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/ Colormap • Page 6487 • {1/80} (1)Friday, 27 October 2000 [Open session] [The witness takes the stand] --- Upon commencing at 9.20 a.m. (5) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Good morning, ladies and gentlemen; good morning to the technical booth, the interpreters; good morning, legal assistants, the registrar, the Office of the Prosecutor, Defence counsel. Good morning, General Krstic. We are going to continue your (10)testimony, and, of course, you are still testifying under oath, and it is Mr. McCloskey who will take the floor now. You have the floor, sir. MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President. Good morning; good morning, Your Honours, counsel, General Krstic. (15)
WITNESS: RADISLAV KRSTIC
[Resumed] • CROSS-EXAMINED by Mr. McCloskey: [Cont'd] • Q.: General Krstic, first of all, I wish you to -- do you have that pointer still? (20) MR. McCLOSKEY: If we could get the General the pointer. • Q.: If you could step to the map, which is Exhibit 2. Could you, first of all, show us on the map the Cyrillic symbols that stand for "Drina Corps" on that map? • A.: "Drina Corps" here is marked in Cyrillic letters "DK". (25)
• Q.: And could you show us where the "Eastern Bosnia Corps" is marked
• A.: The "Eastern Bosnian Corps" is over here, again, marked in Cyrillic letters "IBK". • Q.: Now, can you show us where the boundary is between the Drina Corps (5)and the Eastern Bosnia Corps? I can tell you there is a light red line that appears to have been drawn on the map just above the town of Branjevo. • A.: It should be this border here. • Q.: All right. (10) MR. McCLOSKEY: Could we zero in on that, please? • Q.: I'm sorry, General. Could you show us again, while we're getting a close-up, and just go on that little red line and wherever you say the border is now that we have a close-up. • A.: On this map, it is drawn here. This is the line indicated on the (15)map. • Q.: Okay. And could you point out where Branjevo, the village of Branjevo, is, if you know, near Pilica. You can just give us the general area, General, if you don't see where it's written. • A.: I really can't see it written here. (20) • Q.: All right. Thank you. • A.: It should be somewhere here, I think, in this area.
• Q.: You can go ahead and have a seat.
Now, the 3.500 to 4.000 victims that you noted reading about in
the UN report, do you have any reason to believe that those numbers are
(25)not accurate regarding the people that were murdered by the VRS after the
• A.: I cannot claim that that number is correct. • Q.: You contest it? • A.: I'm not contesting it, but I cannot assert that that is the right (5)number. • Q.: You saw the exhumation evidence. Are you contesting that the bodies that were found in the graves are victims of Srebrenica? • A.: I'm not contesting the graves. As I have already said, I learnt for the first time about those gravesites in the course of this trial when (10)the Prosecution produced evidence before this Trial Chamber. • Q.: Do you believe or do you have any evidence to believe that any of those victims recovered from those exhumations were battle casualties? • A.: Probably. I personally have no evidence on the basis of my previous knowledge, but what has been presented here in court is (15)evidence. • Q.: Do you have any indication that the people that were found in those graves were battle casualties? • A.: The indications can be found solely on the basis of the evidence presented here. (20) • Q.: So you do not contest the exhumation evidence in any way? • A.: I am not contesting it. • Q.: Now, did you know that the Branjevo Military Farm was an asset of the Zvornik Brigade?
• A.: At the time, I had no knowledge that the Zvornik Brigade had a
(25)farm in Branjevo. It was not at all within the framework of my activities
• Q.: Now, could security officers, under your theory of the case, such as Ljubo Beara and Vujadin Popovic, take over the Kula school near Pilica, the Pilica Cultural Centre, the school -- the new school at Petkovci, the (5)school in Orahovac and place hundreds and hundreds of prisoners in each of those schools without informing the command structure of the Zvornik Brigade? • A.: I don't know that. • Q.: And if they did inform the command structure of the Zvornik (10)Brigade, what would the duty of the Zvornik Brigade be in terms of informing their superior command? • A.: Their duty was to inform or notify the superior command about it. • Q.: Who would that have been? • A.: It was the command of the Drina Corps. (15) • Q.: Now, the same question for taking over the Branjevo Farm. The fields near Kozluk, right next to the Drina Wolf barracks, the plateau of the dam near Petkovci, and the field just up the road from the school at Orahovac, could Ljubija Beara and Vujadin Popovic have taken and used those fields, those areas, for the murder of thousands of Bosnian Muslim (20)men without informing the Zvornik Brigade command? • A.: It is possible. It is possible, in view of the way in which they worked and behaved. • Q.: What is possible? • A.: Yes. (25)
• Q.: What is possible, General?
• Q.: General, there's a war going on and this is right near the front lines; is that not correct? (5) • A.: Yes, but at the same time there are large-scale combat operations going on from the direction of Tuzla, with the 2nd Corps of the BH army. Then the Zvornik Brigade is also fighting against the 28th Division. So the main concern of the brigade command at the time were the combat operations. And I don't know to what extent they had time and the means (10)to keep watch as to what was happening deep within their area of responsibility, especially if this is being done by a superior command to them, and I mean the Main Staff, headed by Ljubo Beara. • Q.: General, automatic weapon fire is rather loud, isn't it? • A.: Yes, but there was such fire all over the place in that area, (15)starting from the area linked to the 1st Birac Brigade, up to the borderline with the Eastern Bosnian Corps, because an offensive had been relaunched at the time from Tuzla towards the positions of the Zvornik and Birac Brigades; and there were also activities by the 28th Division, then the combat activities of the Zvornik Brigade to crush that offensive, and (20)it was hard to tell where the fire was coming from.
• Q.: General, you heard Mr. Butler testify that on July 14th the column
had not reached the area of Orahovac, there had been no major assault from
the 2nd Corps, yet all day long on the 14th, from the afternoon all the
way through the evening, there was sounds of automatic rifle fire in the
(25)village of Orahovac, not to mention the bulldozers and the screams of the
• A.: Whether there was fire on the front line at the time or not, only the command of the Zvornik Brigade and the battalions under its command know about that. • Q.: Let's assume for Branjevo Farm, for example, that it's a military (15)farm, military officers run it, and that in order to use that farm as an execution field, the military thing would have been done; it would have been approved through the Zvornik Brigade command. Wouldn't that be the normal way things would have worked? • A.: Knowing who was in charge of this, it did not have to be approved (20)by the command of the Zvornik Brigade at all. • Q.: So Beara and others could have just stolen the Branjevo Farm for their own purposes and the Zvornik Brigade wouldn't have done a thing or cared or known; is that what you're suggesting?
• A.: I wouldn't put it that way, that they would steal it, but Ljubo
(25)Beara was the head of the security of the Main Staff, and he had the
• Q.: I don't want to get into 1992 -- • A.: There is no way -- there was no way for the command of the Zvornik (5)Brigade to resist Ljubo Beara, to oppose him, with respect to his use of that facility and others. • Q.: Of course there isn't. Orders from General Mladic. It was their duty to follow orders from General Mladic, wasn't it? • A.: Are you asking me about Ljubo Beara? (10) • Q.: It's the duty of Zvornik Brigade to follow orders of General Mladic as it comes from the Main Staff through the Drina Corps or through Ljubo Beara; it's their duty to follow orders, isn't it? • A.: I do not believe that General Mladic issued any kind of task to the Zvornik Brigade -- (15) • Q.: That wasn't my question -- • A.: -- in connection with everything that was happening in the facilities in his area of responsibility. • Q.: My question was -- • A.: That is how I understood your question. (20) • Q.: Let me try again. You said the Zvornik Brigade could not resist the orders of Ljubo Beara, correct? • A.: Yes. • Q.: So they would follow the orders of Ljubo Beara.
• A.: No. I believe that Ljubo Beara did not consult them at all,
(25)because if he had consulted them, then Colonel Pandurevic would not be
• Q.: Ljubo Beara is a Main Staff security officer. He's not a commander, is he? • A.: Yes, but he runs the Security Service, which has considerable (5)authority. • Q.: Vujadin Popovic, as the Assistant Commander for Security, is not a commander of troops, is he? • A.: He is not, but he is in charge of the deployment of units of the military police. (10) • Q.: He has the power to advise the commander on how those units are deployed, but he does not have the power to deploy those units outside the authority of his commander, does he? • A.: Could I please be able to answer these questions in private session? (15) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] General Krstic, why can't you answer this question in public? This is a very general question, simply to learn whether a security officer can have command over troops. That was the question that the Prosecutor has asked you. It's a question that has to do with the rules and regulations. I don't see why you can't (20)answer that question. Mr. Prosecutor, will you please put your question so that I can check whether I understood you correctly.
MR. McCLOSKEY: If I can -- I think it would be best, Your Honour,
if I -- it was a question regarding the structure and the power of the
(25)Assistant Commander for Security for the Drina Corps, whether or not he
(5) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, you see. So I have understood correctly. You can answer that question easily. • A.: Very well, but Mr. McCloskey -- I do apologise, but he has been mentioning names. I agree that I can answer the question if it has to do with the duties of a particular officer. (10) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes. Well, answer the question without mentioning the name if that is helpful to you. Just answer the question without giving any names. Mr. McCloskey, please repeat your question so as to remind General Krstic. (15) MR. McCLOSKEY: • Q.: General, in the corps command -- there is an Assistant Commander for Security in any corps command. That security person does not command troops, does he? He merely advises the commander on the appropriate use of military police; is that correct? (20)
• A.: That is correct. However, we have already discussed this. If
that person, by order of a superior commander, is placed under somebody
else's command and the entire structure of the units you are referring to
is placed under the command of that officer to whom this one is
subordinate, then they are in control and deploy those units in the way
(25)they see fit.
