under paragraph 5 also, General: "Reserve forces of a size of two or three companies of the MUP, and one company from the 1st Vlasenica Light Infantry Brigade." Those MUP forces in Vlasenica and one (10)company from the Vlasenica Brigade were the reserve forces as set out in this plan; correct?
• A.: Yes, they were envisaged, but this order was never handed to them,
as can be seen at the end of this order, when the units to whom this order
was handed are listed on page 6. And it says: Forward command post of
(15)the Drina Corps, the 1st Zvornik Brigade, the 1st Birac Brigade, the 2nd
Romanija Brigade, the 1st Bratunac Brigade, the 1st Milici Brigade, and
the 5th Platoon. So not a single of the units which were envisaged to be
the reserve force received this order, nor did we, while carrying out the
task assigned to us by the commander of the Drina Corps, have such
(20)reserves, nor did we think that we would need to deploy them and engage
them in battle. It was only in the 11th, in the afternoon, upon orders by
General Mladic, that the order was given to strengthen the attack from the
direction that the Bratunac Brigade should have attacked on -- and I spoke
about this earlier on in my testimony -- because we had a lot of problems
(25)with a part of that brigade which was engaged in the attack.
(5) • Q.: Do you know a MUP officer named Dusko Jevdic, nickname or code name Stalin, who was a man identified as being in Potocari on July 12th near Mladic's entourage? • A.: No. I never heard of that man, and, particularly, I never heard of such a nickname either. (10) • Q.: Now, this section of the report makes a reference to two or three companies. How many soldiers would be envisioned in a company of this kind? • A.: I'm not aware of the numerical strength of those units of the MUP. I am not familiar with their organisational structure. An Infantry (15)Company in a Light Brigade in the army numbered between 80 and 100 men. As for MUP unit strength and their organisational structure in terms of numbers, it's something I'm not familiar with. • Q.: Would the commanders that received this report be able to tell how many men there were in reserve for them or would they be like you, they (20)wouldn't know? • A.: I'm afraid I didn't quite understand your question.
• Q.: In receipt of this report, a commander would naturally look to see
how many reserves he had, and would a commander, when they read the size
of two or three companies, get at least some sort of an estimate of how
(25)many men would be backing him up in reserve?
• Q.: Well, let me call your attention to the reserve section. In the next paragraph right under the reserve section, it says "Task," and there (10)is a listing of tasks, and one of them says, "To prevent an enemy withdrawal." MR. McCLOSKEY: Usher, it's page 5, sorry, in the English translation, of the exhibit Krivaja 95, 428A. • Q.: General Krstic, do you consider the exodus of the 28th Division (15)from the Srebrenica enclave on July 11th and 12th an enemy withdrawal?
• A.: I did not give the matter any thought except in regard to the
order of the commander, the Corps Commander for active combat, the order
for active combat. It was our assessment that the forces of the
28th Division would only withdraw from the area in between the enclaves of
(20)Srebrenica and Zepa to behind the lines Guber Banja, Zivkovo Brdo,
Alibegovac, Kak. We did not even take into consideration the possibility
of the forces of the 28th Division as a whole because of our efforts to
achieve this aim given in this order that they would withdraw from the
same area, because there was no reason for them to do so in terms of the
(25)order of the Drina Corps Commander.
• A.: I really do not know who ordered first the bringing in of MUP forces and especially the special detachment from the MUP Brigade to the area of Bratunac on the 11th. I never addressed any such request to anyone nor did I make such proposal. And I think that the Commander of (10)the Drina Corps didn't do that either, because those forces arrived on the 11th. I and the command of the Drina Corps never addressed such a request to the Main Staff, but it is a fact, as we have seen on videotape, that those forces did appear blockading the road between Konjevic Polje (15)and Kravica in the early morning hours of the 12th and later. • Q.: Where did those MUP forces that arrived on the 11th in Bratunac, where did they come from? • A.: I don't know where they came from. I don't know where that unit was located. But they appeared there on the 11th. And General Mladic (20)spoke about this at a meeting with the Command of the Bratunac Brigade when he said, among other things, that a detachment of the special MUP forces had come to Bratunac.
• Q.: In planning this operation, are you aware of anyone speaking to
the MUP and letting them know that they were going to be put in this plan
(25)as reserves?
• Q.: Who put in this section about the MUP being reserves? • A.: The Corps Commander envisaged a reserve force, and he counted on some MUP forces, should they be necessary. But I would like to repeat, (5)until his idea was put into effect, and that was in the morning of the 10th, there was absolutely no need to engage any unit from the reserve force, not just MUP units but the company from the Vlasenica Brigade was not needed either. • Q.: You mentioned that Obrad Vicic, the operations officer, played a (10)major role in drafting this document; is that right? • A.: Yes. • Q.: Now, there is, I believe, a Colonel Slavko Ognjenovic who was also in operations at that time; is that correct? • A.: We didn't have any officer with a surname Redjenovic. (15) • Q.: Sorry. That was my pronunciation. I'll try it again. Slavko Ognjenovic. • A.: Colonel Slavko Ognjenovic. He was an officer in the section for morale, legal, and religious affairs. • Q.: Did he assist in the drafting of this plan in any way? (20) • A.: No. Why would he? Only when it comes to moral support, together with his superior officer Colonel Cerovic, that is possible that he may have participated with respect to that paragraph. • Q.: Was Colonel Ognjenovic present in the Vlasenica area during the assault on Srebrenica from July 5th through the 13th? (25)
• A.: His superior officer, Colonel Cerovic, must know about that. He
• Q.: One other question about Krivaja 95 and we'll move on. Is there anything in this plan that envisaged the continuing of the assault, if advantageous circumstances allow it? (5) • A.: I spoke about that yesterday in response to your question, to explain the term "the elimination of the enclave," "to create conditions for the elimination of the enclave." To that end, there may be a task specified. And then it says: In the next assignment, attack along such an axis and reach such-and-such a line, in the event that the 28th (10)Division continues to carry out combat operations to engage in sabotage activities, as it had done previously. • Q.: Does that envision a whole new attack plan and a whole separate assault, or could this plan have the same forces that are involved in the initial assault just continue on through? (15) • A.: This refers to a later time period and to some other forces, probably stronger forces than those that were engaged to carry out the order of the commander for combat action.
• Q.: I will refer you again to the section of the reserve forces, but
this time just above the section of the reserve forces. It's the page 5
(20)of Krivaja, and it states:
"In case of advantageous development of the situation, be in
readiness for an attack on and in pursuit of the enemy along the
aforementioned axis."
Is that the separate attack that you've just testified about or
(25)something else?
JUDGE WALD: General Krstic, I have one question on Krivaja 95 before we leave it. What do you think Krivaja 95 would have anticipated (5)if the Muslim 28th Division simply retreated? Just once the -- once your forces had begun, if they simply retreated toward Muslim-held territory, just fled, did Krivaja 95 anticipate that you would follow, pursue in attack mode, or just let them go? If they just turn on their heels and fled towards Muslim-held territory, what do you think Krivaja 95 (10)anticipated should be the reaction of your forces? • A.: With respect to Krivaja 95 and the 28th Division, we envisaged that the forces of the 28th Division would simply take up positions in front of the line designated in the Drina Corps Commander's order, and that is Guber Banja, Zivkovo Brdo, Alibegovac, and the feature Kak. We (15)never even thought about the possibility that the forces of the 28th Division would pull out, would withdraw from the Srebrenica enclave and make breakthroughs along different directions, because they simply had no need to do that, because our task was simply to separate the two enclaves and nothing more. (20)
JUDGE WALD: So any reaction you would have to their withdrawing
and moving toward Muslim-held territory would have to be the result of
another set of orders? There would have to be new orders given as to what
to do, apart from Krivaja 95, is that what you're saying, should the
Muslim forces start withdrawing and moving out of Srebrenica toward
(25)Muslim-held territory? Is that right? Okay.
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] General Krstic, I too have a (5)question. I should like to go back to the question of reserve forces. If I understood correctly, you participated in the planning of this operation; is that true? • A.: Yes. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] So in the plan, you defined (10)tasks for the reserve forces, involving two or three companies. There is something I don't understand. How can you assign tasks to a force whose size you are not aware of? • A.: We did not clearly specify the tasks of the reserve forces. We didn't deliver the order to them precisely because their tasks were not (15)specified. It is only in general terms that the potential task of the reserve forces was defined, but it is not stated here which units they are, nor where they should come, nor the axes along which they should act. So no details are given which would have been required had this order been delivered to them. Then you would have to tell them, "You will (20)be deployed in such-and-such a place," or "Go from this region to another region and carry out such-and-such a task." JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Thank you.
