Recall that in 1930 Nadir Shah confirmed support for the treaties that had been signed between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union in 1921 and 1923 and that he promoted good relations between the two nations. The same kind of cordial relations flourished after the Second World War and, eventually, distinguished Afghanistan as the first non-Communist Third-World nation to receive Soviet aid. In fact, each aid package was accompanied with cultural fringes of its own. These included such contributions as the 1957 Radio Moscow's broadcasts in Pushtu, the official language of Afghanistan at the time, and the opening of an Afghan/Russian Friendship House in 1959.

Soviet contacts with the Afghan leadership during the fifties and the sixties were primarily of a political nature. They consisted of high level visits by the prominent heads of each state. In the case of the Afghans these were longer stays of two or three weeks while in the case of the Soviets, they were of much shorter duration. The objectives of the visits, on the part of the Soviets, were to locate Afghan needs, to assess strategic points and to propose to both the Soviet and Afghan governments ways in which they could cooperate in overcoming foreseeable problems. On the part of the Afghans these were mostly educational trips whereby they became familiar with Soviet technology and with ways that such technology could be utilized in Afghanistan.

As a result of each trip, specially designed aid packages were shipped to Afghanistan. In the early stages, these packages included kits for building a combined flour mill-bakery-granary or a motor repair works or an asphalt factory. Later on equipment and trained personnel were sent for the building of major roads such as the famous Salang highway through the Hindu Kush. Although only 100 miles in length, this highway cuts a four-day Kabul-Mazar-i Sharif journey into about a day. A similar highway joins Kushka, in southern Uzbekistan to Qandahar in southern Afghanistan.

Improvement in the irrigation systems included not only canals and dams, but also mechanized farming, building of fertilizer plants and adoption of Soviet techniques to Afghan traditions of river valley farming. The most beneficial strategically located Soviet development projects in Afghanistan, however, included a gas pipeline spanning the Amu Dariya, a number of hydro-electric power stations and several airports, including an international airport at the capital city of Kabul. Smaller regional airports were constructed at Aq Chah, Mazar-i Sharif, Herat, Farah, Qandahar, Khost, and Bamiyan.

The objective of the Soviet Union in its cordial relation with Afghanistan was two-fold. One was Afghanistan's continuance of her neutral stance vis-a-vis the United States and the People's Republic of China, a stance that forced those powers to use Pakistan and Nepal respectively for listening posts; the other was maintenance of trade relations with the Afghan people. This latter was of special importance to Afghanistan, particularly during the periods of hostility with Pakistan on the question of Pushtunistan.

Under Daoud Khan, Soviet contribution became even more substantial. They assisted in creating a modern Afghan army, along with Soviet equipment and technical training. In fact, in the 1960's the Soviet Union contributed to the building of Afghanistan's infrastructure in a big way. During this time a number of large industrial enterprises were completed. These included the 680 kilometer long Kushka (in present-day Uzbekistan), Herat-Qandahar highway, the 750 kilometer Kabul-Sherkhan highway, the Naghlu hydroelectric station, the Jalalabad irrigation system, and the Kabul polytechnic, just to name a few. Thus, under Daoud, Soviet influence that had been developing since the independence of Afghanistan and the establishment of Soviet power, was on the rise.

During the post-Daoud era, the Soviets added, mostly clandestinely, to their activities in forming communist cells and recruiting intellectuals, students from the technical schools, and commanders as well as the rank and file of the army.

On January 1, 1965, a nucleus of thirty youth, led by Noor Muhammad Taraki, formed the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). In 1969, Babrak Karmal, Hafizullah Amin, and two other PDPA members entered the lower house of the Afghan parliament.

While the PDPA was growing in strength, the Afghan government continued its efforts at keeping a neutral stance vis-ˆ-vis the west and the Communist world. Maintaining neutrality, however, became difficult when the PDPA split along the Khalq (southern, tribal Pushtuns) and the Parcham (northern, urban Dari speakers). Undaunted by the split, the Soviets worked with each faction separately, assigning them different tasks. The Khalqis, for instance could reach the lower echelon of Afghan military while the Parchamis reached the highest. The same was true for the penetration of the civil sector. On the surface, it was Karmal's Parcham that drew the most attention. But when it came to actual business, it was Taraki's Khalqis who received concrete support.