• A.: Under normal conditions, they do not command troops. • Q.: Troops, infantry officers, commanders, brigade commanders, for (5)instance, they're pretty tough guys. They're used to taking orders and giving orders, but they're not used to taking orders from security guys, are they? • A.: That is correct. • Q.: So when Vujadin Popovic comes into the Zvornik Brigade area, or (10)Ljubo Beara comes into the Zvornik Brigade area, their only authority is the authority by which they have gained from their commanders; is that correct? • A.: You're referring to Ljubo Beara and Vujadin Popovic? • Q.: Yes, sir. (15) • A.: Ljubo Beara did receive orders from his commander, but Vujadin Popovic certainly didn't receive orders from his commander, but he received them from Ljubo Beara. • Q.: In the normal course of events, if security officers come to infantry troops, infantry commanders into their area, and provide orders (20)or information, their only authority is that gained from their commanders; is that correct? • A.: I don't know whether they came among officers who were in command of units on the front.
• Q.: Vinko Pandurevic would not follow the order of a security officer
(25)unless he felt that it was the order of the security officer's commander,
• A.: With respect to prisoners of war, he would not follow them at all. • Q.: But somebody arranged for all these schools and all these sites (5)and all this engineering equipment and the drivers from the 6th Battalion and the 4th Battalion infantry from the Zvornik Brigade and the MPs from the Zvornik Brigade. Somebody did that, didn't they? Somebody assisted the security people in all that, or did they do it all themselves, these two guys? (10) • A.: I don't know at all who helped them, that they took vehicles from the 4th Battalion to use them for whatever they were doing. MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. If we could go to another area. I would like to play the video of General Mladic and General Krstic and others going through the town of Srebrenica on July 11th. It should be (15)Exhibit number 145. But before we play it, let me ask the General one question. • Q.: General, do you have a nickname or a shortened name that some officers refer to you as? • A.: I do not have a nickname of any kind; I just have an abbreviation (20)of my surname. And with that shortened -- abbreviation of my surname, my subordinates never referred to me by that name; they always addressed me as is prescribed by the rules and regulations when it comes to relationships between superior officers and subordinates in the army. So I said my subordinates never used that abbreviation. (25)
• Q.: Do you remember when Mr. Ruez asked you that same question and you
• A.: It's not a nickname. As I said, it's an abbreviation of my last name. A nickname is something else again. • Q.: I see. So you didn't tell Mr. Ruez about the abbreviation of your (5)last name; you just were talking about you didn't have a nickname? • A.: Yes. Yes. • Q.: You were being completely honest with Mr. Ruez on that point? • A.: I was being completely honest, yes. • Q.: Okay. Now, General Mladic refers to you by this shortened name, (10)does he not? • A.: That's his right. I had no right to be angry with him for doing so, for calling me in the way he did. • Q.: On July 11th, as you were beginning to walk into Srebrenica, did you have any reason to be angry with General Mladic? (15) • A.: It was all very strange to me, what happened with respect to the entrance to Srebrenica, and I spoke about that during my testimony yesterday. • Q.: General, lots of things have been very strange, but my question was: Did you have any reason to be angry with General Mladic? (20) • A.: I could have been angry in myself with Mr. Mladic, but it was his right to decide whether he was going to enter Srebrenica or not -- it was not up to me -- and, of course, his overall behaviour in the town itself.
• Q.: My question was not whether you could have been mad, General, but
my question was whether or not you were angry or mad at General Mladic on
(25)July 11th, during the time that you walked through town.
• Q.: General, were you or were you not angry with General Mladic on July 11th as you walked through the town? (5) • A.: In myself, I was mad, yes, within me.
MR. McCLOSKEY: Now, if we could play 145/1, I believe. MR. McCLOSKEY: • Q.: So, General Krstic, what is your shortened name? (10) • A.: Krle. • Q.: The name we saw General Mladic refer to you as. • A.: Yes, but he said first "Krstic." He referred to me by the name "Krstic" first and then said "Krle." • Q.: That's the same "Krle" we've seen in the intercepts? Or the same (15)word, I should say. • A.: I don't want to speak about intercepts. I am talking in concrete terms about this situation and in relation to the concrete situation that we saw a moment ago. • Q.: The word Krle, K-r-l-e, was seen in transcripts of Bosnian (20)intercepts; is that correct? The Prosecution's evidence, whether you believe it is valid or not, it was seen as part of this case? • A.: Yes.
• Q.: Now, before coming into town, we've seen a video of the APC and
you and General Mladic, and we didn't play that, but I would like
(25)Exhibit 157 put on the ELMO for a moment, if we could.
THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. • A.: This is General Mladic. (5) MR. McCLOSKEY: • Q.: Who is the one in the forefront of the photograph, for the record, in the centre. Sorry, General, you need to point on the ELMO. You need to point on the ELMO so we can see your pointer. Try to speak into the microphone as best you can also. (10) MR. McCLOSKEY: If you can help him pull that microphone towards him. • A.: On this photograph, you can see the following persons: General Mladic, myself, Lieutenant Colonel Vinko Pandurevic. MR. McCLOSKEY: (15) • Q.: And for the record, Vinko Pandurevic is to the -- immediately to the right of General Mladic, and General Krstic is immediately to the left of General Mladic. And how about the other two soldiers? Who are they? • A.: These soldiers were from the security of General Mladic. • Q.: And what were their names? (20) • A.: I don't know. • Q.: Do you have your own security? You're a General. • A.: No. • Q.: At any time between July 5th and July 12th, did you have any security person for your personal security? (25)
• A.: There was just the security for the forward command post, not my
• Q.: And to make sure the record is clear, the nature of the record's clear, when we talk about personal security, we're not talking about the (5)security branch in any way with this line of questioning. • A.: Yes. I understood your question. • Q.: And who -- • A.: Apart from the driver, I didn't have anybody. • Q.: And who was your driver? (10) • A.: My driver was Tosic. • Q.: What's his -- • A.: Vlado. And then soldier Bjelanovic, Private Bjelanovic, another driver, and Krstic, who had the same surname as myself. • Q.: What was that Krstic's first name? (15) • A.: His name was Dalibor. • Q.: Any relation to you? • A.: No. He was a refugee from Sarajevo. No kin of any kind. • Q.: And what was his position relating to you? • A.: He was a private soldier and a driver. (20) • Q.: Who was your driver on this trip into Srebrenica? • A.: It was precisely that driver, Dalibor Krstic. • Q.: And the other driver's name, I'm sorry, again, was Josic or Tosic? • A.: Vlado Tosic. (25)
• Q.: And where was he at the time that you were coming into
• A.: He was in the vehicle with me. • Q.: And where did Vlado Tosic spend the night during this operation from July 5th through to July 13th? (5) • A.: From the 5th to the 13th of July, he was where I was. • Q.: And precisely can you tell us where you spent the night during that time period? • A.: From the 5th to the 11th of July, I think I spent most of my nights at the forward command post, but I spent one night in the command (10)of the Bratunac Brigade. That was on the night between the 11th and 12th. • Q.: Where did Mladic spend the night when he was at the forward command post? • A.: I don't know where he slept. I don't know. But he didn't spend a (15)single night at the forward command post. • Q.: Did Dalibor Krstic also spend the night at the same place you did during this time period? • A.: Yes. MR. McCLOSKEY: All right. If we could go to one more brief photo (20)exhibit, number 768. And if the monitor could be zeroed in on the face of General Krstic, which is in the right-hand side of the picture. Okay. That's fine. • Q.: General, you don't look angry.
• A.: That's what you think. If you can't see that I am angry -- it is
(25)not in my nature to demonstrate my anger and feelings before my
• Q.: This was a -- • A.: -- or my subordinates. • Q.: This was a great moment in the history of the war for the VRS (5)army, wasn't it? • A.: I did not say that. MR. McCLOSKEY: Your Honour, I think it's a good time to break. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. McCloskey, it is a good moment to break. Let us now take a 15-minute break. (10) --- Recess taken at 10.15 a.m. --- On resuming at 10.33 a.m.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Mr. McCloskey, before resuming,
I should like to make an observation in connection with your
cross-examination. The Chamber has noted something. We did not interrupt
(15)so as not to break your continuity, but I would like you to pay attention,
because you used -- when you mentioned the interview of General Krstic
with Ruez, you used the word "honest" and "dishonest." I don't think it
is up to you to judge the witness.
Another observation: I think you must abstain from making
(20)comments; for example, "There were many strange things." I'm just giving
you an example. It's not up to you to make comments of that kind.
A third point I should like to underline: You asked General
Krstic that he doesn't seem to be angry. In my opinion, that is not the
right way to put the question. You could perhaps ask: "What was your
(25)mood at the time?" for instance. I could give you another example.
MR. McCLOSKEY: Understood. Thank you, Mr. President. • Q.: General Krstic, this photograph that is on the ELMO, can you tell us who the person is that's between General Mladic and yourself? • A.: The person between me and General Mladic is the president of the (20)assembly of the municipality of Sokolac. • Q.: Can you tell us his name? • A.: Milan Tupajic. • Q.: Is he a military man in this capacity? Is he in this photograph?