JUDGE RIAD: General Krstic, just -- you were referring more than
once to the fact that your task and your plan was to separate the two
(25)enclaves. You mentioned before that -- you said, "Our starting point was
(5) • A.: Yes, I was a General. JUDGE RIAD: So you were participating in the planning? • A.: Yes. JUDGE RIAD: You were part of the process? • A.: Yes. (10) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] I think, Mr. McCloskey, it is time for a break, so we're going to have a 15-minute break now. --- Recess taken at 10.18 a.m. --- On resuming at 10.34 a.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Let us resume. Mr. McCloskey, (15)please continue. MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President. • Q.: General Krstic, I would now like to get into an area we touched upon briefly yesterday, and that is your leadership role in the attack on Srebrenica and its aftermath. You told us that you were at some point (20)surprised to find out that you would be at the forward command post and that General Zivanovic was going to be back at the headquarters; is that correct?
• A.: As regards this particular operation, the implementation of the
Corps Commander's decision, I was indeed designated by him to monitor and
(25)control the activities until the final completion of the task, but that
• Q.: So it was your job to be in the front command post and monitor and control the activities of the battle? • A.: My task at the Pribicevac forward command post was to monitor the (10)bringing in of the Drina Corps units that were deployed for the purposes of that operation to specific areas, to monitor the beginning of the attack, the course of the attack until the final completion of the decision of the Drina Corps Commander, that is, until the indicated line, Guber Banja, Zivkovo Brdo, Alibegovac, Kak feature was taken up. (15)I reported there on the commander of the Drina Corps all the time, and I kept receiving orders from him as to what to do in the situation when the attack is not going according to the plan's dynamics for the reasons that I mentioned during my examination-in-chief. • Q.: And what date did you actually begin your function at the (20)Pribicevac command post? • A.: At the Pribicevac command post, I began my function upon my arrival there, that is, on the 5th of July in the afternoon hours. • Q.: And did you continue that function in the days following? • A.: Yes. (25)
• Q.: On July 9th, the plan changed, didn't it?
• Q.: Where did you stay during the night while you were at the Pribicevac command post between the 6th and the 9th? • A.: I slept at the forward command post. (15) • Q.: Are you sure you didn't go back to Bratunac because of your leg or for any other reason? • A.: I can't be sure about that, but most of the nights I stayed at the forward command post. • Q.: When was the decision made, as far as you're aware, to change the (20)plan and actually continue the attack on to the town of Srebrenica?
• A.: On the 10th of July, in the morning or sometime around noon, the
commanders of all the units that were engaged in the operation reported
that they had completed the assigned task. The 1st Battalion, which was
under the command of Lieutenant Vinko Pandurevic, reported that it had
(25)regained control of Zivkovo Brdo, whereas the 2nd Battalion, commanded by
• Q.: Had you received a document from General Tolimir prior to that on (10)the same subject, on July 9th? • A.: I think that a document did arrive late in the evening of the 9th of July, and on that day, in the afternoon of that day, General Mladic and General Zivanovic, in addition to General Gvero, had arrived to the forward command post. (15) MR. McCLOSKEY: If we could have Exhibit 432A and B provided to the General. This is a July 9 communication to the Drina Corps, to Generals Gvero and Krstic personally. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. McCloskey, I should like to draw your attention to the need to indicate precisely for the usher the (20)page and the paragraph of the document so that the technical booth can broadcast the document for the public, including, of course, the relevant portion of the text.
MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President. Hopefully these will be
easier, as opposed to being in the middle of the documents. This is a
(25)one-page document. And if we could just -- yes, thank you. That's the
• Q.: And General Krstic, do you have the B/C/S version of that? • A.: Yes, I do. • Q.: If you could take a moment to read it to perhaps help refresh your (5)recollection. Just let me know, if you can, when you're finished so I can ask you some questions, but take your time if you need it. I think, like you said, this was, according to the stamp, was received at 2350 hours on the 9th. But as you can tell from the second paragraph, this paragraph indicates that, and I'll quote, "That the Drina (10)Corps ..." Excuse me. I had better start from the beginning. "The president of Republika Srpska has been informed of successful combat operations around Srebrenica by units of the Drina Corps and that they have achieved results which enable them to occupy the very town of Srebrenica." (15)Now, you've just testified that by the 9th that hadn't been done yet. Do you think this is correct or was your recollection correct about this -- when the objectives were achieved that allowed this change of direction? • A.: By this time, as regards the receipt of this document from the (20)Main Staff of the army of Republika Srpska -- and the time indicated was 2350 -- nothing was happening to enable us to conclude that the attack can be continued towards Srebrenica. As I have already said, none of the features that were designated in the commander's order were not yet taken up [as interpreted] (25)
• Q.: How do you explain the conclusions based that General Tolimir is
• A.: Well, most probably the reports coming from the Main Staff during the combat operations were also forwarded to the Supreme Command for the (5)attention of the president, Mr. Karadzic. • Q.: And who would have been sending those reports? • A.: You mean from the Main Staff? • Q.: From the zone of operation where the battle is going on. • A.: From the zone of operation, the reports were going to the Drina (10)Corps command, to the attention of the commander, and the Main Staff. That was customary. That is how we reported during the crushing of the offensive of the BH army, which was conducted from the directions of Tuzla and Kladanj. So this was not the first time that the reports were going from a particular zone of operation, both to the Drina Corps command and (15)the Main Staff. There was an established line of reporting from the forward command post to the command post of the Drina Corps and the Main Staff, and further on from the Main Staff to the Supreme Command. • Q.: I believe you've testified that General Mladic is the one on July 10th that made the decision to continue the attack on Srebrenica; is that (20)correct?
• A.: General Mladic and General Zivanovic arrived at the Pribicevac
forward command post in the afternoon of the 9th of July. They were there
on the 10th as well, and he ordered that the operation towards Srebrenica
be continued. He also ordered that the troops enter the town of
(25)Srebrenica.
• A.: Mladic did not order the operation to continue. He took over (5)command over all commanders and gave them individual commands for the continuation after he introduced himself and issued the order. But it is true that this order of his is linked to this document which General Tolimir sent to the Drina Corps forward command, to General Gvero and me personally. (10) • Q.: So it is this order, Exhibit 432, reflecting the wishes of President Karadzic that initiated General Mladic's actions to move this operation on to the town of Srebrenica? • A.: Whether this was prompted by the order or the wish of President Karadzic to continue the attack into the town of Srebrenica is (15)something that one could discuss, but it is quite clear that when General Mladic appeared on the 9th on Pribicevac and later on, his intentions were quite clear. JUDGE WALD: If I may, let me just ask one question. General, in the second paragraph, it says the President is (20)satisfied with the results and has agreed with the continuation of operations, which certainly suggests that somebody has recommended to him, if he's agreed with the continuation of operations. Do you have any knowledge as to who would have made the specific recommendation to the President that he agreed with? (25)
• A.: Most probably that such a recommendation was given to him by
JUDGE WALD: Just a follow-up question. Do I understand from your testimony that prior to the time that General Mladic, in your words, took (10)over and gave individual commands to the units to go on through and enter Srebrenica, that you were not personally consulted for your advice as to whether that was a wise course of action militarily to take? In other words, did General Mladic go ahead and make that order to the individual unit commands without ever asking you your opinion or advice? (15) • A.: Nobody asked me for my opinion nor did they consult me. Whether General Mladic, on the road from Jezernica to Pribicevac, did discuss this with General Zivanovic, I really don't know, but the early arrival of General Gvero at the forward command post, and later the arrival of General Mladic and General Zivanovic, spoke for such intentions, because (20)after receiving this document from the Main Staff and also the next day, on the 10th, the order was given to continue the attack, so General Mladic's intentions were quite clear as regards the continuation of the attack. JUDGE WALD: Thank you. (25)
MR. McCLOSKEY:
• A.: I don't know whether General Tolimir knew that General Zivanovic and General Mladic would come to the forward command post in the afternoon of the 9th, but he certainly did know that we were there, that is, General Gvero and myself. (10) • Q.: So prior to General Mladic's arrival at the forward command post, you had been the person in control of the battle plan and the operation at the forward command post; is that right? • A.: Yes. Yes. Until the afternoon of the 9th when General Mladic and General Zivanovic arrived, I reported regularly about all problems (15)encountered in the course of the operation. • Q.: And the Brigade Commanders who had been leading the assault reported to you at least daily, if not more, during that assault; is that correct? • A.: Yes, until that date, the afternoon of the 9th. They reported to (20)me not through written reports but using radio communications, RUP 12, which was fully encrypted, so that I knew at every point in time where the units were, what line they had reached.
• Q.: So by the afternoon of July 9th, you, as the Chief of Staff in
control of this battle, had more knowledge than anyone else of how it was
(25)going.