On July 17, 1973, when Zahir Shah was vacationing in Europe, his cousin Daoud Khan staged a coup and, with the assistance of the PDPA overthrew him. Daoud Khan then abolished the monarchy and declared himself the President of the Republic of Afghanistan.

The roots of Afghan dissatisfaction with western influence on their culture preceded the involvement of Russians and later Soviets in Afghan affairs. We have already briefly outlined the three conflicts, two of them major bloody conflicts, between the Afghans and the British, alluded to activities of Sayyid Jamal al-Din Asadabadi (al-Afghani), and the formation of a mujahidin core under Amir Habibullah. The aim of this core was to overthrow British rule in India and create a United Muslim India and Afghanistan. But, it only succeeded in gaining Afghanistan's independence from Britain in 1919.

When the Russians, as part of the "Great Game" moved into Muslim territories in Central Asia, the Muslims of the region rose against the Russians in defense of their land, property, and traditions. Known as the Basmachi uprising, the conflict began in 1916 in Khujand (in present-day northern Tajikistan) and spread throughout Central Asia. When the Amir of Bukhara was dethroned by the Soviets and fled to Afghanistan, Afghans, too, became involved in Muslim opposition to the Soviets' institution of a socialist way of life in the region. Soviet recognition of the independence of Afghanistan impressed some of the population in the urban centers, but it never affected the deep resentment that the Afghans bore against westerners.

As long as the Soviets were involved in building roads, airports, and irrigation canals, the Afghan Muslims tolerated their presence. During Daoud Khan's rule, however, when communist cells were being formed and when the sacred tenets of Islam--the divinity of Allah, the prophethood of Muhammad, and the authority of the Qur'an--were questioned, tolerance gave way to a lack of cooperation. Once Daoud and the Soviets ignored the cold shoulder and went about emancipation and education of women, the conflict took a violent turn. Neither was this the only conflict that plagued Afghanistan. The Parcham and Khalq factions of the PDPA battled for supremacy with the Khalq faction gaining the most ground.

While the conflict between the Afghan Communists and the Muslims remains unresolved, in 1978, the Khalq and Parcham factions of the PDPA unite and bring their full force on the government and the person of President Daoud. In a bloody coup, Daoud and the members of his family are assassinated (April 27, 1978) and Noor Muhammad Taraki becomes the President. Hafizullah Amin and Babrak Karmal become his deputies.

Noor Muhammad Taraki

The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan As is the case with these kind of violent changes of government, the takeover is followed by mass arrests, and torture. There are also many changes the most prominent of which was the change of the flag of Afghanistan. Taraki's first diplomatic step was to sign a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union. Then he went about the task of implementing reforms not only in Kabul and the other urban centers but in the countryside as well. Noor Muhammad Taraki was born into a Ghilzai (Pushtun) family of nomads on July 15, 1917 in the province of Ghazni. He received his early education in Ghazni followed by further education in Bombay and Kabul. For a while, he worked in a Pushtun Trading Company in Qandahar and at the Company's offices in Bombay. Using his English as a means of elevating his status, he entered journalism. By 1953, he had landed the job of Afghan press attachŽ in Washington. Before he became a politician, he was the Director of his own business, the "Nor Translation Bureau."

As mentioned above, on January 1, 1965, he founded the PDPA. He was the editor of Khalq. When the party split in 1967, he remained with the Khalq faction. The centerpiece of the Soviet-inspired reforms in the new Democratic republic of Afghanistan as it emerged from the Saur revolution was land reform. Led by the "teacher and great guide," Taraki, the reforms went well as long as the Afghans were not knowledgeable of the full impact of the reform. Once the Afghanis realized that not only the inviolability of ownership of land but also the inviolability of their ownership of their wives were at stake, they took action, of the same type that they had taken against King Amanullah's ungodly reforms in 1929. In June of 1978, the Mujahidin movement, dormant since the time of Amir Habibullah, was revived.