• A.: Yes. Tupajic was president of the municipal assembly of Sokolac
(25)at the time, and while I was commander of the 2nd Romanija Brigade, he
MR. McCLOSKEY: If we could go to Exhibit 158. (10) • Q.: Three men, identified as 1, 2, and 3 in this photograph, who are clearly identified by Drazen Erdemovic as members of the 10th Diversionary Unit, and you were standing right next to them. Was the 10th Diversionary Unit with you in Srebrenica in the town in this photograph? • A.: I'm not standing next to them; I'm just passing by them. The 10th (15)Diversionary Detachment, throughout the duration of the operation until the entry into Srebrenica, was not at all engaged in any way. They are not mentioned in the Corps Commander's order, not even as a reserve force of the Drina Corps. • Q.: My question is: Are these three men 10th Diversionary? (20)
• A.: I don't know that. I simply did not observe nor did I seek to
identify which unit which soldier or group of soldiers belonged to. The
fact that I passed by them -- I passed by the other soldiers who were
there too -- and I didn't notice anything in particular with respect to
individuals or groups nor did I make an effort to learn in any way which
(25)unit they belonged to. I didn't pay attention to their uniforms,
• Q.: You've mentioned the -- who is the Commander of the 10th Diversionary Unit at this time? • A.: I know from before that the Commander of the 10th Diversionary (5)Detachment was Miso Pelemis. • Q.: And do you recognise Miso Pelemis? Do you know what he looks like? • A.: I saw him once at a celebration of the day of the Birac Brigade on the 20th of May as the Brigade Commander, because Colonel Andric invited (10)me to this celebration as his colleague. The next day was the celebration of the 2nd Romanija Brigade, the 21st of May. That is the day when the unit was formed that was being celebrated. • Q.: What year? • A.: I think it was in May. (15) • Q.: Before or after the walk through Srebrenica? • A.: Before. Before. • Q.: So did you recognise Miso Pelemis in your walk through Srebrenica? • A.: No. I didn't see him at all. (20) • Q.: He is identified as on the film, and Mr. Ruez, in his direct testimony, clearly on that film. Did you see him on that film? • A.: I don't remember that photograph, but it was shown here. Mr. Erdemovic, in his testimony, spoke about his presence there.
• Q.: Do you recall, in your earlier testimony, saying that
(25)General Mladic made an order on the 11th for the soldiers to light
• A.: I'm afraid I didn't get the translation of that. Yes. Yes. Before the airstrikes and during the airstrikes and after that, General Mladic ordered that, for protection purposes, (5)haystacks should be set on fire. • Q.: And that order went out to the brigades and various units involved in the operation on the 11th of July? • A.: This was ordered by General Mladic. • Q.: So would it have been communicated to the units in the field that (10)would have been near the haystacks? • A.: General Mladic ordered this to the brigade commanders. • Q.: So the units in the field would have received -- • A.: Which means, yes, it was conveyed to the units. • Q.: Do you recall during the testimony of Drazen Erdemovic that he (15)received an order from Miso Pelemis to light haystacks on fire? • A.: I don't remember that particular detail. MR. McCLOSKEY: If we could go to Exhibit number 770. • Q.: This is a freeze-frame of General Mladic sitting down and you're standing over him. Are you communicating with General Mladic in this (20)photograph?
• A.: Yes. General Zivanovic was nearby, on the other side, together
with the brigade commanders. This was, I think, after he issued the order
to continue the operation towards Potocari, and the brigade commanders
resisted in a certain sense for the reasons I explained when answering
(25)questions by my Defence counsel.
• A.: From the 11th to the 12th, the order was that all units should (5)stop at the lines they had reached. And after the meeting in Bratunac, all the units were pulled from those lines towards the town, and they were withdrawn to former positions in the direction of Viogora. • Q.: That occurred after the brigade commanders complained to General Mladic that, "We shouldn't go further. We don't know where the (10)28th Division is"; is that right? • A.: Yes. It was said that we had no contact with the 28th Division because civilians were in Potocari and because they were still moving towards Potocari. So there was a possibility that, together with the civilians, there were forces from the 28th Division, and if the attack (15)were to be continued towards Potocari, the consequences would be considerable on both sides and especially for the civilians. And the euphoria around the entry into Srebrenica was stimulated, as I have already said, by whose behaviour. • Q.: So in this situation, the brigade commanders were able to reason (20)with General Mladic and their decisions were followed -- excuse me -- their advice was followed? • A.: Yes. This was something that the brigade commanders had to do as commanders, as professional soldiers. • Q.: And Mladic listened to them? (25)
• A.: Yes. He was very angry, and then he gave the order stop at the
• Q.: And in this photograph, number 770, you appear to be communicating with General Mladic; is that correct? • A.: Yes. Yes. That was precisely in connection with what I have just (5)said. • Q.: And this is the period in the -- about what time did you go into Srebrenica, just to clear up that, that day on the 11th? • A.: After the Commander of the 1st Battalion of the Zvornik Brigade informed General Mladic that a part of his unit had entered Srebrenica, (10)then General Mladic ordered General Zivanovic and myself to follow him towards Srebrenica. We went along the route Pribicevac, Zeleni Jadar, Bojna, Srebrenica. • Q.: What time did you get into Srebrenica? • A.: This was in the afternoon. Two or three hours after the (15)airstrikes perhaps. I don't remember now exactly what time it was. • Q.: And you had already been sidelined by General Mladic in a position where you were -- had no more authority or work to do for the operation? • A.: I wasn't relieved of my duty as Chief of Staff, neither myself nor General Zivanovic as Corps Commander, but the command over the brigade (20)commanders was taken over by Mladic. He ordered, he commanded, he took charge, and we simply followed him into Srebrenica. • Q.: I understand. I don't want to go back over that ground, but my question was: This is at that time period where you had been -- I think the term we ended up agreeing on was "sidelined." (25)
• A.: Yes.
(15)
• A.: Simply, the brigade commanders -- at least, that was my
assessment -- had to respond in this way and to persuade Mladic that that
was not a good thing, that there were civilians in Potocari, and that
there could be serious consequences for the civilian population and also
for the forces that had entered Srebrenica, and also the possibility of
(20)the presence of 28th Division forces in Potocari among the civilians.
Those were the main reasons.
The brigade commanders felt it was their duty to respond in this
way and to persuade General Mladic not to continue, because it would have
been crazy to continue the operation towards Potocari. And that can also
(25)clearly be seen on the previous map, the exhibit, that the units from
MR. McCLOSKEY: If we could go to -- THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, Mr. McCloskey. (5) MR. McCLOSKEY: If we could go now to Exhibit 771. • Q.: General, did you see Lieutenant Colonel Popovic as you came into Srebrenica? • A.: No, I didn't notice Lieutenant Colonel Popovic in Srebrenica. • Q.: If I could direct your attention to this Exhibit 771. Who is the (10)man standing over your left shoulder? • A.: By physical appearance and the way this person is dressed, there were many soldiers like that. It seems to me to be Lieutenant Colonel Popovic. He never came to the forward command post on one single day, nor did he come with me to Srebrenica, nor did I see him coming with Mladic or (15)Zivanovic. • Q.: Does this photo refresh your recollection about his presence, bring back any images of him being present, any conversations you might have had with him in Srebrenica, anything like that? • A.: No, not at all, not at all. I said for reasons of my health also, (20)my memory is not such that I can remember all the details. • Q.: General Zivanovic was in Srebrenica, the Corps Commander; you were in Srebrenica, the Chief of Staff. We now see Lieutenant Colonel Popovic as the assistant commander for security. Were you aware of his duties and his assignments at this time period, at this time in Srebrenica? (25)
• A.: No, not at all. I was not at all aware of them, nor was he in any
• Q.: Were you acting as deputy commander at this time? • A.: No. I was the Chief of Staff. The Corps Commander was there and he was in command, and the Corps Commander at that time was at the forward command post at Srebrenica when the forces, troops entered town. (10) • Q.: When you were in Srebrenica, did you hear General Mladic make that comment about, "Now it's time to take revenge upon the Turks"? • A.: I did not hear that, all of it, because I wasn't able to go as fast as him, and as General Zivanovic. They went faster. But I did hear some of the details, especially when he ordered the continuation of the (15)operation. I heard that part. • Q.: The term "Turks" is a derogatory terms for Muslims, is it not? • A.: I never used that term. Everybody has his own way of expressing himself, so I don't wish to comment upon what General Mladic said. For me, they were Muslims and Bosniaks, as far as I was concerned. (20) • Q.: Can you comment on General Mladic's use of the term "Turks" in that context? • A.: No, I wouldn't wish to comment on that. • Q.: You wouldn't support the use of that term in that context? • A.: If it were up to me, no. I didn't use the term myself. (25)
JUDGE RIAD: General Krstic, it was used officially. We have here
(5) • A.: No, you cannot use that officially, not at all. For us, they were Muslims, at that time; and later on, after the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina gained independence, they were Bosniaks. But that was signed by General Skocajic. I had nothing to do with that. That was probably written at the time when I was absent and when he replaced me, (10)while I was undergoing treatment. JUDGE RIAD: 18th March 1995. • A.: Yes. That's right. I wasn't -- JUDGE RIAD: The command -- thank you. MR. McCLOSKEY: (15) • Q.: General, there's a worse term for Muslims that we've heard in this trial. What term is that? • A.: Witnesses frequently -- well, not frequently, but I notice them use the term "balija," a term of some sort, "balija." • Q.: That is a profoundly offensive term for a Muslim, is it not? (20) • A.: Yes, but I never used it, and the Muslims did use terms for the Serbs, such as "Chetnik," and that is derogatory too, especially used in the way they did and how they understood the term "Chetnik," the concept "Chetnik."
JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me again, but the word "Turk," the name "Turk"
(25)was not derogatory, was it? "Balija" is, but "Turk," what did it mean
• A.: Probably because they were Muslims and that area was for a long time, as you well know, for 500 years, in fact, under Turkish rule, so probably that term remained and dates back to those days, the days of (5)Turkish rule. JUDGE RIAD: So it means that they are not part of the country; they belong to Turkey? • A.: No. No. They belong to Bosnia-Herzegovina. JUDGE RIAD: Thank you. (10) MR. McCLOSKEY: • Q.: When the commander officer communicates to the public or to his troops in a manner derogatory, racially derogatory, what kind of message does that send the young troops in the field, when the term "Turks" is used or the term "balija" is used? How would you expect the young (15)men -- the 18-year-olds, the 19-year-olds, the 20-year-olds -- to react to that kind of term? JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Petrusic. MR. PETRUSIC: [Int.] Mr. President, I consider that this question is an obvious example and runs along the lines of your (20)suggestions and guidelines given after the break today, so that I should like to ask the Prosecutor to be more concrete in posing his questions and linked to the events and facts. All this seems to me to be a comment on his part and to enter into surmise and conjecture and reactions to a situation which is not concrete and not based on fact. (25)
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Mr. McCloskey, please
MR. McCLOSKEY: • Q.: Can you comment on the effect you might expect General Mladic's statement to have on the troops? (5) • A.: It would have a bad effect in the sense that it would encourage something that was not good. • Q.: What would it encourage that was not good? • A.: Well, when that is said by the commander of an army, then it is clear what kind of effect this is going to have on the ordinary soldier, (10)words used like that and expressions of that kind in a situation when the soldiers come into contact with members of either the 28th Division or possibly with the civilian population. • Q.: In particular, what would happen? What could happen when this contact occurs under this sort of incitement? (15) • A.: There would be serious repercussions than the ones that could be expected. • Q.: Violence, for example? • A.: Well, you're asking me now to -- I've already said, actually. I've already told you when I spoke about the fact that the attack should (20)not be continued how the commanders reacted to that, and I think that when I talked about that, I answered your question, in fact.
• Q.: You answered earlier, and you said, "Then it is clear what kind of
an effect this is going to have on the ordinary soldier, words used like
that and expressions of that kind in a situation where the soldiers come
(25)into contact with members of either the 28th Division..." but you don't
• A.: I think that I have provided you with an answer to your question. Perhaps there would be uncontrolled behaviour on the part of people. • Q.: What is Drinski magazine? General, is your leg bothering you? (5) • A.: Well, I'll keep it up until the break. Thank you for your concern. • Q.: What's Drinski magazine? • A.: I don't know what Drinski magazine is. • Q.: Have you heard of the publication of the Drina Corps called the (10)Drinski? • A.: The paper Srpska Vojska. • Q.: Srpska Vojska, I believe, is one of the magazines for the army of the Republika Srpska, but I believe the Drinski magazine -- if you recall the testimony of Mr. Butler, there was an article in Drinski about the (15)Branjevo Military Farm, and Mr. Butler testified that he believed this Drinski was a magazine published for the Drina Corps. You were Chief of Staff and Commander for the Drina Corps. Have you heard of this magazine? • A.: I think that the Zvornik Brigade had a magazine of some kind. (20)Whether it was called the Drinski magazine, I don't know. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Visnjic.
MR. VISNJIC:
[Int.] Mr. President, I think that there is
a problem in the interpretation, perhaps. If we're thinking of the same
magazine, the name of the magazine is just Drinski or Drinski Novine but
(25)not Drinski magazine. Perhaps I'm wrong, but as far as I can recall, that
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Thank you very much, (5)Mr. Visnjic. With that clarification, I should like to ask Mr. McCloskey to rephrase his question. MR. McCLOSKEY: • Q.: Have you heard of a magazine called Drinski, whether it be Zvornik Brigade or -- (10) • A.: Yes. Yes, there was something of that kind, a publication of that kind of the Zvornik Brigade. I think that, later on, the Drina Corps and its information service did publish a paper of this kind, and I think it had the same title. • Q.: Do you recall an interview you gave to Drinski? (15) • A.: Possibly. Possibly I did. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] I see that we are in need of a break at this point. So let's take a 15-minute break. --- Recess taken at 11.15 a.m. --- On resuming at 11.34 a.m. (20) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. McCloskey. Let's continue. MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
• Q.: One brief question before we get to Drinski. Did you hear any of
the commanders or any officers talk to their troops about the comment
(25)General Mladic made taking revenge upon the Turks?
• Q.: When were the officers aware that the comment was made? • A.: I don't know that. • Q.: Did anyone hear him make it while he was in Srebrenica? (5) • A.: I don't know that either. • Q.: Did you hear him make it while he was in Srebrenica? • A.: I don't remember being close to him at that point in time to be able to hear him. • Q.: So you may have heard it, but you don't remember, or what? I (10)don't understand your response.
• A.: I don't remember hearing that. MR. McCLOSKEY: • Q.: Making reference to page 66 of the interview with Mr. Ruez, line (15)13: (Q.:) So he was keeping his comments for the television, comments like, 'It's time to take revenge on the Turks.' He kept that for the television. He didn't use these kinds of words in front of his staff? (A.:) We were not with him all the time. That was his usual (20)conduct. Following the takeover of Srebrenica, everyone could hear what he was saying in front of the cameras, and that was when he said that we should go out to Potocari and take revenge on the Turks." • A.: I heard that here, yes, from the videotape.
• Q.: Did you hear it in Srebrenica? The comment was everyone could
(25)hear it.
MR. McCLOSKEY: Now if we could go to Drinski, and I've got copies of the entire magazine, as well as -- but it's only in B/C/S, but I do (5)have full translated copies of the article that I'm going to be referring to, and this is Exhibit 744. And if we could present the General with the original magazine, it would probably be easiest, and if you could go to the article which is marked with a yellow sticky. And I would request, Your Honour, that we are allowed to get the original magazine back and go (10)with the photocopy. And if we could put the English page -- General, if you could take a moment to familiarise yourself with that, with this interview and this article. For the record, this is publication Drinski, date November 1995. The headline of the article is "The Youngest, but an Elite Corps (15)Already." The author is Vuk Kovacevic, entitled "Interview with Major General Radislav Krstic, Commander of the Drina Corps of the Army of the Republika Srpska." JUDGE RODRIGUES: Mr. McCloskey, what is the page to be put on the ELMO? (20) MR. McCLOSKEY: Page 2. And if we could get a close-up of the top four paragraphs. That's great. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Visnjic.
MR. VISNJIC:
[Int.] Mr. President, while the General is
reading the article, I would have a suggestion to make. I see that this
(25)is quite a lengthy text given to us by the Prosecution. In view of the
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. McCloskey. MR. McCLOSKEY: Your Honour, there are some other lengthy documents related to this article that we have, in fact, given to the Defence because they are more lengthy than a two- or three-page article. (10)The issue that is brought up by this article is particularly sensitive, and it is the belief of the Prosecution that the -- it is appropriate and the best way to get at the truth to provide it in this manner. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] There's no question that it is (15)important. The question is that if we give General Krstic enough time to read the document, we'll be waiting here in the meantime, and I think there could be a practical suggestion. You have other matters to address. We could leave this question to be addressed after the long break that we will have in half an hour's time. In that way, at least we (20)would have -- General Krstic and the Defence would have 10, 15 minutes to read this document. Do you agree with this practical suggestion? MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, of course, Mr. President, I agree. I understand the point, and we'll --
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Very well.
(25)Mr. Visnjic, is this solution acceptable to you?
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] You were not speaking into the microphone. (5) MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Yes, Mr. President. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well. That's what we will do. Please go on to your next question, Mr. McCloskey, and after the break, you can go back to this area since the Defence and General Krstic (10)at least will have had a little time to review the document, because we will see -- I said "review," because later on we will see what the position of General Krstic is. MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President. • Q.: General Krstic, I think I asked you yesterday when you became (15)reactivated after being sidelined, but now I want to ask you when General Zivanovic became reactivated after he was sidelined. On the afternoon of July 10th, you testified he was sidelined, put out of the command chain. Did he become reactivated at some point where he was allowed to have command authority again? (20) • A.: After which date? I apologise.
• Q.: You said yesterday that on the afternoon of July 10th,
General Mladic took over direct command and sidelined you and
General Zivanovic. So I would like to know, after the afternoon of
July 10th, when was it that General Zivanovic gained some sort of command
(25)authority again?
