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ASH/ Industry conduct/ Tobacco Explained: 6. Passive smoking
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Tobacco Explained

6. Passive smoking

All allegations that passive smoking is injurious to the health of non-smokers, in respect the social cost of smoking as well as unreasonable demands for no smoking areas in public places, should be countered strongly.

BAT recognising the threat posed by passive smoking, in 1982.

 

6.1 Summary

At the beginning of the seventies, the industry recognised ETS as an increasing problem for the industry.

By the late seventies, the industry started forming smokers’ rights organisations, and setting up front groups to defeat proposed restrictions on smoking at work or in public places. The companies have maintained that they are defending the freedom of choice, but these organisations have really operated as tobacco industry proxies. Where there is a division between the interests of smokers and the interests of tobacco companies (cessation, nicotine addiction, warnings etc) these groups have favoured their paymasters.

By the late seventies, industry research showed that there were harmful constituents in smoke – whilst denying there was any problem in private, they tried to reduce the quantity and composition of side-stream smoke (the smoke given off at the end of a burning cigarette). Some low side-stream products entered the market in the late nineties.

Just as the companies have done with the health impact of smoking, the companies have set out to misled the public about the dangers of ETS, and to create a controversy about the health implications of ETS.

By the beginning of the eighties there was increasing epidemiological evidence that ETS posed a serious threat to the health of non-smokers, and increased the risk of lung cancer.

By the late eighties, Philip Morris and lawyers acting on its behalf set up a covert programme in Europe to recruit scientists to counter the negative publicity surrounding passive smoking.

In the early nineties, measures included setting up supposed independent foundations looking at Indoor Air Quality, and the publications of articles, books and research designed to confuse the issue of ETS and create a false controversy over the dangers of sick-building syndrome.

 

6.2 What is known - key facts about passive smoking

 

6.3 What the tobacco industry said and what it knew

6.3.1 Early to mid 1970s:

Anti-smoking attack

 A Brown and Williamson lawyer senses the threat posed by passive smoking:

"The anti-smoking lobby is using the issue of the alleged health effect of smoking on the non-smoker to generate media publicity. This trend has been growing since 1970 …There is no medical evidence concerning the health effect of passive smoking. The real purpose is symbolic to make smoking socially unacceptable and by limiting the public areas where it is permitted."6(B&W,1973)

 

6.3.2 Mid-late 1970s:

Respond with a smokers’ rights campaign

 "RJ Reynolds is planning to strike back at the increasing number of anti-smoking crusades in the nation by launching its own smokers’ rights campaign."

The Chairman of the Board of RJR says:

"The publication will deal with the so-called public smoking issue, the latest tactic by anti-smoking groups in their effort to do irreparable damage to the tobacco industry."7. (Tobacco Reporter 1976)

 

Research points to health problems in smoke

 Scientists at BAT replicate an experiment carried out by Carl Becker from Cornell University showing that glycoproteins [which can induce allergic reactions] were present in tobacco smoke. A scientist

"explained that … Beaker’s findings in relation to the presence of glycoproteins in mainstream and side-stream smoke had been confirmed."8. (J Esdterle 1977)

Further BAT research highlights that: "… there is concern over the level of nitrosamines in foodstuffs. This explains in part the sensitivity to the presence of nitrosamines in tobacco smoke and, particularly, the levels in side-stream smoke. The latter is a potential threat to the currently held view by many authorities that passive smoking does not constitute a direct hazard."9. (S Green 1978)

 

But publicly we maintain its just an annoyance

 BAT: " In our view this [ETS] appears to be an area of exaggerated concern ..the question is not really one of a health hazard but perhaps more of an annoyance." 10  (BAT 1977)

 

Front organisations established…

 B&W and the other leading US tobacco companies defeat Proposition 5, the California Clean Indoor Air Act of 1978, by forming a front organisation called

"Californians for Common Sense."11(E Pepples 1978,1979)

 

it could threaten our viability – need medical evidence to refute claims

 The Roper Organisation conducts a study for the US Tobacco Institute:

"what the smoker does to himself may be his business, but what the smoker does to the non-smoker is quite a different matter … This we see as the most dangerous development yet to the viability of the tobacco industry that has yet occurred ... The strategic and long run antidote to the passive smoking issue is, as we see it, developing and widely publicising clear-cut, credible, medical evidence that passive smoking is not harmful to the non-smoker’s health."12(1978)

 

6.3.3 Early-Mid 1980s:

Independent evidence says ETS a serious risk

 An article is published in Science, concludes that;

"ETS presents a serious risk to the health of non-smokers. Since this risk is involuntary, it deserves as much attention as outdoor air pollution."13. (J Repace, A Lowrey 1980)

The BMJ publishes a major epidemiological study by Takeshi Hirayama that concludes non-smoking women married to smokers were more likely to develop lung cancer than non-smoking women married to non-smokers. 14