• Q.: So when General Mladic arrived and General Zivanovic arrived, did you brief them with the knowledge that you had gained? • A.: Yes. I spoke about that when I was examined in-chief. I briefed him on the situation and all the problems with respect to the (10)implementation of the order of the Corps Commander. • Q.: Were you aware of any communications General Mladic had with Main Staff in Han Pijesak or the Office of the President, wherever they happened to be at the time, while he was -- • A.: No. (15) • Q.: I'm sorry. -- while he was there at Pribicevac? • A.: No, no, I was not aware of any such contact. • Q.: Then in the evening of July 9th we have the letter authorising, under an agreement with the army, for the attack to continue, so there must have been some communication between the army and the president. (20) • A.: I didn't have any communication with the president. Probably General Mladic did, not only when he reached the forward command post, but later on as well.
• Q.: Did you provide your advice to General Zivanovic and General
Mladic on the situation when they arrived on what could be done, in your
(25)opinion, based on your knowledge on the ground?
• Q.: You, as Chief of Staff of the corps, did your job and your responsibilities regarding the continuing military activities from July 9th change at all from July 9th, or did you continue to be Chief of Staff (10)and assist in the operation as you had before? • A.: You mean after General Mladic issued the order to continue the attack? • Q.: Yes. Precisely, yes. • A.: I spoke about that during the examination-in-chief by the Defence (15)regarding the role of General Mladic, the role of General Zivanovic, and myself. To provide any comments, proposals, or suggestions to General Mladic when he gave orders was quite superfluous. This was something that we were well aware of. We never even tried. Whether General Zivanovic had said anything to the Main Staff commander before that, I don't know. (20) • Q.: Your position as Chief of Staff would be to help facilitate and carry out the orders of your commander, General Zivanovic, and of course his commander and your commander, General Mladic. Did you continue in that role to facilitate their orders and their wishes from the time that they came to the forward command post? (25)
• A.: Even General Zivanovic did not assist General Mladic, not to
• Q.: So you did follow the orders of General Mladic and General Zivanovic regarding the continuing operation? • A.: No. I carried out the command of the commander of Drina Corps, to (15)carry out his decision. But as I said before, General Mladic said to both me and Zivanovic: "Look how command is done." All we could do was listen, and nothing more. On the 11th, General Mladic gave orders to General Zivanovic that he should continue the attack from Kvarc to Guber Banja, where we had (20)problems with the Bratunac Brigade, and he ordered a unit to be brought there to continue the attack along that axis, and that was this company from the Vlasenica Brigade, consisting of 50 to 60 men.
• Q.: General Krstic, after General Mladic arrived at the forward
command post, did you continue communicating to the brigades and
(25)communicating the orders of General Zivanovic in regard to the assault on
• A.: No. Not even General Zivanovic did that, because General Mladic communicated with all the commanders and he gave them orders, and that is the truth. (5) • Q.: We can see General Mladic trying to get that APC by himself off the side of the road, but did he do all the communicating with the brigade commanders by himself and continue the command and control of this operation all by himself without your assistance in any way? • A.: After he was briefed by Lieutenant Colonel Pandurevic, that is, a (10)part of his unit had entered the town, he didn't need any assistance. This was just one incident in the whole process of reaching Srebrenica. He came across this vehicle and he ordered what should be done, that another armoured vehicle should be used to pull out the UNPROFOR APC. • Q.: That's July 11th, and I do want to get to July 11th, but we're (15)still on July 9th. So a lot of military communication, a lot of military work had to be done to continue this attack on to Srebrenica, is that a fair statement, on July 9th? • A.: There wasn't really a lot of work to do except to give orders to the Brigade Commanders to continue the attack and simply to monitor their (20)progress from the forward command post, when the Brigade Commanders reported that they had accomplished the task. And from the observation post where General Mladic and General Zivanovic were, they could see those positions and monitor the progress of forces with the help of binoculars.
• Q.: You had been the one that had been communicated with the Brigade
(25)Commanders and running the show prior to the arrival of General Mladic.
• A.: After the 10th, when he ordered the continuation of the assault, I did physically communicate with Brigade Commanders later on the ground (5)where General Mladic was too, but all the actual command was taken over by General Mladic. This wasn't a broad area of attack by these units. The forces consisted of two battalions. It wasn't the whole Drina Corps that was engaged in the area for it to be necessary to communicate and monitor (10)activities from various directions and on a broad front in the area of operations. I must repeat once again that I found it strange why such an order had been issued when the aim was, according to the Corps Commander, quite clear. I also said that General Mladic, even when down to the battalion (15)level, even company level, wherever he went, he took over command, not only in this case, but wherever he went. There are many examples of this. • Q.: What did you do after the afternoon of July 9th when General Mladic arrived? (20)
• A.: I have already said that I reported to him and General Zivanovic
about the situation. On the 9th, we were together at the forward command
post. I still had communication with all the commanders who were
reporting about what they were doing, what problems they were having, how
much progress they had made and so on, until the 10th, until the moment
(25)that the commanders had reported that they had accomplished the task, I
• Q.: So between the 9th and the 10th, you performed your normal activities in running the operation and communicating with the Corps (5)Commanders? • A.: With the commanders of the units that were engaged in the operation. And normally, I would send a report from the forward command post to the Drina Corps Command, regardless of the fact that General Mladic and General Zivanovic were present. (10) • Q.: So with their presence, you continued your previous activities of controlling the operation under their command? • A.: No. • Q.: What were you doing? • A.: I was with General Mladic and General Zivanovic, and we were (15)monitoring how his orders were being followed. • Q.: Now I'm talking about the period between the 9th and the 10th. Who passed on General Mladic's orders?
• A.: I've already told you. I said that on the 9th, in the afternoon,
and on the 10th until the moment the commanders had reported that they had
(20)accomplished the task, I communicated with them. General Mladic and
General Zivanovic did not interfere in any particular way in that. They
just suggested -- gave suggestions as to what should be done to speed up
the dynamics of the attack and so on. But after General Mladic took over
command, my role and that of General Zivanovic was a purely formal one,
(25)mere presence. We were simply present. He took over command. He called
• Q.: And this occurred when? What precise date and time did General Mladic take over complete command and sideline you and (5)General Zivanovic? • A.: The two of them, after leaving in the evening of the 9th to spend the night somewhere, the next morning they arrived at the command post. The commanders of subordinate units reported that they had accomplished this task sometime in the morning. I don't know exactly at what time it (10)was, but it was before noon. JUDGE RIAD: General Krstic, just to put it in more understandable terms for us non-military people, General Mladic was commander of the whole situation. You -- General Zivanovic or you or the other commanders were supposed to implement the orders. It had to pass through you to be (15)executed. Could I understand it this way? • A.: I apologise, Your Honour. That is not so. The moment General Mladic took over command, he directly communicated with all the Brigade Commanders. He was in command of them. So what I had done before, until the moment the commanders reported that they had carried out (20)the task of the Corps Commander, was taken over by General Mladic, and he issued commands whereas General Zivanovic and myself were just merely present there.
JUDGE RIAD: You had to be sure that the orders were executed?
You had to report that mission accomplished? What was your
(25)communication? You said, "I did physically communicate with the brigade
• A.: When I said physically that I communicated, that was just when we entered, when we went into the town of Srebrenica and greeted one (5)another. Until then, I couldn't be in physical contact with them. That is not what I meant before. General Mladic took over command. He gave commands to the brigade commanders. Neither myself nor General Zivanovic had any particular role in all of that from the moment he took over command. (10) JUDGE RIAD: So you had no role at all. • A.: Only formally. General Zivanovic was the Corps Commander. I was the Chief of Staff. But in actually in control and command of the units to continue the attack, I had no role. I have already said that I was surprised by such an order and decision to continue the attack and enter (15)Srebrenica, because we had not planned for that. That had not been envisaged at all. There was no plan to continue the operation. So in such a situation, what kind of measures could General Zivanovic and myself undertake? It was simply the brigade commanders who went along in the direction of Srebrenica, following orders from General Mladic. (20) JUDGE RIAD: Just for my knowledge, according to the military rules, do officers or soldiers receive orders from the chief commander or it has to pass through the different grades?
• A.: The moment General Mladic appeared and took over command, even
General Zivanovic, as the Corps Commander, and myself, we had no right to
(25)make any comments about it because his decision was quite clear.