(5) • Q.: When did he start to carry out his duties as Corps Commander? • A.: The very fact that General Zivanovic attended the meeting in the evening at the Command of the Bratunac Brigade, which was chaired by General Mladic, and before that he attended the meeting with representatives of the Dutch Battalion at the UNPROFOR, confirms what I (10)said and my position that General Zivanovic was the Corps Commander. As to whether he carried out any assignments linked to Srebrenica and everything else that happened after the forces of the Drina Corps left to go towards Zepa, that I don't know. • Q.: So you believe he regained his authority to command on the night (15)of the 11th of July? • A.: I don't know what he discussed with General Zivanovic -- with General Mladic, I'm sorry. General Zivanovic was the Corps Commander and General Mladic the Commander-In-Chief of the VRS. I don't know what they discussed. (20) • Q.: You were still, on July 11th, still the Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps, and General Zivanovic was still the Corps Commander. You've testified he had no power after July 11th. Can you clarify the issue of when he regained power?
• A.: I don't know that. It is a very, very difficult question to ask
(25)me when my commander was reactivated. He was not relieved of duty.
• Q.: Are you aware that he ever took command authority between the 11th (5)and the 15th of July? • A.: General Zivanovic was at the command post. Whether he was in Vlasenica or somewhere else, I don't know that. He did issue some orders, and I spoke about those during the examination-in-chief, when I was questioned by the Defence attorney. (10) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. McCloskey, I'm sorry for interrupting you. General Krstic, when you met General Zivanovic at Srebrenica, did you speak amongst yourselves about the situation in the corps command? • A.: No, Mr. President. I could not discuss such things with my (15)superior officer. That would be an insult. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] I can understand your answer, but let me put the question differently. Did your commander speak with you, the second in command, about the situation regarding the corps command? (20) • A.: I apologise. Are you referring only to the situation around Srebrenica or in general? JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] If you wish, you can begin by answering the question regarding the situation in general.
• A.: General Zivanovic was the Corps Commander. The very fact that he
(25)came together with General Mladic speaks for itself. On the 9th, in the
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] So General Zivanovic did not speak with you, but you observed that he agreed absolutely with General Mladic, he was in agreement with General Mladic; is that what you are (5)saying? • A.: It is a fact that he did not oppose General Mladic in any way when the question of the continuation of the attack was to be done, after his orders had been carried out, and also with regard to the entry into Srebrenica itself. (10) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] So to make things quite clear, and it is not a play of words, you know that General Zivanovic did not oppose, but you don't know whether he was in agreement, whether he was in agreement; is that what you're saying? • A.: Yes. I don't know. (15) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well. I'm sorry, Mr. McCloskey, for interrupting. You may continue. MR. McCLOSKEY: • Q.: Between the period of July 11th and July 15th, was the Drina Corps command eliminated in any way in the area of Zvornik and Bratunac by the (20)actions of General Mladic?
• A.: I have also spoken about that. I spoke about it during the
examination-in-chief, that is to say, when I was asked by the attorney.
From the moment that General Mladic ordered a continuation of the
attack, and then the entrance into the town itself, and then his position,
(25)the position taken at the meeting in the command of the Bratunac Brigade,
(15) • Q.: So General Zivanovic, under that theory, would have no authority to issue orders regarding prisoners or anything else? • A.: General Zivanovic, as far as I recall, wrote several orders by which he linked himself up with the orders of the Main Staff and so conveyed them on to the subordinate units. (20)
JUDGE WALD: I have one question there. General Krstic, was it
your impression that during this same period we're talking about, the
11th to the 15th or 16th, the 28th Division, along with the civilians in
the column which was moving towards Tuzla was having some kind of
engagements with the army along the way, and, in, fact, I think you
(25)testified there was some casualties, to your knowledge. Was it your
• A.: When speaking about the conflict between the civilians in the
(10)column and the members of the army, I don't think I can comment there, but
I will answer your question in the following way: When it comes to the
prisoners of war, I truly did gain the impression that General Mladic, he
himself or his assistants, were in charge of all that.
At the forward command post at Krivaca, 14th, an order of that
(15)kind arrived, and it was brought to my attention and sent on from the
Corps Command to me. And in amongst other things, it spoke about the
breakthrough of the 28th Division, the possible activities, their possible
activities and operations, and the capture of members of the
28th Division. It also speaks, among other things, of where those POWs
(20)should be put up.
So until that time and later on either, I had no knowledge about
the prisoners of war. And the very fact that this order was sent to me
from Krivaca towards Zepa was only sent -- I was only to be -- this was
only to be brought to my attention, which meant that I had no
(25)responsibility and no involvement in the affair.
• A.: When I spoke about the forces that remained at the front, that
they were engaged in the front towards Tuzla, Zivinice, and Kladanj, and
Olovo, that is that 80 per cent of the overall forces of the brigades that
(15)were committed at the front. And the basic preoccupation of those troops
was the defence, defence from these axes if there should be any activity,
that is to say, involvement of the forces of the 2nd Corps of the army of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, if they were involved. And one of the tasks of the
Zvornik and Bircani Brigade was also to take care and take steps to defend
(20)themselves from the forces of the 28th Division that attacked them from
the rear, from the back. And I had some information when I came from
Srebrenica to Vlasenica, to the command post of the corps, when I was
involved about that by the officer on duty, who told me that the
breakthrough of the 28th Division had taken place towards Tuzla and
(25)towards the Zvornik and Bircani Brigade.
(10) JUDGE WALD: Okay. Thank you. MR. McCLOSKEY: I'd like to refer the General to some of the interview. This is the redacted version of the interview with Mr. Ruez. It's Exhibit 399A. And while you're looking for that, we can ask -- I can ask a couple of other questions. (15) • Q.: General, on the night of the 11th, you said you spent the night in the Bratunac Brigade headquarters. • A.: I didn't spend the night there but I slept in one of the rooms of the command of the Bratunac Brigade, Bratunac Brigade headquarters. MR. McCLOSKEY: I'm sorry. For your search, that's 399A bis. (20) • Q.: What room did you sleep in? • A.: I don't remember. I really don't remember which room I slept in. It is very difficult to say, to be able to say that now. • Q.: Was Dalibor Krstic and Mr. Tosic with you at the Bratunac Brigade headquarters? (25)
• A.: When I lay down, when I went to sleep, they were in front of the
(5) • Q.: Were arrangements made for you to stay at the Hotel Fontana on the 11th or any other time? • A.: I don't know. It is possible. It is possible. But as always, I slept where I was closer to my units; that is to say, I never availed myself of the comforts offered me at that time. But quite possibly some (10)arrangements had been made. I can't say. MR. McCLOSKEY: If we could go to Exhibit -- have you found the interview? It's 399A bis. • Q.: General, if you could look -- in the B/C/S version it should be page 11 and 12; in the English version it's page 19. And if you could put (15)page 19 on the ELMO, and paragraph 3 is the paragraph I'm concerned about. And it's a long answer and covers various topics, but the answer that I wanted to try to get some clarification on was in paragraph -- what is paragraph 3 in the English. But it says: "The commander of the forces that were to go on to Zepa, I was (20)designated to be the commander by the commander of the Main Staff, while for the area of Srebrenica and Bratunac, by the order of the commander of the Main Staff, remained the commander of the Drina Corps, General Zivanovic." Is that correct? (25)
• A.: I apologise. May I just take a moment to read through the
• Q.: Please. • A.: I don't see that assertion here on page 11. • Q.: Page 11 through 12. Sometimes it's hard to sort out the actual (5)pages because they're so different. It begins, "The commander of the forces that were to go on to Zepa, I was designated to be the commander by the commander of the Main Staff." • A.: Well, I apologise. We can read through this. • Q.: Well, General, we'll highlight them for you if you can't seem to (10)find it on that page. So we'll take that back and we'll highlight it so you can go directly to it. MR. McCLOSKEY: If we can have Exhibit 7642/A [sic], and 764/3/A ready after that. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. McCloskey, perhaps you (15)should take a look at the transcript with the first exhibit and introduce a correction. MR. McCLOSKEY: I'm sorry, Mr. President. I didn't understand -- JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Because the exhibit was not 7642/1, but perhaps it was 764/2/1. I think that's a difference in the (20)number of the exhibit, but I'd like confirmation from you, please. MR. McCLOSKEY: It's my understanding that the exhibit we're looking for is 764/2/A.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] There we have it. You have just
made the correction. So I was right. I do apologise. And please
(25)continue.
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes. There's no problem there. We're not going to have a short break; we're going to have our long (10)break. And I think everybody is in need of luncheon, like all of us. So I think the time has come for us to take our one-hour break and this will give us a chance to get everything organised after the lunch break. So we'll reconvene in one hour's time.
--- Luncheon recess taken at 12.15 p.m.
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Now that our stomachs have been satiated, we will be able to fulfil our work too. So please continue, Mr. McCloskey, so we can see what the results are. (5) MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President. General Krstic, if you could briefly take a look at Exhibit 764/1/A, which we handed to you during the end of the break so you would have a little bit of a chance to look at it. MR. McCLOSKEY: And if we could put the English on the ELMO (10)and ... • Q.: This appears to be some sort of receipt to the Command of the Bratunac Brigade and dated July 31, with a total in the amount of 6.341 dinars. And if we could go to 764/2/A, it will be the same thing there. (15)General, it appears that this is a hotel receipt for accommodations in the Hotel Fontana in Bratunac for room 204, General Krstic, and the General's escorts Vlado Tosic and Dalibor Krstic, room 210, on 5/6 July. Did you or your escorts stay in the Hotel Fontana on those dates? (20)
• A.: This is an exhibit that I was not given before the break; I only
just got it. I haven't had a chance to look at it, but that is not
important.
