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BACKGROUND
Baluchistan has remained marginalized and under-resourced ever since its independence from the British rule over 60 years ago, when it had not been much developed either as compared to other parts of newly founded Pakistan. Most remote parts of Baluchistan have seen very little development, if any, and probably have remained in the same situation over the past few centuries. Outside the few main cities, the region is characterized by chronic poverty, illiteracy, feudalism and bonded labour, widespread disease and very high mortality, especially for mothers and children. The lack of economic opportunities means that livestock and farming are the only options, while recent extreme weather conditions and frequent droughts have made this even more difficult each year. There is widespread hunger and malnutrition among children, several times higher than the agricultural plains of the country, and the Baluch children grow up never to achieve their true potential.
This widespread deprivation however can not be linked to a popular separatist movement in the province, as no such movement exists as yet, at least. The separatist movement has primarily been spearheaded by three (of the two dozen or so) so-called nationalist tribes in Baluchistan - Bugti, Marri and Mengal - substantially out of the Chieftains' vested interests and politico-economic gains, and perhaps with some external support, as alleged by the Pakistani government. The three tribes while forming the main party at conflict with the Pakistani forces, have had their fair share of disputes and internal conflict over the years, dating back to British times, if not earlier. It is widely believed that the current unrest has been a repercussion of Nawab Bugti's assassination by the Musharraf regime in 2006, however the conflict has been simmering in Baluchistan ever since the Pakistani Army first laid foot in Kalat in the first year after Independence, resulting in Pakistan officially annexing the province. Many Baluch, especially from the three rogue tribes still do not recognize the legitimacy of the Pakistani government and believe in total independence, not just provincial autonomy. It is interesting to note that Jinnah was openly opposed to sending troops to Baluchistan and the tribal areas, but the Pakistani Army had set foot in the province even while Jinnah was in command. Jinnah's vision for Pakistan, however progressive, faded away with his untimely death and that of his closest companions such as Liaquat Ali Khan. It is also interesting to note that at the time of Independence, most tribal chiefs and Baluch elders had voted for either independence or accession to India, yet the Khan of Kalat (the de-facto Baluch Governor back then) decided in favour of Pakistan (disputed by some to date). After Independence, the Baluch also resisted settlement of Urdu-speaking immigrants from northern India in the Baluch cities, mainly Quetta. The struggle to resist the Pakistani armed forces in Baluchistan and the non-Baluch settlers in fact had started as early as 1948.
How did we come to this?
In the early years of Pakistan, political instability meant that within the first decade, the Constitution had been written and rewritten, and national policies modified several times by several governments - most brutally during the time of dictatorships. The Pakistani Armed Forces were thus sent into Baluchistan in the name of protecting 'national interests' and the conflict intensified over the years, with peaks during 1948, 1958 and the 70's. With cross-border support from the Iranian government (having similar interests), the revolting tribes were mostly subdued, and military posts and garrisons were established throughout the province. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan lead to rapid militarization of the Western borders of Pakistan, including Baluchistan, and consequently the region saw increased military presence that contributed to simmering unrest. The influx of the millions of Afghan refugees meant that the already limited resources would now have to be shared and while the Baluch honourably hosted over one million refugees, many of whom settled permanently, the impoverishment of Baluchistan continued, and to some extent worsened with the population growth, in the 80's and 90's.
An end to Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan meant that hundreds of Baluch mujahideen (holy warriors) had lost their jobs and thus their livelihoods overnight - after being handsomely paid for years by the Pakistani, Saudi and American intelligence services. Within a few years however, several new militant groups had emerged in Baluchistan, and two of these gained notoriety fairly quickly - the Baluch Liberation Army (BLA) and the Jundallah. Both were composed of nationalist Baluchs, but aimed their efforts at different targets. The BLA terrorized the non-Baluch settlers in Quetta and Pakistani armed forces settlements, while the Jundallah tried to fight for the rights of Sunni Baluchs in Iran. Both organizations were outlawed by the Pakistani, and later by the US and British authorities. Skirmishes continued on both fronts for several years peaking again in the 90's, and it was probably more to do with more resources for the nationalists, such as demands for increased royalties on the natural gas produced from the tribal leaders, and seldom for the common Baluch's right to food, water, education, health, land ownership or decent livelihoods. If anything, most tribal chiefs and elders had overtly been opposed to development and thus 'modernization' of Baluchistan as this could threaten their very way of life and consequently their supremacy. Nonetheless, after several years of negotiations and failed attempts at renegotiation of royalty rates by subsequent governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, the military regime led by Musharraf forcefully dealt the Baluch insurgents, culminating in the (alleged extra judicial) killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti in 2006 (by the Pakistani military forces). The other tribal elders and Bugti clan went underground or in exile and the revolt had been subdued once again. Baluch resistance has resurfaced in the recent years, and has become increasingly violent since 2010. The current movement seems to be more scattered, with pockets of resistance sprouting here and there, targeting symbols of Pakistani Federation, such as the Gwadar port, Gas and Power supply lines, armed forces and non-Baluch residents of Baluchistan. The Pakistani armed forces have become more aggressive in the recent years, and Baluch groups claim hundreds (thousands according to some sources) of missing Baluch men, widespread atrocities and civilians being targeted indiscriminately.
What happens next?
Generally, a majority of Pakistanis believe that foreign powers interfere in the country's affairs, deliberately destabilizing it. The presumed geo-political worth of the country has become a national obsession so much so that all major wrong doings by the politicians or the generals is openly and conveniently blamed on the external powers and the so-called 'big game'. Pakistan is always under threat from some evil power trying to instil unrest and break away parts of the 'Land of the Pure'. And so most people religiously believe that what ever has been happening in Baluchistan has been orchestrated by someone somewhere with evil intentions for Pakistan - a boogeyman, if you may. The recent bill in the US Congress on separatist movement in Baluchistan added fuel to this fire of speculation. Sadly and truly, the boogeyman has been Pakistan's own creation - a figment of her politicians' imaginations or perhaps that of her armed forces' - both surviving on this delusion of evil that dwells to threaten Pakistan's existence. History has shown that most harm to Pakistan and her people has come from within than from outside the country. The fall of Dhaka showed that the Pakistani establishment disenfranchised her people so much that they had to break away to ensure their survival. It was not an external power that created the reasons, as much as Pakistanis would like to believe, but the reasons were created from within. The external forces merely facilitated what had already been ignited internally.
It's a shame that Pakistan hasn't learnt from her mistakes. A glance at Bangladesh's progress over the years is proof enough that impoverished populations are so, because they are kept marginalized. Bangladesh today rivals Pakistan with its exports and global trade. As they say, history repeats itself. It would be shameful if the Pakistani leaders handle the Baluchistan situation as they did for East Pakistan in 1970. The Baluch people deserve to exercise their fundamental and inalienable human rights, as much as all other people do, and the deserve a quality of life standard that is available elsewhere in the country, if not better. They also deserve the right to determine their future for themselves, and I, like most Pakistanis, believe that the majority of Baluch people would choose to stay with Pakistan, as the masses have not supported the many separatist movements since the time of Independence. If however, the Baluch people, and not their Chiefs, decide to carve out a future for themselves, I'd wish them much success from all my heart. And if Gwadar manages to deliver for them what Dubai did for the Emirates, I think Pakistan would benefit from this success much more than anyone else. So, Bon Chance Baluchistan! Let freedom prevail!
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