Pakistan response must be strategic, systematic

By Nasim Zehra

COLUMN READING:

In his first response to the Indian demand that the Pakistan government hand over the 20 men on India's "most wanted list", Pakistan's Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar has made two points. One, that it is a legal issue. Two, that therefore if the evidence is provided Pakistan can consider extradition of these individuals. Three, that Islamabad would consider the extradition of wanted persons under the SAARC Anti-Terrorism Convention. These three points raised by the foreign minister and reported in the local press need close examination.

First, that Pakistan's response to the Indian demand is linked to a legal issue, not to a political or diplomatic issue. That if India provides the evidence supporting the involvement of these 20 people in terrorist attacks inside India the Pakistan government can consider the Indian request.

Asking for evidence should be a relevant but secondary issue. The primary issue is about the individuals in the list of 20. There is only one individual on that list, Azhar Masood of Jaish-i-Mohammad who is a Pakistani citizen. Masood who was held in a Srinagar prison was acquitted of all charges by the Supreme Court of India.

Maulana Azhar may have violated Pakistani law for which the state of Pakistan must take action against him. He is already under arrest. There is no substantiated evidence on the basis of which the Indian government can demand his extradition to India. In addition to Azhar Masood there are five others on the list who Delhi claims are Pakistani citizens. These are allegedly individuals India claims are responsible for hijacking the Indian airline flight IC-814 in December 1999. The issue of their nationality has to this day remained unresolved.

The Indian government claim that the hijackers were Pakistani citizens was not backed by the has not been backed by the passenger list of flight IC-814 released by the Kathmandu airport authorities.

According to the list there were 154 Indian passengers a few North Americans and Nepalese. Pakistan government's request that the immigration records generated at the time of boarding flight IC814 by the passengers be provided to check the veracity of the Indian claim that there were in fact five Pakistanis on the flight was turned down by the Indian authorities.

The Indians claimed that the five Pakistanis illegally boarded the plane from the tarmac without going through immigration and security checks. This was refuted immediately by the Indian airlines staff at Kathmandu as well as by the Nepalese security forces.

In addition to the citizenship question there is another key issue regarding the whereabouts of these people. There is no evidence that other than Maulana Azhar and Syed Salahuddn most of them are present in Pakistan. In fact a leading Indian daily The Hindustan Times on January 2 in a front page story reported that five of those on "the terror list" are not in Pakistan. The Hindustan Times correspondent spoke to one of those on the list - Paramjit Singh Panjawar - who claimed that he was speaking from Germany.

Syed Salahuddin who lives in Pakistan is a citizen of Indian Kashmir. As this is disputed territory, Salahuddin is therefore not an Indian or a Pakistani citizen. He is involved in the armed wing of a movement for the right of self-determination that has been legitimised by UN Security Council Resolutions 91 and 122.

The UN charter legitimises armed struggle of a people living under foreign occupation. These technical issues aside there is no evidence of Syed Salahuddin carrying out so-called "terrorist activities" on Indian territory. At least as international law stands at present involvement in a freedom struggle does not amount to any punishable crime. Also there is also no reliable Indian incriminating Syed Salahuddin for carrying out any terrorist activities.

The Indians forced the issue of the hijackers being Pakistani by handing over photographs of the five hijackers to the Pakistan government. It remains unclear to this day how the Indian government was able to photograph the five masked hijackers. The Indian explanation was that the photographs of the hijackers were given to them by four Indian nationals involved in a bank robbery in Mumbai.

According to a Mumbai police officer four men involved in the robbery a week after the hijacking incident had confessed during interrogation that they had given Indian passports to five Pakistanis planning the hijacking operation. Until this day no one knows the content of the negotiations that took place between Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh and the hijackers. Pakistan's demand for the transcript of the deal and of the negotiations was shared by the Indian Government.

The Indian demand regarding handing over of the 20 wanted men needs to be rejected on multiple scores. India has taken advantage of Pakistan's inadequate response to India's mostly 'engineered' tales about Pakistan's involvement in terrorist activities.

The second point related to extradition raised by the Pakistan foreign minister is incorrect since first there must be the question of an extradition treaty with India. None exists at present. The third point regarding Pakistan's action under the 1987 SAARC convention obligating Pakistan to enact a law to penalising terrorist offences anywhere South Asia, Sattar should have established linkage between resolving key bilateral issues in South Asia which contribute to undermining regional cooperation and security. Terrorism and the SAARC Terrorism Convention will be the Indian themes at the forthcoming SAARC summit.

The objective will be to put Pakistan in the 'dock.' Pakistan cannot allow Delhi to frame the issue in a manner that puts the onus on Pakistan of proving its innocence vis-a-vis the December 13 incident. The issue of controlling terrorism through rule of law within the sovereign territory of every SAARC member is what Pakistan must call for.

Clearly we must acknowledge that it is a political and diplomatic issue. Its content, its thrust and its fall-out is primarily political. Of unleashing maximum pressure on Pakistan to force a change in the objectives of its Kashmir policy.

The Indian moves following December 13 are part of a carefully thought through and, to some extent, a well coordinated and well-implemented plan to bring the Kashmir issue to a close. These steps are a direct extension of their policy of post-September 11 of engineering an indictment against Pakistan along with the Taliban government.

After September, Jaswant Singh went to Washington and Brajesh Mishra to Europe to convince key members of the international coalition against terrorism that Pakistan is part of the terrorism problem and therefore cannot be part of the solution.

As India continues with its accusatory propaganda against Pakistan we must understand that Indian propaganda is as good and as successful as as our inefficiency to effectively counter it.

India is on an aggressive propaganda roll against Pakistan. India is violating bilateral agreements, threatening to rescind treaties including the Indus Basin Water treaty, has aggressively declared Pakistan government and Kashmiri groups culprits responsible for the December 13 attack. Pakistan's response cannot be grand-sounding rebuffs. It has to be strategic, studied and systematic.