While the Khalq continued to purge the ranks of its opposition on the grounds of policy differences, a crack appeared within the Khalq faction itself over tactical and leadership issues. The Soviets and Hafizullah Amin had repeatedly warned Taraki about his harsh treatment of the Muslim masses. He had not been responsive; rather, he had added to his maltreatment of the clergy and the tribal chiefs. The issue eventually came to a head when the Khalq faction split into the "Red Khalq" faction, supporting Taraki's policies and the "Black Khalq" faction, following Hafizullah Amin. Then, on October 9, 1979, Hafizullah Amin's "Black Khalq" faction secretly executed Taraki and purged the faction of "Red Khalq" members.

Hafizullah Amin

Between September 16, 1979 and December 27, 1979, Hafizullah Amin served as the President of Afghanistan. Amin was born into a Pushtun (Ghilzai) family of Paghman, near Kabul, in 1929. He received his early education in Afghanistan and advanced education in the United States. Later on, he became a teacher and, for a time, served as a school principal. He became a Marxist in 1964 and represented Paghman in the 13th session of the parliament in 1969. Between 1973, the year Zahir Shah was ousted, and the 1978 Saur Revolution, Amin campaigned intensively to strength the Khalq faction at the expense of the members of the Parcham faction. During his short presidency, he continued to strengthen his own faction within the Khalq at the expense of the ex-Taraki "Red Khalq." In this connection, he also tried to put some space between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union by approaching the United States and Pakistan for assistance. The change of policy was swift enough for Amin to be marked as a CIA agent.

During Amin's short tenure as president, the entire geopolitical situation of the region changed. Islamic fundamentalists in revolutionary Iran were bound to strike out either in the direction of Iraq or of Afghanistan. If the latter, they were likely to join up with the Mujahidin of Afghanistan and move on the Muslim-populated Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union. Since the Afghan government was powerless in dealing with internal Muslim revolt, it was not likely to be able to withstand additional Islamic insurgence from the outside. The Soviet Union, therefore, made a preventative move. It moved its forces stationed in the southern republics into Afghanistan. Then, in order to have full control of the region without interference from Afghanistan's new friends, the United States and Pakistan, Hafizullah Amin and his followers were executed (December 27, 1979).

Babrak Karmal

The Communist Takeover and Its Aftermath If there had been any pretence of independence for the Afghan people during the presidency of Taraki and Amin, it was taken away with the installment of Soviet puppet Babrak Karmal (December 27, 1979). The change of the name of the republic into the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), was itself disturbing. Karmal was born into a military family of Kabul in 1929. After the Saur Revolution, when the Parcham ranks were purged, he was appointed Afghanistan's ambassador to Czechoslovakia (April 1978). Soon after that, accused of anti-Khalqi activities, he was stripped of his party membership, which meant also all his positions in the Afghan government of the time. He moved to Moscow, from where, after having been rehabilitated, her was brought to Kabul and installed as President, Party secretary, and Head of the Revolutionary Council.

As president, Karmal denounced the excesses of Amin, reorganized Afghan society along the lines of the Muslim republics--even though the Afghans lacked the half-century of dealing with the soviet system--and pretended that all was going well. Neither the Afghan upper classes, which found themselves forced to serve the system, nor the Muslim masses of Afghanistan were impressed. Although phrases such as "national unity," and "respect for Islam" were used to remold the outward appearance of the republic, the content of Soviet reform had remained the same. These included the curtailment of the power of the clergy, undermining of the authority of the tribal chiefs, destruction of the Afghan family unit, and the imposition of socialist values, economic exploitation, and political enslavement. In other words, Karmal's super-cosmetic efforts at masking socialist intentions backfired and the country became irretrievably divided along Communist and Muslim lines. The larger picture for the Soviet Union was even more disturbing as not only Iran, through Afghanistan, was a threat to its republics but, gradually, Islam was appearing as a threat to its own very existence.