JUDGE WALD: General Krstic, one question. Yesterday, you emphasised many times that the objective of Krivaja 95 was limited to reducing the size of the enclaves to the urban areas and separating them, (5)and we should know that or we should be aware that if the objective had been any greater than that, i.e., trying to capture the town, many plans would have had to accompany it. You mentioned plans or relationships with UNPROFOR, plans for relationships with what you did with the civilians and you mentioned a whole list of those. I assume none of those were done in (10)this case once General Mladic had said continue the attack onto the town; is that correct? None of those plans were drawn up in the usual fashion? • A.: That is correct. Not in the usual fashion, but in no fashion at all. JUDGE WALD: So to your knowledge, to your knowledge, there was no (15)communication with the UN people that the objective was now to go into the town and capture it? • A.: No. JUDGE WALD: Thank you. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] We are now going to have a (20)break, 15 minutes. --- Recess taken at 11.25 a.m. --- On resuming at 11.42 a.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. McCloskey, you may continue. (25)
MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
• A.: We were not pushed aside; we were there, where General Mladic was, and we were simply following what he was ordering to his subordinate commanders. We were not elsewhere; we were there with General Mladic. • Q.: Did you yourself do anything to implement General Mladic's orders (10)in this time period? • A.: No, nor did General Zivanovic do that, except that at one point he ordered that a company from the Vlasenica Brigade should be brought in, pursuant to the order of General Mladic that the attack from the Guber Banja axis should be stepped up. (15) • Q.: So General Zivanovic did implement General Mladic's order to bring in the Vlasenica unit? • A.: To step up the attack in the area where the Bratunac Brigade was supposed to attack. But it didn't do that. The Bratunac Brigade wasn't acting pursuant to the order, and General Mladic said that it should be (20)done. And then after that, General Zivanovic ordered to the Vlasenica Brigade command that a certain number of troops or units should be brought in, the units that I have already referred to. • Q.: So how would you describe your position at this point?
• A.: I believe that I have answered your question several times
(25)already. I think I have.
• A.: No, I was not relieved of my duty. No talk about that. But there wasn't any single order concerning the implementation of the order of the commander of the Main Staff to the brigade commanders. That was my (5)business. This can be seen from the report which was submitted first by Vinko Pandurevic, the Zvornik commander, as he entered Srebrenica, and later on by the commanders of other brigades and units after General Mladic, together with General Zivanovic and myself, had entered the centre of the town. (10) • Q.: Didn't General Mladic need your help and the help of General Zivanovic to implement the attack plan? • A.: He didn't request any help from us. He was in contact with all of the commanders, he monitored the activities, he issued orders, until the entry into the town. We saw on the video clip what he ordered to the (15)commanders after they had entered the town, that is, that the attack should be continued towards Potocari and Bratunac. So he didn't issue that order to me and the Corps Commander, but directly to the brigade commanders. • Q.: So you did absolutely nothing to implement General Mladic's orders (20)or to assist in this continuing attack? • A.: I'm sorry, Mr. McCloskey, but I do believe that I have answered your question several times. • Q.: Were you ever reactivated, where you started doing your job again and started doing your duty again? (25)
• A.: I don't know what period you have in mind.
• A.: In connection with the Srebrenica operation or ... • Q.: Anything on those dates. • A.: After the 12th or, rather, the 11th of July, when the Commander of the Main Staff ordered that an attack should be launched towards Zepa, I (10)took over again my duty, that of the Chief of Staff of the corps, that is, the command over the units which were attacking towards Zepa. • Q.: Was that the evening of the 11th that you were given the job to actually do something now? • A.: In the evening of the 11th, at the meeting which was held at the (15)Bratunac Brigade headquarters, I received my order concerning Zepa, and my next activities were focused on the implementation of that task from then on, except for the fact that I attended the meeting at the Fontana Hotel in Bratunac, pursuant to the order of General Mladic. • Q.: So between the afternoon hours of July 10th, when Mladic sidelined (20)you and Zivanovic, until the evening hours when you were assigned the Zepa operation, you did nothing? • A.: Only a report left the forward command post, and that report was forwarded to the command post of the corps and the Main Staff. So except for that order, I didn't do anything else. (25)
MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. If we could go to Exhibit 482A.
• Q.: General Krstic, could you -- this is from a publication, Srpska (5)Vojska. Could you tell us what Srpska Vojska is? • A.: This is a monthly publication of the VRS, which was published by the Information Service of the Main Staff of the VRS. • Q.: In looking at the first page in the B/C/S, we see General Mladic and yourself, and I believe that's Legenda, on the podium at some sort of (10)proceeding. Is that right? • A.: I don't think we have the same copy. I only have page 7 of this document. • Q.: I'm sorry. I took yours and put it on the ELMO. Now, do you recognise -- (15) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. McCloskey, perhaps we should have the English version on the ELMO. No? MR. McCLOSKEY: That's a good idea. • Q.: General Krstic, could you just tell us briefly what this -- well, we recognise General Mladic and yourself. And the man with the beret, (20)who's that? • A.: You mean the man with the beret? • Q.: Yes.
• A.: That is Major Milan Jolovic, a detachment commander, the
detachment in question being the Drina Wolves. They were part of the
(25)Zvornik Brigade. And as regards this stage, I believe that it took place
• Q.: Thank you. And General Mladic gave a speech that day. Do you (5)recall that speech? Do you recall hearing his speech? • A.: Yes, I do, but I don't remember any specific details of it. But I remember that he held a speech that day.
• Q.: All right. Well, he -- according to the publication Srpska
Vojska, they quote a part of the speech, and according to that, General
(10)Mladic mentions you. And I'm sorry, I can't point out to you on that
exactly where that is on that first page, but if you could look for your
name and I will slowly read that section in English while you have a
chance to find it. And these are, according to Srpska Vojska, the words
of General Mladic:
(15)"... not only in Podrinje, on Bjelasnica, Igman, Treskavica, on
the Nisic plateau, but also in Krajina. You fought heroically under the
leadership of your Chief of Staff or Corps Commander who, although
severely wounded, made a tremendous contribution to the victory of Serbian
arms and the Serbian army, not only against the Muslim gladiators in
(20)Srebrenica and Zepa, but also against those who helped them, now by land,
now by air, now from behind the conference table, or through the media.
They could not be saved because they did not deserve to be saved. All of
those who obeyed the agreement and came to the UNPROFOR base were saved
and transported."
(25)And then he goes on to talk about the buses. Now, in the
• A.: When General Mladic mentions Treskavica, Bjelasnica, the Nisic
plateau, he refers to the period of time of 1993 when the units of the
Drina Corps took part in the Bjelasnica operation, and in late 1993 and
beginning of 1994, also on the Nisic plateau, where he conducted the
(10)operations in question. At that time, I was not the commander of the
Drina Corps; I was the commander of the 2nd Motorised Romanija Brigade.
Earlier on in my testimony, I spoke about my activities after I
had taken over as the Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps. That was in
November and December of 1994. So at that time, General Mladic could
(15)not -- was not able to speak about that because there was no talk about
that operation at that time. And in 1993 he was on Bjelasnica, and the
commander of the Drina Corps at that time was General Zivanovic. So this
could refer to General Zivanovic as well, who had also been severely
wounded, and the Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps, General Skocajic.
(20)I cannot rule out the possibility that he was talking about me;
however, I don't see anything in particular here, except for the mention
of Treskavica, Bjelasnica, the Nisic plateau and other features that might
potentially refer to me. It is true that I was in Srebrenica and in Zepa,
so he -- this could actually refer to both myself and General Zivanovic or
(25)the former Chief of Staff, General Skocajic, and also perhaps to Colonel
• Q.: Do you recall taking the podium after General Mladic's speech? • A.: Yes, I do remember. I spoke briefly. • Q.: Did anyone speak between you and General Mladic, or were you right after General Mladic? (20) • A.: First the assembly was addressed by the new commander, the commander of the brigade, who had been appointed to that duty, that is, Major Jolovic; then myself as the Corps Commander; and after me, General Mladic; and then later on the others took the floor, some of those present from the army and some from the civilian authorities. (25)
• Q.: Was General Zivanovic present?
• Q.: Did General Zivanovic play any leadership role in the Zepa (5)operation? • A.: I spoke about that. Before the Zepa operation started, General Zivanovic issued I don't know how many preparatory orders, what the units in Zepa should do while the operation towards Srebrenica was ongoing, and later on I would also receive from him when I reached the forward command (10)post, I think one order from him, just for my information. • Q.: So General Zivanovic didn't play much of a leadership role in Zepa; you did. • A.: Yes. Yes, that is correct, at the beginning of the operation and right through until the end. (15) • Q.: You understand it's the submission of the Prosecutor that you led the Drina Corps during the Srebrenica campaign and the events afterward, and you took over command position on the 13th, right before the Zepa operation, which is very similar to what General Mladic is saying here if you're the one he's talking about; isn't that right? (20)
• A.: I cannot say whether you are right or not. Let me tell you my
opinion and position and the way things were. I had no leading role in
the Srebrenica operation, absolutely no leadership role whatsoever. By
the Commander of the Drina Corps, I was assigned to monitor the activities
of units, implementing his decision. After that -- and I also described
(25)this -- my role was sidelined after General Mladic and General Zivanovic
• Q.: Now, after the mentioning of the Muslim gladiators in Srebrenica and Zepa, this speech goes on to say that someone, be it you or whoever, "... also against those who helped them." (5)Excuse me. I'll try to read that so we can make some more sense out of it. "You fought heroically under the leadership of your Chief of Staff or Corps Commander who, although severely wounded, made a tremendous contribution to the victory of Serbian arms and the Serbian army, not only (10)against the Muslim gladiators in Srebrenica and Zepa, but also against those who helped them." Who would be those who helped the Muslims in Srebrenica and Zepa? JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Petrusic. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Mr. President, the Defence would (15)like to object because this sentence has been taken out of the context of the whole text of this interview, and the Defence would request that when asking questions, the Prosecutor be more specific regarding time and persons he's referring to. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. McCloskey. (20)
MR. McCLOSKEY: I'm trying to be as specific as I can relating to
the wording of the document, and if the General needs to take more time to
review the whole article, I have no objection to that. The General has
taken some time, I believe, and put us in the context that the Nisic
plateau and the Krajina had nothing to do with him. Therefore, it's this
(25)next few sentences, starting with "You fought heroically ..." that I wish
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, but we will wait for the answer of General Krstic. It is all part of the general context of the question, the dates and persons that are referred to. So let us wait for the answer of the General regarding persons and dates. They will be part (10)of the answer. If not, we'll see. If not, Mr. McCloskey can be more specific in his questions. So please continue. MR. McCLOSKEY: • Q.: General Krstic, do you need to read the whole article to get a (15)feeling for the context of these sentences, or do you want to take a little time to do that, or do you feel you understand the speech and can answer my questions? • A.: Yes, I understand your part of the question, but would you please repeat it? (20)
• Q.: All right. And again because it's a long sentence, I better start
from the beginning.