 

Privately B&W accepts the evidence

 B&W’s corporate counsel, writes about the Hirayama study, saying that both German and British scientists paid by the tobacco industry had reviewed the work and

"they believe Hirayama is a good scientist and that his non-smoking wives publication is correct."15 (J Wells 1981)

 

But we need to counter allegations strongly

 "All allegations that passive smoking is injurious to the health of non-smokers, in respect the social cost of smoking as well as unreasonable demands for no smoking areas in public places, should be countered strongly."16 (BAT, 1982)

 

Need to reduce side-stream and undertake research

 "BAT’s strategy is to develop cigarettes with reduced side-stream emissions and/or reduced smell and irritation. Conduct research to anticipate and refute claims about the health effects of passive smoking."17 (W Irvin 1983)

 

6.3.4 Mid – late 1980s:

Independent evidence accumulates:

The US Surgeon General, Dr. Everett Koop, publishes a report stating that

"it is certain that a substantial proportion of the lung cancers in non-smokers are due to ETS exposure"18. (1986)

In the UK, a Government advisory committee maintains that passive smoking increases the non-smokers’ risk of developing lung cancer by 10-30 per cent. 19 (1988)

 

BAT mounts defensive scientific challenge

 "Another important issue affecting acceptability [of smoking] is passive smoking. Our current initiatives are to challenge the whole area of ‘low risk epidemiology’. There are reputable external experts who believe that this is a highly imprecise science and we are finding means for them to express their concerns."20 (BAT, 1986)

 

and suggests going on the pro-smoking offensive

 BAT discusses: "a more direct public relations/political campaign might need to be mounted, primarily based on protecting the rights of smokers."< 21. (BAT 1989)

 

The covert Whitecoat Programme

 US lawyers working for Philip Morris and the US Tobacco Institute, begin setting up a "European Consultancy Programme" to counter proposed restriction on ETS. The underlying theme is to covertly recruit scientists or "Whitecoats" to work on Philip Morris’ behalf, who will defend smoking and try and convince people that ETS is harmless. Code-named "Whitecoat" its "end goals" are:

Resist and roll back smoking restrictions

Restore smoker confidence.

The `pre-requisites’ are

Reverse scientific and popular misconception that ETS is harmful

Restore social acceptability of smoking."22 (J Rupp 1988)

 

Sick- building smoke-screen

 BAT strategy review says: "work being funded by the Tobacco industry in the USA on Environmental Tobacco Smoke (ETS) was being funded jointly by Philip Morris and RJ Reynolds rather than by the Tobacco Institute. B&W had put money into privately funded projects at the University of Kentucky and was active in promoting work on ‘sick-buildings’ to research the degree to which radon and air conditioning systems were important contributors to environmental health hazards." 23 (BAT 1988)

 

And the denials continue

 "No conclusive proof exists to support the claim that exposure to environmental tobacco smoke in public places is a health risk to non-smokers."24. (The Tobacco Institute 1989)

 

6.3.5 1990s:

Major covert consultancy operation

 An internal industry memo summarises the status of the "European Consultancy Programme":

"Our consultants have created the world’s only learned scientific society [Indoor Air International] addressing questions of indoor air quality ...Our EC consultants have formed a consulting group called ARIA (Associates for Research in Indoor Air) … One of our consultants is an editor of this very influential British medical journal, and is continuing to publish numerous reviews, editorials and comments on ETS and other issues …One consultant is, for example, the advisor to a particularly relevant committee of the House of Commons."26(Covington and Burling 1990)

 

Independent evidence accumulates

 The US EPA concludes that ETS is a Class A carcinogen, estimating that ETS is responsible for 3000 lung cancers annually among non-smokers, whilst contributing up to 300,000 cases annually of respiratory illness in infants and children younger than 18 months. 26. (Tobacco Control 1993)

The Report of the Scientific Committee on Tobacco and Health (SCOTH) is published:

"Passive smoking is a cause of lung cancer and childhood respiratory disease. There is also evidence that passive smoking is a cause of ischaemic heart disease and cot death, middle ear disease and asthmatic attacks in children."27. (1998)

 

But its all about freedom of choice

An editorial in Tobacco International states:

"Communism is about the absence of choice, which is why it failed; smoking is about the freedom of choice, which is why it survives."28. (Tobacco International, 1998)

 

And biscuits and fudge

 Philip Morris runs a series of adverts in Europe stating that the dangers from second-hand smoke are less than those from eating cookies or drinking milk. The Advertising Standards Authority rules that the Philip Morris campaign

"gave the misleading impression that passive smoking had been proved to pose less danger to the health of UK consumers than the five activities cited by the advert."29. (R Oram 1998)

 

And foul-play

 The tobacco industry is accused of "foul play" for misrepresenting the findings of an unpublished WHO report. Chris Proctor, Head of Research at BAT, claims that the report:

"confirms what we and other scientists have long believed that while smoking in public may be annoying to some non-smokers, the science does not show that being around a smoker is a lung-cancer risk."30 (the Guardian, 1998)

WHO issues a press release to deny that it is suppressing research and that

"passive smoking causes lung cancer."31 (WHO 1998)

 

But the denials continue

 John Carlisle, of the Tobacco Manufacturers Association:

"There is no statistical evidence linking passive smoking to lung cancer."32 (The Independent, 1998)

References:

  1. Report of the Scientific Committee on Tobacco and Health. Department of Health, 1998
  2. Law, M R et al. Environmental tobacco smoke exposure and ischaemic heart disease: an evaluation of the evidence. BMJ 1997: 315: 973-80
  3. Smoking and the Young. Royal College of Physicians, 1992.
  4. SCOTH, 1998
  5. Health effects of exposure to environmental tobacco smoke. Report of the Office of Environmental Health Hazards Assessment, California, 1997.
  6. E. Pepples, Memo to J. Blalock, 1973, 14 February {1814.01}
  7. Tobacco Reporter, World Revolution in Tobacco Industry, 1976, 103 (7), p71-72; quoted in M. Teresa Cardador, A.R. Hazan, S. A. Glantz, Tobacco Industry Smoker’s Rights Publications: A Content Analysis, American Journal of Public Health, 1985, Vol 85, No 9, September, p1212-1217
  8. J. Esdterle, Biological Research Meeting, 1977, 27 November {1164.23}
  9. S. Green, Notes on a Group Research & Development Conference, 1978, March, Minutes, 1978, 6 April {1174.01}
  10. BAT Board Strategies, Smoking and Health, Questions and Answers, 1977, 25 November [L&D BAT 26]
  11. E. Pepples, Campaign Report - Proposition 5, California, 1978, 1979, January {2302.05}
  12. S. A. Glantz, J. Slade, L. A. Bero, P. Hanauer, D. E. Barnes, The Cigarette Papers, University of California Press, 1996, p59
  13. The Roper Organisation, A Study of Public Attitudes Towards Cigarette Smoking and the Tobacco Industry in 1978, Vol., 1 1978
  14. J. Repace, A. Lowrey, Science, 1980, Vol 208, No 464; Quoted in R. Kluger, Ashes to Ashes - America’s Hundred-Year Cigarette War, the Public Health, and the Unabashed Triumph of Philip Morris, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1996, p496
  15. T. Hirayama, Non-Smoking Wives of Heavy Smokers have a Higher Risk of Lung Cancer; A Study from Japan, British Medical Journal, 1981, 282 (6259: 183-185); quoted in S. A. Glantz, J. Slade, L. A. Bero, P. Hanauer, D. E. Barnes, The Cigarette Papers, University of California Press, 1996, p59, 413
  16. J. Wells, Re Smoking and Health - Tim Finnegan, Memo to E. Pepples, 1981, 24 July
  17. BAT, Board Guidelines, Public Affairs, 1982, April {Minn. Trial Exhibit 13,866}
  18. W. Irvin, Side-Stream Research, BAT, 1983 {1180.24}
  19. US Surgeon General, 1986 report.
  20. Independent Scientific Committee on Tobacco and Health, 1988
  21. Patrick Sheehy, BAT. December, 1986.
  22. BAT, Tobacco: Strategy Review Team, 1989, 10 November
  23. J. P. Rupp, Letter to B. Brooks, Covington and Burling, 1988, 25 January; Proposal for the Organisation of the Whitecoat Project, No Date {Bates No: 2501474296}
  24. BAT, Tobacco Strategy Review Team, 1988, 31 October {Minn. Trial Exhibit 11,540}
  25. The Tobacco Institute, Smokers’ Rights in the Workplace: An Employer Guide, 1989
  26. Covington and Burling, Memorandum, Report on the European Consultancy Programme, 1990, Describes events of the 1 March, {Bates No 2500048956}
  27. Tobacco Control, EPA - Special Report - Respiratory Health Effects of Passive Smoking: Lung Cancer and Other Disorders, 1993, No2, p71-79
  28. Report of the Scientific Committee on Tobacco and Health, Department of Health, 1998, 11 March
  29. Tobacco International, 1995, April, p3
  30. R. Oram, Passive Smoking Claims Invalid, Financial Times, 1996, 16 October, p10
  31. S. Boseley, "Foul Play" By Tobacco Firm, The Guardian, 1998, 9 March, P1
  32. WHO, Passive Smoking Does Cause Lung Cancer, Do Not Let Them Fool You, Press Release, 1998, 9 March
  33. G. Cooper, Living With A Smoker Can Kill You, The Independent, 1998, 12 March, p1; G. Cooper, Tobacco Barons Refuse to Back Down in Passive Smoking Battle, The Independent, 1998, 12 March, p5

 

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