Leonid Brezhnev continued the hope that the Afghan situation that, by the way, was of his own making, would be resolved successfully. By the time of his death, the situation in Afghanistan was worse than it had ever been before. Mikhail Gorbachev, who took control in 1985 could not entertain a similar hope. Rather, he realized the difficult straight that the Soviet Union was already in and the abyss that the Union was approaching economically, ideologically, and, in terms of support for an unending war. On May 15, 1988, therefore, he announced the Soviet Union's intention to remove its forces from Afghanistan. This was also a clarion call to Babrak Karmal that his tenure as President of the Republic was coming to an end. It was now pretty much academic whether the Afghans would or would not comply with Soviet dicta. It was whether the Muslim Mujahidin would allow Soviet forces to withdraw without annihilating them enroute as their forefathers had done to the British at the end of the Second Afghan War.

Mohammad Najibullah

In order to create the appropriate link with the Mujahidin, in May 1986, the ineffective, actually despised, Babrak Karmal was replaced by Dr. Najibullah Ahmadzai. Najibullah was born into a Pushtun merchant family of Kabul in 1947. He received his early education at the Habibia school and his advanced education at the College of Medicine of Kabul University from where he graduated in 1975. He joined the Parcham faction of the PDPA in 1965 and, subsequently, was arrested and incarcerated a number of times. Between July and October, 1978, he served as the Afghan ambassador to Tehran. Due to continuous purge of Parchamis in Kabul, he remained abroad until the formation of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan under Babrak Karmal. During Karmal's tenure, Najibullah served as the general president of the Afghan secret police (KHAD). As his career indicates, he was the best choice as a secretary general of PDPA who can at once serve as a liaison between Moscow and the Afghan Mujahidin.

Soviet departure from Afghanistan in 1989 created a power vacuum in the region with grave consequences for the Soviet Union and the world. In this vacuum, Najibullah had to rule a country divided along ethnic, linguistic, regional, tribal, and ideological lines. As a first step, he purged the Central Committee of pro-Karmal members; then, in order to keep the government from stagnating, he reorganized the government in 1989 and again in 1990. When his Defense Minister, Shahnawaz Tanai tried to stage a coup against him, he survived the Khalqi attempt. Furthermore, realizing that he did not have the type of support that his predecessors had enjoyed, he annulled the more controversial reforms.

Dissatisfied with his refusal to step down and allow the Mujahidin to install a truly Islamic government in Afghanistan, his rule was one of constant strife.

Additionally, Najibullah who had been asked by the Soviets to take control and to defend Afghanistan using the leftover Soviet armaments never received any more assistance. The situation was not any different for the Mujahidin who had similarly hoped to receive assistance from the American Central Intelligence Agency, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. Both groups were disappointed; they were left pretty much on their own. The United States made sure that there would be no more resurgence of Communist rule in Afghanistan. As for Pakistan, it achieved the control of the Pushtun population stemming the tide of Pushtun solidarity (cf., the 1950's Pushtunistan problem). And Saudi Arabia established its brand of Wahhabism with the assurance that it could penetrate Central Asia and beyond.

For defeating Najibullah's Sovietized army, the Mujahidin capitalized on the good will and the Islamic zeal of the Afghan masses. They promised that they would, after Najibullah is defeated, to usher in an era of tranquility under the green banner of Islam. Calling themselves protectors of the Shari'a and restorers of Afghan rights, they attracted large numbers of young Afghani warriors to their training camps. Surplus American armaments allowed them sufficient time for practice and for regrouping against the increasingly weak forces abandoned by the Soviets under Najibullah.