"You fought heroically under the leadership of your Chief of
Staff or Corps Commander, who although severely wounded, made a tremendous
contribution to the victory of Serbian arms and the Serbian army, not only
(25)against the Muslim gladiators in Srebrenica and Zepa, but also against
• A.: This is a political slogan of General Mladic. I would prefer not to discuss it, but he probably is referring to the UNPROFOR forces who were there in Srebrenica and Zepa. Up to now, never have I said in my testimony that the Dutch Battalion in Srebrenica and the Ukrainian (10)Battalion in Zepa did not carry out their tasks correctly and properly. But whether they did or not, it is up to someone else to judge anyway. • Q.: All right. So if we do take that as meaning the UNPROFOR forces, I'll continue to read, "Now by land, now by air, now from behind the conference table." (15)Now, you were at the conference table twice with UNPROFOR during the Srebrenica operation, on the evening of July 11th for the first time and the morning of July 12th for the second time; is that right? • A.: I think this doesn't apply to that conference table at all, the one at the hotel in Bratunac. He was probably referring to something much (20)broader and at a much higher level. • Q.: Then it next says, "Or through the media." We also know you gave an interview in Potocari on the afternoon of July 12th. Do you think that's what he's referring to or not?
• A.: In my opinion, that has nothing to do with it at all.
(25)General Mladic, from the beginning of the war, headed the army, and he
• Q.: The next sentence: "They could not be saved because they did not deserve to be saved." Who's the "they," in your opinion, that he's (15)referring to? JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Visnjic.
MR. VISNJIC:
[Int.] Mr. President, I do apologise. I
don't like to interrupt the cross-examination, but I would like to make a
remark which might facilitate the better understanding of this text for
(20)everyone, including General Krstic.
So this is a lengthy article, and perhaps it would be helpful for
us to have a translation of the whole text into English, because then both
the questions and the answers could be placed in context, taking into
account the whole article. These are just excerpts. And I don't want to
(25)comment on General Krstic's answer, but I think that it would be helpful
(5) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Thank you very much, Mr. Visnjic. Mr. McCloskey, do we have a complete translation of this article? MR. McCLOSKEY: I'm not sure, Your Honour. However, we do -- it's a two-page article and the full B/C/S is in front of the witness. And I (10)think the General has helped us put in context the part that I spoke of, that the part regarding the Nisic plateau doesn't involve him; it involves the troops he's speaking to. And we can see from the lines about the buses that go on and on and on, he goes into other topics. We can, of course, provide the Court with a full context. I know Mr. Visnjic's (15)skills allow him to read both languages, and so I know he will understand the entire article, so I respect his opinion regarding if there's other material there, that he will know it and I will not. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes. We have a basic issue here that General Krstic heard the speech; he was present there. But in any (20)event, Mr. Visnjic, do you have any idea of certain elements of the context which could be important to have a better understanding of the questions and answers, as you have told us? Is this a general remark you're making or you have some particular elements in mind?
MR. VISNJIC:
[Int.] Mr. President, if I may give an
(25)example. General Krstic has already answered, but it might help
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well. Thank you very much. I think that I now understand a little better Mr. Petrusic's objection. (10)Could the Prosecutor give us some general framework about this article? What was the date when the speech was delivered, for instance? We don't know that. Whether the speech mentions the Dayton Agreements. That is important. Also, to give us the time frame and the circumstances under which this speech was delivered. (15) MR. McCLOSKEY: Your Honour, it's my understanding that the article is dated 28 December. I do not know whether I can get it closer to that, and I would suggest this is a very ripe area for redirect, if necessary, for redirect examination, to clear it up. I don't want to be unfair to the General, but the Dayton Agreement is not relevant to my (20)questioning. Perhaps counsel feels it is relevant, and has every right in redirect to bring it up.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Yes. In any event, I think it
would be a good idea. We're going to have -- just a moment, please. I
have to confer with my colleagues.
--- Luncheon recess taken at 12.25 p.m.
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] So, Mr. McCloskey. Do you have any news for us? MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President. I can tell you that the date (5)of this ceremony has been determined to be December 2nd. However, I, in thinking about it, have agreed with Mr. Visnjic that I think we should have a full English translation so there is no spectre of taking this out of context. This is something we have reviewed the B/C/S and this is what we decided to bring out, but I have asked for this to be fully (10)translated. And we will bring it back in time so we can see the full context by which this was given, and then we'll briefly deal with the last sentence or two and go on. So there's -- that's what my intention would be regarding this document. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes. But the ceremony was held (15)on the 2nd of December, 1995. Is that the case? MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Your Honour. That's what our research has indicated, and we will provide the authentication for that, and a full translation of this. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well. Please continue. (20)I am sorry. Yes. Judge Riad has a question.
JUDGE RIAD: Just before we continue, and to sum up a point which
was raised in the last session, General Krstic, you said before we
adjourned that, and I'm quoting you, you said, "I had no leading role in
the Srebrenica operation. I was assigned to monitor the activities of
(25)units implementing Mladic's decision."
• A.: I said that I didn't have any particular task at the moment. I (5)was monitoring the situation. I was listening to General Mladic, him issuing orders, and then those orders being carried out by his subordinates like General Zivanovic. JUDGE RIAD: You were making sure that the orders are well executed? (10) • A.: No. I wasn't allowed to interfere in his orders, nor was General Zivanovic, and that is what happened. JUDGE RIAD: You said before, of course, that you could not give advice and nobody could interfere. The orders were directly -- you even said they were given directly to the units. Then you added after that (15)that you were monitoring the activities of the units. So I want to just put this in harmony, in perspective. You're monitoring, to put it in perspective, with the direct contact between Mladic and the units. What did you have to monitor? • A.: I was simply observing the actions of the units pursuant to the (20)orders of General Mladic. I didn't have any active role in it. JUDGE RIAD: You were just an observer. • A.: Yes. JUDGE RIAD: Did you have to report if it was well done or not?
• A.: No. General Mladic was in contact with the unit through our means
(25)of communications, and when they approached the city, he could -- he was
JUDGE RIAD: When did Mladic leave? • A.: Sorry, what date do you have in mind? JUDGE RIAD: During the Srebrenica operation, did you have to (5)monitor while Mladic was there or after he left? What you called the Srebrenica operation, according to you. • A.: As of the afternoon of the 9th of July until the evening of the 11th of July, General Mladic was at the forward command post. JUDGE RIAD: And you had to monitor at that time or after that (10)time? • A.: Throughout that time, I was observing the situation, together with the Corps Commander. JUDGE RIAD: Even after he left? • A.: I don't know when General Mladic left the area of Srebrenica. I (15)left it on the 12th. JUDGE RIAD: So during that time, you, according to your words, you were assigned to monitor the activities of the units. What are these activities? • A.: I wasn't assigned to do that. (20) JUDGE RIAD: I'm using your words.
• A.: No. I wasn't assigned to monitor the activities. I don't think
that that is what I said, that is, to monitor the situation. The
situation was such that I was unable to give any comments, any proposals,
just like General Zivanovic, or all I could do was to listen to
(25)General Mladic issuing orders to the unit commanders, commanders of the
JUDGE RIAD: So in other words, you were sidelined, as they say. You were not at all functioning. • A.: I was with General Mladic, like General Zivanovic. I was there. (5)General Zivanovic as the Corps Commander and myself as the Chief of Staff, and those were our roles. We were observing him commanding, issuing orders, and then units obeying his orders, but we didn't take any active part whatsoever in what was going on. JUDGE RIAD: All right. In the transcript it is clearly said you (10)were assigned to monitor the activities of the units. It was not said -- you do not say, "I was observing the activities of the units." So you have to be clear about that. Either you were observing or monitoring, and this is why I'm asking you the question. • A.: I was not assigned to perform monitoring; I was simply observing (15)the situation and listening to General Mladic issuing orders to unit commanders. I was not actively involved in any way in anything, neither myself nor General Zivanovic, until the moment we actually entered Srebrenica, after he had given an order to continue with the attack. JUDGE RIAD: And after he left on the 11th, what were you (20)observing?