It is quite possible that someone may have announced that I would
be accommodated there together with my drivers in the Bratunac, rather,
(25)the Fontana Hotel in Bratunac, but we certainly were not there because the
• Q.: We'll go to the next exhibit then, 764/3/A. This is another bill from the Hotel Fontana for General Krstic, Tosic, Vicic, Kosoric, and (10)Dalibor Krstic, from 5 through 13 July, 1995, giving yourself, Vladimir Tosic, and Dalibor Krstic 8, the number 8. And if we have eight nights beginning the 5th of July, that would mean your last night was the 12th of July, checking out the 13th. However, you say you were not at the hotel? • A.: No. The rooms were certainly probably booked. There's no reason (15)for me not to say that I did sleep at the Fontana Hotel. There's absolutely no reason for me not to say that. • Q.: Perhaps they were booked because someone anticipated you would be staying at the hotel. • A.: Possibly that someone from the Command of the Bratunac Brigade (20)booked those rooms, and that should go through the logistics body, through the Assistant Commander for Logistics. And I never said, nor did any of the officers from the forward command post announce that we would come and stay there, but clearly there was a bill that had to be paid because the rooms had been booked, but no one went there. (25)
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Mr. McCloskey, excuse me.
• A.: Mr. President, it is a luxury. It is wasteful. It could only have been one of the assistants to the Commander for Logistics to have (10)said that it was possible that we would be accommodated there. This may have been the case with people who were used to comfort, but I certainly didn't go there nor did I ever avail myself of such comfort. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] You may continue, Mr. McCloskey. (15) MR. McCLOSKEY: • Q.: General Krstic, you do recall having meetings on the evening of July 11 and the morning of July 12 in the Hotel Fontana? • A.: I remembered the meeting of the 11th, in the evening, only after the evidence was produced here in the course of the proceedings, and on (20)the 12th I did remember attending a meeting. And I'm not denying that I attended those meetings, both the first and the second, the one on the 11th, in the evening, and on the 12th, in the morning.
MR. McCLOSKEY: Now, if we could go back to the Drinski article,
Exhibit 744. And prior to getting into the substance of that, Your
(25)Honour, I would, for the record, like to say that this article was
• Q.: If you could put page 2 on the ELMO. General, that appears to be
the second question that is asked to you, and I'll read it for the
record:
"From the very beginning of this war, the Muslims had open
(10)ambitions to take Podrinje. What was the decisive factor in thwarting
these ambitions and making it possible for the Serbian people to remain in
its centuries-old dwelling places?"
And your answer, which is in quotes in the magazine:
"It's true that the Muslims did all they could to take Podrinje.
(15)They tried to realise their plan by perpetrating crimes against part of
the Serbian population at the beginning of the war, hoping to frighten and
drive them from this area."
And then under a new set of quotes:
"The Serbian people in this region remember well the criminal acts
(20)perpetrated in World War II by the Ustasha and the balija army. Realising
that they would try to repeat those actions again, the Serbs readily
picked up their weapons and confronted the Muslim assaults, defending
their hearths and their defenceless."
Was this question asked of you and did you answer it in this
(25)manner?
• Q.: This was an accurate reflection of your response to this question? • A.: Yes. • Q.: And you did use the term "balija"? (15) • A.: Yes. But it can clearly be seen that this relates to armed units from the Second World War and not to the army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
• Q.: I want to ask you about the message in this answer. You refer to
the Muslims, and then you refer to the Ustasha and balija army of the
(20)Second World War, and then you say, "Realising that they would try to
repeat those actions again" -- that's a comparison of the Muslims and the
balija army in the English translation -- "the Serbs readily picked up
their weapons and confronted the Muslim assaults, defending their hearths
and their defenceless."
(25)The message that this sends out to young troops is what?
• Q.: All right. I want to go down to -- I'll skip the next question
and go down to the other question, which starts with: "You were in
command of the brigade which practically defended the entire Romanija
plateau in the Sarajevo region. Despite almost daily attacks, the 2nd
(15)Romanija Brigade preserved both the territory and the population. How was
this achieved?
When the 216th Mountain" -- and then your answer is: "When the
216th Mountain Brigade of the former JNA, the current 1st Romanija
Infantry Brigade, was deployed from Romanija to Sarajevo at the beginning
(20)of May 1992, the Serbian people on the Romanija plateau were left without
protection. They were faced with the threat of genocide."
And as we go on: "Realising the danger of the situation, the Main
Staff of the army of Republika Srpska decided to form the 2nd Romanija
Motorised Brigade (21 May 1992) which quickly evolved into an
(25)exceptionally strong tactical unit, capable of not only protecting the
(10) • A.: This referred to members of the army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and not to the Muslim nation. In the examination-in-chief, I said -- • Q.: General Krstic, my question was: Were these your words? • A.: Probably, yes. (15) • Q.: My next question is: You actually -- you used the term "genocide" in this context one, two, three times. "People," the first one, "were threatened with genocide"; the third [sic] one, "protecting the Serbian people from" -- the second one, excuse me -- "protecting the people from genocide"; the third one, "liberating and the people saved from (20)genocide." Is this an accurate reflection of the threat that the Serbs faced at the time or is this a distortion for propaganda purposes?
• A.: In the course of the Second World War, in this area terrible
crimes were committed precisely by the formations that I referred to in
(25)answer to your first question. The Serb people, like the other peoples of
• Q.: So you think there was a realistic expectation of genocide being committed against the Serb population in the early parts of the war or at (5)any part of the war? • A.: If that assessment had not been a realistic one, an army of the Serb people would not have been formed. And the same applies to the army of Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. • Q.: When you tell young soldiers that "The opposing army is coming to (10)commit genocide on you," what kind of reaction would you expect from them? • A.: I never said this to young soldiers. In the first place, I didn't have any young soldiers in my brigade. These were mobilised men, men of older age groups, with the exception of some 15 soldiers who were in the (15)Staff Command of the 2nd Romanija Brigade and who never went to the front lines. MR. McCLOSKEY: If we could go to Exhibit 745. • Q.: General Krstic, you can see throughout that this is a communication on October 30, 1995, from the Command of the 1st Zvornik (20)Brigade, and among other things, in the text of the document, it quotes a congratulations from you, their commander. MR. McCLOSKEY: And if we could put the English translation page 2 on the ELMO, where it starts "Officers and soldiers!"
• Q.: I would quote the document. It says: "In this connection, Corps
(25)Commander Major-General Radislav Krstic sends the following
• A.: I would like to see those congratulations here. I can't find the text that you have just read out, the text of the congratulations. I should like to be given a little more time to find it and read it. • Q.: Page 2, right in the middle. (15) • A.: Yes, I found it. • Q.: What kind of reaction can you expect from soldiers, young and old, that hear their commanding officer refer to the enemy as "the hated enemy" and that has committed genocide on them?
• A.: Every enemy is a hateful enemy. Just as for us the forces of
(20)Bosnia-Herzegovina were for us, we were for them by the same token. But
there are no words here where I say that the Muslim people were hated by
the Serb people. We are speaking about armed formations here. So it is
not essential whether I wrote that or somebody else wrote that from the
Corps Command and sent it on. This does not refer to the Muslim people;
(25)it refers to the armed formations who did what they did in the area they
• Q.: Were similar messages as this that I've just read to you, referring to the hated enemy and the genocide against the Serbian people, were those messages made by General Mladic and President Karadzic from the (5)beginning of the war and throughout? • A.: I don't know that. I don't know whether they sent messages like that or not. MR. McCLOSKEY: If we could go to Exhibit 749. This is one of the thicker exhibits that we've provided the Defence a few days ago. And if (10)we could just put the front page of the -- thank you. This is entitled "Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska," entitled "A Report on the Results Achieved on the Front, the State of the Army of the Republika Srpska, Problems and Tasks in the Forthcoming Period," from Ratko Mladic. • Q.: General Krstic, who is this report sent to? (15) • A.: I don't know who this report is sent to. It does not say here.
• Q.: I'm going to quote the first paragraph:
"The incursion of regular Ustasha units from Croatia into the
territory of the former BH at the beginning of April of this year and
their attacks from Slavonia and western Herzegovina set off the second
(20)phase of the break-up of Yugoslavia, the carve-up of the former BH and the
attack against the Serbian people. The Serbian people in Herzegovina,
Kupres, Posavina have been exposed to brutal destruction and genocide
unseen in history."
Is this a distortion or do you believe this is an accurate
(25)reflection of the situation?
MR. McCLOSKEY: If we could go to Exhibit 750A. If we could put page 1 on, to start with. This is a document entitled "Republika Srpska Main Staff of the Army of the Republika Srpska, Analysis of the Combat Readiness and Activities of the Army of Republika Srpska in 1992." It's a (10)long document, and I wish to direct your attention to the concluding remarks by the supreme commander of the armed forces of the Republika Srpska, Radovan Karadzic. That is page 152 and 153 of the English version. And Your Honour, this document was also provided to the Defence several days ago. (15)It's right near the end of the document called "Concluding Remarks, the Findings of the Analysis of the Combat Readiness and Activities of the Army of Republika Srpska." I'm sorry, General, I didn't have that marked beforehand, but it's a few pages from the end. And if you could look at page 006417 -- (20) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] I apologise. Mr. Visnjic is on his feet.