Additionally, since their cause was recognized as a just cause by the Muslim world, warriors from all Muslim lands poured into Afghanistan to participate in a Jihad against the infidels. These young Muslims fanned out into the remote parts of Afghanistan and refugee camps of Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Iran preaching the Wahhabi gospel and recruiting anti-Soviet and anti-Western soldiers. As the war with Najibullah dragged on, the Mujahidin became more organized. Their perspective on the war, too, was affected. With the entrance of warriors like Usama bin Laden and institution of training camps, the focus began to change. Defeating Najibullah became a minor affair compared to the daunting task of defeating the West. Gradually it turned out that not only Najibullah but the Mujahidin as well must leave the scene. The latter had to be eliminated after it eliminates Najibullah.

In 1992, the Mujahidin defeated Najibullah entered Kabul and set up an interim coalition government. Najibullah took refuge in the United Nations Mission. The affairs of Afghanistan fell into the hands of Burhaniddin Rabbani and Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, rivals who, as early as 1976, had sought the leadership of the Afghan people. Due to their subversive activities they both had been living in exile in Pakistan. Hikmatyar, it should be mentioned, had tried unsuccessfully to topple the government of Daoud Khan as early as 1976.

In Mujahidin Afghanistan Rabbani was elected president by his party called the Islamic Society of Afghanistan. Hikmatyar, the Head of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan became Prime Minister. The two leaders differed on many issues. Within a short time Hikmatyar rose against Rabbani, using the might of the southern Pushtun tribes against the Tajik President. Day in and day out he bombarded Kabul devastating all that Afghans from the days of Dust Muhammad and Nadir Shah had accumulated in terms of Afghan civilization and culture .

At the same time, the Mujahidin were implementing a program of de-Sovietization of their own that pitted brother against brother and father against son.

As part of this process, the Mujahidin systematically removed women from education, the labor force, and all social functions. They went even beyond that and entered private homes raping young women and looting property. Needless to say that the harsh treatment doled out by the Mujahidin forced more and more Afghans into Pakistan and more children into Pakistani refugee camps where, increasingly, the Wahhabi thought was becoming the dominant philosophy.

Under the Mujahidin Kabul became a virtual ghost town. People did not know where to turn. Neither were the other towns of the country faring any better. Herat, Mazar-i Sharif, and Qandahar were in the hands of regional warlords, some God-fearing and moderate, others cruel and violent. All were seeking prestige, wealth, and satisfaction for themselves and their immediate families.

By 1994, the United States, no longer worried about a resurgence of Communism in Afghanistan, gradually left the scene. Saudi Arabia, however, having created the niche it needed for the expansion of Wahhabi thought in the region, continued to funnel funds in, delivered by young Saudis like Osama bin Laden and general camp instructors. Left alone, Pakistan became worried. What could happen to Pakistan's stability, Pakistani authorities wondered, if Afghan Mujahidin decided to expand their brand of Islamic fanaticism into their domain? The situation had the potential of destabilizing not only Pakistan, but also the already shaky republics of Central Asia. Something needed to be done to curb the power of the Mujahidin.

Islamabad gave the Afghan question due thought. It was decided to send in the Taliban to displace the Mujahidin and to establish a moderate Islamic rulership in Afghanistan. The blue print for the future Afghan government had supposedly been taught in the refugee camps. At the time, the Taliban seemed to be among the best students of theology that the camps could offer. They were supposed to win the situation for both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, the two main nations that supported them until shortly after September 11, 2001.

The Rise and Fall of the Taliban

The Taliban, a rag-tag band from the Pushtun stronghold of Qandahar rose against the Mujahidin and, in 1994, captured the strategic city of Herat. For the next two years the Mujahidin and the Taliban fought each other for the control of the rest of Afghanistan, devastating the infrastructure of the country as well.

Eventually, in September 1996, the Taliban won the battle against the Mujahidin, entered Kabul and, as the first order of business, hanged both Najibullah and his brother in the Kabul public square. The defeated Mujahidin, led by Commander Ahmad Shah Mas'ud, moved to the Panjshir Valley in the Tajik-speaking northeast. Over time, the northern warlords formed an alliance against the predominantly Pushtun south. The coalition thus formed came to be known as the United Front or the Northern Alliance.