• A.: In the evening hours of the 11th of July, we parted ways in
Srebrenica and I returned to the forward command post. After he had
ordered, while still in Srebrenica, to me to attend the meeting at the
Bratunac Brigade headquarters, so after that I went back to the forward
(25)command post, and from the forward command post I went to the meeting
JUDGE RIAD: Thank you, General. (5) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] General Krstic, I also have a question for you at this point. I believe that you still have in front of you the document which is a press article from the Srpska Vojska publication. Mention is made here of the commander who had been severely wounded. You told us that Zivanovic had been wounded in 1992, I believe. (10) • A.: Yes. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Tell me something: Who was this speech addressed to? • A.: On the basis of what General Mladic spoke about, that is, the involvement of the Drina Corps unit, it was very difficult to conclude (15)exactly to whom this speech was addressed. He mentioned an operation which took place in 1993, in the month of July. That operation was designed -- JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] I should like to know who was present at the ceremony; all Corps Commanders, officers who had been (20)invited? Was it only a ceremony involving Corps Commanders? Who was it who actually listened to this speech?
• A.: I will try to answer your question, Your Honour, although I
believe I have already said that. The ceremony was organised as one of
the professional units of the VRS was being established. In this
(25)particular case, it was a brigade which was part of the Drina Corps, and
(5) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Thank you. I'm sorry to interrupt you, but therefore the speech was not addressed to all of the Drina Corps but only to one brigade which was part of that corps? • A.: No. The speech was addressed to the Drina Corps in general, as a whole, and that is why General Mladic -- (10) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well. So it was addressed to the Drina Corps in general. I should like to know for how long did the soldiers usually stay, remain within the Drina Corps, within a corps? So those soldiers at the time were not professionals, I believe. • A.: The soldiers would remain in the Drina Corps from the moment it (15)was established until the end, that is, until the end of the war, that is, until the signing of the Dayton Accords, since 1992, as of the month of November, up until, I believe, 21st of December, 1995. And the brigade in question was a professional brigade which was established after the end of the war, one professional brigade which was part of the VRS. (20) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Thank you. When General Zivanovic was wounded, was he already the Corps Commander or not?
• A.: General Zivanovic was wounded prior to the establishment of the
Drina Corps in the area of Gorazde, when he was conducting an operation as
the chief force engineers officer of the Main Staff, and he was a trusted
(25)person of General Mladic. And after that post, he was assigned to the
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] So General Zivanovic was wounded sometime prior to the establishment of the Drina Corps. If I'm not mistaken, you were wounded sometime in January 1995, end of January 1995. (5) • A.: I was wounded on the 29th of December, 1994, as the Chief of Staff. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Okay. So having cleared that up, I should like to ask the following question: The soldiers who were members of the corps, are they more likely to remember the injury of (10)General Zivanovic than of yourself? • A.: All soldiers of the Drina Corps were aware of the fact that General Zivanovic had been wounded. He spoke about it very often when touring his troops. He would say, "I was severely injured but I'm trying to come to visit you regularly," and so on and so forth. And I think that (15)my injury would be remembered by the soldiers of the 2nd Romanija Brigade because I was their commander, and I was injured in the area of responsibility of that brigade in my capacity as the Chief of Staff there. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Thank you very much, General. (20)I'm sorry, Mr. McCloskey, for this interruption. Please continue. MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President. • Q.: On the 11th of July, prior to the trip that the command staff made to Srebrenica, who was issuing the orders to shell the enclave area? (25)
• A.: You're referring to the course of the operation in general, up
• Q.: I meant to say on the -- during the day of July 11th only, who was issuing orders for shelling or artillery, if any? • A.: As far as I can recall, on the 11th of July, there was no need (5)whatsoever to shell the town of Srebrenica, because the units of the Drina Corps were already on the outskirts of the town. • Q.: So are you saying there was no shelling at all on July 11th? • A.: As far as I can remember, no, there was no shelling. • Q.: Do you remember the testimony of Witness B, who was the Sergeant (10)Major who was at the meetings, who testified that a shell exploded amongst the civilians in the UN Compound on July 11th? • A.: Yes. Yes, I remember that testimony and when he said that, but I don't remember any shell falling anywhere at all, because even if a 60- or 82-millimetre [sic] shell had fallen into this huge amount of people that (15)had gathered there, there would have been many killed and many wounded individuals on such a small area. • Q.: How about a mortar shell? • A.: That applies to mortar shells as well. • Q.: So you're challenging the testimony of Witness B's account (20)regarding the shell that fell into that crowd on that day? • A.: I'm not challenging it, I'm simply telling you about the consequences which would have been likely after a fall of a projectile of that kind.
• Q.: Do you recall the testimony was that it fell between two APCs and
(25)wounded several civilians? Would that be consistent with a mortar shell?
• Q.: Who was making the decisions about targeting for artillery or mortar or other direct means of fire? (5)I'm sorry. Let me ask you a better question. Who was making the decisions regarding the actual artillery on the assault of Srebrenica? • A.: Artillery is activated pursuant to the request of the Superior Command to provide support along certain axes or certain facilities, and also there can be activation of artillery of the unit which is engaged in (10)the attack itself. I told you what kind of support the units had at their disposal on the ground and also what kind of support was available at a higher level, at the level of the command. So when it comes to the activation of the artillery from the command, that is always carried out pursuant to a (15)request from one of the commanders on the ground. And as far as I can recall, if I may, except for the support of the 2nd Battalion, which was attacking from the direction of Podravanje towards the Kak feature and Alibegovac, where there were no civilians except, of course, for the positions of the forces of the 28th Division, (20)there was no support -- artillery support from the level of the Corps Command, that is, the projectiles of 80 [as interpreted] millimetres. It would have been absolutely crazy to fire a projectile of such a large calibre into such a populated area. • Q.: Now, on July 11th, after the NATO bombing -- (25)
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Excuse me. Mr. Visnjic.
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Thank you, Mr. Visnjic. (5)Mr. McCloskey, can you clarify this point, please? It's further complicated because now the transcript is talking about 180 [sic] millimetres. I think we need to clarify this point. We have 80, 130, and now 180 [sic] So let's clear the matter up, please. So please do so, Mr. McCloskey. (10) MR. McCLOSKEY: • Q.: General Krstic, can you help us out on this? Which millimetre did you mean? • A.: In answering your question, I was speaking of the various calibres available to subordinate units, whereas the corps artillery that would act (15)upon the request of commanders had artillery of 130-millimetre calibre, and it acted against the Kak feature and Alibegovac. • Q.: Now, on July 11th, after the NATO bombed certain Serb positions, were you aware of any communications coming from the Serb command, going to the DutchBat command, threatening the Dutch that they should stop (20)resisting or face the consequences, certain consequences? • A.: I learnt about that threat in the course of these proceedings here, a threat made by General Mladic.
• Q.: All right. Let me go to the proceedings where this first came
out, and it was in the testimony of Major Franken on page 2023. The
(25)question began at line 10, and the question was: "Very briefly ..."
• A.: That is English. • Q.: I'm sorry, General. For the trial purposes, we don't have B/C/S, (5)so I will read it slowly and I think you'll be able to understand with the translation. Question: "Very briefly, and to theorise, in your opinion, Major Franken, what would have happened if the Dutch army would have mounted a defence in Potocari?" Answer: -- JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Excuse me for interrupting you, (10)Mr. McCloskey. We have on the monitor the transcript, but perhaps you should tell us with precision what part of the transcript we are talking about. If not, it's better not to have it. MR. McCLOSKEY: We are beginning on line 10, Mr. President, and going down to the bottom of the page, so perhaps if we could get a little (15)better focus on that. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well. MR. McCLOSKEY: It should be page 2023. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well, now. That's it. Thank you. (20) MR. McCLOSKEY: And it may be complicated by the fact we're saving paper. If you can find page 2023. It's up in the right-hand corner. So it's on the back. If you can get from line 10 all the way to the bottom. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] That's fine now. Please continue, Mr. McCloskey. (25)
MR. McCLOSKEY:
• A.: No, I was not aware of any such threats, especially not the message, if I understand you correctly, which appears to have been sent (20)from an armoured vehicle belonging to the UNPROFOR. • Q.: Were you with General Mladic the whole day on the 11th or could he have made it outside of your presence? • A.: The whole day except in the evening, when we parted, in Srebrenica. (25)
• Q.: I'm sorry. You may have been cut off. What did you say?