MR. VISNJIC:
[Int.] Mr. President, while the General is
looking for that portion of the text to which the question refers, I
should like to make a remark. It is true that this document, like the
(25)previous document, was provided a few days ago to us -- last Friday,
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well, Mr. Visnjic. Let us see. Please proceed, Mr. McCloskey, with your questions. (10) MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
• Q.: General Krstic, I don't want to get into the substance of the
document in any great length, and I will quote the first paragraph under
the concluding remarks of the supreme commander, Radovan Karadzic:
"From self-organised units at the local level, the Army of
(15)Republika Srpska has grown into a powerful armed force of the Serbian
people, which is ready to perform all the tasks and reach all the
objectives assigned it. It is a powerful army, which, relying on its
Serbian people, the state, the Orthodox Church, and its own material
resources, has managed to protect the Serbian people against genocide, to
(20)protect its territories and the Serbian heritage from the Ustashi Muslim
hordes, and to rout them on most battlefields."
This is the only statement I wish to use from this report. And I
want to ask you if you notice a similar message in the president's remarks
that I just quoted as the message that you gave in the Zvornik Brigade
(25)document that we discussed earlier.
• Q.: You did use the term "Ustasha" in the Drinski article, did you (5)not? • A.: Yes, but that referred exclusively to World War II and not to this war, and that is clearly stated there. I have never seen this document. It is also dated 1992, when I was commander of the brigade. Yes. It is an analysis for the year 1992, which was "Performed Combat Readiness of (10)the Army of Republika Srpska." It is for 1992, and it was executed in April 1993. That is what I understand from the title page. MR. McCLOSKEY: I don't have any further questions on this topic, and we can go on to Exhibit number 44. • Q.: I want to take us now to the evening of July 11th at the Hotel (15)Fontana. This is, obviously, a photo of General Mladic at that meeting. Is that correct? • A.: Yes. • Q.: And as the camera panned, we see that you're sitting on the General's right side at that meeting; is that correct? (20) MR. McCLOSKEY: And could we go to Exhibit 45. • Q.: Is this an accurate reflection of yourself sitting next to judge -- excuse me -- General Mladic at the meeting? • A.: I cannot see myself to the right of General Mladic on this picture. (25)
• Q.: Were you seated at that table during the entire meeting or did you
• A.: I don't remember that. • Q.: Do you recall the sounds of a screaming animal at that meeting? • A.: No. (5) MR. McCLOSKEY: Could we have the Exhibit 40 on the video, if we could play that. • Q.: Do you recall the testimony of the sergeant major who was at that second meeting with you regarding the screaming animal and how frightened it made him? (10) • A.: I remember him saying that. • Q.: And do you remember the Bosnian Muslim representative that also recalled hearing that and being frightened by it? • A.: I cannot remember having been to the meeting on the 11th, that is, I couldn't remember. But in the course of these proceedings, I see that I (15)was there, and I do remember that Mr. Mandzic was present at that meeting. • Q.: You have no recollection of the animal's death cries that were heard at that meeting? • A.: I don't remember. Possibly there were some cries. Whether it was (20)an animal or something else, I don't know. I just don't remember, and I have no particular recollection of that or -- but quite possibly people did hear that. I am not contesting that. • Q.: You were raised in the country around animals, where animals were slaughtered, were you not? (25)
• A.: I never slaughtered even a chicken.
• A.: Well, yes. (5) • Q.: This animal was identified by the witnesses as the cries of a pig. Are you aware of any particular sensitivity that the Muslim people of Islam faith would have to the slaughter of a pig immediately outside the window where they were having a meeting? • A.: I shall answer your question in the following way: I grew up with (10)Muslims. Our properties were border on each other.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] General, I apologise for
interrupting. The question asked by Mr. McCloskey is a clear one. Are
you aware of the significance, what it means for a Muslim -- let me put it
this way -- I'll read it out in English. I'm trying to find it on the
(15)transcript, the exact words.
• A.: Mr. President, I was just about to give you an answer when I tried
to say that we lived together, side by side, and I never mentioned -- I
noticed that the Muslims were afraid of that, afraid of hearing a pig
slaughtered by the Serbs when the Serbs were preparing food for the
(25)winter. Our houses were next to each other. It was nothing new to them,
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Please continue, Mr. McCloskey. MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President. (5) • Q.: The context of neighbours in the country is a little different than the context of my question. What I would like to know is in a situation such as this, the meeting at the Hotel Fontana with general officers of the VRS, a colonel of the DutchBat, a Muslim schoolteacher, and a situation after the fall of Srebrenica enclave, what kind of (10)reaction would you expect from a Muslim of Islam faith that hears a pig butchered under the window, outside his door? • A.: Well, possibly somebody was slaughtering a pig nearer or further away. I'm not contesting that. I don't know why. Perhaps they needed to slaughter a pig, whoever was doing it. (15)But let me answer your question. I wouldn't feel at all pleasant. I wouldn't feel pleasant if I heard that sound. I don't enjoy hearing the sound of an animal being slaughtered. • Q.: Do you recall the testimony of the sergeant major that when the pig's cries finally died out, someone went over and closed the window, (20)what he felt was a means to call attention to this. Is it possible, in your view, that this pig was slaughtered in order to intimidate the members of the meeting?
• A.: Well, I don't know who the officer of the Dutch Battalion was who
testified. There were a number of them who testified.
(25)Now, whether this particular animal was slaughtered to intimidate
(5) • Q.: The context we have is that, earlier in the day, General Mladic made the comment on the Serb television, "It is now time to take revenge upon the Turks," and on the next day, the 12th, people were separated, put on buses, and led to a massacre of 4.000. In that context, is it possible that this pig was killed in order to intimidate the Muslims and the Dutch (10)at the meeting, by General Mladic? JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Visnjic. MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, I feel that this repetition of one and the same question is superfluous because the General has already answered, with all due respect to my learned colleague. (15) MR. McCLOSKEY: I can go on, Your Honour. I can go on. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes. I think it would be advisable to proceed, because the General has already said several times that he does not know, that he did not take part in it and does not know of any intentions or why that was done. You were going to show a video (20)clip, Mr. McCloskey, but please proceed.
MR. McCLOSKEY: Your Honour, that's the pig squealing, and I
don't think we need to hear that anymore.
So, Booth, please pull that video.
Now if we could go to Exhibit 40A, which is the English
(25)transcript --
MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President, I understood that, and based on General Krstic's answers, I didn't feel it was necessary for us to hear the pig again. And I appreciate the objection of counsel on that. And I (10)think it's probably near break time. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, indeed. It's time to take a 15-minute break. --- Recess taken at 2.13 p.m. --- On resuming at 2.30 p.m. (15) JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. McCloskey, the Chamber would like to have this Exhibit 40. General Krstic said that he didn't hear the squealing of the animal, but we would like to see whether it is possible to hear it or not, so we would like to hear that exhibit, Exhibit 40.
MR. McCLOSKEY: For background, Your Honour, Colonel Karremans is
(20)speaking. The tape is going on. It's hard to say exactly how long he's
been speaking or how long the meeting's been going on, but he's speaking
for a while and then you'll hear a sound.
MR. McCLOSKEY: Could you rewind it, please. Try to start -- it
(25)should start at the beginning, I mean just a little bit before where you
MR. McCLOSKEY: I think that's the end. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Very well. You may continue (5)now, Mr. McCloskey. MR. McCLOSKEY: • Q.: General Krstic, did that refresh your recollection? • A.: I heard that here in the course of the trial. I would say that this is a kind of imitation rather than the slaughtering of a pig; at (10)least, that's how it sounds to me now. • Q.: Like a human imitation? • A.: It's quite possible. MR. McCLOSKEY: If we could go on to Exhibit 40A, which is the transcript of the second meeting, and I'd like to start it on page (15)0090499. The English version, it's just about the second-to-the-last page. And the -- JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Visnjic. MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President, I apologise, but the answer to the last question put by Mr. McCloskey, I think the answer was (20)not adequately translated. Mr. McCloskey asked General Krstic, "Does it sound like a human imitation?" and he answered in Serbian and he said, "That is how I hear it now." And the answer, as far as I understand it: "I allow it to be possible. It's quite possible." So I'd like this point to be cleared up by the interpreters. (25)
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Mr. McCloskey, would you repeat
MR. McCLOSKEY: After the playing of the pig, I asked the General if that refreshed his recollection, and then he said something to the effect that, "I heard it here in the course of the trial. I would say that this is a kind of imitation rather than the slaughtering of a pig; at (10)least, that's how it sounds to me." • Q.: Then the question is: You felt that this was a human imitating a pig? • A.: I said that that is possible too, because it is only here, after hearing it now, that I thought it might not be the real squealing of a (15)pig. • Q.: Before we get to the actual transcript, we're now in the evening of July 11th. This meeting was to start at 2300 hours, I believe. Were you aware that there were thousands of people gathered at the -- at and around the UN compound and the factories in the vicinity in the evening at (20)this time on July 11th?