• Q.: General, from the time period of July 12th through the rest of (5)July, based on your knowledge, how many Muslims were summarily executed by the VRS? • A.: Would you please repeat your question. • Q.: From July 12th through the end of July, based on your knowledge, how many Muslims were summarily executed by soldiers of the VRS? (10) • A.: I don't know that. • Q.: Do you recall -- • A.: The number of missing and executed, I learnt about those numbers from the reports of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, after I came here. (15) • Q.: Do you recall telling Mr. Ruez that the number you were aware of was 3.500 to 4.000? • A.: That was what I read in the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. It is not based on any knowledge I had prior to that. MR. McCLOSKEY: If we could go to Exhibit number 161/5. This is (20)an aerial exhibit of a large area of disturbed earth that was testified to about in the Prosecution's case, in the area of Glogova. • Q.: General, whose area of responsibility is this area of Glogova in? • A.: The area of Glogova was within the area of responsibility of the Bratunac Brigade. (25)
• Q.: And it's the submission of the Prosecution that there were
(5) • A.: Zeleni Jadar is also or was -- Zeleni Jadar was in the area of responsibility of the Independent Skelani Battalion. MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. And if we could go to Exhibit 761, which is the large -- a large exhibit. There's one -- a large exhibit is behind -- it's the floppy cardboard one. That's it. You should be able (10)to balance it on the easel. • Q.: Now, this is an aerial image, dated 17 July, of the Branjevo farm. It's the submission of the Prosecution that those are hundreds and hundreds of Muslim victims on the ground there. Are you familiar with the area around Branjevo? (15) • A.: No. I was never in Branjevo. • Q.: Is the area of Pilica in the area of the Zvornik Brigade responsibility? • A.: In the area of responsibility of the Zvornik Brigade, yes. • Q.: Now, you, in your direct testimony, made it very clear that you (20)did not feel Colonel Blagojevic took any part in any of the executions that occurred in the Bratunac Brigade area of responsibility; is that correct? • A.: Yes, correct.
• Q.: And you also made very clear that you didn't feel General or,
(25)excuse me, Colonel Pandurevic was involved in any of the crimes in his
• A.: Yes, correct. MR. McCLOSKEY: Now, if we could go to Exhibit 543A, and if you could put it on this page, July 13th. (5) • Q.: Now, General, this is a vehicle log from the Zvornik Brigade, indicating that the military police vehicle went to -- on July 13th, went to Orahovac, to Zvornik, to Orahovac, to Standard, to Bratunac. Can you tell us, prior to moving thousands of prisoners up to the Zvornik Brigade area of responsibility, what preparations the Zvornik (10)Brigade would have had to conduct to prepare to accept those prisoners for storage at Orahovac? • A.: I am not aware of any preparations, nor that they actually engaged in any preparations. • Q.: All right. Well, before hundreds and hundreds of people were (15)delivered to your area, if you were told that, would it be fair to say one would have to find an area to put them? • A.: I don't know who found the areas, who selected them. I cannot say that it was the commanding officers in the Zvornik Brigade or somebody else who was in control of all that, because it could be clearly seen from (20)the reports or one of the reports of the Zvornik Brigade Commander when he asked the question who accommodated so many refugees in certain areas in his area of responsibility. • Q.: But somebody would have had to find a place to put them before they put them there, wouldn't they? (25)
• A.: I don't know that. There's nothing I can say about that. And
• Q.: General, I'm not asking you who did it. I'm just asking you the simple question whether or not someone would have had to find a place to (5)put people if they were given an order to accept people in their area. • A.: Probably the person who was in charge of it all. He found the places where they would be put up. • Q.: And when moving hundreds of people by bus or by truck throughout this particular area, from Bratunac up to the Zvornik Brigade area, (10)someone would have had to make sure the routes were secure; is that not correct? • A.: At the time, I was not there, so I don't know who took care about all the measures that needed to be taken for those people to be transferred from Bratunac to those locations. (15) • Q.: General, I'm not asking you to tell me who. I'm just asking you, in a common military sense, that when you move large numbers of people through a potential military zone, it's standard practice to secure those routes, to make sure there's no mines, no enemy, no obstructions, so those people can be moved freely to where they need to go, especially with (20)prisoners. Isn't that true?
• A.: The Drina Corps was never in such a situation as to have such a
large number of people being transported through its area of
responsibility. The area from Bratunac via Zvornik to those locations
could not have had any mines. That is out of the question, because these
(25)were routes that were regularly used. Except for the very beginning of
• Q.: How would the people directing the movement of the prisoners know which route to take unless someone had checked out a route and given them directions? (5) • A.: Let me repeat what I have already said. The person who was in charge of it all. • Q.: And once the location was identified to store prisoners and once the prisoners arrived at that location, they would need to be guarded by someone, wouldn't they? (10) • A.: They should be placed under guard. • Q.: And if those prisoners were to be blindfolded, somebody would have to make a lot of blindfolds in preparation for those blindfoldings? • A.: I don't know about that. • Q.: And if those -- (15) • A.: But I accept what the witnesses said during the proceedings, that there were such instances. • Q.: And if those persons were to be transported a short distance by vehicle to an execution site, transportation assets would have to be marshalled to transport those victims to the execution sites; is that not (20)correct? • A.: Yes, that is correct. • Q.: And during the transportation of the victims to the execution sites, security would need to be present to guard the convoy or to guard the vehicles full of prisoners; is that not correct? (25)
• A.: Probably somebody took care of that, whoever was in charge of it
• Q.: And if those prisoners were to be executed, hundreds and hundreds of prisoners were to be executed in a one day's time, the troops necessary to pull the triggers to execute the victims would also have to be (5)marshalled and transported to the execution fields; correct? • A.: Yes. Yes. • Q.: And if those troops were to stay all day at the execution fields, killing people, they would need ammunition; correct? • A.: Yes. (10) • Q.: They would need water; correct? • A.: Yes. • Q.: They would need food; correct? • A.: Yes. • Q.: And if we multiply this by, first, Orahovac on the 13th; Petkovci (15)on the late night hours of the 13th and 14th; Kozluk on the 15th; Branjevo farm on the 16th; Pilica Cultural Centre on the afternoon/evening of the 16th, this is a rather large logistical operation to take some 4.000 people and murder them like this, is it not? • A.: Somebody must have taken care of it and provided probably logistic (20)support, the person who was in control of the whole thing. • Q.: Orahovac, Petkovci, Kozluk, Branjevo farm, Pilica were all in the Zvornik Brigade area of responsibility; is that correct? • A.: Yes. You already said that, and I confirmed it.
• Q.: If we can turn the page so we can see July 14, 15, 16, 17, of the
(25)travels of this military police vehicle. And I would note that on the
• A.: I cannot claim 100 per cent that this vehicle of the military police went there for the reasons you are mentioning. I also cannot claim that it did not. All this is in the area of responsibility of the Zvornik Brigade, where a battle was ongoing at the time against the forces of the (20)28th Division. MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, General. I believe it's break time.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Yes. We're going to have a
break now. I think 10 minutes will be sufficient, because after that we
have a big break until the next day, until tomorrow. So 10 minutes for
(25)now.
--- On resuming at 2.30 p.m. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. McCloskey, please continue. MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President. (5) • Q.: General Krstic, on the 13th and 14th of July, the military police vehicle and the officer or officers that are in it were under the command of the Commander of the Zvornik Brigade, Vinko Pandurevic; is that correct? • A.: I cannot say whether they were under the Command of the Zvornik (10)Brigade Commander. • Q.: Well, under the traditional chain of command and control, they should have been unless something radical had happened; is that right? • A.: That vehicle may have belonged to the Military Police Battalion, that is, the Military Police Battalion of the Main Staff, but it could (15)have also belonged to the Zvornik Brigade. • Q.: Well, for this question, I want you to assume that it belonged to the Zvornik Brigade, consistent with Mr. Butler's testimony. So if it belonged to the Zvornik Brigade and the traditional normal chain of command was working, they would have come under overall the command of (20)their Commander, Vinko Pandurevic? • A.: The right to use a motor vehicle, when it comes to the police, is vested within the Security Organs, without their having to consult the brigade commander. So if we assume -- that would be the case if we assume that the vehicle belonged to the Zvornik Brigade. (25)
• Q.: We've already established that, at the corps level, the assistant
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Visnjic. (5) MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, it would perhaps be easier for the witness to be given the document in B/C/S. He hasn't received it yet, and it might help him with his answers. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. McCloskey, do you agree? MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President. I'm sorry, I wasn't -- (10) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well, then, thank you. MR. McCLOSKEY: • Q.: The question was regarding the security, the structure of the security in the brigades. The security officer for the Zvornik Brigade -- I believe it's Drago Nikolic -- did he come under the command of the (15)Zvornik Brigade Commander? • A.: There is a provision of the rules of the Security Services, among others, which speaks about the fact that the Security Organs can carry out the tasks which need not be known to their superior officer. As regards this particular vehicle work log, I must say that I see it here for the (20)first time, and I have seen it during the proceedings already, but it is very difficult for me to comment on something in which I took no part and which I saw here for the first time.
• Q.: Do you have any indication that these military police officers are
under a separate chain of command, under the Security Organ and not under
(25)the command of the Zvornik Brigade?
• Q.: Isn't that generally in a situation where the Brigade Commander is (10)under some sort of suspicion or an investigation, a lot like an internal affairs investigation, not in the normal workings of the military? • A.: This doesn't refer only to the commander when he is under some kind of investigation; it also concerns other assignments. • Q.: All right. Let me go back. (15) MR. McCLOSKEY: And to try to save some time, Your Honour, I will ask certain pieces of evidence without referring to each one of them in detail and see if we can do it that way. • Q.: General Krstic, do you recall, during Mr. Butler's testimony, an exhibit which was the Zvornik Brigade MP roster for attendance, that (20)showed on July 14th that the ten members of the Zvornik military police were assigned at first to Orahovac, and then that "O" for Orahovac on the 14th was erased and something else was put in its place? Do you remember that document?
• A.: I think I should have the document. I think it would be
(25)necessary --
• A.: -- the exhibit in question. I can perhaps remember it but not sufficiently, I mean, in order to comment on it. • Q.: Do you challenge the supposition of the Prosecution that ten (5)members of the Zvornik Brigade military police were at Orahovac on July 14th? • A.: I cannot either challenge or agree with that allegation. I should like to see the exhibit once again in order to refresh my memory of the testimony of Mr. Butler. (10) • Q.: Fair enough. It is also the submission of the Prosecution that the Zvornik Brigade Engineering Company was present during the executions at Orahovac and participated in the burials of the victims, in fact, shone its lights on the victims during the execution. Do you have any reason to contest that allegation? (15) • A.: Same as for the previous thing that we discussed. I cannot either contest or confirm that allegation. I said that I did not take part in the drafting of such documents, and I saw them here for the first time. • Q.: All right. One more try on one other issue that is not related specifically to documents. The testimony of one of the Orahovac (20)survivors -- MR. McCLOSKEY: And I will come up with his letter soon, Your Honour. I'm sorry. It was a protected witness.
• Q.: -- testified that he recognised the voice of Gojko Simic, a person
he had worked many years with at a company in Belgrade; and that he heard
(25)the other people, the other Serb soldiers, referring to him as "Gojko";
• A.: I have never seen that Simic. I didn't know the man. And I can (10)only give you the same response as the one that I gave in response to your question about the military police. I cannot either contest or confirm what you're saying, in this case that the engineers of the Zvornik Brigade were used. I didn't have any prior knowledge about that, that is, about the use of the military police of the Zvornik Brigade or the use of the (15)engineers of the Zvornik Brigade. • Q.: All right. Let me try, if I can, to give you a hypothetical. MR. McCLOSKEY: Your Honour, I'm not sure if hypotheticals are valid in this institution, but if there are any problems, please let me know. This is something -- (20) JUDGE RODRIGUES: Put the question. We'll see. MR. McCLOSKEY:
• Q.: General Krstic, the hypothetical I wish to ask you is: Assuming
for a fact that ten members of the Zvornik Brigade Military Police were
guarding people at Orahovac the day they were killed, on July 14th;
(25)assuming for a fact that it was a small unit from the 4th Battalion of the
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. Visnjic, do you have an objection to make? MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, the objection concerns the question. I believe that the same kind of questions were (10)objected to by the Prosecution before, so I'm simply following their approach. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Let me just tell you that the Prosecutor is allowed to test the credibility of the witness, so we will overrule your objection and ask General Krstic to answer the question, (15)please. • A.: Those are assumptions, and again, it is very difficult to comment on the assumptions, that is, the assumption that they were really members of the Zvornik Brigade. However, on the basis of everything that I have so far spoken about, the right to use units of the military police is also (20)vested with the Security Service, and I spoke about that in the interview that I gave on a previous occasion. I cannot rule out the possibility that there was someone else -- and you know exactly who I have in mind -- that someone belonging to the Security Service was not involved in this execution of the task. (25)
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] I'm sorry to interrupt you,
• A.: Yes, if he learned about it later on, that is, that his soldiers or his units had been used by someone else for this purpose. But I abide by what I have already said concerning Colonel Pandurevic, the commander of the Zvornik Brigade. (10) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes. But again, if this is true, if it is true that it really happened, so if we assume that it happened, Colonel Pandurevic would have had to know and coordinate that, or not? • A.: At the time he didn't know, and I believe he didn't because he was (15)preoccupied with the front and the actions from the direction of Tuzla, and he was engaged against the 28th Division, so he couldn't undertake any measures. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Please continue, Mr. McCloskey. MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes. (20)
• Q.: General, Mr. Butler testified that Colonel Pandurevic did not get
back to the Zvornik Brigade until the afternoon of the 15th of July. So
who would have been in charge of the Zvornik Brigade in the absence of the
commander?
I understand that, by definition, the commander is always
(25)responsible and is always in command, but who is the person on the ground
• A.: It is the brigade chief of staff. • Q.: In this case, that would be Dragan -- Major Dragan Obrenovic. (5) • A.: Yes. • Q.: Now, I understand your answer regarding the military police and that perhaps the security came in and took over them. That still leaves the 4th Battalion, under my hypothetical, the infantry soldiers of the 4th battalion of the Zvornik Brigade. Who would have responsibility over (10)them? • A.: From the assumption and the testimony of witnesses, it is very difficult to comment on assumptions. I am still not quite sure that they were soldiers from the 4th Battalion. If they were, then the person responsible would be the chief of staff, on condition that this was done (15)with his knowledge and approval. • Q.: And how about the soldiers or soldier in the engineering -- is your leg bothering you, General? I just noticed you've just held it. • A.: When I testified earlier, I wasn't thinking only of the members of the security when I said that I do not exclude the possibility that other (20)individuals may have been involved and engaged by order of somebody from the Superior Command, and I have in mind, in the first place, the Security Service.
• Q.: Are you saying it's possible that the Security Service could come
in and just take a unit of the infantry, take a unit of the engineering,
(25)assets of the Zvornik Brigade without the authority or involvement of the
• A.: I understood you to mean the engineers. • Q.: Let's talk about the engineers, yes. Can they come in and just take the engineers and the engineering assets? (5) • A.: They can, with the knowledge of the commander of the unit, who at the time -- whoever it was at the time, but they may also do it without his knowledge, without him knowing about it. • Q.: Do you have any indication that that happened? • A.: Whether Lieutenant Colonel Dragan Obrenovic knew about this or (10)not -- probably he will come and tell us if he comes here to testify, and I really would like him to come and inform us about the truth, who was his commander, whether he knew about all this, or whether he did this on his own initiative and so on.
• Q.: All right. Let me go to another hypothetical and another
(15)execution site, Petkovci. I want you to assume that a vehicle belonging
to the 6th Battalion of the Zvornik Brigade, which is in the Petkovci area
of responsibility, the 6th Battalion, was used to make several trips back
and forth to the village of Petkovci, which is the same village the
prisoners were stored in, to the dam at Petkovci on the 15th, the day or
(20)evening that hundreds and hundreds of people were murdered. If the
6th Battalion vehicle was involved in the transportation of those
prisoners, could that be used, that vehicle and those soldiers belonging
to the 6th Battalion, could that be used without the authority of the
command of the Zvornik Brigade, be it the 6th Battalion command staff or
(25)the Zvornik Brigade command staff?
• Q.: General, this is a hypothetical where I'm asking you to assume certain facts. It's up to the trier of fact to decide whether these facts have been proven at all, but I do have the right to ask you these questions. (15)However, if you could step briefly to the map, the Serb map, I think that will answer your question about the location. MR. McCLOSKEY: If we could -- it's Exhibit number 2. It's the Krivaja map. It's the paper map that's just hanging. It's hanging there. (20)
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Mr. McCloskey, I apologise for
interrupting, but I don't think that these are hypothetical questions to
clear up a little bit the question of the Defence, because frequently
we're mixing questions with answers. Very often, General Krstic, when you
asked him what happened, he would answer something must have happened. We
(25)are no longer in the area of suppositions, at least that is my
MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President. I've just asked the General to step to the map and it's very late, so perhaps this would be a (10)good time to break. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, perhaps. Perhaps it's better. Otherwise, we overstep the time limit. So we're going to stop there for today, and we will resume tomorrow at 9.20. I wish you a good afternoon. Until tomorrow. (15) --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.00 p.m., to be reconvened on Friday, the 27th day of October, 2000 at 9.20 a.m. |