• A.: I cannot say that I heard that -- whether I heard that in the
evening of the 11th or on the 12th, but in any event, it was heard, stated
by Mr. Karremans and Mr. Mandzic. Until then, I had no prior knowledge
that such a large number of people were in Potocari, though it was clear
(25)that the forces had entered Srebrenica and that the people had left for
• Q.: If you had sent reconnaissance soldiers to view the crowd and view the people assembled in Potocari that evening, they could have provided you with the intelligence of the rough numbers of people by that evening, (5)could they not have? • A.: I didn't send any reconnaissance people. • Q.: Had you been reactivated by this time in the evening of the July 11th or were you still sidelined by General Mladic? • A.: I had not been relieved of my duty of Chief of Staff. I was clear (10)when I said that General Mladic appointed me for commander of the forces engaged towards Zepa at the meeting in Bratunac. I am also asserting that I didn't send any reconnaissance soldiers down there. I didn't need to do that. Why would I do that, anyway? • Q.: Well, there were -- if there were military-aged men in that crowd (15)that were armed, they could have been a threat to your troops, could they not have, in that crowd? • A.: I wasn't aware at all that there were able-bodied men of military age among such a crowd of people in Potocari. • Q.: So prior to the meeting with General Mladic and the DutchBat (20)representatives, is it your contention that General Mladic assigned you as the Commander of the Zepa operation? • A.: Yes, at the meeting in Bratunac, at the meeting of the command of the Bratunac Brigade before this meeting.
• Q.: So as you sat next to General Mladic in the presence of DutchBat
(25)and Mr. Mandzic and others, you were the Commander of the Zepa operation;
• A.: That was the assignment given to me. That was the assignment given to me by the Commander of the Main Staff, but I went to the meeting as the Chief of Staff of the Corps. (5) • Q.: So you, at the meeting at 2300 hours with General Mladic, you now again had all the duties and responsibilities incumbent upon the Chief of the Staff of the Drina Corps? • A.: I had no duties with respect to Srebrenica even as the Chief of Staff. This emanates from his order, when he issued me assignments (10)regarding the Zepa operation, to me and the brigade commanders. • Q.: So you had nothing to do with Srebrenica but you were at the key Srebrenica meeting on the 11th and the next one on the morning of the 12th? • A.: I was there on the 11th in the evening and on the 12th. (15) • Q.: And was the VRS capable that evening of doing reconnaissance on the large crowd that was gathering in Potocari? • A.: I didn't deal with that at all. • Q.: My question, General, is: Were they capable of going and watching the crowd that night, the VRS, doing military reconnaissance on a very (20)large group of individuals? • A.: Security of the refugees, as stated by Colonel Karremans, was provided by the forces of the Dutch Battalion. Whether somebody did any reconnaissance, I really do not know at all.
• Q.: Assuming that the VRS was capable of doing reconnaissance and
(25)providing you with the rough numbers of people at Potocari, would it be of
• A.: Those are just assumptions that you are talking about. JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] General Krstic, I'm sorry for (5)interrupting. I think that you told us that the Brigade Commanders at Srebrenica opposed the order of General Mladic to continue towards Bratunac because one of the reasons was that elements of the 28th Division could be there with the civilians, and if that was true, there would be grave consequences. I think those are more or less the words you used. (10)So I'm asking you now why the supposition, the supposition, that elements of the 28th Brigade might be in Potocari was taken into account not following General Mladic's orders, and afterwards that same assumption is of no interest. Could you answer that question?
• A.: Mr. President, I didn't say that that assumption was not of
(15)interest. The Brigade Commanders were given clear orders to stop at the
lines they had reached and not to engage in any further assaults and to
hold on to those attained lines. I don't know whether and on whose orders
they engaged in any reconnaissance, if they had been ordered to halt at
those lines. It was clear that the civilian population was in Potocari.
(20)I spoke about that when we suggested to General Mladic that it was not a
good idea to continue and that it was possible for members of the 28th
Division to be there and who could establish in the dark whether there
were any members of the 28th Division or not, especially units that had
until then engaged in combat operations and which had halted at the lines
(25)they had reached.
MR. McCLOSKEY: • Q.: Around 2300 hours, did you know where the 28th Division was? (5) • A.: No, we didn't know where the 28th Division was. We just knew about the lines that had been reached -- • Q.: Would it have been an important military -- • A.: -- our lines, but we didn't know where the 28th Division was. • Q.: Would it have been an important military objective for you to find (10)out where they were? • A.: From the response of Lieutenant Colonel Pandurevic to General Mladic at the meeting in Bratunac on the 11th, in the evening, he said that -- he said we don't know where the 28th Division is, and it would be important for us to know. But the order to halt units and to prepare for (15)the Zepa operation came second in significance with respect to the 28th Division. • Q.: So it would be important for you that evening to find out where the 28th Division was? • A.: We look upon this matter as professional soldiers, because we (20)didn't start the operation to separate the two enclaves Srebrenica and Zepa to eliminate the population in the enclaves but simply to prevent further communication of the 28th Division in between Srebrenica and Zepa. That was the aim of the operation.
• Q.: So you didn't receive any intelligence at all about how many
(25)military-age men might be amongst the group that was assembling in
• A.: No, we didn't discuss that at all. • Q.: I wasn't asking you about whether you discussed it; I wanted to know whether or not you had received any information regarding men at (5)Potocari. • A.: We didn't receive any information; at least, I did not and the Brigade Commanders did not. • Q.: Would you agree with me that there must have been a plan developed to separate the Muslim men in Potocari, to transport them onto buses, and (10)to murder them? • A.: No, I don't agree with you at all that there was a plan. • Q.: Do you think this all happened without a plan, some 4.000 to 5.000 to 6.000 people murdered in the way we've seen as the evidence has progressed? (15) • A.: I had no indications or any clues in that direction, nor could I ever imagine that any such thing could happen. • Q.: General, I'm asking you a question now in the capacity of your expertise as a General, as a Chief of Staff, and under the definition of Chief of Staff, planning is a key role, as you've agreed. And I don't (20)want to go over the operation to murder again; we know what it was. But are you suggesting this evening that this murder operation could have happened without a plan?
• A.: I think I have answered your question. I did not know of any
plan, nor was such a plan compiled, nor did I have any signs that anything
(25)like that could happen.
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Mr. McCloskey, get to your question, please, directly. Do not make assumptions. Put the question that you have for General Krstic and he will answer as far as he can. MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President. I'm gradually pulling myself (10)out of my old shell and I will try again. JUDGE WALD: In Mr. McCloskey's defence, I recognise what is recognised as a legitimate hypothetical in our system. MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Your Honour. • Q.: When would the plan to murder the military-aged men of Potocari (15)have had to have been developed if the plan started on the 12th in the afternoon with the separation? • A.: I don't know that nor did I ever hear that there was a plan. • Q.: It's the submission of the Prosecution that the plan would have had to have been developed between the night of the 11th and the afternoon (20)of the 12th, when it was implemented. Do you contest that allegation? MR. VISNJIC: [Int.] Mr. President? JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Int.] Yes, Mr. Visnjic.
MR. VISNJIC:
[Int.] I'm afraid I have to object now,
because we have already objected to this kind of question. This is
(25)already requiring the witness to approve the position or to confirm the
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] We have already addressed this
question. I personally have said that when Mr. McCloskey made questions
starting from a hypothesis, I admitted, and I spoke in my name but I
(5)thought the view was shared by the whole Bench, because we were discussing
matters at the level of regulations. So there was a hypothesis to
discover how rules function.
In my personal view, it is a bit difficult to accept asking
witnesses questions at the level of facts. Imagine if such-and-such a
(10)thing happened. It is slightly different than when you wish to obtain
information. But it is also true that the Prosecutor or the Defence may
say,
[In English] "It's my submission,"
[Int.] and then the
witness may answer. So I think we're dealing with at least three
different matters, and we're now in the area of legitimacy.
(15)The Prosecutor is entitled to ask his question in the way he
worded it. It's different, in my opinion, when he asks questions of fact
based on hypothesis to discover what the reality was. It's another matter
when he starts with a hypothesis to see how the rule applies. And in my
opinion, and that is my personal opinion, there are at least these three
(20)different hypotheses.
So, Mr. Visnjic, we do not accept your objection because the
Prosecutor may say, "It is our submission," and then the General or the
witness can say, "No, I do not agree. That does not correspond to
reality," and he can tell us what the reality actually was.
(25)So please continue, Mr. McCloskey.
JUDGE RODRIGUES:
[Int.] Yes, me too. I'm trying to
(10)implement that Rule, as you know, because as you know, the Chamber can
guide and supervise the examination-in-chief and the cross-examination.
Perhaps we should refer to at least two basic objectives that are
being pursued to make the cross-examination and the presentation of
evidence effective in establishing the truth. To establish the truth
(15)cannot be done by making a hypothesis of fact and also avoid wasting any
time.
So when I say put your question directly, make your questions
clear, concrete, and concise, it is precisely to avoid all waste of time
and because that type of question will obtain the necessary information.
(20)If we go into hypotheticals and if we are judging the reaction of
the witness, if we're making comments, if we are evaluating the response,
that does not facilitate reaching -- obtaining information and
establishing the truth. And it is precisely further to Rule 90(G)(i) and
(ii) that I made my comments in accordance with those provisions of the
(25)Rule.
(5) --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.00 p.m., to be reconvened on Monday, the 30th day of October, 2000 at 9.20 a.m. |
